In the mid-2010s, Greer was a rising star within mainstream conservative journalism. In 2018, it was revealed that he had written for Richard Spencer’s white-nationalist website Radix a few years earlier, where he made arguments about topics such as the “Jewish role” in promoting multiculturalism. He had already left The Daily Caller for several months before his dox. But henceforth, he would be in essence canceled from movement conservatism.

As Greer points out in Whitepill, his career would have easily survived the revelations about his past today. The things he was saying in 2014 on white-nationalist websites are often scarcely distinguishable from the talking points of major Right-wing influencers and GOP elected officials today. “We know our country’s better than yours,” Megyn Kelly told Haitian immigrants recently, adding: “We don’t want you.… Go back to fucking Haiti.” Rep. Andy Ogles of Tennessee refers to Zohran Mamdani as “little Muhammad” and demands that New York’s mayor be stripped of his citizenship and deported. Rep. Brandon Gill, meanwhile, has complained about Indians working at 7-11 stores — this, despite his wife being of Indian heritage. 

Greer’s new book is a victory lap celebrating what has been accomplished. The title is a reference to taking the white pill, which in online circles refers to being happy about a given state of affairs, in contrast to the black pill, which signifies the loss of hope — both being a spinoff of the red and blue pills made famous by The Matrix. The lesson of his book is that white nationalists have won. But it leaves the thoughtful reader wondering what the point of this race-based politics is supposed to be.

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Full disclosure here: I have known Greer since his alt-Right days. I wrote for some of the same websites, though my politics have obviously gone in a different direction. I now reject white identitarianism of all kinds. My doxxing came in summer 2023. For this reason, I briefly appear as a character in Whitepill, with Greer using me as one example to demonstrate that by the time my former views were unearthed, people could survive revelations that they once expressed racist and other reactionary views. 

Whitepill is essentially a history of the American Right from the Obama era to the present, with a particular focus on race and identity issues, such as DEI, affirmative action, and, above all, immigration. There is not a lot here that is going to surprise anyone who has followed the news over the last decade: from the rise and fall of the Tea Party to the killing of Trayvon Martin; and from the Henry Louis Gates controversy and the resulting beer summit to then-candidate Donald Trump’s comments on immigrants in his 2015 launch speech and the summer of George Floyd. 

The bulk of the book might be a valuable read for young people not old enough to remember the Obama era, or those who only recently started following politics. But for those of us who have kept up with current events over the last 10-plus years, particularly developments on the American Right, there is limited value in most chapters. 

The point of the book is to demonstrate just how much has changed on the Right. The most interesting parts are the author relaying his first-hand account of the transformation. In 2015, Greer was one of the first people at The Daily Caller to support Trump. It marked him as an outcast, and colleagues thought that it was a joke; he built a “wall” of books around his desk in order to show his support for Trump and his signature border proposal. 

Greer’s takeaway from this is that the mainstream movement’s stalwarts in those days were “lame.” He was, and remains, outraged that conservative activists and journalists were uninterested in race and immigration issues, instead stressing deregulation and free markets. Greer’s alt-Right circle, in contrast, featured “a heroin addict with sociopathic tendencies, an unstable taxi driver who couldn’t control his racial outbursts, and one likely federal agent who tried to recruit us into a militia.” For those who weren’t there, it is useful to stress just how marginalized white identitarian attitudes and adjacent opinions were across the political spectrum in the pre-Trump era.

Now, Greer asserts, most prominent figures in conservatism share at least some of these views. This might be an overstatement. Much of the Christian Right remains theologically immune to the racist appeal, and likewise, there are many who haven’t adopted based signaling and racial slurs in the populist bargain.  Nevertheless, as Trump’s hard-line immigration positions and the quotes above from the likes of Kelly and Ogles demonstrate, the author is correct about the general direction of travel.

He celebrates Tucker Carlson for bringing identity issues to the forefront of American conservatism, and the transformation of the late Charlie Kirk, spending five pages documenting his move toward immigration restrictionism and a pinched account of national identity. He correctly points out that Republican voters are motivated primarily by identity-related concerns, rather than economics, which is what created an opening for Trump and more intellectually minded nativists to take over the party. He’s backed up here by a large amount of political science data, which I’ve written about before.

That doesn’t mean that Greer is completely satisfied with the direction of modern conservatism. He thinks it’s too conspiratorial, for one thing. Indeed, it was Greer who coined the term “Insane Clown Party” to highlight Republicans’ growing fascination with topics like UFOs and Satanic pedophile rings. He also has little patience for religious debates on the Right, perhaps limiting his intellectual horizon, since American Christianity has at various points — and sometimes simultaneously — challenged and upheld white supremacy. 

The bigger question is: what exactly is all this for? This is the question that Whitepill never answers, and Greer’s other work likewise avoids. This book is meant to convince those who, like the author, reduce identity and belonging to race and then prioritize racial identity concerns over all else. For Greer, other issues (such as economics or foreign policy) are of secondary importance at best. They matter only insofar as they might promote immigration restrictionism and defeat multiculturalism. Greer doesn’t like conspiracies or abstract intellectualizing as part of a political movement mainly because they make it more difficult to achieve his larger goals. 

What Greer never does is explain what exactly he believes and why. His project is an insular one, proceeding from the unstated assumption that the reader will agree with him on the importance of winning on the issues white identitarians care about; all that’s left are discussions of tactics and strategy. For example, when Greer addresses abortion, it’s from the perspective that those focused on the issue are causing dissension within the Republican coalition. He calls on pro-lifers to be grateful for what Trump has done, and calls on the Right to tune them out as political liabilities. But what if you actually believe that abortion is murder? He makes no attempt at explaining how abortion issues should fit into the white-nationalist project, except from the perspective of its political impact.

To be sure, he’s honest enough to sometimes acknowledge that his own preferred policies are unpopular, as he does on mass deportation. But in that case, he explicitly says that Trump should do it anyway (which is what pro-lifers want on abortion, too). There’s something unprincipled about this approach to political analysis, though one can easily discern the underlying logic. Greer wants to submit to public opinion — that is, until the need comes to get tough on immigration. Because on that issue the Republicans need to forge ahead and do what’s best for the country.

