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		<title>Turkey - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Erdoğan’s paranoid finale</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/11/erdogans-paranoid-finale/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/11/erdogans-paranoid-finale/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Turkey</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Andrew Finkel]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Turkey is already entering a post-Erdoğan era.' (Utku Ucrak/Anadolu /Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Andrew Finkel</strong> has corresponded from Istanbul for both international media and the Turkish press for over 30 years.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ has corresponded from Istanbul for both international media and the Turkish press for over 30 years.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:01:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:01:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COP Summit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Secularism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1080375</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[A succession war is coming]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Rip Van Winkle slept for only 20 years and missed the American Revolution. In November 2024, İlhan Sami Çomak emerged, blinking, after 30 years in a Turkish prison to a country that had similarly changed beyond all recognition. In 1994, he had been arrested for terrorism offenses that could only have been committed by traveling 1,000 miles in a single day — along a railway line which did not exist. A promising student from a village in eastern Turkey, Çomak discovered politics and a Kurdish identity at Istanbul University in the early Nineties. He was tempted, he says, but never recruited, by the armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party insurgency, then near its zenith. That did not prevent his arrest and confession, extracted after 19 days of torture, for two separate arson attacks at opposite ends of the country. The European Court of Human Rights declared his trial unlawful, but he served a full three decades.</p>
<p>The pre-smartphone Turkey that Çomak left behind had been dominated by a military determined to tame the religious populism of its politicians. The Instagram-crazed country he re-entered is dominated by the very politician the military failed to tame.</p>
<p>In 1994, Istanbul had half of its present population of 16 million, but was already growing, largely through migration from Anatolia, at the rate of one Newcastle a year. No politician understood that human tide better than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — street hawker, semi-professional footballer, hard-boiled party boss — who, that year, elbowed his way through a crowded field to become mayor of Istanbul for the pro-Islamic Welfare Party. Erdoğan, too, would see the inside of a Turkish prison: four months in 1999 for reciting a poem at a rally.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1090878878.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will the war bring down Erdoğan?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Andrew Finkel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But he and Çomak drew very different lessons from injustice. Çomak taught himself poetry, and the writings he smuggled out of his cell have won him international fame. Erdoğan learned that power punishes weakness, and that victimhood is a potent political tool. Donald Trump said that the only reason he attended July’s Nato summit in Ankara was out of respect for the strongman president who shares his skepticism of the Western alliance. And, even though Turkey was among the last of the G20 to ratify the Paris Agreement, Antalya is now hosting dozens of world leaders at the COP31 climate summit, Andy Burnham among them. But which Turkey will they be visiting? The “New Turkey” that a younger Erdoğan once promised, or merely a stale caricature of the <i>ancien régime</i> he set out to replace?</p>
<p>No longer in a cell, Çomak talks of the marvel of regaining an unobstructed view of the horizon, of being able to lose himself in a crowd. Erdoğan built a 1,150-room palace. That palace has become a monument to an epoch bearing his name. There is little question that Erdoğan’s Turkey has grown in prosperity and self-esteem. In the early aftermath of the Cold War, the country was desperate to join a European Union that didn’t want it, all while promoting a Turkic identity that might win influence (and the odd contract) in former Soviet Central Asia. Today, it is nothing if not confident. A republic founded over a century ago from the ashes of empire is again redefining its region.</p>
<p>Turkish diplomats once cited the country’s “difficult neighborhood” as a shackle on its ambitions, and as a reason to preserve the military’s role in civilian politics. Erdoğan’s great achievement has been to tame the generals and transfer their power to himself. His growing international influence has become a source of national pride but also a useful distraction from his own retreat from democratic accountability.</p>
<p>That neighborhood, though still difficult, has become a kind of portfolio: mediating between Russia and Ukraine, helping to see off the hostile Assad regime in Syria, even locking horns with Israel, albeit in a contest unlikely to draw blood. Turkey once boasted of having Nato’s second-largest army, though large cohorts of conscripts were kept busy whitewashing fences. Now it boasts of drones and a growing defense industry, driven in large part by Baykar, the company chaired by Erdoğan’s son-in-law.</p>
<p>Even so, Turkey has not entirely abandoned the dictum of the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Peace at home, peace in the world”— a principle that translates as “don’t mess with me and I won’t mess with you”. Turkey has the industrial and scientific base to be a nuclear power but has so far refrained from pursuing one. In the summer, it joined Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan in a mutual defense pact. Yet even after Houthi missile strikes on Riyadh in October, the government seems happier selling arms than sending troops into harm’s way.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Erdoğan exposed a deeper fissure in Turkish society: the resentment of newly urban, pious and provincial Turks towards a Western-facing secular elite.&#8221;</div>
<p>When Erdoğan came to national prominence, the great divides in Turkish politics were between Left and Right, civilian and military. Erdoğan exposed a deeper fissure in Turkish society: the resentment of newly urban, pious and provincial Turks towards a Western-facing secular elite. The founding republican settlement subordinated religion to the state. The bureaucracy, courts and universities saw themselves as guardians of secularism, and the generals saw themselves as guardians-in-chief. The ban on devout women wearing headscarves at university became one of the grievances upon which Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2001.</p>
<p>“Erdoğan’s style is very similar to Trump’s,” says Daron Acemoğlu, the Istanbul-born economist and Nobel laureate. “The secular establishment in Turkey made the same mistakes as the liberal establishment in the US or the UK, but without any of its liberalism.&#8221; He argues that it&#8217;s impossible to understand the AKP without understanding the contempt that the secular establishment has traditionally shown towards conservative provincials. “Erdoğan is good at propaganda, but when he said ‘in this country there are white Turks and black Turks’, that wasn’t just made up.”</p>
<p>The headscarf may have been the most visible grievance, but the deeper one lay in people’s wallets. Erdoğan, running for the Welfare Party, the movement from which the AKP would later emerge, was boosted into the mayoralty by a collapse of the currency in January 1994, followed by an inflation rate of over 100%. An even worse economic crisis brought his newly formed party to national office in 2002. By sticking to an IMF program negotiated by its predecessors, the new government nursed the economy back to health. For the first time, ordinary families could get a credit card, or a loan to buy a house. In 2019, the six minarets of a vast new mosque appeared on Istanbul’s Bosphorus skyline, but shopping malls, highways and sprawling public housing estates became equally prominent symbols of AKP rule.</p>
<p>Yet the machine that built this loyalty is running out of fuel. The liberalization that marked the start of AKP rule in 2002 has long since come unstuck or else has been corrupted. Arguably, the great accomplishment of post-war Turkish politicians was to oversee the mass movement of people from the countryside into the big cities. But that movement also created social fault lines which, a few generations later, are set to shift again. Today’s voters want more than neighborhood-level favors. They aspire to the good life and opportunities once enjoyed by the old urban elite. They also know that to be successful you need to have the right political connections. The A in AKP stands for <i>adalet</i> or “justice”. For a growing number, that letter has gone missing.</p>
<p>That Erdoğan’s AKP fared so badly in the 2024 local elections — coming second with some 35% of the national vote, failing to win back Istanbul and Ankara, and losing a string of other big cities — is a symptom of that disillusionment. Panic that it was losing control is the driving force accelerating the government’s slide into unfettered autocracy. Hence the response to the recent discovery of a Ponzi-like scheme that has left some £13 billion of savers’ money in limbo, was to arrest the messengers. Five journalists were charged over their coverage of a scandal that extended up the ladder to AKP higher-ups. Accused of spreading false information, two are still in custody, joining 23 other journalists behind bars on assorted charges. Yet the fallout of the scandal is proving harder to contain, undermining even further the integrity of the government and eroding individual saving after sharp losses in other financial markets.</p>
<p>And the government still can’t arrest the price of tomatoes. “How happy is the one who says ‘I am a Turk’,” runs another much-quoted Atatürk maxim. But the all-too-common conversation among today’s struggling middle-class parents, throttled by inflation of around 30%, is how to build a life for their children abroad.</p>
<p>While the reforms after the 2001 crisis opened up a new world of consumer credit and mortgages, a disastrous macroeconomic experiment, pairing low interest rates with high inflation, has now left those managing the economy with only one real option: muddling through. The notion that people could put up with the AKP’s brand of autocratic piety because at least it could manage the economy is long gone. The cliché among Istanbul’s chattering classes had always been that, no matter how bad the economy, the restaurants were always full. “They’re not full anymore,” says Ekin Şahin, whose family is in the trade. “People need a handful of reasons to eat out. No one goes out on a whim.”</p>
<p>Just as<i> New York Times</i> leader writers struggled to explain how Trump was elected not once but twice, a large segment of the Turkish population despairs at what it sees as the cognitive dissonance of fellow citizens who still believe Erdoğan is leading the country in the right direction. Increasingly, however, loyalist support is being whittled away. More than half the electorate declined to back Erdoğan in the first round of the 2023 presidential election, and the 2024 local elections confirmed the drift. As in Trump’s America, loyalty is not inexhaustible. The AKP once sold its campaign for Islamic rights as part of a process of democratization. Whether or not that was ever the case, few believe it any more.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has proceeded methodically, transferring an already powerful state apparatus into his own hands. As mayor, he learned how public contracts could be used to build a base. He defanged the military through the high-profile “Ergenekon” trials of senior officers that began in 2008. He also sidelined senior figures in his own party who still regarded him as <i>primus inter pares </i>rather than top dog. The Gezi Park protests of 2013, a vast spontaneous protest to stop a central Istanbul park being turned into a shopping mall, taught him another lesson; he set about systematically capturing not just the legacy media but newly powerful social media too. The attempted coup of 2016 provided an opportunity to move against vocal opponents. The popular Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş was arrested — he remains in jail despite a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights — and the government set about dismantling a rival religious movement, and former ally, led by the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen. A referendum in 2017 abolished the office of prime minister and completed the transfer of power to a virtually unchecked presidency.</p>
<p>Unlike Trump, Erdoğan has held sway for almost 25 years, long enough to fine-tune a system of censorship and repression. Control of the courts has allowed his government to upend the legal process and divide the opposition. This took on fresh momentum with the arrest in March 2025 of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayor of Istanbul, days before he was to be anointed the opposition’s presidential candidate. He now faces charges across several indictments, including bribery, embezzlement, leading a criminal organization, espionage and insulting public officials, which together carry a notional sentence of some 2,400 years. Halk TV — a channel that supported the opposition — was put under the control of a court-appointed trustee as İmamoğlu’s defense in court was about to begin. There is now a long list of mayors and elected officials under threat. It remains to be seen whether the fate of his fellow mayors — over 30 are still in detention — will be raised by another great proponent of devolved government and former mayor, Andy Burnham at this week’s summit. The mayor of Antalya, the host city, is also in jail.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285048947.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s plan for Nato 3.0</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>One explanation for this mounting insecurity is that even paranoiacs have enemies. But while the ruling party may have scored substantial successes in its <i>kulturkampf</i> with the old republican elite, it may now be losing the war. It is not so much that the other side is winning as that Erdogan’s politics of confrontation is wearing thin. Turkish social media hums with clips of schoolchildren, some still in headscarves from after-school Qur’an classes, singing and dancing along to Manifest, a girl band who have just played Wembley Arena after their sentences for obscene behavior at an Istanbul concert were suspended. Survey after survey shows that while the overwhelming majority of Turks identify as Muslim, most agree with Atatürk that religion should be a private affair. Erdoğan set out to mold a pious generation, but young Turks would prefer a decent job.</p>
<p>The possibility, then, is that Turkey is already entering a post-Erdoğan era, even with him firmly in control. As the old sources of popular loyalty weaken, the struggle within the ruling establishment may be less about governing Turkey than about controlling what comes next. One sign of a brewing succession war is that the revolution is now devouring its own. Where repression was once reserved for the regime’s opponents, pro-government pundits and well-connected business cronies are discovering that they, too, can be picked up. Former AKP mayors have been arrested in municipal corruption probes, while the Ponzi scandal has put a former deputy minister and the fund’s AKP-connected chief executive behind bars. These cases look less like a purge than a scramble for position among factions in the presidency, the prosecution service, the security apparatus and the business world. If so, Erdoğan may stay in power long enough to see his own accomplishments unravel.</p>
<p>Where, then, will change come from? Çomak, having given the state 30 years, is not waiting to find out. “I have changed. Life has changed,” he says. “But it cannot be said that there has been any fundamental change in the mentality of power.” Çomak sees little option but to plow his own furrow, to keep writing, and to enjoy the solidarity of a literary community that supported him in prison. He repeats Nietzsche’s old saw that what does not kill you makes you stronger. “Perhaps everyone should spend a month or two in prison,” he adds. “Then they would understand better that there is no room for hopelessness. Just don’t stay as long as I did.”</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1080375</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Why are British women going to Turkey for sex?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/10/the-british-grannies-going-to-turkey-for-sex/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/10/the-british-grannies-going-to-turkey-for-sex/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-540195965.jpg?w=517</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>dispatch </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Julie Bindel]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-15-at-11.44.56.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The nightlife here revolves around flirtatious evening entertainment.' (Fairfax Media/ Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Julie Bindel</strong> is an investigative journalist, author, and feminist campaigner. Her latest book is <em>Lesbians: Where are we now?</em> She also writes on <a href="https://juliebindel.substack.com/">Substack</a>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>bindelj</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an investigative journalist, author, and feminist campaigner. Her latest book is <em>Lesbians: Where are we now?</em> She also writes on <a href="https://juliebindel.substack.com/">Substack</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 23:01:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 11:31:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sex tourism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1078354</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Holidaymakers are exploiting foreign men]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“I love beautiful young women like you.” I had been in the bar for no longer than it took to order a drink before a youthful waiter approached me and turned on the charm.</p>
<p>It’s a steamy evening in downtown Marmaris, a popular resort town in southwest Turkey. The bar is packed with women young and old, mainly from the UK. We’re being “entertained” by locals known as “bar boys”: men in their twenties with muscular physiques and raunchy dance moves. At 64, traveling alone, I appear to fit the clientele perfectly.</p>
<p>Marmaris is a classic Turkish resort: green mountains tower over the blue waters of a large harbor. The long stretch of golden sand attracts more than 1.5 million tourists each year, including around 700,000 Britons. Some holiday companies promote it as an easy, safe, sociable option for lone female travelers. But that also has a downside, encouraging the flourishing of a distinctive form of sex tourism.</p>
<p>&#8220;I would never behave like this at home,&#8221; says Kay, a 45-year-old woman from the North of England. &#8220;But these men come up to you, massively flirting, bare-chested, and seriously gorgeous. What am I supposed to do?&#8221; The men in question are on low salaries, and often don’t have much paid work in the winter. I ask if the men Kay dates ask her for money. &#8220;All the time,&#8221; she says, without hesitation or embarrassment, &#8220;but it&#8217;s not like prostitution. They just want nice things, and I am glad to treat them.&#8221;</p>
<p>The nightlife here revolves around flirtatious evening entertainment. The male staff thrust their groins towards female tourists, tell them they’re “sexy” and “beautiful”; and ask for kisses. &#8220;It is part of the job,&#8221; says Ali, one of the waiters, a tall and slim young man with glossy black hair. &#8220;And it means we get good tips if we do it right. I had one English girlfriend who was older than my <i>ana</i> [mother]. She bought me new trainers and gave me money to pay my phone bill.&#8221;</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;I would never behave like this at home. But these men come up to you, massively flirting, bare chested, and seriously gorgeous. What am I supposed to do?&#8221;</div>
<p>We’re all well aware of why men head to Thailand, with massage parlors and brothels on every corner, hotels charging by the hour, and women prostituting themselves on the street corners of beach resorts. All this results in a well-documented problem of trafficking and sexual exploitation, with thousands of underage Thai girls migrating from impoverished rural areas to meet the demands of male tourists.</p>
<p>But the issue of older women paying for sex with young local men while on holiday is widely misunderstood. Academics tend to <a href="https://id.elsevier.com/as/authorization.oauth2?platSite=SD/science&amp;additionalPlatSites=GH/generalhospital,LS/LS,MDY/mendeley,SC/scopus,RX/reaxys&amp;scope=openid%2520email%2520profile%2520els_auth_info%2520els_idp_info%2520els_idp_analytics_attrs%2520els_sa_discover%2520urn:com:elsevier:idp:policy:product:inst_assoc&amp;response_type=code&amp;redirect_uri=https://www.sciencedirect.com/user/identity/landing&amp;authType=SINGLE_SIGN_IN&amp;prompt=login&amp;client_id=SDFE-v4&amp;state=retryCounter=0&amp;csrfToken=9b4171e7-10c4-4e1b-9909-8ca0b83da41e&amp;idpPolicy=urn%25253Acom%25253Aelsevier%25253Aidp%25253Apolicy%25253Aproduct%25253Ainst_assoc&amp;returnUrl=%25252Fscience%25252Farticle%25252Fabs%25252Fpii%25252FS0278431916301037&amp;migrated=MIGRATED&amp;prompt=login&amp;cid=arp-2b691b20-a741-4d43-bbb4-71a4599dedf9" target="_blank" rel="noopener">describe</a> the women as “romance tourists”, writing about “transactional sex” or the search for “sexual intimacy”. Tabloid journalists often write about “grannies” looking for “toy boys”. But what would we call these relationships if the holidaymakers were older British men and the locals poorly paid young women?</p>
<p>Valerie*, 60, travels to Marmaris at least twice a year, where she “dates” younger men, all of whom work in the tourist trade. &#8220;I never see the same man twice,&#8221; she admits, when we meet in a cafe by the harbor. &#8220;And I worked out [that] I have bought at least half a dozen mobile phones for my boyfriends in the past three years.&#8221;</p>
<p>Does she think the men are attracted to her? She looks taken aback by my question. &#8220;I know I&#8217;m a bit older than some of them, but a lot of these men like that. It&#8217;s different from at home.&#8221;</p>
<p>To be sure, some of the women here are very open about why they travel to Marmaris. They know that sex is on the menu alongside the cocktails. But most women, like Valerie, have convinced themselves that they were engaged in legitimate relationships — rather than transactions.</p>
<p>Talk to the men, however, and a different story emerges. One older waiter told me the women are &#8220;seen as dirty, and as totally without morals. They are looked at with disgust, and everyone knows which ones are here for sex. It&#8217;s the old ones, or the women who come here on their own.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yet for many young men, flings with British women allow them to buy meals, a new phone, or send money to their families. &#8220;These women want sex, and I am happy to give it to them, even the old and ugly ones,&#8221; says Ali. &#8220;I take a Viagra and close my eyes. When they fall in love with me, I can ask for anything.&#8221;</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/brussels-europes-pimp-city/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/brussels-europes-pimp-city/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2212121960.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/brussels-europes-pimp-city/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/brussels-europes-pimp-city/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Brussels: Europe&#039;s Pimp City</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/brussels-europes-pimp-city/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Julie Bindel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The film <i>Shirley Valentine </i>(1989) fed British audiences a winning fantasy of a middle-aged woman escaping domesticity and finding herself through Mediterranean romance. On the surface, Marmaris is selling something similar. But that fantasy leaves out the cultural and economic chasm between the woman on holiday and the many serving the drinks.</p>
