Trump’s diplomacy won’t bring peace European hawks are escalating tensions

So now we know. Washington is intent on decoupling from Europe and reconnecting with Russia. America’s stance was reaffirmed yesterday, in Brussels, by the newly minted Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, who was there primarily to discuss the Ukraine conflict. We already knew the top lines: Nato membership for Ukraine is “unrealistic”, he said, and the war “must end” through diplomacy. Kyiv must abandon aspirations of reclaiming pre-2014 borders — that includes Crimea — and prepare for a negotiated settlement with Russia. 

But Hegseth’s message extended beyond Ukraine. “Stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” he continued, stating that European forces should assume responsibility for providing post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, explicitly ruling out US troop involvement. This aligns with Trump’s broader push for Nato allies to increase their defence spending. He clarified that these troops would not be part of a Nato-led mission and would not be covered under the alliance’s Article 5 guarantee, underscoring America’s disengagement from European security affairs.

While these statements didn’t come as much of a surprise to European leaders, given Trump’s previous rhetoric, they did reinforce a fundamental shift in US Ukraine policy, one which prioritises diplomacy over continued military engagement. While this represents a welcome departure from Biden’s more confrontational stance, the path to peace remains fraught with obstacles.

Hegseth did not outline specifics for a possible peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. But, according to a leaked version of Trump’s proposed peace plan, reported by Ukrainian media, the territories seized by Russia would be ceded in exchange for security guarantees. Kyiv would be expected to renounce military and diplomatic efforts to reclaim lost land and officially recognise Russian sovereignty over these regions.

Regardless of this plan’s veracity, it is clear that it reflects Russia’s main condition for peace — something of which Trump is fully aware. His administration’s recognition of this geopolitical reality, coupled with the improbability of Ukraine regaining those territories, signals an important shift toward realistic diplomacy. Further reinforcing this new diplomatic approach, Trump announced on Truth Social that he had held a “lengthy and highly productive” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. “We agreed to work together, very closely, including visiting each other’s nations… We will begin by calling President Zelensky, of Ukraine, to inform him of the conversation, something which I will be doing right now”.

Re-establishing direct dialogue between Washington and Moscow is undoubtedly a positive development. However, the biggest near-term risk is that Trump may attempt to pressure Putin into a ceasefire without a fully developed peace framework. This is bound to fail.

For Moscow, we know, will not compromise on its key demands, which include the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from four Russian-occupied regions. We know from Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov that any ultimatums from the US would be ineffective and that any negotiations must recognise the “reality on the ground”.

A major problem here is the proposal to have European-led peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, which is almost certain to face strong resistance from Moscow. Regardless of whether they are Nato-affiliated or not, Russia would see them as a Nato proxy force — an unacceptable scenario. As Anatol Lieven put it: “This is just as unacceptable to the Russian government and establishment as Nato membership for Ukraine itself. Indeed, the Russians see no essential difference between the two”.

Another complicating factor is that America’s security decoupling from Europe — the Europeanisation of Nato — also risks becoming an obstacle to peace, insofar as it is, paradoxically, emboldening a more hawkish stance from key European leaders.

Within the European Union, an influential pro-war coalition has emerged, primarily driven by Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania. The new European Commission has placed these countries in key foreign policy and defence roles, further solidifying their influence. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in his inaugural address as European Council President, stated: “If Europe is to survive, it must be armed”.

Similarly, Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has insisted that Europe must significantly increase its defence spending in response to the US disengagement, while maintaining the position that Russia must be defeated at all costs. Meanwhile, Andrius Kubilius, the new European Commissioner for Defence, has called for a “Big Bang approach” to ramp up European defence production.

Beyond the EU, the UK is equally belligerent and is doubling down on its military support for Ukraine. On January 16, Starmer signed a bilateral defence partnership in Kyiv, pledging an additional £3 billion in annual military aid, on top of the £12.8 billion already provided. The deal also reaffirms Britain’s backing for Ukraine’s Nato membership. 

Nato Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, echoed these sentiments on Wednesday, stating that he “agrees” with Trump on the need to “equalise security assistance to Ukraine” but warned that “to truly change the course of the conflict, we must do even more”. His remarks follow recent statements advocating for Nato to “adopt a wartime mindset”.

Underlying this growing military buildup is the belief that Russia poses an existential threat to Europe, despite Moscow lacking both the capability and intent to attack Nato. What might be dismissed as European posturing in response to US disengagement actually represents a significant obstacle to peace. As long as European leaders continue to escalate militarily, the chances of a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine war diminish.

The real danger is that by persistently predicting an inevitable war with Russia, and preparing for it, Europe may ultimately bring that very war into reality. Faced with a rapidly growing European arms buildup and entrenched anti-Russian sentiment, Moscow may conclude that waiting is no longer an option. If European Nato members continue escalating tensions, Russia could decide to strike pre-emptively rather than risk allowing Nato’s military capabilities to reach a critical threshold. Even in a less extreme scenario, Europe’s increasingly aggressive posture is fundamentally incompatible with a lasting peace in Ukraine. 

In other words, while the Trump administration’s pivot away from Europe and push for diplomacy may appear to be a step toward de-escalation, it risks unintentionally achieving the opposite. Rather than restraining Europe’s military ambitions, US disengagement is emboldening key EU and Nato actors — particularly in Eastern Europe — to pursue an increasingly confrontational stance toward Russia.

The Europeanisation of Nato, framed as a necessity following US withdrawal, has accelerated the continent’s militarisation and its leaders’ demonisation of Russia, perpetuating the very conditions that caused the conflict in Ukraine in the first place. Instead of using this moment to engage in diplomacy, European leaders view the US retreat as a reason to escalate militarily. In this sense, Washington’s decoupling from Europe is at odds with Trump’s stated aim of achieving peace in Ukraine.

Unless European leadership acknowledges Russia’s security concerns, the prospects for a long-term settlement will remain bleak — and the risk of a larger war will continue to loom over the continent. Ironically, the US’s attempt to distance itself from European security affairs may ultimately pull it back into an even larger conflict — one that it will have far less control over.

---