In order to piece together why Greer believes that identity issues need to be paramount, one has to gather stray comments. He tells us that H-1B visas threaten to harm American workers, and that mass immigration has made cities like Minneapolis “hotbeds of Third-World corruption and politics dominated by ethnic spoils.” But he doesn’t elaborate on these points. One might ask for some data on the H-1B issue, or whether Somalis in Minneapolis, an extremely small portion of new arrivals to the country, are representative of immigrants as a general matter. Mainstream MAGA pretends that immigration leads to much higher levels of crime, but Greer seems aware that this is not true in the aggregate. By not taking up such false narratives, he is left with few tools to make the positive case for his hardline positions. 

It is important to note that Greer rejects the label of white nationalist. To him, though, this rejection simply implies that he accepts the American system and doesn’t aspire to form an ethnostate. However, this is precisely what I would call a worldview that prioritizes maintaining white demographic dominance and cultural primacy. Why else consider every single form of immigration a threat, and why else should anti-white racism, especially after the vibe shift, remain such a high priority? Greer doesn’t explain, but it all makes sense in the context of a racialist worldview.

To Greer, the victory chronicled in Whitepill means that today we can just call this conservatism. It follows that white identitarianism has so successfully swept the Right that Greer doesn’t even feel the need to make the first-order case for his beliefs.   

But that leaves him vulnerable to all sorts of counterarguments (which, again, he doesn’t even bother acknowledging). Even as white identitarianism has ascended, one justification after another for limiting immigration has fallen by the wayside. It was once said new arrivals would boost crime. But crime has consistently fallen — despite some localized disorder and anecdotes that the Trump 2024 campaign pointed to as representative of the effects of immigration (they weren’t, statistically speaking).

Then there is the argument about migrants pushing the electorate to the Left. In her 2015 book ¡Adios, America!: The Left’s Plan to Turn Our Country into a Third-World Hellhole, Ann Coulter argued that nonwhites can be expected to vote Democratic indefinitely into the future; hence, conservatives had to close the border if they hoped to win on any other issue. In 2024, however, naturalized immigrants may well have voted majority-Republican. Now, conservatives are reduced to complaining about competition for tech jobs, despite tech workers not making up any significant part of their coalition, and the American tech industry being such an overwhelming success that it is powering the rest of the economy and putting us at the forefront of the most important industry in the world.

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Some of the MAGA faithful may not see such points clearly, but Greer does. Still, he refuses to intellectually tackle them. Instead, the emotional response to immigration comes first, and justifications are simply put forward on an ad hoc basis. As the intellectual case for restrictionism gets weaker, conservative attachment to nativism only becomes more firmly entrenched. 

The main premise of Whitepill is undeniably true. On the whole, Republicans have moved toward white identitarianism. This being America, even many of our white identitarians are diverse, with names like Nick Fuentes. But there is practically no reflection here on why that is something to celebrate. The worldview presented lacks any larger conception of the good, or a belief in a politics that places an emphasis on virtue. 

To take one example, while Greer laments immigration as a threat to American culture, he is indifferent to the fact that it was his political hero, Trump, who attempted an insurrection. Greer plays down the events of Jan. 6 and ignores the larger context of what we know about Trump trying to overturn the results of the presidential election he lost. What matters is Trump, and the larger Republican Party, as vessels for demographic politics. Even when Greer admirably breaks with his own tribe, as in the case of his denunciation of conspiracy theories, it is a matter of political pragmatism in the service of his larger goals, rather than due to a commitment that honesty and truth are valuable for their own sake.  

Greer has some virtues that are rare among his political tribe. He doesn’t, for example, drink the entire glass of MAGA Kool-Aid. He doesn’t believe that Haitians eat dogs and cats. Nor does he conveniently adopt socialist economic views to oppose immigration. Nonetheless, he is an avatar of a strand of conservatism that centers white identitarianism — without being able or willing to articulate why. 

As a pragmatist, Greer understands that identity politics for white people has worked, and can continue to be a powerful force into the future. But the sad intellectual and ethical state of his type of Right wing politics, and the hollow nature of his attempts to defend what it has become, show why even smarter versions of white identitarianism are degrading and ultimately morally poisonous.

The three rival conceptions can be identified as creedalism, multiculturalism, and pan-white tribalism. For creedalists of the center Left and center Right, the West is a supra-national community of individuals who, regardless of race or religion, share a personal devotion to a universal creed of human rights and liberal democracy.

For Left-wing multiculturalists, meanwhile, the West is made up of European and North American countries with shared legacies of white supremacy and colonialism, countries that ought to be internally remodeled into multicultural societies in which “culture” is used as a synonym for biological race: to fulfill this model’s promise, whites must be deposed; “black and brown folks” lifted up.

Finally, for many, though not all, conservatives and Right-wing populists, the West is an ethno-religious community defined by pan-ethnic white racial identity and pan-Christian or Judeo-Christian religion. Some edgier varieties exclude either Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, or more than one of the three. Still more exotic ones hark back to paganism, viewing Christianity as a Jewish imposition on Viking vitality.

Partisans of all three visions have struggled to reconcile their preferred model with the actually existing political communities of the West, and they view this failure as a “crisis” of the West. It isn’t. Rather, demographic reality simply defies their neat, ideologized picture. Culture and nationhood still matter, but what anchors them are shared language and customs — not Enlightenment philosophy (as the creedalists would have it), not anti-European resentment (as the multiculturalists would), and not blood-and-soil devotion (as the ethno-sectarian Right would).

Start with the creedalists. In April 2016, then-President Barack Obama warned that if UK citizens in the Brexit referendum voted in favor of leaving the European Union, Washington would collectively punish them, sending Britain to “the back of the queue” for any future trade deals.

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In the language of trans-Atlantic centrist creedalism, Obama praised the European Union as one of “the international institutions” that enabled those in its sphere “to institutionalize and internationalize the basic values of rule of law, and freedom, and democracy, that … benefit our citizens as well as people around the world.”