<p>Many of the young men working in Marmaris have migrated here from poor and conservative parts of Turkey further inland. They come for summer work, where they can expect to earn between £425 and £535 per month working at a bar, far more than they would at home. &#8220;It&#8217;s a route out of poverty for many,&#8221; says Dilek, a campaigner for Fethiye Kadın Dayanışma Grubu (FKDG), an NGO that advocates for women’s equality and human rights. She also tells me that the men who come to Marmaris are mainly Kurds, many of whom feel deep shame about what they are doing.</p>
<p>Ali, a Kurd from east Turkey, tells me he lives in fear of any of his family members or friends back home seeing one of the numerous videos circulating online, featuring him and his colleagues simulating sexual moves with the women and dancing in nothing but a thong. “If my mother ever found out what I am doing, she would die of shame.”</p>
<p>Yet young male waiters are not the only victims of this sordid system. I also heard stories of female tourists being threatened. &#8220;When the women realize they are being used, which some of them do,&#8221; explains Yonca, another member of FKDG, &#8220;and refuse to give them any more money, that&#8217;s when the violence starts. He fights back against all the humiliation he feels, having to dance like a puppet for the women, and being treated like a sex slave. They can get very nasty.&#8221;</p>
<p>In videos that went viral last year, male staff members (reportedly not professional dancers) at a bar in Marmaris performed invasive and sexually suggestive moves towards women, often without their consent. Women were also seen being forcibly pulled into bars. The Turkish authorities, who for a long time turned a blind eye to the indecent tourism in Marmaris, only cracked down when this footage of harassment circulated internationally — anxious to protect the reputation of their tourism industry. But when I visited, it seemed to be business as usual. It is ironic that Turkey, which under an increasingly patriarchal President Erdoğan promotes family values and morality in many areas of social policy, allows this situation to continue.</p>
<p>Prostitution apologists continue to insist that no harm is being done either by or to female tourists. Yet Marmaris does not feel very safe for the women being dragged into bars and sexually harassed by young men desperate for work. Nor does it seem fair for those men caught up in an ugly system that trades their dignity for a monthly wage and the fantasy of escape.</p>
<p>Shirley Valentine went to the Aegean, had a holiday romance and came home transformed. The women flying home from Marmaris leave someone else to bear the cost of their transformation.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1078354</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Trump’s plan for Nato 3.0</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/07/trumps-plan-for-nato/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285048947.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lily Lynch]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/150523.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Trump repeatedly praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.' (Win McNamee/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Lily Lynch </strong>is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 23:03:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:33:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1066805</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The alliance relies on coercion and censorship]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Nato summit in Ankara was a showcase of Turkish hospitality and ruthless authoritarian efficiency. Journalists were showered with Turkish delights, perfumes, and porcelain coffee cups, and even Turkey’s cats were enlisted in the charm offensive: white Angora kittens were introduced to cooing journalists in the press center. The roads were freshly paved and the shiny Nato shuttle buses all ran on time. The entire spectacle was sustained by staggering levels of security: roughly 70,000 personnel secured the event — almost <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-06-19/massive-security-operation-for-nato-summit-turns-parts-of-the-hague-into-a-fortress" target="_blank" rel="noopener">double the number</a> present at last year’s Nato summit in The Hague. In the weeks leading up to it, all protests were banned and hundreds of Nato critics and Left-wing activists were arrested. While Trump praised the spectacle, some liberal Atlanticists present told me they were a touch squeamish about the entire display. In their view, the Ankara summit was a deviation from enlightened Euro-Atlanticist democracy, something supposedly intrinsic to the alliance.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>However, a better assessment would have understood the Ankara summit as Nato returning to its roots. In recent months, the theme of Nato reverting to its original Cold War purpose — European deterrence and defense — has been advanced by the Trump administration. The idea was rolled out in February as “Nato 3.0” and is the brainchild of Undersecretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby, a restrainer who advocates for limiting military interventionism and who has therefore been maligned by the liberal Atlanticist set and reportedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/06/us/politics/pentagon-sees-growing-espionage-threat-from-israel.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spied</a> on by Israel. As Colby describes it, Nato 3.0 is not an abandonment of Nato but rather “a return to and validation of its foundational purpose”. In other words, “make Nato great again” by ensuring Europeans pour billions into defense industrial production and technological innovation so they can take care of their own conventional (non-nuclear) defense.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>At this year’s summit, I witnessed the transition to Nato 3.0 in real time. The Trump administration surely regards Europe’s acceptance of its shift in policy and philosophy as a major foreign policy “win”. Multiple senior Nato officials spoke of the need to build &#8220;a stronger Europe in a stronger Nato”, and repeatedly recited figures testifying to leaps in European defense spending in accordance with Trumpian demands. One senior Nato official spoke of the &#8220;simultaneity problem” — the Trump administration’s concern about a scenario in which the US military would be forced to fight multiple major conflicts at once, which he described as the reason “why Europeans are stepping up and taking more responsibility for their own defense”. Whatever their distaste for Trump’s bullying rhetoric, it was clear that Nato officials and allies are now taking the Trump administration’s words very seriously.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-middle-easts-new-power-brokers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-middle-easts-new-power-brokers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2270310557-e1775994069842.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-middle-easts-new-power-brokers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-middle-easts-new-power-brokers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Middle East’s new power brokers</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-middle-easts-new-power-brokers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A few weeks ahead of the summit, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4539593/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-2026-nato-defense-ministerial-i/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">echoed</a> Colby at the Nato defense ministerial meeting in Brussels, tying Nato 3.0 to Washington’s demands that allies raise defense spending. “That&#8217;s what defense spending commitments are all about,” he said, “transforming Nato into a real military alliance that&#8217;s focused on hard power and real deterrence, a Nato 3.0 modeled on the Nato 1.0 that won the Cold War.” During the same meeting, Hegseth gave trans-Atlantic allies an ultimatum. Going forward, he said, American Nato dues would be contingent on allies meeting their own defense spending targets. &#8220;Where other allies do not spend with urgency, our dues contributions will go down,” he warned. He also told allies to expect a review of their progress in six months. If insufficient strides had been made by then, the US would spend less on Nato. This threat contributed to a sense of elevated fear in Ankara. It wasn’t an entirely irrational one either: the Trump administration is dramatically scaling back its involvement in other multilateral institutions. In January, the United States withdrew from 31 UN entities and is currently<a href="https://genevasolutions.news/global-news/un-assembly-chief-urges-us-to-settle-dues-in-full-as-cash-crunch-deepens" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> withholding</a> around $4 billion in mandatory UN dues.</p>
<p>To understand “Nato 3.0”, it’s essential to understand the alliance’s evolution. Nato’s founding was rooted in Cold War ideological and military competition with the Soviet Union. As such, Nato 1.0 was a firmly Right-wing organization, one interested above all in strengthening American dominion over Europe and confronting the Soviet threat. But it also had several other functions, among them spreading the gospel of free markets and crushing internal Left-wing subversion. The North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949 established the military alliance and outlined Nato “values”; the pact promised “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. From the very beginning, not all members lived up to the pompous rhetoric. Founding member state Portugal was then ruled by dictator Antonio Salazar, whose one-party regime <i>Estado Novo</i>, or New State, employed a menacing secret police and outlawed all opposition parties; the dictatorship’s “new” name was an irony, as <a href="https://literaryreview.co.uk/economist-autocrat" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according</a> to Tom Gallagher, the puritanical Salazar “manifested the true reactionary’s horror of change”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The United States was often the alliance’s biggest proponent of working with unsavory regimes, pushing for Franco’s Spain to become a member of Nato with overwhelming support in Congress and the Senate. The US saw Francoist Spain as an ideal ally<a href="https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/22/inenglish/1540219578_899934.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> owing to</a> its “strategic location and furiously anti-communist sentiment”. When some European member states objected to admitting Franco’s regime into the alliance, the United States signed the Pact of Madrid with Spain in 1953, furnishing the dictatorship with aid and allowing the US to build military bases on Spanish soil. French colonial Algeria was also an original part of Nato, with Article 5 extending to the colonized country where systematic torture and concentration camps were used to subdue the population. Meanwhile some former Nazis from West Germany’s supposedly “clean Wehrmacht” — the alliance shamelessly propagated the myth that Wehrmacht officers fought honorably during the Second World War — were also integrated into the pact, with some rising to Nato’s senior leadership. In the face of the Soviet threat, there could be no enemies to the Right.</p>
<p>Nato 2.0 covered a period we might describe as the “long Nineties” and was characterized by End-of-History hubris and excess: rapacious eastward expansion, self-aggrandizing rhetoric about liberal values, and zealous out-of-area operations. Nato’s “out-of-area” actions — operations undertaken beyond the territorial limits of member states — undermined its claim to be a “purely defensive alliance”. As “humanitarian” operations, their results ranged from mixed to disastrous. While the 1999 Nato bombing of Yugoslavia forced Serbian security forces from Kosovo, it did not bring down President Slobodan Milošević; he wouldn’t fall until a contested election several months later. Indeed, Milošević’s own Minister of Information during the bombing, Aleksandar Vučić, has been leader of Serbia in some form for 14 years, and his regime employs Serbian nationalist rhetoric barely distinguishable from that of his former boss. In 2011, Nato intervened in Libya with even more catastrophic results: though sold to the public as a “humanitarian intervention” to protect civilians, the real goal was regime change, with the removal of leader Muammar al-Gaddafi judged a strategic imperative worth many Libyan lives. In the<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> end</a>, a report from Harvard’s Belfer Center determined that “Nato&#8217;s action magnified the conflict&#8217;s duration about sixfold and its death toll at least sevenfold”. Nato 2.0 also included the Great War on Terror, which meant the emergence of non-state actors as a new threat; costly cross-border operations and occupations ensued. If Nato 1.0’s main purpose was containing the Soviet Union in Europe, then Nato 2.0 represented the mother of all mission creep.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If Nato 1.0’s main purpose was containing the Soviet Union in Europe, then Nato 2.0 represented the mother of all mission creep.&#8221;</div>
<p>The summit in Ankara was the alliance’s response to Trumpian demands for a Nato 3.0: a scaled back, “Europe-led” pact that doesn’t rely on the United States as the guarantor of Europe’s conventional defense. As such, the summit kicked off with a grandiose Defense Industry Forum, where Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte repeatedly invoked the term “defense industrial revolution”. The event was an opportunity for Turkey to hawk its indigenous defense industry wares, but it was also an opportunity for Europe. As one official from a European defense ministry wryly put it to me, the forum allowed allies to make a big show of complying with Trumpian dictates to spend more on their defense.</p>
<p>Just to drive the point home, President Zelensky gave a speech at the event likening the current revolution in drone technology to the invention of missiles. He described Ukraine as a reluctant defense industrial powerhouse forged in war and asserted that it should therefore be admitted to Nato. In other characteristically immoderate statements, the Defense Industry Forum was widely touted as a success. A Nato official confirmed that “at least” $50 billion in new defense deals were announced at the forum; among them were $40 billion worth of investment in counter-drone capabilities and multi-country initiatives for the continued militarization of space. The pivot to Nato 3.0 would appear to be well underway.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Untitled-design-49.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Britain&#039;s military be saved?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Turkey is perhaps the model Nato 3.0 ally, which makes its hosting of the first summit of this new chapter richly appropriate. Though Turkey has contributed to Nato 2.0 peacekeeping missions and interventions in places like Kosovo and Bosnia, Turkish President Recep Erdoğan, like Trump, has no time for liberal internationalist pieties. Like Trump, he would like to see Nato stripped bare to its raw essentials of defense and security, ditching democracy promotion and the dissemination of “Western values”. Turkey has the second largest army in Nato and a burgeoning defense industrial base: Turkish defense and aviation exports broke records last year,<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiyes-defense-aviation-exports-exceed-10b-threshold-in-2025/3790365" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> exceeding</a> $10 billion. All of this has won admiration from Trump. Throughout the summit, Trump repeatedly praised Erdoğan, calling him “really a great man”, “a great leader”, and “a strong person”. Trump’s affinity with Erdoğan suggests that what is most valued in Nato 3.0 is a capacity for deterrence and defense; democratic deficiencies are of little concern in an ally that is seen to be pulling its weight. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Despite the notable absence of liberal rhetoric in Ankara, elements of Nato 2.0 remain for now, including the tradition of the annual summit. During the Cold War, Nato held just 10 summits. Today, it holds a wildly expensive summit every year. Last year’s one in The Hague reportedly <a href="https://nltimes.nl/2025/06/19/nato-summit-hague-costing-eu1-million-per-minute" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cost</a> about €1 million per minute, with some media <a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/06/24/7214428/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reporting</a> that it was the most expensive meeting in the alliance’s history. Preparations for this year’s summit reportedly cost €235 million. In addition to being expensive, international relations scholar Patrick Porter believes that annual summits present risks. “The curse of regular summitry…wasn’t a feature of Cold War Nato,” he tells me. “There are these relentless opportunities for trouble and mischief and misunderstanding.” It’s a critique now shared by some other allies. While Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte told journalists in Ankara that the next summit will be in Albania, he would not confirm that it would happen next year.</p>
<p>Whatever the similarities between Nato 3.0 and Nato 1.0, there are also a few striking differences. Nato once justified itself with the Cold War platitudes of prosperity and liberty. This was propaganda to be sure, but it was still integral to winning an ideological battle that once divided the world. Now, the rhetoric of prosperity and freedom has been replaced with the cold, uninspiring promise of “security” — a nebulous, constantly expanding concept emblematic of an ideology that has lost the ability to excite or be believed, and must now rely on coercion, censorship and repression to get its way. While Nato holds a lavish summit each year and member states ramp up spending for a “defense industrial revolution”, people living in allied countries are being told they must endure brutal cuts to health care, education, and social welfare to pay for it all. Alliance boosters like to boast that Nato “protects one billion people”. If it does, it does so at a steep cost.</p>
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					<title>Will the war bring down Erdoğan?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-the-war-bring-down-erdogan/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1090878878.jpg?w=566</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Autocracy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Andrew Finkel]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-24-at-10.18.59.jpg?w=82</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Turkey, once a viable candidate for EU membership, has long ceased to be the poster child for how democracy can flourish in a Muslim-majority society.' (Adem Altan/AFP/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Andrew Finkel</strong> has corresponded from Istanbul for both international media and the Turkish press for over 30 years.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ has corresponded from Istanbul for both international media and the Turkish press for over 30 years.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 22:59:38 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 08:58:29 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1057400</guid>
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								<![CDATA[His regime needs growth to survive]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Four Iranian ballistic missiles ventured into Turkish airspace this spring. The collateral damage was considerable — though not to life or materiel. All four were easily intercepted by Nato defenses before reaching their target. Rather, the harm done was to the confidence of pundits and policymakers who had assumed that Tehran would never turn its sights on its western neighbor.</p>
<p>Their reasoning was that Turkey, which has the second largest standing army in Nato, was not to be trifled with. More to the point, they saw the attacks as a category error. Turkey was just not the enemy. Ankara&#8217;s official self-image is of a natural mediator, a regional heavyweight whose cultural understanding of its neighborhood is deeply rooted in a 600-year Ottoman past. It had loudly denounced the US-Israeli strikes while working its back channels to bring them to a halt. In other words, the missiles targeted Turkish self-esteem. For all its condemnation of US action, and despite saber-rattling at Israel, Turkey was being lumped into the imperial camp it had so loudly refused to join. It was a cruel blow that when talks between the Trump administration and the mullahs in Tehran finally took place, they happened in Islamabad and not Istanbul.</p>
<p>Even before the fog of this conflict lifts, Turkey, like countries elsewhere, is busy calculating who comes out on top. The <em>cui bono </em>matrix is not difficult to run. By most calculations, as Iran goes down, Turkey goes up. Of course, the current high price of oil is a spanner in Turkey&#8217;s disinflation policy, and risks undoing three years of sacrifice that dragged inflation down from a high of 75% per annum to (a still staggering) 32%. Yet as with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, a weakened Iran increases Turkey&#8217;s strategic and commercial clout. In the long term, it reinforces Turkey&#8217;s effort to be an energy and transport hub, and allows it to compete with Dubai as the regional commercial center. That&#8217;s shadowed by opportunities further afield: just last week, Turkey&#8217;s foreign minister signed a &#8220;strategic partnership&#8221; on trade and security with Britain.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As that last deal implies, all this is also good for the Turkish defense industries — not just drones but warships and even fighter jets. Israel views this with some alarm, and Benjamin Netanyahu has warned against an &#8220;emerging radical Sunni axis&#8221; in which Turkey is, presumably, the crucial pivot. In truth, the danger of a confrontation between a US ally and a fully paid-up member of Nato is slim. Ankara&#8217;s greater fear is that a badly wounded and unstable Iran will be a running sore even greater than the Syrian civil war — prompting a refugee crisis along a common 534-kilometer border, or else fueling Kurdish irredentism.</p>
<p>Thumbing back to before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Turkey may have been suspicious of the Shah&#8217;s ambitions to turn Iran into a dominant Middle Eastern power, but relations were largely cooperative. While there was no direct causal link, it is not fanciful to think that the rise of a Shiite theocratic regime in Tehran gave confidence to the Sunni religious Right in Turkey, which was gathering strength in those years. That Turkey was in danger of becoming &#8220;another Iran&#8221; was the newspaper cliché of the day. It is now ironic to think that a preferred solution for the pious government ruling in Ankara would be a stable but weakened secular regime in Iran. The worst option would be for Iran to emerge from the current conflict as master of the Strait of Hormuz, emboldened and unbowed.</p>
<p>Whatever the outcome, the people of Iran may well conclude that they are classic victims of &#8220;the curse of oil&#8221;, a rueful malediction preventing nations from converting natural resources into the well-being of their citizens. The Turkish people might conclude that they suffer from a different sort of hex: &#8220;strategic significance&#8221;. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been at the helm of his country for well over two decades, pioneering the art of transactional international relations while Donald Trump was chasing starlets and Viktor Orbán was still Brussels&#8217; idea of a model democrat. His governments have managed to leverage geography and regional importance to insulate Turkey from external pressures and democratic accountability at home. The question now is whether the war will finally strip away that insulation, exposing Ankara to pressures it has long managed to arbitrage. The answer lies in understanding how profoundly Turkey has changed under Erdoğan&#8217;s rule — and whether that change can still work in his favor.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The question now is whether the war will expose Ankara to pressures it has long managed to arbitrage.&#8221;</div>
