Hezbollah has weakened Iran The Lebanese ceasefire squeezes Tehran's allies

In Hezbollah’s place, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will be deployed to the country’s south instead. They’ll be in charge of security, and preventing any violations of the ceasefire. Among other things, that could include attempts by Hezbollah to smuggle weapons into the country. As part of the agreement, meanwhile, the US, France and other countries will raise funds to train the LAF, helping it fulfil its new mandate. There are reasons to be sceptical of such an arrangement: it failed spectacularly in 2006. This time, though, the ceasefire includes the creation of a new committee, led by the US and France, to monitor the situation in southern Lebanon and ensure the ceasefire holds.

Nor is this merely a theoretical plan. So far, in fact, things mostly seem to be proceeding smoothly — in terms of the LAF’s deployment anyway. Columns of Lebanese military vehicles have started trundling south, while LAF troops have already entered several towns, much to the relief of exhausted locals. It hasn’t all been easy: Israel has already claimed that Hezbollah is ignoring the ceasefire in several places, leading to limited but deadly clashes with the group at several spots along the border. Hezbollah, in turn, has accused Israel of firing in the direction of civilians returning to their homes. Yet at the same time, Hezbollah missile launchers have been spotted moving northward, and the group has said it’s cooperating with the LAF as it assumes control in the south.

What does all this mean in practice? At the very least, Hezbollah’s monopoly on violence in the south has decisively ended: a monumental shift in itself. For a generation, the group had branded itself as the only organisation in Lebanon capable of acting as its “resistance” to Israel, using this title to justify its extensive arsenal and its domination of south Beirut, southern Lebanon, and much of the Beqaa Valley. Though Hezbollah supporters have claimed that their northward withdrawal changes nothing, the fact is that the organisation’s image is now tarnished. How, to put it differently, can Hezbollah act as the “resistance” to Israel now that it’s retreated almost 30 kilometres from its enemy’s border? The humiliating demise of Hassan Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders is hardly good optics either.

As for Lebanon itself, Hezbollah’s moment of weakness is an opportunity. For the first time in decades, the Lebanese government and its military might just have enough political capital among Lebanon’s war-weary public to assert themselves, finally dragging their country back from the prospect of total state failure.

Especially if they can secure genuine backing from the West, Lebanese leaders may be able to use their present momentum to create the foundations for a fully functioning state. Yesterday, one day after the start of the ceasefire, the country’s feeble government announced that it had agreed to finally hold presidential elections in January: a goal that had eluded it for more than two years.

Naturally, Hezbollah and its allies will continue to hold sway. But with the stick of Israeli guns, and the carrot of American diplomatic and financial support, the government that emerges from the ceasefire will be forced to claw back at least some power from Hezbollah — and will, by default, be more pro-Western than before. Lebanon’s infamous corruption and sectarian infighting will doubtlessly persist. Yet with an increasingly tangible partner, Lebanon’s international friends may finally see an opening to forge a path forward toward not only a new security reality in the country, but also a new economic one as well.

It’s a good sign, surely, that Lebanon’s embattled civilian politicians have received tentative support from an unlikely source: Hezbollah itself. Already, the militia’s relatively passive public statements reflect a willingness to work with the suits — a sign, perhaps, that they know their legitimacy is bruised. Though Hezbollah’s MPs were quick to claim that the “resistance” would continue, meanwhile, they’ve also stated that they would help “people to return [home] and to rebuild”. No less striking, Hezbollah’s new Secretary General has claimed his organisation would work within the framework of the Taif Accords. Ending the Lebanese Civil War, in 1990, they called for the dismantling of the country’s militias. Hezbollah, it hardly needs saying, has ignored that particular clause for decades.

All the same, it would be wrong to bet the house on a new Lebanon. The government in Beirut does have a great opportunity to assert its strength: but that’s partly because it has got so much space to fill. As it stands, the Lebanese state is little more than an abandoned husk, occupied by a myriad of sectarian political parties. To put it differently, then, the post-war order offers ample opportunities to several other partisan groups — certainly not Hezbollah, but no more democratic for it.

Hezbollah’s Shi’a allies in the Amal Movement, and who have challenged the group’s position in the past, may well view this moment as an opportunity to present themselves as a less risky and volatile party for Lebanese Shi’a. Among Christians, parties that once tacitly backed Hezbollah have already moved away. And if that creates the potential for a more unified anti-Iranian bloc, Sunni parties like the Saudi-backed Future Movement may well re-emerge too.

As I wrote last month, then, this maelstrom will doubtless lead to renewed chaos over the years ahead, especially if Mikati and his deputies fail to exert power over their country’s borders, or else fail to restrain a resurgent Hezbollah.

And certainly, just such a scenario is possible. The militia, after all, is far more than a domestic Lebanese outfit, with its masters in Tehran remaining crucial. Hezbollah’s troubles have severely damaged Iran’s position in the region, and not simply in terms of men or materiel. For one thing, the ceasefire deal has shattered a central tenet of the regime’s grand strategy: that the fight against Israel in Gaza was inextricably linked to the battle for Lebanon. Though Iran reportedly pressured the militia to accept the ceasefire deal, meanwhile, it also promised to resupply its proxy. But given Israel has implicitly reserved the right to renew attacks against Hezbollah if it violates the ceasefire, something it would inevitably do with US backing, practical support is now much harder to provide. Especially with rival sectarian groups circling, in short, Iran now faces a much less hospitable Lebanese landscape.

Combined with the pressure the ceasefire puts on another Iranian ally — Hezbollah has long supported the Assad dictatorship in Syria — Tehran’s freedom of movement suddenly looks rather constrained. The point, though, is that Iran’s leaders are nothing if not long-term thinkers: there’s no reason to believe that the sphere of influence they’ve meticulously built over decades will suddenly collapse. While, in short, the Islamic Republic’s singular focus on Hezbollah as its strategic lynchpin has proved costly, the country still has moves to play. Just like after the 2006 war, when Beirut tried to use the moment to wrest some control back from Hezbollah, the stage is therefore set for another confrontation. On one side sits the militia and Iran. On the other waits the Lebanese state and its friends. Who’ll emerge triumphant remains to be seen.

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Michal Kranz is a freelance journalist reporting on politics and society in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the United States.

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