These warnings notwithstanding, a decisive majority of Britons voted to leave. Today, returning to the European Union is the quixotic fantasy of a minority, often belonging to the upper professional classes. Creedalism has suffered many other defeats, including the backlash on both sides of the Atlantic against the disastrous global crusade for democracy of Tony Blair and George W. Bush, who in his messianic second inaugural address declared: “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one…. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation … now it is the urgent requirement of our nation’s security, and the calling of our time.”

Then there is Left multiculturalism, which mounted its strongest showing during the Black Lives Matter protests that erupted in 2020 in the wake of George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis. Although policing and race relations in Britain and the rest of Europe are very different from American conditions, BLM spread beyond US shores, underscoring the movement’s (anti-) civilizational ambition.

Inspired by the American Left, activists in European countries vandalized or pulled down civic monuments, rewrote university curricula and museum exhibits, and demanded racial preferences.  The BLMUK manifesto parroted the rhetoric of Left-wing American activists: “We’re guided by a commitment to dismantle imperialism, capitalism, white-supremacy, patriarchy, and the state structures that disproportionately harm black people in Britain and around the world.”

Yet this version of Western “civilization” likewise failed to take hold and exhausted itself. Today, Americans look back on that period — so-called peak woke — almost as a bad (if also oddly humorous) dream. And while such trends take longer to dissipate in the imperial periphery than in the core, it’s unlikely that European-style woke-ism will last much longer. Indeed, in Europe the crises of immigration and assimilation are, in some ways, far more acute, and are likely to discredit the multicultural model for a generation or more.

The Right’s answer to the creedalism of the liberal center and the race-based multiculturalism of the Left is a kind of trans-Atlantic nativism, in which the West is defined as a civilization by racial and religious “heritage.” In 2025, for example, the Trump administration implicitly argued for an ethno-religious definition of the West in its National Security Strategy.

The document contains lines about the importance of Europe as a military ally and a trading partner that could have appeared in any American state paper. But it weaves these into a lurid narrative of Europe and the United States as parts of a single embattled trans-Atlantic ethno-religious community, with shared ancestry and culture as a basis for US-European relations — a concept that would have startled generations of Americans who drew a sharp distinction between the Old World and the New.

Using apocalyptic rhetoric common on the far Right but hitherto unknown in American state papers, the NSS warns that Europe faces “civilizational erasure.” According to the NSS:  “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less.” The NSS gets as close to outright racism and anti-immigrant white nativism as an American state paper can go: “We want Europe to remain European.”

 The subtext: Europe doesn’t look European any more, with all those dark-skinned invaders like former British Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, current Tory leader Kemi Badenoch, and former Irish prime minister Leo Varadkar.

According to the Trump administration, the good news is that the “growing influence of patriotic European parties” — that is, Right-wing nationalist parties opposed to mass immigration and the European Union “indeed gives cause for great optimism.” Implicitly identifying “America” with white Americans of European descent, the document states: “America is, understandably, sentimentally attached to the European continent — and, of course, to Britain and Ireland.”

This would be news to many Americans, including many British- and Irish-Americans, whose ancestors fled poverty or persecution and have no interest in this or that old country. And the idea that sentimental Europhilia is an important part of American culture is hard to square with the intense resistance on the part of many Americans to US involvement in the two world wars. 

The language of Trump’s NSS reflects the worldview of pan-Western American paleoconservatives who idolize the likes of Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary. Orban has described his ideal as “illiberal democracy” and, in July 2022, declared: “We [Hungarians] are not mixed-race: we are simply a mixture of peoples living in our own European homeland.… We are willing to mix with one another, but we do not want to become peoples of mixed-race.”

Religion-mixing, rather than race-mixing, is the target of other defenders of an ethnic conception of the West. In 2025 Andrew Beck, a fellow of the Claremont Institute, which has sent dozens of fellows and staffers into the two Trump administrations, denounced the construction of a Hindu “idol” in Texas and asked in The American Mind: “Are we permitted to determine whether the foundation we build upon remains a distinctly Western, Christian civilization that assimilates outsiders into its mold?” 

Another Claremont fellow, Jeremy Carl, may have doomed his chances to be confirmed as Trump’s nominee to be assistant secretary of state for international organizations with his past statements about the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an “anti-white weapon.”

During a hearing on his nomination, Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) asked Carl to define “white culture”: “You have made several statements about your worry regarding the erasure of white culture in America,” Murphy said. “You know, I understand Irish-American culture. I understand Italian-American culture. I maybe don’t understand white culture, as well. Tell me the values, the white values, that you believed are being erased by the current American government or the prior American governments.” 

Carl, Trump’s nominee, mumbled and struggled to respond, before finally thinking of an example unrelated to immigration and based on race: “I would say that the white church is very different than the black church in terms of its tone and style on average.”

OK, good luck to the populist Right in the quest to frame the black church as the big civilizational threat. Indeed, it’s pandering to the likes of Carl and those further to his Right that will likely break apart Trump’s diverse coalition in the 2026 midterms and beyond.

As Carl’s statement suggests, moreover, while uniting fellow adherents in the United States and Europe, each of the three conceptions of the West is used to divide people within countries between “Westerners” and “non-Westerners.” For the ethno-religious nationalists, American society is divided between “authentic” Americans, who are white and Christian, and Hindus and blacks and many others, who will always be outsiders, even if technically they are US citizens. 

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For their part, American multiculturalists agree that “Western” means “white” by the US Census definition, so that “decolonizing the curriculum” can mean the inclusion of black American authors who by definition are “non-Western,” even though their native language is American English, their religion is Protestant Christianity, and their ancestors have lived in the United States for centuries. 

For creedalists, meanwhile, racists and religious nativists are “un-American” because they don’t share a universalist, ideological conception of Americanism. Belonging to the liberal center, creedalists also typically reject Left multiculturalism, albeit usually with much less vehemence than they reserve for the racial Right.