<p>It might be a stretch to say that Turkey underwent a form of regime change in the 2002 elections that brought Erdoğan&#8217;s Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power. But it is fair to say that those elections obliterated a whole generation of politicians. No party in the previous parliament managed to gain a single seat. In a result reminiscent of Hungary under Orbán, and under a system that rewards the largest party, the AKP won two-thirds of MPs with barely a third of the popular vote. Erdoğan, a former mayor of Istanbul, was still a banned politician at the time, having served a brief prison sentence for &#8220;exploiting religion to political ends&#8221; by reciting a nationalist poem at a political rally — a blatant form of judicial casuistry which he was later to apply to his own political rivals.</p>
<p>Erdoğan&#8217;s political instincts and impassioned rhetoric peppered with references to Islam spoke to the concerns of first- and second-generation urban migrants. His party portrayed a greater acceptance of religion in public life as part of a wider struggle to make Turkey more democratic. Until recently, an aggressively secular Turkish military was a controlling presence in political life. Still, it is important to remember that what brought the AKP to power was not so much a tide of Islamic feeling as an economic crisis. A decade averaging 70% inflation was followed in 2001 by the collapse of the Turkish lira.</p>
<p>Today, it is again inflation, much more than Iranian Kheibar Shekan missiles, that most threatens the Erdoğan government. The parallel with Orbán is inexact — the GDP of Istanbul alone is roughly 1.5 times larger than all of Hungary. Yet like the jobless Hungarian premier, Erdoğan faces the predicament of a populist leader who now strains to be popular. And, like autocrats everywhere, Turkey&#8217;s leader has cultivated a patronage network and a praetorian guard of cronies who will do anything to keep their champion in power. The result is an increasingly disillusioned society that watches its country drop like a stone in international indices of democratic rights and press freedoms. A common reckoning is that 90% of Turkish media is under direct government control. But here&#8217;s the rub. The AKP still suffered its worst defeat since coming to power in the 2024 municipal elections, not just failing in the big cities but losing conservative heartland strongholds such as Bursa, Kütahya and Adıyaman.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2223902775.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Turkey’s Kurds are tired of fighting</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A year after Ekrem İmamoğlu — the popular Istanbul mayor widely seen as the most credible presidential challenger for the 2028 elections — won a second term by 10 percentage points in 2024, the government moved to arrest him on corruption charges. The tactic was familiar: Selahattin Demirtaş, the charismatic leader of the pro-Kurdish party, has spent years in prison despite the European Court of Human Rights repeatedly ruling his detention was politically motivated. The court issued a similar ruling for the philanthropist Osman Kavala, imprisoned since 2017. Kavala’s offense was to support civil society activism, his aggravated life sentence now a warning pour <em>décourager les autres</em>, or in this case other businesspeople tempted to support a dissident cause.</p>
<p>As the constitution stands, Erdoğan is not eligible for another presidential term, but few doubt he will overcome that obstacle. And though current polls show him unable to beat a CHP opponent, his current strategy is to use the courts to run that party into the ground. Mayor after CHP mayor is now being arrested, while the party leadership may be legally disbanded. Turkey, once a viable candidate for EU membership, has long ceased to be the poster child for how democracy can flourish in a Muslim-majority society.</p>
<p>The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Turkey&#8217;s annual showcase conference held earlier this month, offered a revealing snapshot of where Erdoğan&#8217;s transactional model now stands. Dozens of heads of state attended. American and Iranian officials circled the same rooms without meeting. The mood was less about solving the Hormuz crisis than recalibrating for a world in which Washington is, to put it mildly, unpredictable. In such a world, Erdoğan&#8217;s strongman politics finds a ready audience. Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Ankara, was explicit about the new dispensation at the public forum. “This part of the world,” he said, “respects only one thing: power. And if you don&#8217;t reflect power, if you reflect weakness, you are on your heels.” To hammer his point home, Barrack even lauded Erdoğan by name.</p>
<p>But as the price of food rises, as the middle classes try to send their children abroad, and as elected leaders go to jail, Turkish citizens may not be quite so sanguine about the cost to their civil liberties. Turkey pundits used to describe the country&#8217;s fault lines as lying between military and democratic politics, between secular and pious — but these binaries may have been more symbiotic than they appeared. Think of the Victorian optical toy, the thaumatrope: a bird painted on one side, a cage on the other. Spin the disc fast enough and the bird appears inside the cage. The question, as Turkey navigates the turbulence of its neighborhood&#8217;s most dangerous war in a generation, is whether the disc is finally slowing down — and whether, when it does, the bird will still be there.</p>
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					<title>I was detained by Greece’s migrant police</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/border.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Immigration</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Many inmates carried the scars of police beatings, and disease and self-harm were rampant.' Photo: Milos Bicanski/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 22:59:31 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 10 Sep 2025 10:22:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asylum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Athens]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greece]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Schengen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=705685</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Brutality won’t stop asylum seekers]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As far as I’m aware, I’m the only British national who has ever <a href="https://www.thecanary.co/editorial/2021/11/19/detained-and-banned-from-europe-a-british-journalist-in-the-eu-migrant-detention-system/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suffered detention</a> in Greece’s infamous migrant processing system. Held in facilities from Patras to Corinth to Athens for several months in 2021, I witnessed first-hand both the Kafkaesque brutality of the European border regime and its detrimental impact on small Greek island communities.</p>
<p>The circumstances of my personal maltreatment by the Greek authorities are admittedly unique. But as an unexpected byproduct, they helped me understand what actually happens behind the doors of Greece’s notorious detention centers. Whichever party executes that plan here in Britain — whether Reform, <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/robert-jenrick-asylum-seekers-should-be-detained-in-camps/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Robert Jenrick’s</a> Conservatives, or even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/sep/06/shabana-mahmood-set-to-move-asylum-seekers-from-hotels-to-barracks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Labour</a> under new Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood — detaining refugees and processing asylum claims in closed, Greek-style centers will only worsen the very problems these proposals are purported to solve.</p>
<p>In brief, I have spent many years <a href="https://unherd.com/author/matt-broomfieldunherd-com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reporting</a> on the Kurdish political movement in Syria and the existential wars their Western-allied movement has <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2019/02/inside-rojava-democratic-province-trapped-between-turkish-forces-and-isis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fought</a> against both ISIS and Turkey. My work as a journalist incurred the ire of the Turkish authorities, who in turn pressured European governments to <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-000233_EN.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">issue me</a> with a travel ban preventing me from entering the Schengen Zone. The first I heard of all this was when I visited Greece on holiday back in 2021, and then tried to travel on to Italy. Instead, I was halted at the Italian border by gun-toting, balaclava-clad police, locked in a room in a ferry, and deported back to Greece.</p>
<p>I then spent two months held in filthy conditions, including one notorious detention center — a massive ex-military base <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-cpt-again-calls-on-greece-to-reform-its-immigration-detention-system-and-stop-pushbacks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">condemned</a> by the European Committee to Prevent Torture. I was stripped and cavity-searched. I passed days in isolation while severely ill and distressed detainees rattled at their cages, and weeks sharing a room with dozens of men. Many inmates carried the scars of police beatings, and disease and self-harm were rampant. I saw one man slash himself to pieces with a razor after being denied urgent medical care. Shortly before I arrived, a Kurdish refugee <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/31169/protests-over-kurdish-migrants-death-in-greek-detention-camp" target="_blank" rel="noopener">died by suicide</a>.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;I saw one man slash himself to pieces with a razor after being denied urgent medical care.&#8221;</div>
<p>“You’re the Englishman, right?”, bored guards would say as they came to gawp at me. I was languishing in my cell playing solitaire chess on a contraband cardboard set. “Why are you here?” You tell me, I would think to myself. I desperately wanted to get back to Britain, and my jailers had no real reason for keeping me there; Athens, of course, is no friend of Ankara. But thanks to European interests beyond our control, there we were, gazing at one another through the bars.</p>
<p>This summer, Greece has introduced still harsher measures, aimed at curbing migration from North Africa, suspending all asylum applications and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/gr/en/unhcr-comments-draft-law" target="_blank" rel="noopener">criminalizing</a> those seeking asylum in Europe by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgp5rexnk2o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">detaining them in military-style prison camps</a> like those where I languished. It’s an approach that’s gaining traction across the political spectrum in Britain, and one that Aris Roussinos <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote about</a> for <em>UnHerd</em>. But it is also an approach that simply doesn’t work. Rather, it only perpetuates the problem of long-term detention in pressure-cooker detention facilities, threatening migrants with five-year spells behind bars and thus making these detention centers a permanent feature of the local landscape.</p>
<p>Local resentment is fueled and attention deflected from the real villains: canny politicians who weaponize the immigration crisis, distracting locals from sky-high employment and rock-bottom wages, with the result that rage once directed against the IMF and EU is now turned on handfuls of hapless Afghans. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis <a href="https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/disinformation-greece-wildfires-migrants/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">implied</a>, without evidence, that migrants were responsible for deadly wildfires that swept the country back in 2023. He thus deftly deflected accusations of government incompetence by feeding into unfounded anti-asylum paranoia. Meanwhile, the charred bodies of 18 migrants were numbered among the dead.</p>
<p>Today, with oversea arrivals back up to 2017 levels, the very persistence of oversea migration to Greece suggests knee-jerk crackdowns are only a temporary fix. Though Greek authorities are talking about declaring a new “state of emergency”, <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/racist-and-illegal-fast-track-deportations-target-refugees-greece" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fast-track deportations</a> and the use of <a href="https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/august/greece-illegal-violent-deportations-the-heavy-toll-of-seeking-asylum-in-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">illegal violence</a> to deter refugees have been a fact of life there for years. Meanwhile, the first deportations under this “new” system have already been <a href="https://rsaegean.org/en/ecthr-blocks-greece-refugee-deportations-asylum-suspension/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">blocked</a> by a Greek court, suggesting the intensified measures are unlikely to end the endless whack-a-mole game between European authorities, smugglers and migrants.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-migration-broken-schengen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-migration-broken-schengen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-1238021927.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-migration-broken-schengen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-migration-broken-schengen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has migration broken Schengen?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-migration-broken-schengen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Doubtless, harsh measures can suppress migrant flows to a given destination. Post-2016, for instance, refugees who were pushed away from the Aegean Islands turned to Spain and Italy, while Libyan smugglers have now set their crosshairs on Crete, after crackdowns elsewhere in the Med. Yet if the Crete route is indeed closed, another will open. A grown-up migration policy should acknowledge this reality. Instead, rival politicians across the globe compete to outdo one another with tough-on-migration proclamations as their costly detention efforts waste time and taxpayers’ money.</p>
<p>In Greece, the locals struggle to get by. Despite its steadily-improving credit rating, the average monthly salary in the country is reportedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ships-docked-trains-halted-greek-workers-strike-over-rising-costs-2024-04-17/%20strikes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">20% lower</a> than it was 15 years ago. All the while, unemployment remains sky-high, prompting mass strikes and an exodus of educated youngsters.</p>
<p>Immigration can certainly suppress wages and damage the economy, and in Greece and Britain both there remains a risk of cynical business-owners exploiting migrant labor to keep wages down. But in the Greek example, this has nothing to do with the refugees passing through, who only started arriving in substantial numbers long after the financial crisis, and who tend to treat the country as a stepping-stone toward other, more robust employment markets.</p>
<p>In contrast to the Greek case, many asylum seekers to the UK want to start working here immediately, as I myself heard from my fellow detainees. Whether fleeing persecution, insecurity or both at home, they hope to improve their English, build a life and contribute to the economy. This could be made to work to our favor by allowing asylum-seekers to work while their applications are processed — rather than crowding them in hotels and detention centers. This way, they would demonstrate that, contrary to much political discourse, they haven’t arrived expecting a comfy, taxpayer-funded existence. Meanwhile, imaginative political thinking around strengthened worker protections and robust investment could easily mitigate the risk of suppressing wages, especially when asylum seekers are overall arriving in relatively low numbers.</p>
<p>Setting up more pressure-cooker detention centers or funneling people into local hotels only fuels local discontent. In Epping, as throughout Britain, clout-chasing politicians seize on tensions, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cde3w04jwjzo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">genuine</a> examples of criminality among asylum seekers, to fan fears of violence and sexual abuse committed by new arrivals. A focus on these individual incidents, accompanied by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/aug/05/disputed-or-debunked-claims-about-migration-and-crime-uk" target="_blank" rel="noopener">massaged statistics</a>, obscures the fact that the vast majority of asylum seekers are law-abiding and hard-working, just like most ordinary Brits.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-595238680-2-e1705505455445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The betrayal of British Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A political party that acknowledged that reality, rather than inflaming the debate, could then start improving the lives of everyone in the country. In England as in Greece, prior generations of migrants have proven themselves perfectly willing to work and integrate into society, once given the chance. Yet in both countries, ordinary people have been let down by the calculated degradation of the public sphere, with the political class knowing they can rely on cheap shots at newcomers to distract from their own generational failures.</p>
<p>I myself remain strongly critical of the British authorities for continuing to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/sep/20/british-journalist-held-by-police-at-luton-airport-for-five-hours-without-arrest" target="_blank" rel="noopener">violate</a> my rights as a journalist and perpetuating the Middle Eastern conflicts which drive so many refugees to Europe to start with. Nonetheless, once my ordeal in Greece was over, I felt a great sense of relief once I set foot on British soil again. And I feel confident enough in the life and community I have here to want others to share in that too.</p>
<p>As I learned during my sojourn in Greece’s migrant detention centers, those who want to travel will find a way. Neither the cold fact of the deadly Mediterranean crossing, which claimed over 2,000 lives last year, nor the harsh reality of the British or Greek migration systems, will dissuade the desperate from attempting the journey. As I heard in countless conversations, migrants beaten and abused at one border simply assume things will be better at the next, so desperate are they for a new life. Ultimately, the emotive debate over whether migration is a “right” or a crime misses the point: migration is a fact of life, and our political representatives need to start treating it as such.</p>
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					<title>Why did Hollywood ignore a Turkish delight?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/08/why-did-hollywood-ignore-a-turkish-delight/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/08/why-did-hollywood-ignore-a-turkish-delight/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Review</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Geoff Dyer]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-30-at-15.43.04.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['About Dry Grasses insists not only that we attend very closely but that we do so over an uncomfortably extended period of time.' Photo: About Dry Grasses/IMDB.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Geoff Dyer&#8217;s </strong>latest book is <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Homework-Memoir-Geoff-Dyer/dp/1837261989"><em>Homework</em></a>, a memoir. His next novel, <em>L’Avventura</em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">,</span> will be published in May.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[latest book is <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Homework-Memoir-Geoff-Dyer/dp/1837261989"><em>Homework</em></a>, a memoir. His next novel, <em>L’Avventura</em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">,</span> will be published in May.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2025 23:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 10:30:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conclave]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Film]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[popular culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Oscars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=701649</guid>
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								<![CDATA[‘About Dry Grasses’ is seriously seductive]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s latest film,<em> About Dry Grasses</em>, was released in the UK last summer. Terrible timing. I&#8217;m surprised they went ahead with it given the high-quality competition swarming around: the Paris Olympics which demanded about eight hours of concentration each day, European football championships in Germany (ditto), Wimbledon (probably even more). All that sport-watching was taking up a lot of time, and the film, with its inordinate run-time of over three hours, was going to take up even more.</p>
<p>All films today are too long, irrespective of how long they are. You sit there and think to yourself, in real time, as it were, how easy it would be to trim off bits here and there, 10% or 15% overall — and, in a lot of cases, 100% in total — with no loss at all, only an overall improvement in quality. Even <em>Anora</em>, which is a lot of fun, suffered from a kind of serial redundancy in that extended sequence where they’re driving around to about 50 different joints looking for the little Russian brat-punk, energy draining from the picture with each stop. Clocking in at precisely 197 minutes (why didn’t they add another three minutes and round it up 200?), <em>About Dry Grasses</em> was like the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea: at the extreme limit of my fuel, so even when all the sport on telly had come to an end, it still took an effort of will to get out of the house and into a cinema — the number of places it was showing had, by then, shriveled considerably — with very comfy reclining seats and plenty of leg room. This piece is a kind of one-year anniversary celebration of that evening in the middle of August when my wife and I schlepped into the West End, to the Picture House Central.</p>
<p>We were always going to go because Ceylan is not only a master, obviously, but a very funny one too. I pride myself on never having laughed during any film by the witless Coen brothers. Why? <em>Because</em> I have a sense of humor. Laughs in Coen films are just for laughs. They have a reputation as auteurs, those bros, but their films are more frat-house than art-house. Bong-water humor. Ceylan has a sense of humor in the more highly evolved — i.e. deeper-rooted — sense of a comprehensive worldview, a worldview that is pretty much restricted to Turkey, to Anatolia in particular — but it’s all-encompassing. There’s something funny going on most of the time, either in the center or lurking around the edges. I’ve no desire to go there, to Anatolia, which frankly looks like a bit of a shithole, but if I <em>did</em> at some level I&#8217;d be happy because it looks like the kind of place where you can have a bit of a laugh — <em>have</em> to have a <em>lot</em> of a laugh, actually, because otherwise life would be unendurable, which it might still be even with the laughter thrown or, more accurately, built in.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/burning-man-will-rise-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/burning-man-will-rise-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-51635755-1-e1693847507714.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/burning-man-will-rise-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/burning-man-will-rise-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Burning Man will rise again</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/burning-man-will-rise-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Geoff Dyer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Needless to say, when I say Ceylan is funny I mean he’s deadly serious, as serious as Mahmut, the intellectual and photographer in his 2002 film <em>Uzak</em>. Mahmut lives in Istanbul where he is obliged to host Yusuf, a clodhopping relative who has lost his job in a factory. Yusuf sits there, bored out of his mind, as they watch Tarkovsky’s <em>Stalker</em> on TV, the long tracking sequence where the three travelers take the little engine into the Zone. When the provincial visitor can’t take any more of this unbelievable tedium he trudges off to bed whereupon Mahmud flips off the Tarkovsky and settles down to some serious girl-on-girl porn — which he then has to hastily switch off when Yusuf makes an unexpected return to the living room. The humor is not at anyone’s expense, it’s free in the same way that the air we breathe is free, so even if it’s toxic you can’t expect a refund which, incidentally, my wife and I did manage to get from the relevant box offices after watching 20 minutes of <em>Dune</em> (at an Imax) and 30 minutes of David Fincher’s <em>The Killer</em> on the grounds that they were not fit for adult consumption.</p>
