For most of Lebanon’s modern history, the Assads have been as immovable as its mountains. As far back as 1976, early in the Lebanese Civil War, Hafez al-Assad ordered Syrian troops over the border. And there they remained, for 29 years, until his son, Bashar, finally called them home in 2005. Yet even then, these tall men with moustaches continued to cast a shadow over Beirut, influencing Lebanese politics and linking Hezbollah to its main Iranian sponsors.
But now, suddenly, the Assads are gone, scuttling off to Moscow in disgrace. The Syrian Arab Army, which had occupied Lebanon in some form for decades, and which had fought viciously against Syrian rebels for 14 long years, melted like the Lebanese snow in springtime, fatally weakened by violence and wrecked by pitiful salaries. Yet if this revolution obviously means the most to Damascus, Lebanese too could see their lives change. The end of the Assads, after all, leaves vast economic and political opportunities — if, that is, foreigners avoid meddling in Lebanon once more.
With Syria stumbling into a new era, Lebanese political leaders are struggling to grasp what that means for them: especially given they are already reeling from Israel’s assault on Hezbollah and the not-so-final ceasefire that followed. What they have done, at least, is bolster the country’s security, deploying more troops to the Syrian frontier. To quote the office of Najib Mikati, the Lebanese prime minister, his government is working to distance “Lebanon from the repercussions of the developments in Syria”.
In practice, of course, that’s impossible. Assad may be gone, but Lebanon remains joined at the hip to Syria, just as it always has. Certainly, that’s clear when it comes to Hezbollah. As the militia itself has apparently conceded, Assad’s demise represents a “dangerous” new transformation both for Syria and itself. To understand this, you only need to look at a map. Though it was created as an Iranian proxy, Hassan Nasrallah’s former group always needed help from Syria, with the Assads representing a logistical bridge from Tehran to Beirut. The rebel takeover in Damascus has decisively severed this link, and though Iran may still funnel weapons to Hezbollah by sea, it’ll no longer be able to provide the heavy equipment that made the group so formidable.
Nor do the consequences for Hezbollah end there. As the Syrian economy crumbled, the Assad regime effectively became a narcostate, financing both itself and Hezbollah through the captagon trade. Now though, that funding has gone, even as the ceasefire with Israel has squeezed the group north of the Litani River. Dovetailed with persistant IDF strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure, and the group is weaker than ever, especially when you recall that forces hostile to Hezbollah surround Lebanon on three sides. Even the militia itself has begun to see the light, releasing a statement saying it “supported” the aspirations of the Syrian people — a ludicrous claim after helping Assad butcher civilians for years.
Where Hezbollah falls, meanwhile, other forces may rise to take its place. Already, there are signs that Lebanese heavyweights outside the militia’s circle are breathing more freely. Consider Walid Jumblatt. The leader of the Druze, his father was assassinated by Syrian operatives during the Lebanese Civil War. And though Walid himself remained deferential to Assad for much of the last decade, he nonetheless welcomed the dictator’s expulsion. As he wrote after the regime’s collapse: “I greet the Syrian people after a long wait.” He isn’t alone. Gebran Bassil, a Lebanese Christian politician, recently stated that Hezbollah should now focus on domestic affairs, and end its adventures abroad.
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SubscribeIsrael seeks its own safety in a dangerous part of the world, and has annexed the Golan Heights (which was part of Israel in ancient times and has historically seesawed back and forth between numerous conquerors) after a series of aggressive wars launched by its neighbors, for full disclosure.
If the aggressor country risks NOTHING by launching a war, because if he wins he may gain land and resources, but if he loses his borders are inviolate, this has the effect of making aggressive war MORE, not less likely, because you can only win, but not lose.
I note that after WWII, for just one example, Germany lost about 1/3 of its territory to Russia and Poland. According to the author, this was entirely illegal and must be returned, exactly like it was before! 😉
Quite true. Also worth noting is that while the Golan was in Syrian hands people would take potshots at the kibbutzniks in the Galilee below. Israeli control of it means Syria, whoever is in charge there, simply can’t invade.
And the movement to occupy strategic positions on Mt Hermon and elsewhere is because otherwise there’s a vacuum – the Syrian Army no longer in situ – and goodness only knows who’d grab the territory, and for what purposes, otherwise.
The Israelis appear to have very wisely decided they’ll hold the high ground until it’s a bit clearer what’s going to emerge below.