What’s notable about these three versions of “Western civ” is that none has a deep historical pedigree. Rather, all three coalesced in the aftermath of World War II, during the civil-rights revolution of the 1950s and ’60s. Before then, America’s elite tended to define the American nation as an Anglo-Saxon Protestant community, an offshoot of the Germanic Protestant family of nations.  

Of the three versions, the only one that resembles what most Americans for most of American history thought is today’s white nationalism. But here’s the irony — by including white “ethnics” like Irish-, Polish- and Italian-Americans in the category of authentic Americans, contemporary American white nationalism is by historic standards liberal, inclusive, and diverse. 

In contrast to what might be called the new nativism, adherents of the old American nativism assumed that the white race was composed of distinct sub-races with hereditary cultural and personality traits. Anglo-Americans (the majority of US citizens until around 1900) were thought of by leading scholars and politicians as members of a Germanic tribe that was superior to barbaric Celts like the Irish, hot-blooded Latins like the French and Italians, and primitive Slavs like the Russians and Poles.

For two centuries after the Founding this was the elite view, not an eccentric one. For example, in 1776, Thomas Jefferson proposed that the Great Seal of the United States depict “Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honor of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.” Like the radical Whigs of 18th-century England, Jefferson believed that Anglo-American ideals of freedom and self-government originated with Dark Age Germanic tribes. Later in 1825, Jefferson, the co-founder of the University of Virginia, established the first course in Anglo-Saxon in the United States, which he considered the language of liberty. Up until World War I, historians like Columbia’s John W. Burgess continued to promote the “Teutonic germ [seed] theory” of American liberty.

US immigration policy from the beginning was based on a racial conception of membership in the American nation. The Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by a Congress that included many of the drafters of the Constitution, outlawed the naturalization of immigrants who were not “free white persons,” a prohibition on citizenship for nonwhite immigrants which lasted until the mid-20th century.

In 1923, the Supreme Court, in the case United States v. Bhagat Thind Singh, ruled that a Punjabi immigrant from India was not a “white person” and therefore was ineligible to become a naturalized US citizen. Writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Justice Sutherland rejected the claim that Singh was a “Caucasian” or “Aryan” by anthropological standards: “The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whom they knew as white. The immigration of that day was almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their forebears had come. When they extended the privilege of American citizenship to ‘any alien being a free white person’ it was these immigrants — bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh — and their kind whom they must have had affirmatively in mind.” The test was the viewpoint of America’s Founders, and every member of the Supreme Court agreed that the Founders would not have considered Mr. Singh “white.”

America’s white-only immigration policy was tightened up by a series of Asian exclusion acts in 1882, 1892, and 1917. The Immigration Act of 1924 made all Asians ineligible for US citizenship (Arabs were “white” and eligible, but Iranians came from the “Asiatic Barred Zone”)  and created the national quotas to favor Northwestern Europeans among white immigrants. The 1924 Act was signed by President Calvin Coolidge, who, as governor of Massachusetts in 1921, had explained to the readers of Good Housekeeping magazine: “Biological laws tell us that certain divergent people will not mix or blend. The Nordics propagate themselves successfully.  With other races, the outcome shows deterioration on both sides. Quality of mind and body suggests that observance of ethnic law is as great a necessity to a nation as immigration law.” Coolidge and many other old nativists would have taken a look at some contemporary American nativists like part-Mexican Nick Fuentes and shaken their heads.

After World War II, needless to say, equating Americans with Anglo-Americans and describing them as a Teutonic nation sounded Hitlerian. By then, under pressure from the civil-rights movement at home and competition with the Soviet Union for the favor of former European colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the American establishment, still dominated by WASPs, hastily promulgated a new definition of American national identity, the “American Creed,” based on natural rights (the Declaration of Independence) and a term rarely used before the Cold War, “liberal democracy.” Anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish quotas in the WASP-dominated Ivy League universities were gradually eliminated (though legacy admissions remained to favor the right sort of WASPs). The 88th and 89th Congresses enacted the 1965 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished nearly two centuries of official white nationalism.  

During the Cold War and the civil-rights revolution, the liberal center rewrote American history to claim that the American Revolution had been fought not only for the universal ideals of human rights and popular sovereignty, but also for the ideals of colorblind immigration and civil and political rights for people of all races. Liberal creedalists airbrushed out embarrassing details like Jefferson’s Anglo-Saxonism and the support for colonizing freed black ex-slaves abroad shared by Jefferson with James Madison, Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln. 

For example, in 2017, Daniel Fried, an arch-creedalist, declared that “we are not an ethno-state, with identity rooted in shared blood. The option of a White Man’s Republic ended at Appomattox.”

Fried quoted an 1858 speech in Chicago, in which Abraham Lincoln noted that “perhaps half our people” were (white) immigrants who shared no blood with what was then the Anglo-American majority. Nevertheless, he said, they have the right to claim the ideals of the Declaration of Independence “as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the men who wrote that declaration, and so they are.” 

According to Fried, this proves that “Lincoln defined Americans as a nation formed by belief, by faith, a credo nation and a new nation, truly ‘novo ordo seclorum.’” Lincoln was indeed sincere in arguing that the Declaration of Independence was relevant to “the happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, everywhere.” But “everywhere” was not necessarily the United States. In a debate with Stephen A. Douglas on Oct. 15, 1858, Lincoln called for America’s western territories to be “an outlet for free white people everywhere the world over” and named as examples “Hans and Baptiste and Patrick.”

In 1864, as president, Lincoln signed an act to encourage immigration that was limited to recruiting immigrants from Europe who, unlike nonwhite immigrants, could become naturalized citizens under existing federal law — “voluntary white labor” in the words of the bill’s author, Sen. John Sherman of Ohio.

In August 1862, during the Civil War, Lincoln, a long-time advocate of colonizing freed blacks abroad, met with a group of black leaders and urged them to lead free black Americans out of the United States to Liberia in Africa, or else to Central America, telling them: “You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss; but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think.”  