<p>Unlike <em>Once Upon a Time in Anatolia</em> (2011) — which really puts the dead in deadpan — <em>About Dry Grasses</em> isn’t laugh-aloud funny. But it declares the film-maker’s stylistic signature instantly, opening with one of those wide-screen shots of a figure emerging out of a white blankness of snow. From that moment, I was able to relax, thinking, “Yeah, I&#8217;m glad I’ve come.” The figure we’ve seen coming out of the snowy nothingness is Samet, a teacher returning to a school in a remote village, a place with very few romantic possibilities, where everyone’s more or less pissed off. There’s another teacher, Kenan, and there are rumors of scandals and the possibility of a male teacher having crossed the line — less distinctly drawn here than it is in American universities — with a young female student. Discontent is simmering. Nothing ever quite comes to the boil in this place, but everything is almost boiling over the whole time. There’s a third teacher, an attractive woman called Nuray, who does bring things to the boil in a curious way in that, first of all, Samet tries to set her up with Kenan and then, when it appears that these two are indeed getting on well, conceives a perverse kind of longing for her, for himself: a desire to thwart the very things he’d previously set in motion.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/the-brutalists-fatal-flaw/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/the-brutalists-fatal-flaw/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/adrien-brody-in-the-brutalist.avif?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/the-brutalists-fatal-flaw/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/the-brutalists-fatal-flaw/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Brutalist&#039;s fatal flaw</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/the-brutalists-fatal-flaw/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Darran Anderson</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In all and any art, the bigger the theme the more important the details. <em>About Dry Grasses</em> deals with themes so huge I&#8217;m not even sure what they <em>aren’t</em>. The greater the work of art the more difficult it is to say what it’s about and this is true, of course, of un-Ronseal-ishly titled <em>About Dry Grasses. </em>That’s one of the things that makes it utterly transfixing — for the most part. Attention drifts during a long ideological debate but it’s then followed by a sequence — a sort of seduction — so intense you have to remind yourself to blink. Or there’s an earlier scene when Samet and Kenan are at a dreary diner, though that word “dreary” is redundant since everywhere in this town is dreary as all hell. They’re there to meet Nuray, the teacher Samet has told his friend he’ll be attracted to. She says she’s interested in Kenan’s face. The weather systems passing through Samet’s face as he registers this, as she takes a picture of his friend’s face, are so complex it would be a useful exercise to slow them down, like Douglas Gordon’s <em>24-Hour Psycho</em>, to watch them unfold, but that would be futile because it’s not just the changes but the flickering speed of those changes that is so illuminating as to resist illumination.</p>
<p>Often an Oscar for Best Actor goes not for best acting but best impersonating: so Timothée Chalamet, for example, got a nomination for his dead ringer of the young Bob Dylan. Or an actor will impersonate a person with some physical or mental ailment. To paraphrase something Capote said of Kerouac, that’s not acting that’s afflicting. Speaking of affliction, Nuray has had a leg amputated as a result of an accident, which considerably complicates all of the many factors intermingling during the decision-making process of the seduction dinner and its aftermath. I don’t think I&#8217;ve ever studied faces as closely as I did those during these scenes. And I was compelled to do so.</p>
<p>In other words, this was the opposite of being bored which means it was the opposite of watching action scenes which bore the living shit out of me. In <em>The Whole Equation,</em> David Thomson writes that in the history of cinema no effect is “as momentous as shots of a face as its mind is being changed”. I’d push this a bit further and draw attention to the face that can’t make up its mind, that perhaps doesn’t know for sure what its owner is thinking, or that is taking pains to make sure that this process is concealed from the other participants in the scene but is somehow revealed to the audience so that the face on screen effectively holds up a mirror to our attempts to work out what we’re seeing, if we are capable of attending closely enough. That, it goes without saying, is worth attending to very closely. <em>About Dry Grasses</em> insists not only that we attend very closely, but that we do so over an uncomfortably extended period of time. As a result time, if you have a comfortable seat, flies by, almost.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;This was the opposite of being bored which means it was the opposite of watching action scenes which bore the living shit out of me.”</div>
<p>Much has been learned — so much that we are unable to process it, partly because nothing is resolved at the end. It’s like life, ongoing. This is in the starkest possible contrast with the pathetically neat little twist at the end of <em>Conclave</em>. And that got an Oscar for Best Original <em>S</em><em>cript</em>! You might as well have an Oscar for Best-Tied Tie or Best-Tied Shoelaces — and even then it would probably go to a pair of slip-ons because they’re easier to get (on and off). The human relations in <em>About Dry Grasses</em> are impossible to unknot; the more you pull at one strand of them, the tighter and more intractable the tangle becomes.</p>
<p>There are other elements to mention briefly. The breaking of the fourth wall — is it the fourth? I forget how many there are and what it is each of them do — that occurs immediately before the sexual negotiation has been concluded. That’s a vertiginous jolt, but I like a little detail here, as Samet washes down a pill of some kind in the bathroom. Presumably in anticipation of the sexual encounter that lies ahead, a precaution because he is not motivated by lust (neither is she) and both parties are of course acutely aware that the amputated leg, the leg that is not there, might play a part in how the sex might unfold. In a sense, they have sex in order to find out — which is often what motivates people to have sex for the first time anyway.</p>
<p>There are plenty of other points that I’d like to check again. But that would mean watching the film on my computer which I&#8217;m not prepared to do. I&#8217;ll wait for it to come around again on a big screen — and you should do the same — sometime in the future, ideally when it’s part of a complete Ceylan retrospective, when there’s no competing sport on TV. The film earns its size and its length and has elicited a corresponding loyalty on my part.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">701649</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Why Turkey’s Kurds are tired of fighting</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The ceremony was preceded by forty years of conflict. Photo by Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Image]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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										<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 23:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 23 Jul 2025 09:58:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diverse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdistan Regional Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=694585</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Armed struggle is so last century]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">When the guerrilla fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began their armed struggle back in 1984, the Cold War was in its death throes. Ronald Reagan was trying to roll back the Soviet “Evil Empire”, the USSR was chaotically transitioning toward Gorbachev, and the IRA had just narrowly failed to assassinate Margaret Thatcher.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Some of those Kurdish fighters have been in the mountains ever since, waging a seemingly endless campaign against Turkey. When they finally descended this week, to ceremonially destroy their weapons as part of a closely-watched disarmament process, they brought a symbolic end to the Cold War era of armed campaigns for national liberation. In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ao9Zvn40KXw" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v%3DAo9Zvn40KXw&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1uM25mucaBzu1eTTmCvPkt">his first video appearance</a> for over 25 years, jailed Kurdish figurehead Abdullah Öcalan announced: “The PKK movement and its national liberation strategy… has had its day… I believe not in arms, but in the power of politics.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">With their traditional Kurdish clothes and battered Kalashnikovs, the guerrilla fighters certainly seem a world away from the hair gel, wrap-around sunglasses and slick suits of the media scrum, spooks and politicos awaiting them at the foot of the mountain. Öcalan made his historic video appearance sporting a Lacoste polo shirt, prompting ordinary Kurds to rush out and buy up the brand.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The present day is strange, but also familiar. Some <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/august-11/reagan-jokes-about-bombing-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/august-11/reagan-jokes-about-bombing-russia&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0lsb9nuk9512GQn5L27xJ3">headlines from 1984</a> could have been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/truth-or-fake/20250626-yes-trump-posted-a-bomb-iran-and-daddy-s-home-parody-video" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/truth-or-fake/20250626-yes-trump-posted-a-bomb-iran-and-daddy-s-home-parody-video&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3eSJ1X3aSm66vK_yPNi2so">written just a few weeks ago</a> — try “Nuclear Tensions Peak as TV Star Turned US President Jokes About Dropping The Bomb”. And amid our century’s New Cold War, the Kurds are grappling with contemporary versions of some age-old questions. When wars never really end but endlessly evolve into proxy and frozen conflicts, what does it actually mean to declare victory or defeat? And amid spiraling regional confrontations, what are the potential consequences of forging a pact with the devil, and allying with your own long-term oppressors?</p>
<p dir="ltr">As I fly into Iraqi Kurdistan to witness the closely-guarded ceremony first-hand, these questions immediately present themselves. The originally Turkish-based PKK has followed a very different path to the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). While the former has relied on black-market weaponry to fight the Turkish Armed Forces in pursuit of a decentralized, autonomous federation based on direct democracy and women’s autonomy, the KRI has taken a more conventional approach. Following Saddam Hussein’s genocide of the Iraqi Kurds and their loyal backing of the USA’s 2003 invasion, the Iraqi Kurds have achieved quasi-statehood, underwritten by oil wealth and Western support. Some of the Iraqi Kurdish special forces guarding the ceremony, which takes place here on “neutral” soil, sport US flags on their multicam helmets.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-53362168.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Erdogan can’t crush the Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">To its Kurdish critics, the KRI has thus been transformed into a bargain-basement Dubai. The rule of law and living standards might be better here than elsewhere in Iraq, but a small coterie around Kurdish tribal leaders has grown rich in gated compounds, while the majority languish amid poverty and political ennui. “There is not a state here, but only ‘authorities’&#8230; Our democratic revolution could not be translated into true legitimacy,” says Haval Abubakir, the regional governor who is also a prominent domestic critic of the KRI.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Despite these shortcomings, the KRI is a world away from the remote tunnel networks where thousands of PKK fighters still shelter from Turkish airstrikes. With its mushrooming high-rises and untouchable political dynasties built on the reputations of one-time freedom fighters, the KRI offers an image of a path untraveled for Turkey’s own Kurdish population, many of whom are relieved at the end of hostilities even as they worry about downing arms without clear guarantees from the Turkish side.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The mood at the disarmament ceremony is accordingly pensive. Our phones and cameras taken away, we wind up the mountainside to the symbolic site — a cave which first sheltered a clandestine Kurdish printing press during a 1923 uprising against occupying British forces. In conversations among attendees, phrases like “bittersweet” and a “bitter pill to swallow” recur. Pride of place is given to representatives of Turkey’s Peace Mothers. Clad in white headscarves, these formidable women have all lost children in conflict with the Turkish army. In their 60s and 70s, they <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/79-year-old-peace-mother-meryem-soylu-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-news-60650" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.duvarenglish.com/79-year-old-peace-mother-meryem-soylu-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-news-60650&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0-j-D3b178lX6i49AXmA0R">brave heavy prison sentences</a> as they protest Turkey’s continued repression of the Kurdish cause. “It’s enough war, enough pain, enough blood,” one says. “We just want peace, then all will be well.” Despite these brave words, her face is grim. Other members of her delegation break down in tears during the ceremony.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The PKK fighters themselves are characteristically defiant, even as they acknowledge the difficulty of the step they are making. As is customary, the delegation is 50% women, and led by the PKK’s top female commander, Besê Hozat. “As you know, things did not come about with ease, at no cost, and without waging struggle,” she says in a prepared statement, her voice ringing from the precipitous mountain walls. “Quite the contrary — all gains came at heavy cost, through struggling tooth and claw.”</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-afghan-data-leak-was-covered-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-afghan-data-leak-was-covered-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/afghan.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-afghan-data-leak-was-covered-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-afghan-data-leak-was-covered-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Afghan cover-up will haunt the UK</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-afghan-data-leak-was-covered-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The event is a battle of narratives and jostling camera crews, with each side seeking to claim a victory. While Turkish TV broadcast images of twisted, blackened weapons and President Erdoğan boasts of a “terror-free Turkey”, on the Kurdish side the hope is that the PKK’s disarmament will pave the way for both domestic reforms in Turkey and a better future for all the region’s Kurds. Though security forces try to prevent it, audience members defy orders to rise, applaud and chant the Kurdish slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”. Rather than handing their weapons over to Turkish authorities, the Kurds make a point of assembling the guns into a pyre and burning them. “We voluntarily destroy our weapons… as a step of goodwill and determination,” Hozat says.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What now? The path toward peace is difficult, but not unimaginable. The Irish, South African and Basque liberation movements, which have all supported the Kurdish cause, demonstrate the simultaneous possibility and limitations of the peace process. (In one meaningless but pleasing coincidence, an exiled Basque leader reportedly sparked controversy by wearing his own Lacoste-branded shirt during Eighties peace talks with Spain, sparking paranoid accusations of collusion with France.)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Basque political representative Igor Zulaika, who also attends the disarmament ceremony, sees his own party’s sense of “vertigo”, as they took necessarily “blind steps” along their own path from armed struggle to parliamentary participation, reflected in the Kurdish experience. “It was a historical moment, a moment of great hope. Of course, hesitation is part of every such moment, and that’s understandable.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">The ceremony is also attended by representatives of various peace-building NGOs, who share concerns the disarmament process is running in “reverse”, since Kurdish weapons are being downed before any concrete alternative has been established, and without any third party to oversee the PKK’s potential entry to Turkish political life. “The fact we had a strategy, the fact we were united and had the support of our people, meant the process went forward,” Zulaika recalls.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That said, the Kurds already have a political party in Turkey, which has survived a dozen successive bans and the continued detention of thousands of Kurdish mayors, MPs and other activists. Meanwhile, Kurdish representatives speak of handing responsibility from the PKK and its variously-initialled affiliates to a whole “alphabet” of civil-society and political bodies pursuing Öcalan’s federal vision. The systematic release of Kurdish political prisoners would demonstrate Turkey is minded to move the peace process forward: but until now, Erdoğan has responded only by setting up a new parliamentary commission to oversee the disarmament process. Prior Turkish-Kurdish peace processes have collapsed following domestic and geostrategic shifts, while <a href="https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/11072025" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/11072025&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2ZAmTJTxQTIb_CmuaRblVr">Turkish airstrikes are currently continuing</a> despite the supposed ceasefire.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whatever happens next, the ceremony is a point of no return for the decades-old conflict — and thus also a key turning-point for the Middle East at large. While analysts tend to read Erdoğan’s detente with the Kurds as motivated by his <a href="https://www.europeancorrespondent.com/r/whats-really-behind-the-new-turkish-kurdish-dialogue" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.europeancorrespondent.com/r/whats-really-behind-the-new-turkish-kurdish-dialogue&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw33jG0UAQ209JziZXs3UVP4">unlikely pursuit of Kurdish support in Turkey’s Parliament,</a> its outcome will affect not only Turkey but also several of the Middle East’s key current battlefields.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Whatever happens next, the ceremony is a point of no return for the decades-old conflict — and thus also a key turning-point for the Middle East at large.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">In neighbouring Syrian Kurdistan, PKK affiliates have braved warfare against ISIS and Turkey to establish an embattled, unrecognized polity uniting millions on the basis of their federal vision. A functional transition to peace should help these embattled, Western-allied Kurds in their own, ongoing negotiations as they seek to preserve autonomy while reconciling with the Turkish-allied Islamist forces that recently took control of Damascus.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Here in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey has established <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2025/bbc-eye-turkeys-hidden-war?bingParse" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2025/bbc-eye-turkeys-hidden-war?bingParse&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw15xUjHMUqMiuYlxwPRdhfO">over 100 military bases in a de facto occupation</a>, suspended flights to the regional airport, and conducted thousands of consequence-free airstrikes, often killing civilians and journalists. Iraqi Kurdish journalist Rebin Bekir survived an airstrike which killed two of his colleagues. “We aren’t members of any armed organization, but journalists, just like you,” he says, displaying his scars.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As well as potentially ending these violations and bringing stability to northern Iraq and Syria, a ceasefire could pave the way for broader geopolitical reset. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the ruling Iraqi Kurdish party have long set aside other differences to coordinate against the PKK in various constellations. But in Ankara, that calculus may finally be shifting. To many Kurds, it’s significant that the peace deal is fronted not by Erdoğan but by the unlikely figure of hard-Right ultra-nationalist Devlet Bahçeli. Bahçeli is popularly perceived as a representative of Turkey’s so-called deep state, the military-intelligence complex ultimately concerned not with propping up Erdoğan but preserving Turkey’s regional status — in opposition to both Iran and Israel.</p>
<p dir="ltr">On the one hand, Ankara probably hopes that Öcalan’s principled, long-term opposition to Israel will neuter any potential Israeli sponsorship of Kurdish national ambitions. Notably, Turkey recently <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkks-ocalan-no-israeli-dominance-through-kurds?fbclid=IwY2xjawLYtfBleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFmS2Zod2ZvT2oxdDk5Y0lRAR7-DRLiIdkJdWgl_b4nFUkw2ZCctk39-wyTnzYThP5YPpKh_zeLfJpv9hLJbg_aem_WULUq8ZithhH9KQLxWAh-w" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkks-ocalan-no-israeli-dominance-through-kurds?fbclid%3DIwY2xjawLYtfBleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFmS2Zod2ZvT2oxdDk5Y0lRAR7-DRLiIdkJdWgl_b4nFUkw2ZCctk39-wyTnzYThP5YPpKh_zeLfJpv9hLJbg_aem_WULUq8ZithhH9KQLxWAh-w&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2FoGsh8bZtSN7C9zARhSyI">allowed documents to leak</a> in which the jailed Kurdish leader warned against allowing Israel to “turn [Kurdistan] into another Gaza” by extending their influence through Kurdish regions in Syria and Iran.</p>