Lincoln exhorted them to sacrifice their personal comfort to the heroic mission of leading their fellow black Americans out of the country: “General Washington himself endured greater physical hardships than if he had remained a British subject, yet he was a happy man because he was engaged in benefiting his race….” (Whether Lincoln completely abandoned support for colonization by his death is disputed by historians.)

There were black and white reformers at the time like Frederick Douglass who argued in public for a multiracial and mixed-race American nation and a non-racist immigration policy. Abraham Lincoln was not one.

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The mid-20th century creedalist conception of American identity invites an obvious question: if the ideals of the Declaration of Independence really require a colorblind society and race-neutral immigration policy, why did almost nobody realize this until the 1960s? Like it or not, until the mid-20th century, many educated and well-intentioned white Americans without contradiction could believe that slavery and tyranny were evil and also that all human beings have the same basic human rights — but nonwhite people should seek to realize their human rights in other countries, not in the United States, a “white man’s country.” 

Notwithstanding the falsity of its historical narrative, from the 1960s until the 2010s, public schools and political oratory spread the new interpretation of American identity as a creedal nation whose membership is defined solely by subjective personal belief in 18th-century Enlightenment liberalism. But postwar liberal creedalism was contested from its origins after World War II by racialist identitarians on both the Left and the Right.

Naturally, creedalism was rejected by Marxists, for whom the United States was just the biggest capitalist country. But their influence was negligible. More important was the split among black leaders between liberal integrationists like Bayard Rustin and proponents of Black Power like Malcolm X and Floyd McKissick (Martin Luther King, Jr. was strategically ambiguous). In the 1970s and ’80s, Jesse Jackson, the most influential black American leader, promoted race-based quotas in jobs and hiring, and the redefinition of America as a “rainbow coalition” whose colors implicitly did not mix. He led a demonstration against a Western civilization course at Stanford University, chanting, “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western Civ has got to go.” 

Black Power served up the template for future identity-politics movements in America, including radical feminism, the Left wing of the gay-rights movement, and the trans movement. “Multiculturalism” means “multiracialism.” Instead of having a common identity, the United States is envisioned as a multinational state, whose several permanent, unmixing “cultures” are the official races defined by the US Census beginning in the 1970s: black Americans, so-called non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics/Latinos, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans. Instead of getting a separate-but-equal realm of their own, under the post-1970s racial preference, in defiance of the intent of Congress when it passed the color-blind Civil Rights Act, non-Hispanic white Americans have been penalized by design in college admissions, job applications, and government grants.

Like multiculturalists, American conservatives after World War II rejected the idea of the United States as a creedal nation (that is, with the exception of some neoconservatives who were former midcentury liberals or socialists). Many on the Right defended Jim Crow in the South until the mid-1960s but usually avoided crude racism. Barry Goldwater invoked federalism (it was about the states’ right to discriminate against blacks, you see). And William F. Buckley, Jr. invoked “civilization,” notably in 1957 in the pages of National Review, in his essay “Why the South Must Prevail,” in which he defined black Americans and Kenyans as part of the same uncivilized group. “The question, as far as the White community is concerned, is whether the claims of civilization supersede those of universal suffrage,” he wrote. (To be fair, Buckley also proposed that the suffrage should be denied to the uneducated of all races).

The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 put an end to such talk on the mainstream Right.  Such was the dominance in public discourse of post-1964 liberal creedalism that for half a century, many multiculturalist Leftists and pan-white Christian conservatives alike strategically engaged in double talk. Both the identitarian Left and the crypto-racist right invoked the universalist ideals of the American Creed in statements intended for broad public audiences, while appealing to their constituencies and audiences on the basis of racial tribalism. Creedalism in the streets, racialism in the sheets.

On the Left, multiculturalists claimed that race-based preferences — camouflaged by bureaucratic euphemisms like affirmative action, goals and timetables, and diversity, equity, and inclusion — were nothing more than temporary remedial measures that were perfectly compatible with the American Creed. Meanwhile, following the demise of Jim Crow, racial preferences were attacked by the mainstream conservatives, like those around Buckley’s National Review, as betrayals of the ideals of Martin Luther King, Jr. — as though the Right hadn’t vilified those very ideals just a few years earlier.

From the 1960s onward, Buckley and other gatekeepers of mainstream conservatism purged blatant white supremacists and overt anti-Semites like Pat Buchanan and Joe Sobran, who became known as “paleoconservatives.” But the exiled paleocons said aloud what many respectable “movement conservatives” thought. After all, the single most influential public-policy thinker on the American Right in the last quarter of the 20th century was Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute, whose books Losing Ground (1984) and The Bell Curve (1994), co-authored with Richard Herrnstein, provided pseudo-scientific support for what many conservatives, mainstream and paleo alike, already believed — that the welfare state encouraged the government-dependent and disproportionately black poor to outbreed taxpayers, and that blacks are intellectually and genetically inferior to whites. 

By the second decade of the 21st century, the post-1945 creedalist orthodoxy has weakened to the point that the racialist Left and the racialist Right have felt empowered to drop their masks.  In How To Be An Antiracist (2019), Ibram Kendi declared: “The only remedy to racist discrimination is antiracist discrimination. The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to present discrimination is future discrimination” — that is, permanent and society-wide discrimination against white Americans, including those born long after the end of Jim Crow.

Around the same time, in the 2010s and 2020s, the racist and anti-Semitic right learned to use Twitter and podcasts to circumvent the gatekeepers of establishment conservatism and infiltrate the Republican Party at the highest levels. For example, in February 2025, Marko Eliz, a 25-year-old staffer who shared pro-eugenics, anti-racist and anti-Indian material online, was forced to resign from DOGE — and was then reinstated. In January 2025, the Department of Labor posted a video with the text evocative of Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuehrer: “One Homeland. One People. One Heritage. Remember who you are, American.”

Another Labor Department social-media campaign depicted American workers as heroic, idealized white men — and only white men. An ICE recruitment post on X (formerly Twitter), meanwhile, portrayed a lone cowboy on the frontier beneath a stealth bomber with the phrase “We’ll have our home again,” the title of a white-supremacist song, “By God, we’ll have a home again.”

Despite their differences, both the multicultural Left and the racialist Right tend to equate race and culture. Both have racialized Latin Americans and Muslims as “brown.” For the nativist Right, Latin Americans and Muslims belong to the brown and black hordes besieging the pan-white Judeo-Christian West. For the multicultural Left, they are part of the nonwhite global majority oppressed by Europeans and Euro-Americans beginning with Columbus in 1492.                    

Fortunately, both the racialist Left and the racialist Right are doomed by demographic trends on both sides of the Atlantic. Increasing rates of interracial marriage are blurring the stripes of the rainbow coalition. As mixed-race Americans increase as a share of the population, the elaborate post-1970s system of official races and race-based preferences is likely to collapse as a result of its own incoherence, if it isn’t swept away by the courts and Congress first.

Thanks to demographic change, the racialist Right’s definition of “real” Americans as part of a trans-Atlantic white Judeo-Christian West is already anachronistic. Among Americans under the age of 18, only 47% are non-Hispanic whites. Only around 40% percent of Americans are non-Hispanic white Christians. And only 48% of Americans between 18 and 24 in 2023-4 identify as Christians. Post-white, post-Christian America is here.

Elsewhere in the West, Christianity is already a minority religion in Britain (46%), Germany (42%), and France, where 51% are areligious “Nones.” In the world as a whole, the largest group of Christians are Africans, followed by Latin Americans, with Europeans in third place. Will European and American conservatives advocate re-Christianizing Western civilization by importing fellow believers from Nigeria, Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia to the United States and Europe?

Don’t count on it. Shortly after bombing ISIS in Nigeria in the name of protecting Nigerian Christians on Christmas Day 2025, the Trump administration froze visa processing for immigrants from 75 countries outside of North America and Europe, including Nigeria. Earlier, in October 2025, Trump slashed refugee quotas and prioritized them for white South Africans, so the majority of new refugees to be admitted by the United States will be white.

In theory a racial and religious national identity in the United States and Europe might be fabricated, in the same way that the Judeo-Christian identity was invented in the middle of the 20th century to accommodate Catholics and Jews alongside the former WASP regency. Perhaps self-described white Hispanics and “white-adjacent” Asian Americans might informally be included in a neo-white racial identity.  Islam and Hinduism could also be included, to make a new category of “theism” (mono- and poly-). But defining American or Western identity as “neo-white” and “theist,” leaving out only black people and atheists among others, is so remote from the self-perceptions of ordinary Americans and Europeans that it would be unlikely to be effective as a Right-wing rallying cry.

Can creedalism be revived as a unifying force in twenty-first century America? Probably not. Creedalists are right to object to claims, like those of The New York Times’s 1619 Project, that anti-black racism has been the central factor in all of American history. But the creedalist fairy tale, in which American history is a series of tragic lapses from the supposed colorblind idealism of 1776, is just as bogus. 

Creedalism offers illogical political theory as well as bad history. It answers the question of how Americans should govern themselves, but not the question of who Americans are. American identity can’t be defined merely by belief in the Enlightenment ideals of the American founding. The ability to passionately recite the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address does not entitle foreign nationals to US passports. Conversely, law-abiding Americans cannot be stripped of US citizenship and deported if they reject the American Creed for illiberal ideologies like communism, fascism, or Islamism; an American monarchist is still an American.

A nation is a bounded, particular community, not a multicultural hotel for permanent foreign diasporas or the creedal base camp for a global democratic ideological revolution. And contrary to the nativist agenda, the cultural boundaries that distinguish one nation from another need not be racial or religious — and, indeed, can’t be in a diverse and religiously pluralist nation.

Fortunately, little is necessary to distinguish a modern cultural nation from others beyond a common language and a few national customs and mores shared by otherwise different subcultures. Most countries wisely prefer to forget their awful political histories and controversial dead politicians and to base national identity instead on a national language and widely-shared customs. 

The idea that people will not fight and die for such a “thin” linguistic-cultural nationalism is based on the mistaken idea that citizen-soldiers fight to promote this or that abstract ideology, including the American Creed, rather than to avoid dishonor in the eyes of family and neighbors or government punishment. In the US conflicts widely regarded as the “good wars” — the American Revolution, the Civil War, the world wars — state or federal military levies and drafts were required, because there were not enough volunteers to risk life and limb crusading for American ideals, however defined.

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The best replacement for creedalism, multiculturalism, and pan-white tribalism might be called “melting-pot multi-faith nationalism.” Government policy would be strictly neutral with regard to religion and race. The Census would stop labeling Americans on the basis of arbitrary, pan-ethnic official races. Race-based affirmative action would be abolished.  

In foreign policy, crusading liberal creedalism would be rejected, but so would the manifestly false idea that the 21st-century world is divided among homogeneous “Western,” “Oriental,” “Muslim,” and other “civilizations.” Relations between Washington and countries in Europe and elsewhere would be based on mutual national economic and security interests, not ties of blood or faith or belief.

As for religion, politically motivated attempts to pulverize different denominations and religions and blend them into a single synthetic identity — pan-Protestantism, pan-Christianism, pan-Judeo-Christianism, pan-Abrahamism — would have no place in a melting-pot multi-faith America. All creeds in the United States — including variants of Islam, Hinduism, New Age sects, neo-pagan heathenism, and organized atheism — would be guaranteed autonomy, within basic legal limits: kosher and halal meat yes, human sacrifice no.

Views of religion in post-Christian America might resemble those that were held in pre-Christian Rome, according to Edward Gibbon: “The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful.”

Unlike creedalism, multiculturalism, and pan-white Judeo-Christian tribalism, this vision of American identity is aligned with what most Americans actually believe. According to a Pew Research poll in 2017, 70% of Americans believe that to be considered a true member of the American nation one must speak English; and around half of both Republicans and Democrats say that sharing national customs and traditions is important. But only 32% believe that being born in the United States is part of being American, while a mere 29% of all respondents — and only 43% of Republicans — think that being Christian is part of being American.         