<p dir="ltr">On the other, Ankara is equally wary of what it views as a pragmatic marriage of convenience between Iran and the PKK, and simultaneously hopes to neuter the threat of the Kurds profiting from any future confrontation between Turkey and Iran. At the outside, given Ankara’s desire to curry favor in Washington by playing up its anti-Iranian credentials, Turkish and Kurdish interests could even directly align against the pariah state. If the PKK does down weapons altogether, many could end up in the hands of its Iranian affiliate PJAK, the most serious armed force on the ground capable of posing a threat to Tehran.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whether the peace deal stands or falls, the Kurds’ strategic location means they’re poised to exert outsized pressure on what increasingly resembles a three-way confrontation between Turkey, Israel and Iran — with Iraq and Syria as key battlegrounds. “If the Kurds are allowed to be a part of stability, not a factor causing more pressure, it&#8217;s better for all concerned,” says Abubakir, the governor of Sulaymaniyah Province. Yet two days before we speak, explosive drones likely fired by Iranian-backed militias were shot down over his city. These realities bring to mind the <a href="https://www.peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/two-kurdish-poems-in-english/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/two-kurdish-poems-in-english/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1753268188754000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3J6P3PebmAaSdMGoTyCZ6W">sombre lines</a> written three centuries ago by the great Kurdish poet Ehmedê Xanî: “Like a great wall the Kurds stand between the Turks and the Persians…/Both sides make the Kurdish clans/Targets of their poison-tipped arrows.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Kurdish representatives optimistically present the disarmament ceremony as a turning-point, from their long 20th century of struggle and betrayal toward Öcalan’s vision of a peaceful 21st century movement pursuing bottom-up, grassroots change. As a symbolic gesture, the guerrilla fighters place their Kalashnikovs, one-by-one, onto a pyre, alongside a rocket launcher and light machine gun. They add wood and petrol, and set it alight.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The bonfire of weaponry is constructed to resemble the Kurds’ traditional New Year fire, which symbolizes rebirth and renewal. But however optimistic the symbolism, the fact remains the guns are burned. As the guerrilla fighters return to their mountains, hands which have clutched weapons for decades now hang loosely at their sides.</p>
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					<title>Regime change won’t neuter Iran</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/06/regime-change-wont-neuter-iran/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/06/regime-change-wont-neuter-iran/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2220302582.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>National destiny</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Mott]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Blue-20-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Regional dynamics will outlast any leader. Photo by AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Christopher Mott is a Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, an author, and a former researcher at the US Department of State.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Mott is a Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, an author, and a former researcher at the US Department of State.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 23:01:15 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 09:20:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Ali Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Azerbaijan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=686938</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It will not be decapitated twice]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The timing of American intervention on the side of Israel in its preemptive war on Iran is no coincidence. With Hezbollah diminished and the Syrian state weakened, this is the best opportunity Tel Aviv has to effect regime change in Iran. While the American goal seemed initially to be cessation of Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli operations have been of a much wider scope, implying an attempt to bring about either full regime change or state failure. Such an eventuality would leave them as the unquestionable hegemon in the Middle East for decades to come… or so they think.</p>
<p>Since the strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, Donald Trump has begun publicly toying with the idea of regime change. The idea defies the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/15/war-on-terror-911-deaths-afghanistan-iraq/">calamitous and consistent record of failure</a> of the West’s Middle East interventions. And even if the <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/01/new-american-century-1997-2006-and-the-post-cold-war-neoconservative-moment/">neoconservative fever dreams</a> of remaking Iran into a Jeffersonian democracy somehow come true, such an outcome will not, in the long run, fundamentally correct the fading position of the United States. Nor will it provide increased overall long-term opportunities for the Israeli state to endlessly expand its influence. Any removal of Iran from the regional chessboard will create a power vacuum that is, at best, temporary.</p>
<p>It was only last month that, while <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-extraordinary-saudi-speech">addressing a crowd</a> in Riyadh, Trump renounced the <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/usaid-critics-funding/">missionary non-government organizations</a> and <a href="https://therealistreview.substack.com/p/which-way-liberal-interventionist">liberal internationalists</a> whose promises — that non-Western societies can be refashioned by the West — have brought so much ruin. Trump’s welcome invocation of realism now seems to have been forgotten — just as realism becomes more necessary than ever.</p>
<p>The unspoken context, one that the White House would do well to heed, is that Middle Eastern countries have become wealthier and more powerful over recent years. Like China and other rivals, these countries have each chipped away at American hegemony. The US economy has grown, but <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/u-s-share-of-global-economy-over-time/">these countries have grown faster</a>. Once dominated in singular fashion by the United States, the world is now becoming polycentric. This is as true in the Middle East as in other parts of the world, such as <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-rapidly-evolving-order-india-russia-navigate-complex-geopolitical-landscape-jaishankar-101743081216286.html">South</a> and <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/06/23/japan/politics/ishiba-nato-trip/">East Asia</a>, where it is increasingly clear <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/01/29/the-rise-of-a-multipolar-west-asia-why-the-middle-east-resists-hegemony/">that multipolarity reigns</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahu-has-played-his-trump-card/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahu-has-played-his-trump-card/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-1202310386.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahu-has-played-his-trump-card/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahu-has-played-his-trump-card/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Netanyahu has played his Trump card</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahu-has-played-his-trump-card/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What this means is that any power vacuum will be filled with local actors before the great powers arrive. An immediate neighbor can be a permanent presence in a way a distant power never could. The local power <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2022/03/26/middle-powers-in-the-multipolar-world/">maintains an advantage both in morale and logistics</a> and therefore can outlast outside forces. In international relations this is often referred to as “escalation dominance”, and it often occurs in places like Ukraine, where Russia will always be more committed to its near-abroad than the United States could be for Eastern Europe. In the Middle East, escalation dominance will be held by those nearer to Iran than the US.</p>
<p>Should the Iranian regime become critically weakened, the true victor would be <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/04/10/turkey-a-middle-power-pioneer/">Turkey</a>. Turkey has much to gain from present tensions. It is strongly committed to pursuing its regional self-interest; it has a large domestic military-industrial complex to satisfy; and its large economy gives it much to gain from trade with neighbors such as Iran. Turkey’s only disadvantage compared with Israel is its lack of nuclear deterrent, but Middle Eastern powers, having just seen the consequences of not having a nuclear deterrent, will now become even more interested in acquiring one. While Iran and Israel damage and discredit each other regionally, Turkey is perfectly positioned to pick up the pieces as both a diplomatic arbiter and as the largest state in immediate proximity to Iran.</p>
<p>A naive faith common among many North Americans and Europeans today is that alliance networks hold some kind of ideological and cultural power that can turn members into perpetual friends. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/liberal-international-order-neither-universal-nor-exceptional-188026">History decisively disproves this</a>. Take the example of democratic Greek city states warring with each other; or the revolutionary republics of the Enlightenment (France and the United States) cutting their alliance almost immediately over divergent interests; or the British and American role in toppling <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-1953-coup-us-tensions-3d391c0255308a7c13d32d3c88e5f54f">nascent democratic rule in Iran itself in 1953</a>. Alliances are temporary and ultimately interest based. Neither Turkey’s status in NATO, nor its close partnership with Azerbaijan, a state with a tight military relationship with Israel, would provide meaningful stumbling blocks to a growing security competition between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Iran, after all, <a href="https://time.com/6265077/how-iran-won-the-iraq-war/">won the American-led Iraq War</a>; why shouldn’t Turkey win the Israeli-Iranian one? Israel lacks the capability to occupy all these nations and handle an ever-growing number of proxies that could facilitate endless expansion.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If the Iranian government falls, many Arab states will attempt to maximize their own autonomy against both Turkey and Israel. Some will seek the protection of one against the other, intensifying the rivalry of two powers whose previously buried hostility no longer has a common foe to keep it in check. Long-lasting orders of peace exist elsewhere, in forms such as the “postwar order” of Europe, but this was made possible by overwhelming American (and Soviet) power. Such a dynamic that does not exist in the Middle East today, which lacks the conditions for any order of regional hegemony. Should Iranian society fracture among ethnic or regional lines, this competition will only be heightened. And Israel’s distance from Iran means its strategic operations would most likely be operating at a relative disadvantage in a competition between Turkey, some Arab states, and perhaps Pakistan and Russia. Azerbaijan might even attempt to increase its control over the <a href="https://realistreview.org/2023/02/24/azerbaijan-and-iran-a-tale-of-two-countries/">Azeri-majority northwest</a> of the country. Armenia, likewise, would lose its <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/05032025-regional-dynamics-the-evolving-iran-armenia-relationship-amid-geopolitical-shifts-analysis/">only reliable foreign backer</a> and have to draw closer to Moscow as a necessity.</p>
<p>It is possible, albeit very improbable, that the unlikely dreams of the regime-change advocates come to pass. Iran, in this scenario, is able to draw upon its internal cultural cohesion and its general populace’s disdain for its theocratic elite, thus making a successful transition to a new and less fanatical state. But this will not change the long-term calculation of multipolar power diffusion. Iranian civilization and statehood predate the 1979 revolution, the rise of European global power, and even Islam itself. Iran is ultimately a regionally-anchored civilizational power made up of the shared cultural experiences of a proud and influential people. Whether it is governed by a theocracy, monarchy, democracy, or any other form of government, that will not change so long as there exists a state strong enough to keep the Iranian plateau secure. And this new state, eventually, will be a regional power again. The current Iranian government’s monomaniacal Israel fixation may disappear, but its interests will not. Even if many in the populace celebrate the fall of the government, the real and obvious danger of Israeli influence undermining the sovereignty of Iran will be apparent for all to see. Such a state will do its utmost to ensure a similar decapitation strike will not occur again. As a result, this state will seek to project regional power and perhaps even revive its nuclear program.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A new Iran will seek to project regional power and perhaps even revive its nuclear program.&#8221;</div>
<p>This prospective Iranian state would be less ideological than its existing incarnation and more national interest-based. This more secular Iran would be freed from ideological commitments such as those to Palestinian liberation or the bringing forth of <a href="https://shiism.hds.harvard.edu/publications/hidden-imam-and-end-time-primer-mahdi-islamic-theology-and-global">the “Hidden Imam”</a>, a figure promised in the apocalyptic eschatology of some strains of Shi’ism. If anything, a secular Iran would be more capable of building alliance networks, garnering foreign sympathy, and deftly navigating the waters of diplomacy and development in such a way as to prevent the ever-frustrated US-Israeli quest for hegemony. Without a theocratic Shia Iran to hold as bogeyman, Israel and the US would find that the other regional states would pivot their foreign policy accordingly, adjusting towards a balance of power to counteract Israeli ambition. With less archaic and ideological posturing, the Middle East would be a region of hard-nosed realism.</p>
<p>Trends may come and go, but security competition remains eternal. Iran remains a country that sits at a vital junction in the Eurasian landmass. It arguably <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/diplomacy-iran-will-serve-us-interests-eurasia-179209">holds a balance of power</a> that keeps the region out of singular great power control. It may or may not be unwise in the short term to topple such a government. But Iranian civilization will surely outlive this regime just as it outlived the others that have ruled it before. And Iran, in any form, will always act to prevent any form of hegemony over its near-abroad.</p>
<p>Tel Aviv and Washington can try all they like to upset this dynamic, but their efforts are unlikely to pay long-term benefits. Israel, in the end, is going to have to take its place as just one of the regional nodes of influence rather than as a singular domineering force. The United States, likewise, must restrain its ambitions in the region. The era of global crusades is over. For the West, the project of the future is to accommodate the new regionalism and the failure of American-imposed globalization.</p>
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					<title>Why Erdogan can’t crush the Kurds</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-53362168.jpg?w=523</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>PKK</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The group is often portrayed as an anachronistic throwback.' Mustafa Ozer / AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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										<pubDate>Tue, 13 May 2025 23:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 11:57:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=677042</guid>
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								<![CDATA[They have always moved with the times]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 1978, a handful of Kurdish political science students gathered in an obscure village in Turkey’s southeast, together founding a militant Marxist-Leninist party. A half-century on, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates have controlled territory from Iran’s remote Zagros Mountains, through the Iraqi desert to ISIS’s erstwhile Syrian capital Raqqa. The PKK’s affiliates have won global influence and sympathy through their famed, women-led struggle against ISIS, even as the PKK itself remains a listed terror organization thanks to its ongoing conflict with Turkey — itself a key NATO ally.</p>
<p>The PKK’s senior leadership recently gathered in the cave networks where they shelter from ceaseless Turkish airstrikes, and in a somber-looking conference proposed an end to the conflict which has cost a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkey-claim-syrian-kurds-terrorists-not-isis-ypg-pkk-sdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> 40,000 lives. Most of the dead were Kurdish civilians killed by Turkey’s brutal counter-insurgency, a fact often missed when that grim statistic is trotted out. And, certainly, Ankara’s drone technology and growing geopolitical clout have tipped the balance against the PKK, with the group’s embattled, exiled leaders hardly negotiating from a place of strength.</p>
<p>Yet rumors of the PKK’s demise are often greatly exaggerated. The sophisticated, sprawling Kurdish revolutionary movement is a many-headed hydra, and a step back for the guerrilla forces stationed in the Iraqi mountains may well come with gains elsewhere across Kurdish-majority regions in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Whether the PKK will actually down arms remains an open question. Whatever happens next, Kurdistan remains a crucial geopolitical battleground, and the PKK’s movement will continue to play a crucial role in a conflict stretching from Gaza to Tehran and beyond.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Rumors of the PKK’s demise are often greatly exaggerated.&#8221;</div>
<p>It’s hard to reconcile familiar images of gleaming Mediterranean holiday resorts — with their rows of equally gleaming “Turkey teeth” — to the savage guerrilla warfare at the far end of Anatolia. But the violence is very real. The West chooses to see Turkey as a flawed but basically functional parliamentary democracy. But with <a href="https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/20-000-hdp-members-taken-into-custody-in-4-years-10-000-jailed-48896" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tens of thousands</a> of Kurdish politicians, MPs, mayors and activists detained in recent years, this definition seems like a weak excuse to avoid provoking a deeply authoritarian ally.</p>
<p>As for the PKK itself, the group is often portrayed as an anachronistic throwback to a vanished era of anti-colonial struggle, beginning its fight for an independent, socialist Kurdish state “late” in the 20th century. Yet the group has moved with the times. The Nineties were a period of deep crisis, as the party reckoned with the USSR’s collapse as a potential sponsor of Kurdish national aspirations. The broader ideological delegitimization of communism did not help either. These existential challenges were compounded by the 1999 capture of the PKK’s political and intellectual figurehead Abdullah Öcalan, who has remained detained ever since on the prison island Imrali, where his almost total isolation inspires frequent comparison with Nelson Mandela.</p>
<p>Reacting to these developments, Öcalan came to view both communist and capitalist nation states as inherently repressive — a message reiterated by banners adorning the PKK’s subterranean disarmament conference. Instead, Öcalan now advocates for a decentralized federation based on municipal governance, minority representation, women’s autonomy, and ecology. This unexpected departure from communist and nationalist orthodoxy almost tore his party apart. During a period of reformation lasting from 1999 until 2003, the PKK <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1934120.stm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">briefly changed</a> its name, sought to reorganize into an unarmed, civil and political federation, and entered into secret negotiations with Ankara. None of these steps caused the PKK to collapse, and indeed are effectively being repeated in this latest détente.</p>
<p>Indeed, these internal upheavals helped the PKK refind its strength, diversifying its tactics and building up ever-broader support in Kurdish civil society. Parties sympathetic to Öcalan’s vision made unprecedented gains in Turkey’s parliament, alongside renewed Turkey-PKK peace talks. At the same time, the revolutionary Kurdish movement achieved global fame. ISIS were sweeping through Iraq and Syria, and only the PKK stood in their way, fending off the jihadist genocide of the Yazidis and leading thousands of the Kurdish-speaking religious minority to safety — all in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/11/a-u-s-designated-terrorist-group-is-saving-yazidis-and-battling-the-islamic-state/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unexpected</a> battlefield coordination with the US. The PKK’s Syrian affiliates went further still, winning the support of a US-led “Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS”, as its all-female Kurdish units spearheaded a successful, years-long campaign to eradicate the caliphate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Millions of people now lived under PKK-inspired rule in and around Syrian Kurdistan, guarded by the presence of US troops. Tens of thousands of women took up arms and many more joined a civil-society revolution, as Kurds celebrated unprecedented freedoms and local communities explored self-governance amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. Öcalan must have rubbed his eyes to see his utopian vision taking hold in a growing zone of PKK influence reaching almost to the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Almost, but not quite. As ISIS were defeated, Turkey reacted violently to the Kurdish movement’s domestic, cross-border and international gains. Peace talks foundered amid bitter and renewed civil conflict in Turkey, while cross-border military operations against Syrian Kurdish regions killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands more. Syrian Kurds’ dreams of international recognition for their embattled enclave vanished. Yet as this potted history shows, the PKK’s story is one of dogged survival and organizational flexibility, adapting its tactics and even its ideology to respond to challenges of the sort which have crushed many other would-be revolutionary movements. The latest disarmament announcement is equally part of this continued, strategic evolution.</p>
<p>For Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also has problems of his own. Turkey is confronting both Israel and Iran, putting Ankara on an uncomfortable collision course with both of the Middle East’s power blocs. These tensions have reached boiling point following the unexpected December 2024 ouster of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad by militant Islamist forces with deep and growing ties to Ankara. Iran was the big loser as Turkey expanded its influence in Syria, while Israel will not countenance the presence of Turkish military bases and former al-Qaeda affiliates near its own, growing zone of occupation in southern Syria.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the PKK’s Syrian affiliates continue to control a third of the country’s territory, its oil wealth, and its largest single armed force in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US-trained, highly effective SDF guards tens of thousands of ISIS affiliates on behalf of its Western allies, and Americans have no desire to see the slightly less radical Islamists who now rule Damascus take control of these facilities. If Turkey and Syria’s jihadist-turned-statesman Ahmed al-Sharaa want the Western powers to continue their rapid normalization of the new regime, they would be well advised to continue their present strategy and avoid picking a fight with the SDF. Rather, heavy US pressure has brought about a tentative peace deal between the SDF and Damascus, in tandem with the PKK-Ankara agreement. For now, Turkish airstrikes against Syrian Kurdish regions have abated.</p>