A more recent (2025) Pew survey found that only 26% of Americans, including 62% of white evangelicals, believe that only one religion is true, while 48% think that many religions may be true, and 25% believe there is little or no truth in any religion (1% did not answer). Sixty-one percent of all Americans, and 62% of white Americans, say that the declining share of the white population is neither good nor bad. 

Maybe American policymakers and public opinion leaders should adopt the conception of American national identity that most Americans already share. 

Engel allows Italian-Americans and Greek-Americans and other lesser breeds into the Heritage America tent, notwithstanding that it “was a significant sociopolitical mistake” to admit “the type of people that came here during the Ellis Island generation.” The likes of Andrew Cuomo, it seems, will be tolerated — but only if they “are ethno-culturally tied to the ethos and spirit of the United States prior to its definitional transformation into a Propositional Nation after World War II.” (Maybe there should be a lustration process, in which swarthy Ellis Island Americans ritually denounce Emma Lazarus’s poem “The New Colossus,” inscribed on the Statue of Liberty.)

According to Engel, Heritage America “includes the blacks of the Old South (like Booker T. Washington), though it repudiates any instinct that some of them have to leverage their experience for the purposes of political guilt in our time. It also includes integrated Native Americans with the same stipulation.” Ah, there are stipulations. So black and Native-American membership in Heritage America is conditional on their agreeing with Engel’s ideology — otherwise, no Heritage for them. Meanwhile, “peoples like Indians, or Southeast Asians, or Ecuadorians or immigrated [sic] Africans are the least capable of fitting in and should be sent home immediately.” Under the New Order, then, Vice President JD Vance will have to visit his Indian-American wife and mixed-race children in South Asia.

All of this turns my thoughts turn to an important question: Am I a Heritage American?

My earliest ancestor in the New World, according to family tradition, was a Scottish pirate who practiced his trade in the Chesapeake Bay in the early 17th century, following the founding of Jamestown. In 1648, another ancestor, Thomas Lane, was one of 47 people “transported” from England to labor on the plantation of a gentleman who had been granted 2,350 acres in Virginia that had been carved out of “Indian lands” only three years earlier. His descendant William Lane Sr. became a wealthy slaveowner in Fairfax County and a captain in the Virginia militia during the American Revolution.

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One Tennessean ancestor of mine fought at the Battle of New Orleans under Andrew Jackson and died of a disease contracted in camp. Another had his farm in Georgia burned by Union forces during Sherman’s march in the Civil War. Still another ancestor, a member of the US Cavalry, was shot while fighting Indians on the western plains during the Civil War; he survived and came to central Texas as part of the federal Reconstruction forces. The family heirlooms I own include a small arsenal: a stiletto dagger; two flintlock pistols and a powder horn; a vintage Colt Walker revolver; some Civil War minie balls and a grenade; the sword given by the Army to my great-grandfather, who served in the Spanish-American War.

Last but not least, after the Civil War, my great-great-great grandfather, a Texas cowboy, proposed to his bride by handing her a letter from horseback before he rode off to join a cattle drive. And a distant relative of mine in a collateral line was Wyatt Earp, the legendary lawman of O.K. Corral gunfight fame. Sounds pretty Heritage-y to me.

But those are all maternal ancestors. On my father’s side, I am a third-generation Swedish-American, and according to Pastor Joel Webbon, another white-nationalist firebrand with growing influence these days, “first-generation immigrants can never be true Americans. But neither can [the] second generation, even if born and raised here.”

He has a point. It takes diasporas a while to dissolve, if they are not replenished. My Swedish-born great-grandmother would ask her children, when they brought home friends from the one-room prairie schoolhouse, “Ar de svenskar eller Amerikaner?” (“Are they Swedes or Americans?”)

Then again, the immigrant Swedish-American pioneers and their children were white and Protestant, and they cleared land for small family farms. One of my ancestors on the Swedish side worked as a cowboy on a cattle ranch. Heritage or Hyphenates?

To complicate matters further, I am also one-eighth Jewish (the Union cavalryman shot by the American Indian during the Civil War was an Austrian-Jewish immigrant). Can Jews be Heritage Americans? According to Pastor Webbon, America is “not for Hindus. It’s not for Muslims. And it’s not for Jews. It belongs to Christians.” Non-Christians “can be in the car … but they don’t get to drive.” Now I’m worried that my driver’s license will be revoked in the Heritage American Regime.

My identity crisis deepens. To be fair, I have been confused about my racial identity for most of my life. According to the US Census, I was born a simple “white.” But then, in the 1970s, the federal government resolved that I’m a “non-Hispanic white,” a term made up by the Census in those years as a catch-all encompassing every white ethnic group that doesn’t know how to make good tamales. Under the Biden administration, the Census added a new category, “Middle Eastern and North African,” or MENA, that includes many ethnically Jewish people (in addition to Persians, Gulf Arabs, Levantines and Mesopotamians, and Amazighs, among others). Am I still a non-Hispanic white, or, as a one-eighth Jew, am I a MENA?

Confusing matters further, under halachic law, I am Jewish because my mother’s mother’s mother was Jewish. And yet under the Nazi Nuremberg Laws, I would have been classified as a non-Jewish Mischling of the second degree, rather than a Jew.

Bottom line: I don’t know whether I am a simple white, a non-Hispanic white, a MENA, a Jew, a second-degree Mischling, or a Heritage American.

Let’s turn from biological race to American culture. According to Ben R. Crenshaw, a doctoral student at Hillsdale College and another race-Right theorist: “Liberalism only ‘worked’ in America because these [white British Protestant] identities were commonly known and accepted… Thus, if America hopes to regain her strength, to preserve her historic people and way of life, and not be plundered of her wealth and inheritance by international pirates, then she must recover her own identity politics. She must ask and answer with force and conviction what her identity is. And then, she must have the political will to once again practice a politics of exclusion and preservation if she hopes to remain America much longer.”