<p>Syrian Kurdish leaders are therefore quietly confident, issuing maximalist demands aimed at preserving their Kurdish-led, multiethnic federation and its military wing, even as they prepare for the potential evacuation of PKK-trained military commanders from Syria and fret over a future, unwanted clash with Damascus. Some degree of Syrian Kurdish autonomy will certainly be preserved, though how far this will resemble Öcalan’s radical, direct-democratic vision is another question.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-2163514212-e1736517183984.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain&#039;s last chance to stop Islamic State</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Across the border, it is less clear what the PKK will get from its own deal with Ankara — beyond a mooted amnesty for the majority of its guerrilla fighters and transfer to a nominally safe third country for senior commanders. A close listen to the “disarmament” speech makes it clear the PKK will only down weapons if their demands are met, including Öcalan’s release as a non-negotiable first step. Ankara must therefore take the next step: a genuine, internationally monitored amnesty would be a good place to start.</p>
<p>There are many hurdles before a peaceful transition, each presenting an opportunity for both the PKK and Turkey to abandon the process once again. Ankara has over 100 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c985lw7lywlo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">military bases</a> deep in Iraqi Kurdish territory, waypoints for its war against the PKK. This little-known, de facto occupation is linked to Turkey’s so-called “Development Road”. A $17-billion project, it <a href="https://jacobin.com/2024/08/turkey-war-iraq-regional-power/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">will link</a> Baghdad to Europe via Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey, offering a third way beyond both the Houthi-blockaded Red Sea and a <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/imec/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed alternative route</a> running from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Israel, but unacceptably bypassing Turkey. As Turkey seeks to align itself as a key regional partner, therefore, Ankara will be loath to give up its Iraqi beachhead in the name of a peace deal. As of today, Turkish airstrikes continue to hit PKK’s positions in Iraqi Kurdistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, battle-hardened PKK veterans may wonder if their sacrifices are justified by Kurdish gains in the Turkish parliament or Syria, and continue their fight under yet another name. Intriguingly, the 1999-2004 ceasefire period saw the PKK switch focus from its long-term battle against Turkey to back its Iranian Kurdish affiliates targeting the no-less repressive Iranian regime. Today, Israel’s obliteration of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” raises the possibility of future destabilization in the Islamic Republic. The PKK, or its successor organizations, might well be drawn into any such future conflict. Meanwhile, Israel has been making overtures to the Syrian Kurds, at the risk of alienating their Arab allies and international supporters.</p>
<p>Kurdistan may remain formally divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, but it lies at an increasingly crucial geostrategic crossroads — not only between the Middle East’s warring power blocs, but also on routes for infrastructure, oil and even water. Those weary, gray-haired Kurdish militants never completed their political scientific degrees, but they have learned valuable lessons across 50 years of conflict. As state power declines, drone technology becomes cheaper, and resources become scarcer right across the world, canny non-state armed groups like the PKK and the Houthis can and will play an increasing role over the coming decades. The PKK may be changing strategies once again, but its long struggle is far from over.</p>
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					<title>Is this the end of Erdoğan?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/04/is-this-the-end-of-erdogan/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/04/is-this-the-end-of-erdogan/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Protests</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Christopher de Bellaigue]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Blue-19-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Further blows will be landed. Kemal Aslan/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Christopher de Bellaigue </strong>is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2025 23:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 06:35:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ekrem İmamoğlu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Istanbul]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=668504</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Turkey's pro-democracy movement stands alone]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Freshly-shaved, in a pressed shirt and exhibiting the merest hint of a pot-belly from all those kebabs on the go, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, knotted his blue tie while standing in his dressing room at home. “Hundreds of police have gathered at the door,” he told his supporters on social media, “but I will continue to fight ceaselessly against that person and against that mind which manipulates this whole process like a machine.” Then he stepped into the street and into custody. Thus, on 19 March, “that person”, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, precipitated Turkey’s current political crisis by having his main rival arrested on suspicion of corruption and supporting terrorism (let us dispense with any notion that the Turkish judiciary is independent).</p>
<p>Since then İmamoğlu’s party, the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, has held huge protest rallies across the country and staged a primary in which more than 15 million people anointed him as their candidate for the presidency. The opposition has also led a boycott of industrial conglomerates, media companies, and retail groups associated with the government, which has been patchily observed. On 2 April, many shops in Istanbul and elsewhere were shuttered in support of some 3,000 detained protesters. Such measures are clearly intended to spook investors and prompt a currency crisis of the kind that the Central Bank has already spent $25 billion in reserves to prevent. The interior minister deplored the opposition’s “assassination attempt on our national economy”.</p>
<p>The small number of independent Turkish journalists still able to work inside the country concur that the CHP, a fissiparous outfit with a talent for walking into political traps, has handled the crisis surprisingly well. Noting that İmamoğlu’s detention even brought protesters into the streets of Erdoğan’s hometown of Rize, on the Black Sea, one such commentator, Murat Yetkin, declared, “the wind is changing”.</p>
<p>Since Erdoğan embraced authoritarianism in the early 2010s, he and his AK Party, or AKP, have captured the judges, cowed the universities, and lobotomized the mainstream media. Rather than report on the biggest of the recent protests, by hundreds of thousands of Istanbullus (2.2 million according to the CHP), on 29 March, Turkey’s main news channel debated filo pastry recipes for the forthcoming Bayram holiday.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Rather than report on the biggest of the recent protests, Turkey’s main news channel debated filo pastry recipes.&#8221;</div>
<p>Erdoğan has a habit of revealing the outcome of judicial investigations before they conclude. Referring to a probe into what he called the “bribery, corruption and terrorism” of CHP municipalities, he predicted that “as it advances and deepens [it] will reveal how far the arms of the criminal organization have embraced the municipalities like an octopus”. Depicting the protests as a Jacobin frenzy, and neglecting to mention the police’s use of tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets, he warned that such “street terror is nothing but an attempt to veil thefts” of which his opponents stand accused.</p>
<p>That the current agitation is both deep and wide testifies to Erdoğan’s declining credibility even among his constituency of Islamists, nationalists, and small businesses, which is corroborated by ever-slimmer electoral pickings. It also points to the emergence, finally, of a credible alternative to his suffocating misrule.</p>
<p>For years the CHP had struggled with the legacy of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, who conceived of the party as an engine of Turkish nationalism, economic dirigisme, and prescriptive secularism. Erdoğan’s recent CHP opponents were either too nationalist to attract the Kurds, who make up around 18% of the population, or — as in the case of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, loser of the 2023 election — were disadvantaged by their membership of the Alevis, a big minority sect to which some Sunnis are axiomatically (and indefensibly) averse.</p>
<p>İmamoğlu, by contrast, is an observant Sunni with a background in the private sector — which Erdoğan supporters find reassuring. He possesses personal magnetism, a reputation for competence, and an instinct for the popular cause (milk for poor children; cleaning up the Golden Horn, for years a foul and dangerous suspension, now a place where dolphins cavort). To the Alevi and socially liberal base he inherited from Kılıçdaroğlu, he has added many Kurdish supporters. In a speech he delivered in the Kurdish region a few days before his incarceration (a 50-minute barnstormer with barely a glance at his notes), he referred to the Kurds as “the foundation stone, the central pillar of this country”. The emergence of the Kurds as a political force marks a big departure from the old nationalist insistence on a wholly Turkish nation. When I lived in Turkey as a journalist in the Nineties, CHP officials would deny the existence of the Kurds altogether, calling them “our brothers in the southeast” or, yet more egregiously, “mountain Turks”.</p>
<p>Of all the qualities that İmamoğlu needs as he begins a confinement that will either destroy him or make him invincible, the most salient is that he, alone among Erdoğan’s adversaries of the past quarter of a century, is a proven winner. In 2019 İmamoğlu was elected mayor of Istanbul, which had been a fiefdom of the AKP and its predecessor party ever since Erdoğan himself became mayor in 1994. The Supreme Election Council promptly annulled İmamoğlu’s victory and ordered a re-run only for indignant Istanbullus to return him with a bigger majority. In last year’s mayoral elections, he trounced his AKP opponent. As the saying goes — and as Erdoğan can confirm, having himself made the leap from mayor of Turkey’s biggest city to prime minister — “whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>When I interviewed a smiling Erdoğan in the spring of 1997 on the terrace of an Ottoman pleasure house, the then Istanbul mayor had a reputation for personal magnetism, competence, and an instinct for the popular cause (planting trees on Istanbul verges, piping water to the poor). In this sense, he and İmamoğlu have much in common — they even both hail from the Black Sea region. We were brought early strawberries which we ate while admiring the view over the Bosphorus. The word “democracy” came up often as we talked, even though the previous year Erdoğan had caused outrage by describing democracy as a tram: “it goes as far as we want it to go, and then we step off.”</p>
<p>Last month Turkish democracy ran out of track. Erdoğan’s decision to arrest his rival is a bet against his own experience. It was a jail sentence handed down by Turkey’s (then militantly secular) judiciary that propelled Erdoğan to national power in the first place. His crime in December 1997 was to recite a martial poem which the courts interpreted as an incitement to religious insurrection. The vindictiveness of the judgement turned him into a martyr while his mastery of the democratic discourse established him as a symbol of what Turkey’s Nato allies, searching frantically for unobjectionable Muslim regimes, referred to as “moderate” Islam. The US consul in Istanbul visited the mayoralty to commiserate; the case, she said, would “weaken confidence in Turkish democracy”. Erdoğan served four months in prison and in 2002 became prime minister, a post he subsequently abolished, creating the executive presidency he currently occupies.</p>
<p>The president does not intend to step down when his second term ends, in 2028, as the constitution decrees. Which brings us to another character integral to determining the outcome of the current crisis: Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which has waged an on-off war against the Turkish state since 1984. Erdoğan needs the help of Öcalan’s followers in parliament to enact constitutional changes that would allow him to run for a third term. The PKK is keen: its units have been hammered from the skies by Bayraktar drones manufactured by Erdoğan’s eponymous son-in-law, and its alliance with Syria’s Kurds has been imperilled by Turkey’s influence over the new government in Damascus, which it helped install. So it was a big moment when, on 27 February, after months of secret negotiations, Öcalan ordered the PKK to disarm and disband. Two days later the group’s commanders in northern Iraq announced a ceasefire.</p>
<p>A good deal for the Kurds would involve parole for Öcalan and a new Turkish constitution enshrining Kurdish cultural and political autonomy. But Amberin Zaman, perhaps the best-informed analyst of Kurdish affairs (and herself a courageous reporter who was driven out of Turkey by Erdoğan’s threats), believes that the president’s promises to Öcalan (made through intermediaries) amount to little more than an amelioration of his prison conditions and freedom for a prominent Kurdish politician. Nor have the Kurdish nationalists stayed silent during the current protests, with one of their parliamentary leaders denouncing İmamoğlu’s arrest as “a black stain” and “a blow against democracy and justice”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/broom.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Further blows will be landed. It is possible that Erdoğan will appoint an apparatchik to assume the government of Istanbul as he has done for municipalities whose Kurdish nationalist mayors have been removed or jailed. The loyal media will release details of alleged misdemeanours by the CHP, whose leaders are warning that the authorities will fabricate evidence using AI.</p>
<p>In a reign lasting almost a quarter of a century, Erdoğan has many precedents to draw on as he assaults the CHP. Back in 2016, a coup attempt by parts of the armed forces that had been infiltrated by devotees of Fethullah Gülen, an exiled cleric, was met with a huge purge not only of the army but also the bureaucracy, the universities and the media. Hundreds of thousands of people — not all of them Gülenists, by any means — were jailed, sacked, or forced into exile. To go by the accusations that the government has been leveling against the CHP, the party would be wise to brace for a similar total war.</p>
<p>Forget moderate Islam. Forget Turkish democracy. Erdoğan long ago flattened the secular judges and generals in his path and what he represents now is transactional geopolitics and power in perpetuity. Like the Ottoman sultans he admires — a favorite is Sultan Selim I, who almost tripled the empire’s size and committed what would nowadays be called a genocide against the Alevis — his vision is panoptic. He keeps his army, Nato’s second largest, busy fighting Kurds on both sides of the Syrian border. He opens the sluices and migrants flow into the EU; when the EU pays him enough he shuts them again. He pipes Russian natural gas into Europe for Vladimir Putin, while to Volodymyr Zelensky he sells Bayraktar drones that are used to kill Putin’s soldiers. Donald Trump likes him so much he let Turkey off with a 10% tariff and congratulated Erdoğan on doing “what no one’s been able to do in 2,000 years; you’ve taken over Syria”. The Russians call him “the plug for every barrel”.</p>
<p>This time around, don’t expect the US consul to come to the mayoralty to deplore the spectacle of a Democrat behind bars. Don’t expect Sir Keir Starmer to leap to the defense of a fellow Leftist who on the eve of his arrest was stripped of his university degree, rendering him ineligible to become president. Instead, think of Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, who crowed, “There’s just a lot of good, positive news coming out of Turkey right now.” For this isn’t the late Nineties. In its cells, its streets, this pro-democracy movement stands alone.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">668504</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lily Lynch]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/150523.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Turkey has become a formidable partner. Peter Nicholls/Pool/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Lily Lynch </strong>is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 00:15:54 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 01:13:50 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Olaf Scholz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Propaganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=662929</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Turkey is taking advantage of global chaos]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Celebrating the Turkish centennial, in 2023, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan unveiled an outsized vision of his country’s future. The “Century of Turkey” would have his country playing a far more autonomous, assertive role. “The international community will see a Turkey that takes more initiative in solving global crises”, the President promised, as Ankara would push for the “establishment of peace and stability” in its region. The concept built on Erdoğan’s idea that Turkey was on track to become a “logistic superpower” — and would, he predicted, eventually become one of the world’s top powers.</p>
<p>A few years ago, the idea seemed fanciful. Turkey had just been hit by twin earthquakes, killing more than 55,000 people. As the country struggled to recover from the devastation, and amid a mounting economic crisis, Erdoğan’s Turkish Century seemed destined to remain confined to the realm of fantasy and propaganda. But just two years on, the stars seemed seem to be aligning. As the old order collapses, Turkey is on the ascent, and Erdoğan is poised to take advantage. With Assad gone from Syria, and Iran’s regional influence greatly diminished, it is Turkey that looks ready to fill its place.</p>
<p>All the while, Turkey’s profile has been rising in the West, where the fraying transatlantic partnership is rendering Europe weaker and more peripheral by the hour. As the Trump administration raises the spectre of retreat, a disoriented Europe is scrambling to shore up its defense, and Turkey — which boasts the second largest army in NATO and a burgeoning defense industry — suddenly looks like a formidable partner. Ankara seems to be aligning itself with the EU’s bloc of Atlanticist liberals, while European leaders have shown interest in enhanced cooperation. Turkey has been invited to attend various strategic meetings in Europe and the abrupt surge in overtures prompted Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to quip that the Europeans were now “rediscovering” Turkey’s existence.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, Erdoğan said that “establishing European security in the absence of [Turkey] is inconceivable”. Zelenskyy was already well aware of this. On the day peace talks between Russia and the United States began in Saudi Arabia last month, which sidelined both Ukraine and the EU, it was Erdoğan who the Ukrainian President chose to visit. Only the Turkish leader was capable of projecting strength enough to command the respect of <em>both</em> Putin and Trump. It is clear that, in the emergent Trumpian world, one shorn of liberal platitudes about “shared values” and “defending democracy”, Erdoğan carries more weight than Kaja Kallas and Olaf Scholz. And Turkey, a Black Sea power that has retained relations with both Russia and Ukraine, as well as China and the United States, now appears better positioned than many Western states.</p>
<p>Turkey’s new weight in global affairs seems to have emboldened Erdoğan to take drastic authoritarian measures domestically. Earlier this week, Turkish police arrested his main political rival, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, on charges of corruption and terrorism. Some 100 other people were also arrested in a crackdown on the opposition and government critics. With Trump in the White House and the EU’s relative strength diminished, Erdoğan knows there will be little substantive pushback as he employs draconian methods to extend his political longevity.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/why-trump-is-winning-outside-of-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/why-trump-is-winning-outside-of-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-622138992-1-e1723217981464.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/why-trump-is-winning-outside-of-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/why-trump-is-winning-outside-of-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Trump is winning outside of America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/why-trump-is-winning-outside-of-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The response to the political turmoil in Turkey has been dramatic: protesters have flooded the streets of Turkish cities and Turkish markets have tumbled since İmamoğlu’s arrest. If Erdoğan appears as an erratic autocrat at home, abroad he is seeking to depict himself as a constructive mediator and standard bearer of regional security. He has recently offered to host peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, leveraging Turkey’s middle power status to present Ankara as a constructive bridge builder. This expands on the role Turkey played earlier in the war, when, in early 2022, it negotiated the Black Sea grain deal and brokered peace talks. Positioning himself as an indispensable middleman, Erdoğan has also expressed support for Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine, while the two men call each other friends. Though Erdoğan had “no meaningful dialogue” with Biden, Trump has repeatedly described Erdoğan as “a very smart guy” and “very tough”; he has also credited the Turkish President with the fall of Assad. During an official phone call earlier this week, Trump reportedly told Erdoğan that he entrusted Turkey with Syria’s fate. Matching his words with action, Trump’s pick for US ambassador to Ankara is one of his closest and most trusted associates, Tom Barrack, the top fundraiser for the President’s 2016 campaign. It’s a position that has been vacant since early September.</p>
<p>Marginalized by America, EU membership has also long eluded Turkey. Though it became a candidate country around the turn of the millennium, its accession was blocked, ostensibly over its democratic deficits and human rights record. But many suspected this rationale concealed an unspoken truth: Turks are Muslim and therefore <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/eurowhiteness/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">incompatible</a> with the European project, which has always been more civilizational in character than its liberal proponents like to admit. On rare occasions, someone acknowledges this. In a 2002 interview, Convention on the Future of the EU chair (and former French President) Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said that Turkish membership would spell “the end of the EU as a political union”. Two years later, internal market commissioner Frits Bolkestein said that if Turkey joined the EU, the “liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain”.</p>
<p>In any case, European leaders have often found Turkey more useful outside the EU than in it. During the early years of the Syrian Civil War, millions of refugees entered Turkey. Then, in 2015, an unprecedented number fled onward into the EU. Eager to prevent further new arrivals, the EU struck a deal: Brussels would pay the Turkish government to house Syrians. As far as Europe was concerned, Turkey was a convenient buffer state, useful for the offshoring of the EU’s problems rather than an equal partner. The 2016 attempted coup in Turkey contributed to a further deterioration in relations with EU countries. But recent weeks have seen a reimagining of this relationship, with a country once regarded as a fringe irritant elevated to the status of major player integral in European security.</p>
<p>If recent months have seen the tables turn for Turkey-EU relations, then the shift in relations with Syria have been yet more momentous. Turkey opposed Assad right from the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, in 2011, and for years furnished the Islamist opposition with direct and indirect assistance. His fall last year, and the victory of opposition forces led by former al-Qaeda affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was celebrated as their own — and not without reason. There is talk that Turkey might train the new Syrian army and open airbases in the country; now that HTS is in power, Erdoğan is hoping to reshape the country and region to his liking. The ambition is political as well as economic: the day after Damascus fell, Turkish construction-related stocks, primarily in steelmakers and cement, soared to new heights. In Syria’s ruined infrastructure, Turkish firms see a lucrative opportunity.</p>
<p>Even recent massacres of members of the Alawite sect by Sunni militants have allowed Turkey to advance a long-held interest: the thwarting of the Kurdish led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Earlier this month, the new Syrian government signed a landmark agreement with the SDF, which Ankara views as a terrorist affiliate owing to its ties to Kurdish militants in Turkey. The agreement stipulates the integration of all civil and military institutions in SDF-held northeastern Syria into a unified Syrian state. The deal also dissolved the SDF’s autonomous administration, which Turkey regarded as a threat to its security. Pro-government media in Turkey has framed the agreement as a success in securing the SDF’s “disarmament”. Meanwhile, a delegation of senior Turkish officials rushed to Damascus to press for its implementation in line with Ankara’s interests.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“In Syria’s ruined infrastructure, Turkish firms see a lucrative opportunity.”</div>
<p>While it may yet be derailed, the agreement would remove the main impediment to Turkey-US relations: the US backing of the SDF. America currently has 2,000 troops in Syria to support the SDF in its fight against ISIS, but the Trump administration has hinted it might recall them. The agreement between the SDF and Damascus is seen as a prerequisite for this.</p>
<p>Erdoğan also has high hopes that he can now repatriate many of the millions of Syrians who have fled to Turkey in recent years. If Syria&#8217;s security situation spirals into further sectarian violence, Erdoğan risks paying a heavy political price. The initial arrival of Syrian refugees provoked a xenophobic backlash in Turkey, boosting the electoral fortunes of the nationalist opposition to Erdoğan, who see the presence of so many conservative Muslims in the country as a threat to Turkey’s secular tradition. They will only return voluntarily to a stable, functioning Syria. The massacres earlier this month already mean that the Trump administration is all but certain to keep its crippling Assad-era sanctions in place, which will make it far harder to entice Syrians back home. Regime change in Damascus has therefore presented Erdoğan with both immense opportunities and risks.</p>
<p>Assad’s overthrow has also revived talk of the so-called “Turkish model” — an old idea that held up Turkey as the pinnacle of regional success. The model is associated with Erdoğan’s 2000s-era honeymoon period with the West. Turkish sociologist Cihan Tugal has <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/188-the-fall-of-the-turkish-model?srsltid=AfmBOorZrcad3PDrlUbWlnoX9RJ2u8KIs6L8Yza6pok3iCkrI35MlH_S" target="_blank" rel="noopener">described</a> it as “a marriage of formal democracy, free market capitalism and (a toned down) conservative Islam — Islamic liberalism”. This meant that Erdoğan’s conservative Muslim government could justify un-Islamic practices like alcohol consumption in economic terms, as essential for boosting tourism. The model was a response to the Iranian revolution and the destabilizing reverberations it had sent throughout the region; it was an attempt to incorporate the threat of political Islam rather than suppressing it. During the first decade of the new millennium, many believed the Turkish model might be the answer to the Middle East’s woes: it promised to make Islam both governable and modern.</p>
<p>As far as Turkey’s Western admirers were concerned, the model was a success: it nurtured the entrepreneurial instincts of Anatolian businessmen and tempered any excesses in piety through exposure to globalization and international capital markets. At the height of the Arab Spring, in 2011, when the Turkish model was being prescribed for the entire region, Turkey’s economy was growing faster than any country in Europe. Infrastructure projects multiplied, the country’s network of roads grew by 10,000 miles; the number of airports doubled to 50; Turkish Airlines flew to more destinations than any other airline on Earth; and gleaming shopping malls and mosques proliferated across the country.</p>
<p>At first glance, it appears that the new leaders of Syria would be the ideal pupils for the Turkish model. Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa sounds a bit like Erdoğan did in the mid-2000s. While carefully cultivating a pious image for himself, the former al-Qaeda emir has promised an “inclusive” political process that will reflect the will of the people. He claims to have embraced pragmatism and fashions himself as a neoliberal. He’s so convincing that “globalists” of the old school have been desperate to hear more: in January, al-Sharaa’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, was interviewed on the Davos stage by none other than Tony Blair. A few weeks later, al-Sharaa was a guest on Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart’s podcast <em>The</em> <em>Rest is Politics</em>.</p>
<p>Even in the unimaginably optimistic scenario that would see Syria replicate Turkey’s example, it wouldn’t be a recipe for universal success. The Turkish model always contained major flaws. For one thing, its vast economic growth was not felt by most Turks. Even at the pinnacle of the model’s supposed success, Turkey still had a high unemployment rate, and inequality was the third highest of all OECD countries. In the end, then, the Turkish model contained within it the seeds of its own demise: the new middle class that had been empowered and enriched by neoliberalization ultimately rebelled against Erdoğan’s neoliberal government, culminating in the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013. The failures of the Arab Spring, along with the government’s draconian response to the Gezi Park unrest, spelled the end for the optimistic period associated with the Turkish model. As liberal, democratic Islam and a path to EU membership receded from view, a more conservative and authoritarian version took its place. Though Erdoğan kept the neoliberalism, this vision has endured there ever since.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/broom.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the same time, Erdoğan’s grand ambitions for Turkey’s role in the world are constrained by a gloomy domestic reality. Turkey’s economy is now in tatters. Last summer, it sank into recession and inflation has been sky-high for years, hitting a peak of 85.5% in October 2022. As of December, it was still a staggering 44.4%. In spring of last year, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost the municipal elections to İmamoğlu’s secular opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in a sweeping, nationwide defeat.</p>
<p>The fall of Assad, then, was a life raft for Erdoğan, as he struggled to navigate these domestic woes. But the neoliberal Islam of early Erdoğan is unlikely to provide Damascus with a similar boost. Donning a suit, courting the affections of the WEF, and preaching the gospel of neoliberalism like a Pole in 1991 have not yet enabled the new Syrian government to bring sectarian strife under control, or convince their doubters that they seek to build anything other than a Sunni supremacist state. And even if they could, the fact that the Trump administration and other Right-wing populists are challenging the entire liberal order — tearing down free-trade treaties, withdrawing from multilateral institutions, and raising the specter of de-globalization — makes the Davos crowd and their models look even more outmoded, almost like a relic.</p>
<p>If Turkey can’t export peace or a recipe for economic growth to Syria, Erdoğan could yet profit from war. The country’s booming defense industry is fast becoming a source of national pride. According to Erdoğan, Turkey now ranks eleventh in the world in defense industry exports. Last year, its defense exports totalled $7.1 billion, an increase of 29% from $5.5 billion in 2023, while its defense products are now exported to 180 countries around the world. In particular, Turkey has excelled in the production of drones. Its flagship product, the Bayraktar TB2, has been described as “the drone that changed the nature of warfare” for its affordability and capacity to evade air defenses.</p>
<p>Also burgeoning is Turkey’s space program, though few outside of Turkey may have heard about it. Turkey is building up its existing space research and development to supplement its defense industry. At the end of last year, construction began on its first spaceport in Somalia. (Turkey opened its first African military base in Mogadishu in 2017 and is rapidly expanding its presence across Africa.) Meanwhile, the Turkish government has acknowledged that it plans to use its spaceport for missile testing. In space as on Earth, Turkey has sought to diversify its foreign relations: it has applied to join the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a planned lunar base led by the Russian Roscosmos and China’s National Space Administration that is a competitor to the American Artemis program. Erdoğan has also met with Elon Musk and the two are said to enjoy cordial relations, the Turkish president expressing an interest in collaborating with Musk in the future, since they are both “actively working in the fields of space and technology”.</p>
<p>With this array of cards to play, Erdoğan is now making a renewed bid for EU membership. This time, though, he is not just asking for Turkey’s accession; instead, he is fashioning himself as the EU’s savior. “It is Turkey and its full EU membership that can save the European Union from its deadlock, ranging from the economy to defense and from politics to international standing,” he said at the end of last month.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“If Turkey can’t export peace or a recipe for economic growth to Syria, Erdoğan could yet profit from war.”</div>
<p>Of course, not everyone in Europe will be happy about the prospect of closer relations with Turkey. Erdoğan and his ambitions are still viewed with suspicion by many. Distrustful observers have deemed his civilizational rhetoric and aspirations “neo-Ottomanism” — an irredentist ideology that would supposedly see the return of old imperial lands to Turkey. Steve Bannon has described Erdoğan as “the most dangerous man in the world” over his alleged desire to restore the Ottoman Empire. Such fears are misplaced: “neo-Ottomanism” is more of a rhetorical device used to fire up his base than a sinister plan for territorial reconquest. Still, Erdoğan’s civilizational rhetoric makes some in Europe bristle. Only last year the Turkish President asserted that “the West’s progress — built on blood, tears, massacres, genocide, and exploitation&#8230; has temporarily gained the upper hand to strangle the divine and human-centered civilization of the East”. Such proclamations are standard fare among leaders outside the West, but surely trouble some in Europe.</p>
<p>Others still are concerned about Erdoğan’s “transactional” approach to foreign policy, on full display when Sweden and Finland made bids to join NATO. Erdoğan wielded Turkey’s veto power to block the membership of both Nordic states until they agreed to crack down on Kurdish exiles accused of terrorism. If some EU leaders are prepared to embrace Erdoğan to fortify European security, they know he’ll expect to receive something in return.</p>
<p>This week’s arrest of İmamoğlu will be another major concern for those already skeptical of deepening EU-Turkey relations. It will also be a significant test of widely touted “European values”: will European leaders prioritize defense and security (and therefore preserving their relationship with Erdoğan) over democracy? Blunt-force authoritarian tactics can only strengthen European reservations about the prospect of enhanced cooperation, but it is also entirely possible that European leaders will simply choose to look the other way: since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Brussels has pivoted to a more aggressive posture, adopting the vision of a so-called “geopolitical Europe” that is less concerned with values and has “at last learned to speak the language of power”. Erdoğan fits into such a picture perfectly.</p>
<p>Indeed, Turkey’s message of European renewal has been gaining traction. Though the EU is effectively closed to new members, and Turkish accession will not be forthcoming, the country is suddenly being treated as a formidable power worthy of respect. After four years of Biden, during which European liberals paid lip service to combating authoritarianism and defending democracy, their sudden embrace of Erdoğan reveals more than just the extent of Turkey’s new relative power. That the Europeans must line up now to kiss the sultan’s ring demonstrates how swiftly the world has changed.</p>
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					<title>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/broom.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['When appealing to its anarchist and socialist supporters, the AANES has long drawn comparisons to the Spanish Civil War.' Photo: Delil Souleiman/Getty.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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										<pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 00:02:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 10:20:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=657804</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Their fate will remake the region]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>From the moment I cross the rickety pontoon bridge from Iraq into Syrian Kurdistan, I feel a deep sense of isolation. The arrivals hall, which offers the only link to the outside world, is falling apart around me. The duty free shop is shuttered, and even its sign is crumbling — the &#8220;DUTY&#8221; has long since vanished, but you can just about make out &#8220;FREE&#8221; clinging to the wall outside. Away from the crossing, the road passes wheat fields strewn with garbage, dotted by creaking oil derricks patched together after repeated airstrikes. It&#8217;s all overlooked by a foreboding border wall, from which Turkish guards take potshots at shepherds and would-be refugees.</p>
<p>Welcome, then, to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), a place that sometimes feels at the very edge of world affairs. Save the Catalan Parliament, no foreign body recognizes this multi-ethnic federation of four million people, often known by its Kurdish name Rojava. And yet this rugged corner of the Middle East, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, has long been a fulcrum of regional change. The Assyrians and Seleucids and Ottomans have all come and gone, leaving locals deeply conscious of their storied history. One group of AANES-affiliated Arab women’s activists have named themselves &#8220;Zenobia&#8221; — evoking the ancient warrior queen who briefly defied Rome here back in the 3rd century.</p>
<p>These days, AANES faces threats equal to Aurelian’s legions. After the dramatic collapse of the Assad regime, Damascus is ruled by Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his al-Qaeda offshoot Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Turkey, HTS’s key backer, lurks behind the border wall, its drones leaving vapor trails spiraling through the sky as they target AANES ambulances, civilian protesters and Kurdish commanders continuing the fight against ISIS. And then there is the Islamic State itself, no longer a physical Caliphate but still backed by tens of thousands of fanatical detainees, currently wallowing in AANES-run camps but eager for revenge.</p>
<p>With Donald Trump still prevaricating over Washington’s role in the region, the future feels bewilderingly unclear. Nor is this surprising. AANES’s existential struggles for survival have long been animated by dynamics driving the broader conflict now engulfing the Middle East — proxy conflict amid a new Cold War; Islamist insurgency and authoritarian brutality; struggles over oil and water resources between rich capitals and impoverished regions. All the while, the AANES’s vision of multi-ethnic federation governance offers a striking alternative to Islamism and autocracy, even as its fate hints at the future course of conflicts swirling through Syria, the Levant, and beyond.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-2303990443.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why America can&#039;t keep China down</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Throughout Syria’s decade-long civil war, these complex tensions played out in Qamishlo. The largest Syrian Kurdish city, and the AANES’s de facto capital, it was long divided between Russian-backed Assadists and US-backed Kurds. In practice, that created a complex patchwork of checkpoints and intrigue recalling Cold War Berlin. Woe betide the visitor who confused a checkpoint belonging to &#8220;Sutoro&#8221; (a pro-Kurdish Christian militia) with one guarded by &#8220;Sootoro&#8221; (their pro-Assad rivals).</p>
<p>Today, Russian troops are withdrawing from their base at Qamishlo airport, their presence untenable since Assad’s ouster. Yet the uneasy peace that endured here for over a decade hints at the strange relationship between Bashar al-Assad and his former Kurdish subjects. The Assads historically repressed Kurdish language and culture, while the AANES’s armed forces sporadically skirmished with Assadist militias. But as he focused on entrenching his doomed regime, Assad mostly left the Kurds alone.</p>
<p>Many locals fear the same cannot be said for his successors. &#8220;Assad was brutal, but you knew where you stood with him,&#8221; says Abu Adil, a guard standing by a former regime compound in downtown Qamishlo, a defaced poster of the dictator flapping nearby. &#8220;We don’t know if HTS will come and take these buildings over, if the [AANES] will move in, or if we can tear them down and build something in their place.&#8221; Abu Adil knows how volatile politics here can be. He himself was displaced in a 2019 Turkish offensive that saw hundreds killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. &#8220;Turkey’s militias stole everything,&#8221; he explains. &#8220;They didn’t leave a single washing machine behind. We don’t have any problem with HTS: but Turkey is the problem.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ankara has long been existentially opposed to the AANES, fearing the project in Kurdish-led autonomy provides ideological inspiration and material support to Kurdish militants hoping to dislodge Turkey’s own Islamist autocrat: President Erdoğan. With the Assads gone, Turkey is now aiming to finish what it started in 2019. Last December, Ankara moved to occupy all the remaining AANES-held territory west of the Euphrates, displacing 100,000 people. Over 100 civilians have been killed in ongoing Turkish airstrikes, amid reports of potential war crimes, with the offensive now concentrated around a key hydroelectric dam offering Turkey a potential bridgehead across the Euphrates.</p>
<p>Especially considering their long fight against ISIS — the battle to retake the key city of Kobane killed hundreds of Kurdish fighters — many newly displaced refugees are unsurprisingly resentful. “We were a shield protecting not only the rest of [AANES], but the whole world,” says Ahmed Sharo, a gold merchant and AANES loyalist who fled the Turks to Qamishlo. I’ve heard similar arguments during previous trips to Rojava, but the mood is now especially bitter. No wonder: after wallowing in a refugee camp for years, Sharo says he only had 30 minutes to flee advancing Turkish militias. After we spoke, two women approached and asked for money, a first in all my visits to Rojava’s proud and politicized refugee camps.</p>
<p>It’s clear, then, that many locals here are tired of life in the AANES, unrecognized by the world and exposed to the depredations of a major NATO ally. Yet if Turkey’s assault is particularly concerning to people like Sharo — the Kurds, Yazidis and Christians who’ve benefited most from Rojava’s model of minority self-determination — they’re not the only ones to worry. Just like the region’s population at large, both the civilian AANES and its military wing are now Arab-majority, working to unite religiously conservative Arab communities into their multi-ethnic project. The “administration and the military” are not Kurdish, emphasizes Hamdan al-Abd, a charismatic, mustachioed sheikh who represents Arab interests in the AANES Executive Council. “Rather, they respect and protect all communities in the region.”</p>
<p>Others would disagree. I meet al-Abd in Raqqa, the former ISIS capital and now the largest city in the AANES. Like other officials, he is careful to fly both the AANES’s livery and the new three-starred Syrian flag in office, the latter waved by pro-democracy protesters at the start of the civil war and now by the new Islamist government in Damascus. Yet when protesters in Raqqa raised this same flag following Assad’s expulsion, AANES security forces opened fire. In a gloomy hotel lobby, I hold furtive conversations with activists who say they’ve consecutively been detained by the Assads, ISIS and the AANES. “People here don’t feel free, as they now do in the rest of Syria,” says one. “We believe that the new government in Damascus has the same ideas as us, and in the future, this city will be part of their central government system.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Nor are these revolutionaries-turned-NGO-employees the only ones to disdain the AANES experiment. Jihadis do too, as I discovered when I visited a Raqqa lingerie store. The owner implausibly claims her husband died of a heart attack just as US forces carpet-bombed the city, making her the likely widow of an ISIS fighter. She says the people of Raqqa are “waiting and praying” for Turkish militias to purge the city’s secular Kurdish administration. Though her prosperous business could never have existed under ISIS — the Caliphate were never big fans of latex corsets, even sold by women in full niqabs — she hopes Ankara’s close relationship with al-Sharaa in Damascus can bring an end to corruption at checkpoints and bring down import tariffs.</p>
<p>The AANES has shown some openness to local sensitivities. Though the diplomatic and military elite is still dominated by Kurds, Raqqa and other Arab areas have been able to secure exemptions in areas like secular education, military service, oil tariffs and marriage law. Public opinion in Raqqa is therefore more nuanced than either the AANES or its opponents suggest. By defending the rule of law and protecting basic services even in Arab regions — visiting for the first time in three years, I was struck by the pace of reconstruction in Raqqa’s bustling market — officials have long been able to secure tacit support from locals otherwise suspicious of its modernizing, feminist vision. “Despite all the errors AANES has made, it is nonetheless the best option in Syria,” a female Arab journalist in Raqqa tells me, sipping a fruit milkshake from a nearby store. “I personally would like to see the AANES and HTS reach a deal for a shared administration.”</p>
<p>Syria’s leaders have tried to find some common ground. Al-Sharaa has already met the top Syrian Kurdish commander, while HTS and AANES have maintained a careful ceasefire, with both sides expressing sincere desires to prevent further conflict and establish working committees and a national conference. But Turkey’s massive influence as al-Sharaa’s key foreign interlocutor is frustrating progress, while both sides have deeply contrasting visions about what Syria should look like: secular versus clerical; federal versus unitary.</p>
<p>This creates a paradoxical challenge for AANES leaders eager to devolve decision-making autonomy to Syrian communities. But like that lingerie store owner, many people in these same communities long for a more-or-less centralized Syria, a vision they trust the new strongman in Damascus to deliver. Before the war, Syria was not a particularly conservative or radicalized country. Yet 14 bloody years of conflict have catalyzed Islamist militancy and Sunni Arab chauvinism, particularly in reaction to the Alawite clique around Assad. More broadly, even moderate Arabs — and some Kurds — would be willing to tolerate a degree of Islamist authoritarianism under HTS as the price of internal stability and reentry into global markets.</p>