Who knew that everything good in this country was done by my old-stock ancestors before all those non-British Europeans at Ellis Island and recent immigrants from elsewhere in the world arrived and screwed everything up? Is there a club I can join, like Sons of Heritage America? A secret handshake? Discounts on Heritage Americana on sale at the local Cracker Barrel?

I have to confess that I like the idea that, if I qualify as a Heritage American, citizens of other ancestries should ritually offer their thanks to my progenitors. It would be nice if, when I am on an airplane, the pilot would announce: “We have a Heritage American on the flight today, please give him a round of applause.” And I would smile benignly as strangers shook my hand, saying, “Thank you for the service of your British Protestant ancestors.”

To be honest, though, I’m not convinced my British ancestors really deserve to be retroactively thanked for taking part in a heroic, visionary effort to found a new society. Most of them just wanted to buy land and maybe slaves and make money. Many of my colonial-era English ancestors in the 1600s seem to have been indentured servants, brought over as contract laborers to work for fixed terms for this or that Southern tobacco farmer with a headright granted by the Crown, before obtaining their freedom.

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As for the Scots-Irish in my family tree, they didn’t cross the Atlantic from Northern Ireland in the 1700s because they had a bold spirit of adventure and wanted to wrassle bears, wear coonskin caps, make moonshine, and invent NASCAR. They were victims of rising rents charged by English landlords who gentrified Ulster, after having used the Scots-Irish as their shock troops in subjugating and ethnically cleansing the Catholic Irish.

As far as I know, neither my English nor my Scots-Irish ancestors before 1776 had any intention of creating a nation-state organized as a democratic republic that would be independent of the British Empire and a beacon of liberty to the world. Only a few zealous Puritans in New England had grand visions of the American future, hoping that the saints of New England would launch the conversion of humanity to Calvinism — not liberal democracy.

To be fair, pan-racial categories like non-Hispanic white and “MENA” and Asian and Pacific Islander are just as absurd as the idea of a pan-white, pan-Christian, or pan-Protestant Heritage American. The political scientist Eric Kaufmann has observed that the US system since the 1970s has been one of “asymmetric multiculturalism” — pan-racial categories get to have their own official “cultures” and “traditions” and “symbols,” but that is not allowed for whites — sorry, non-Hispanic whites.

Forget, for a moment, domineering white Christian nationalism. Why not allow symmetrical multiculturalism, in which the color white is added to the rainbow in a non-aggressive way?  Why not White Pride Week and White Heritage Month and a White History Museum on the national mall, where tourists can learn about the many contributions to our country of white Americans like George Washington and Thomas Edison and Lady Gaga?

The problem is that many stereotypically “white” cultural traditions are not, in fact, white in their origins. For centuries, despite division along the lines of racial castes, American culture has been a mixed-race melting-pot culture. The archetypical corn-fed Midwestern farm boy was fed on maize, developed originally in Mesoamerica by Native Americans. Barbecue? From barbacoa, a loan word in Spanish from the Taino Indians of the Caribbean for a meat smoker.

The American cowboy is a version of the Mexican vaquero, from his lariat (la reata) to his chaps (chaparreras) to his boots. In the 1950s and ’60s, a majority of American suburban houses were ranch-style homes, popularized by Cliff May, whose one-story designs with patios (another Spanish word) were inspired by the homes of his Spanish and Mexican ancestors in California. The banjo? An African instrument, brought to the New World by slaves and popularized among whites by 19th-century minstrel shows.

If you throw out everything in white American culture except colonial-era British Protestant imports, you’re left with — what, exactly? Boston baked beans? Buckled shoes? So maybe we should think twice before inventing Kwanzaa for white people.

Like pan-racial “cultures,” pan-racial political solidarity of any kind is rare in the United States. The slowly eroding bloc voting of black Americans is the exception to the rule. Though tilting toward Democrats, Hispanics and Asian-Americans have long divided their votes between the two parties. So have so-called Heritage Americans.

The Patriot and Loyalist factions in the Anglo-Protestant majority fought each in the Revolutionary War. A few generations later, Northern Anglo-Protestants and Southern Anglo-Protestants fought in the Civil War, which killed more Americans — mostly white Protestant Americans — than all other US conflicts combined.

Plus, white Americans have always been found in rival parties. In the 2024 election, white voters, who made up 71% of the electorate, were pretty evenly split, with 57% voting for Trump and 42% voting for Harris. To the perpetual dismay of white nationalists, the political divisions among white Americans — regional, religious, cultural, class-based — have always defeated any pan-white consciousness, even in the most racist eras in American history. Though a few of its members may infiltrate the Republican Party now and then, the fringe Right will remain on the fringe because there is no chance that normal, sane white Americans will ever be persuaded that they must set aside their other differences and unite in politics against domestic racial and religious minorities and nonwhite and non-Christian immigrants.

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Darryl Cooper, the online autodidact who provoked outrage when Tucker Carlson let him spread his revisionist views about Nazi mass murder, made this obvious point in a podcast with the nativist writer Scott Greer: “Most of the Southern racialists I know are closer to neo-Confederates than white nationalists, and don’t labor under the illusion that they share much of a common destiny, let alone a common identity, with Portland hipsters or Upper East Side Jews, or even liberal Yankee elites, for that matter.”

Given the many divisions among Heritage Americans, the United States isn’t going to become a white Protestant ethno-state any time soon — certainly not under President Trump, with his Jewish in-laws and Jewish-convert daughter. Indeed, the only way in which the GOP can hope to obtain a sustainable political majority is to build upon the gains made by Trump in the 2024 election among working-class Hispanic and black voters.

Contra the Heritage Americans, the racial divide is weakening in US politics and giving way to the “diploma divide” among all races. Nothing could undercut the growth of the Republican coalition more than toleration by mainstream Republicans and conservatives of fringe white nationalists, who have podcasts and fly-by-night churches and rural compounds, but no significant number of voters behind them. To quote Tennessee lawmaker and frontiersman David Crockett, a Heritage American if ever there was one: “That don’t make sense. It don’t even make good nonsense.”