<p>Resolving these questions is especially urgent given the deteriorating humanitarian situation. In Kurdish, “the grass is always greener on the other side” is pessimistically rendered as “herbs grown in your own garden always taste bitter” — an apt description of mutual suspicions between Kurds and Arabs. In Raqqa, locals claim the Kurdish administration is appropriating local oil wealth to fund its own separatist ambitions, as wild rumors fly of 24-hour electricity and newly-paved roads in Kurdish areas. But when I travel north to Kobane, site of that famous 2015 victory, I find just the opposite. Turkish airstrikes have put the hydroelectric dam out of action, while their proxy militiamen regularly pepper frontline pumping stations with heavy weapons. Without electricity, hospitals are battling to maintain basic standards, and even the proverbial gardens are struggling. Without much rain this year, the environmental crisis in this desertifying region only grows.</p>
<p>With so much uncertainty, it’s no wonder some in AANES are looking further afield for security. Abu Adil, the security guard in Qamishlo, has already sent his sons to the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to find work. Like many Syrian Kurds, he uses the word “Kurdistan” simply to mean the rival Iraqi region, suggesting a lack of faith in the AANES’s own Kurdish project. Absent other friends, the Kurds are forced to hope US protection can keep them safe, even if that means partnering with the conservative KRI. Given Trump’s erratic foreign policy, that isn’t a sure bet, though it’s undoubtedly more plausible than hoping Israel will come to the rescue, as some desperate locals would wish: Tel Aviv has happily instrumentalized the Kurdish cause while keeping up a brisk oil trade with Ankara.</p>
<p>Assessing these panicked appeals, a Syrian Kurdish friend describes his stateless people as “children who grew up without parents, leaving them desperate for love from anyone.” Indeed, the Syrian Kurds have long sought support in unexpected places. On the one hand, the AANES has drawn support from the international Left by advancing its progressive ideology through the “anti-fascist” struggle against ISIS. On the other, the AANES’s armed wing successfully established themselves as the Pentagon’s indispensable partner in the war against Islamist terror. Even beyond emotive appeals to anti-fascist values, or else the security risk posed by over 40,000 ISIS affiliates still held in the region, yearning for a HTS takeover, there are reasons for observers of all stripes to care about what happens next.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Syrian Kurds have long sought support in unexpected places.&#8221;</div>
<p>When appealing to its anarchist and socialist supporters, the AANES has long drawn comparisons to the Spanish Civil War. The analogy is more than a rhetorical flourish. Just like in Spain, the Syrian bloodbath presaged a far wider conflict, one defined by proxy warfare, state collapse and mass displacement. The conflict offers a case-study for the coming disintegration of the so-called “rules-based international system” — a euphemism for US hegemony — as Islamism and other forms of political militancy both challenge and buttress central state power.</p>
<p>All this is precipitated by rising temperatures, desertification, failed harvests, and the weaponization of water resources. Israel’s degradation of Iran’s clients in Hezbollah and Hamas forms part of this broader story, paving the way for Assad’s collapse. Turkey’s expansion of drone and proxy warfare beyond Syria into Iraq, Azerbaijan and Libya does too. The mooted economic corridor linking Saudi Arabia through Israel to Europe, while evading Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, will be linked to fresh conflicts, as will Turkey’s competing, multi-billion dollar Development Road project between Baghdad and the West. Combined with worsening resource competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and Horn of Africa, little wonder that AANES representatives have long referred to this spiraling polycrisis by a simpler name: World War III.</p>
<p>The complex struggles in northern Syria therefore form part of a broader picture, suggesting ways in which state governance, resistance and reaction might evolve in decades to come. For all their differences, the AANES and HTS have responded to these historical upheavals in strikingly similar ways. &#8220;HTS have two faces,&#8221; says one opposition activist in Raqqa. &#8220;One is a religious face, which aims to export jihad worldwide; and the other is a political one, which tries to find a solution for all the peoples in Syria. We are with them for this second approach.&#8221; The AANES, which has long sought to balance radical Leftist militancy and institutionalized legitimacy, could be described in similar terms. Evolving far beyond its utopian vision of a decentralized &#8220;commune of communes&#8221;, it&#8217;s established a complex federation capable of feeding and protecting millions of people despite severe ideological differences. Indeed, while AANES officials dramatically claim that &#8220;Turkey wants to reorganize Syrian society under an Ottoman <em>vilayet</em> system&#8221;, their own project rather closely resembles that unwieldy pre-modern federation.</p>
<p>Given this mutual pragmatism, it’s possible to at least imagine a future <em>modus vivendi</em> between HTS and the AANES. While the latter have declared their readiness to recognize al-Sharaa, and integrate into his new Syrian army, any such transition is likely to be fraught and protracted. Rather, the Kurdish leadership will seek ways to survive, adapting themselves to a diminished role in the new Syria. Their chances depend on the direction taken in Damascus. Al-Sharaa himself looks set to continue down the path of technocratic crony capitalism, coupled with authoritarian repression of civil society. It’s a model he has already successfully trialed in Idlib, while the new Syrian foreign minister recently joined Tony Blair on stage at Davos to proclaim his hopes that his country would follow the Saudi Arabian path toward neoliberal integration. While this model could protect some basic rights, community self-determination in the Kurdish model is likely to remain beyond the pale.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, it’s striking to hear AANES talking points over women’s and minority rights being echoed by both al-Sharaa and the conservative Arab opposition in Raqqa. From 1789 to 1917, all true revolutions have had an impact beyond their collapse, as civil rights once seen as radical become everyday conventions. The same could yet happen in Syria. Of course, the Spanish Civil War analogy also implies the likelihood of the Rojavan revolution’s final defeat. Yet this is a corner of the world where hope can thrive even in the grimmest of circumstances, even amid the “bitter herbs” of your own garden. Just ask Raqqa’s female activists, whose namesake Zenobia died in exile, her resistance to the Romans crushed.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">657804</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Syria is doomed to instability</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-1242115912.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Postwar</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rajan Menon]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Blue-thumbnail-example-5-300x300-1-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The new Syria may not last. Huseyin Nasir/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rajan Menon </strong>is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;"><br />
</span></p>
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						<![CDATA[is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;">
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										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2024 00:01:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 19 Dec 2024 00:01:42 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jolani]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=644864</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Outside agents will stoke chaos]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The House of Assad endured for over half a century, but crumbled in 10 days. Ba’athism is dead and Abu Mohammed al-Jolani now finds himself the de facto leader of a government in Damascus, led by his rebel coalition Hay&#8217;at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It’s a denouement he may have dreamed of but likely never expected. For now, Jolani can bask in the euphoria and gratitude sweeping his country. But soon, he’ll have to meet Syrians’ pent-up desire for good governance and better lives. In a land as multicultural as Syria, perhaps the most urgent task involves proving his self-proclaimed tolerance. And many Syrians remain cautious, wondering whether his political conversion is little more than a tactical makeover.</p>
<p>In order to convince them, Jolani must create political stability while distancing himself from Assad-era repression. This means ending such practices as casting offenders into dungeons, common under both Bashar al-Assad and his father. It also means the disbanding of Assad’s security services. Nor will Jolani pardon any officials, civilian and military, who have committed egregious human rights violations. Syrians will want to see such offenders brought to justice: especially senior members of the military, the Ba’ath Party, and the <em>mukhabarat</em> (secret police). They will also want the hated <em>shabiha</em> (“ghosts”) to be held accountable. These citizens groups, armed and trained by the Assad regime, have been <a href="https://cija-syria-paramilitaries.org/#investigating-assads-ghosts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> of kidnap, torture and murder on a vast scale. To deliver justice and accountability there must be new legal codes and a new judiciary with people who are both qualified and trusted by the public.</p>
<p>Jolani’s biggest long-term challenge, though, will be reviving Syria’s battered economy. For a time, perhaps, Syrians will blame their economic hardships on the Assad regime. But, in time, they will hold their new rulers responsible, and fulfilling economic expectations will prove a formidable task. Syria’s <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCAGDPSYA646NWDB" target="_blank" rel="noopener">per capita GDP</a> has plummeted from $3,000 in 2011 to a pitiable $421 in 2021: that’s 86%. At the same time, the World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/05/24/syria-growth-contraction-deepens-and-the-welfare-of-syrian-households-deteriorates" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reports</a> that “consumer price inflation” increased by 93% in 2023, even as 69% of Syrians live in poverty.</p>
<p>It hardly helps that 13 years of civil war have killed 500,000 people, displaced more than seven million, and turned six million others into refugees, the majority in Turkey. Then there are the <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/11/10/the-worlds-most-unlikely-safe-haven" target="_blank" rel="noopener">half a million</a> people who’ve fled into Syria from Lebanon — escaping punishing Israeli airstrikes — and the million more <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/node/27191" target="_blank" rel="noopener">displaced</a> during the recent HTS offensive. With the economy in ruins, resettling returnees will be costly. Mohammad al-Bashir, the interim prime minister until elections next year, has urged Syrian refugees to return and rebuild their country. But even if only a small fraction of them heed his call, they will still need to be housed, fed, and provided with basic necessities to help them reintegrate into society.</p>
<p>Given Syria’s pervasive poverty, the new government won’t have much of a tax base to stimulate growth. In theory, income from oil sales could help: Syria produced <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=3110" target="_blank" rel="noopener">387,000 barrels</a> of oil a day in 2010 and exported about a third. But the oil fields are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/50464561" target="_blank" rel="noopener">largely</a> in Syria’s east and northeast, the stronghold of Syria’s Kurds, now known as the Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria (AANES). Run by Farhad Abdi Shaheen (better known by the nom de guerre Mazloum Abdi), leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is backed by American troops as part of Washington’s fight against the Islamic State (IS).</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Given Syria’s pervasive poverty, the new government won’t have much of a tax base to stimulate growth.&#8221;</div>
<p>Jolani, who has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called for</a> a new Syrian settlement featuring <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">regional autonomy</a>, could strike a deal with Abdi to share oil revenue in return for Kurdish autonomy. Abdi, for his part, has sent <a href="https://hawarnews.com/en/mazloum-abdi-aanes-participation-crucial-to-solving-syrian-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">positive signals</a> in return. He ordered that the post-independence national <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/kurdish-administration-says-adopts-syria-s-independence-flag-371f475e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">flag</a> adopted by HTS be flown by all administrate bodies within the AANES and declared that his enclave is part of Syria and will participate in a new political settlement encompassing the entire country.</p>
<p>Yet a deal between Jolani and Abdi could run into an obstacle, one that highlights the interplay between internal governance and external relations. Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, Turkey’s leader, has now gained even greater influence in Syria, especially in its northeast, following Assad’s fall. And he could have an even freer hand if Donald Trump, who <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-syria-troops-assad-biden-rcna183781" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said recently</a> that the United States “should have nothing to do” with Syria, withdraws American troops from the AANES, something said he’d do in 2018 but did not. Erdoğan may oppose any deal between Syria’s new government and Abdi’s SDF: he considers the latter a branch of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> (PKK), which has been waging a secessionist war against Turkey since 1984.</p>
<p>Since the start of Syria’s civil war, Turkey has <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-642284-Turkeys-military-operation-Syria-FINAL.pdf">invaded</a> northern Syria repeatedly. In concert with the Syrian National Army (SNA), its local proxy, it has also occupied <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a14241de-8dbf-4a69-b064-2991f5992503" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stretches of territory</a> west of the Euphrates River deep inside Syria. After Assad’s fall, the SNA, backed by Turkish air and drone strikes, has pushed into <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/12/syria-turkey-wants-to-extend-its-buffer-zone-by-pushing-back-kurdish-forces_6735985_4.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">several border towns</a>, forcing local residents to flee. Erdoğan had also pressed Assad for the right to patrol Kurdish-populated areas across Turkey’s border with Syria. Jolani may therefore find himself forced to stand with Abdi to oppose Turkey’s increasingly extravagant demands.</p>
<p>Jolani is also under pressure from Israel, which has “temporarily” occupied the UN patrolled <a href="https://www.972mag.com/israeli-settlers-syria-lebanon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demilitarised area</a> beyond the Golan Heights, created in 1974, as well as some territory beyond it. It also launched hundreds of airstrikes to destroy the Syrian army’s weapons stocks and chemical weapons sites, the latter strangely never discovered before despite Israel’s vaunted Intelligence capabilities. Israel also acted without first trying to engage HTS to see whether this zone could be preserved and an agreement reached to keep the Syrian army’s weapons out of the hands of terrorist groups and to secure and then destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stocks.</p>
<p>Jolani has called for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands, but Tel Aviv has refused: and there’s no reason to expect the United States will side with Jolani. The rebel leader knows, of course, that his efforts to improve Syria’s economy could be derailed if tensions between Syria and Israel boil over into violence. While he has called Israel&#8217;s attacks and incursion unjustified — and criticised its “unwarranted escalation” — he isn’t spoiling for a fight. Syria, Jolani conceded, is just too weak, and should focus on economic reconstruction and diplomacy with Israel instead.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-109891750-e1697718512510.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The failed lessons of Libya</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As expected, Jolani has asked for the lifting of economic <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/us-and-european-sanctions-on-syria-091620.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sanctions</a> on Syria — imposed by the EU and far more broadly by the United States — which didn’t diminish the living standards of Assad and his cronies but did hit ordinary Syrians hard. The West, though, won’t provide sweeping sanctions relief anytime soon: it will first test HTS’s governance practices, especially its declared commitment to be inclusive and abandon terrorism. The West will also expect Jolani to battle IS, which has conducted close to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/al-assad-syria-isis.html?searchResultPosition=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">700 attacks</a> in Syria this year alone. The problem is that Jolani won’t have many resources at his disposal: Israel’s airstrikes destroyed as much as 80% of the country’s military power.</p>
<p>Then there are the Russians and the Iranians. Both have suffered serious setbacks but will surely seek to regain the influence they enjoyed under Assad. The Russians have apparently already <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-12/russia-nears-deal-with-new-syria-leaders-to-keep-military-bases" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cut a deal</a> with Syria’s new rulers to retain their airbase in Khmeimim and the naval base at Tartus. That stake may induce them to avoid stoking instability. But Iran has no comparable motivation, and has anyway suffered a much larger loss of influence following the triumph of HTS. If HTS fails the governance test, Iran may decide to back such opposition forces as emerge. As Naim Qassem, the leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s ally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-says-group-lost-its-supply-route-through-syria-2024-12-14/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a> recently, his group has lost its supply route from Iran — but could regain it if “a new regime” emerges in Syria.</p>
<p>Outsiders jostling for position, let alone arming local surrogates, could make the already-daunting governance challenges HTS faces even harder. Syria is too strategically important to be left alone, but meddling foreigners bent on shaping its political future should be careful. The upheavals resulting from their rivalries will affect them too, through another surge in refugee outflows or an increase in terrorism or narcotics trafficking. Sadly, based on the past, there isn’t much hope that they will act any differently.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">644864</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The Turkish Left&#8217;s love for Assad</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/12/the-turkish-lefts-love-for-assad/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/12/the-turkish-lefts-love-for-assad/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Immigration</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kaya Genç]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/man2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The Turkish Left have engaged in a dangerous love affair with Assad. Bulent Kilic/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Kaya Genç </strong>is a novelist and essayist from Istanbul. He is a European Press Prize finalist and author of four books.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a novelist and essayist from Istanbul. He is a European Press Prize finalist and author of four books.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 00:00:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 00:00:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=643860</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Anti-imperialists have only empowered Erdoğan]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Bashar al-Assad, who ruled Syria with an iron fist for 24 years before getting his comeuppance, received silent support from one of the unlikeliest places during his dictatorial rule. Numerous groups in Turkey’s splintered Left, from self-professed Maoists to Stalin apologists and various “Kemalist revolutionary” sects, have pledged alliance to the leader of the Syrian Ba’ath Party since the war started in 2011. The love affair has been costly for Turkey’s secular progressives, the very people the Leftists claim to represent. And it has empowered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has accused the opposition of being heartless in the face of Syria’s tragedy.</p>
<p>Erdoğan strongly supported the Free Syrian Army in its endeavours to “protect and liberate Syria and Syrians from the tyranny of the Assad regime”. In 2012, when prime minister, he expressed his desire to embrace his rebelling Islamist brothers in Damascus in service of his “neo-Ottomanist” vision, and “inshallah, to pray in front of Saladin Mausoleum and do namaz in the Umayyad Mosque”. He was clearly acting in self-interest. An adviser to Erdoğan <a href="https://yurtsever.org.tr/2018/afrinde-56-sehit-verdik-ama-ihaleleri-turk-muteahhitler-alacak-166095/">noted</a> in 2018 how, thanks to Turkey&#8217;s involvement, &#8220;Turkish contractors will get a bigger share of the pie&#8221; in Syria. But the Left, for its part, built a pro-Assad case built on anti-immigrant, anti-Arab and “anti-imperialist” sentiment.</p>
<p>The Turkish Left’s love for Assad is rooted in their respect for Ba&#8217;athism, the Arab nationalist ideology that promoted national unity through the leadership of a socialist revolutionary state. It had identified Syria&#8217;s Ba&#8217;athism as a sister movement to Ataturk’s Kemalism, the founding ideology of the nation: with a similar holy trinity of nationalism, socialism and secularism. Like its Syrian counterparts, Turkish Leftist movements since the 20th century have adopted an anti-imperialist posture, violently defended modernisation, while considering “foreigners” dangerous agents of dark outside powers. Kemalists claimed that the only way to unify the country was by imposing militant secularism through a repressive state apparatus and by banning all Islamic lodges and public expressions of religion. Anyone talking about ethnic rights and political freedoms or daring dissent was branded an imperialist stooge.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-928555530-e1734005623498.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria has spooked MBS</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For these strands of the Left, anti-regime activities in Syria were an imperialist ploy. After the rebels moved their command centre from Turkey to Damascus in 2012, <em>The Washington Post </em>and <em>The Los Angeles Times</em> claimed that the CIA and US special operations units were training Syrian rebels in Turkey and Jordan, months before Barack Obama had approved sending arms. These reports sufficed to convince the Turkish Left that the Syrian suffering was manufactured in Western capitals and disseminated by the Western press to convince the world to intervene in the civil war. Instead of sharing the pain of those who suffered unspeakable tortures at Sednaya Prison — the &#8220;Human Slaughterhouse&#8221; — they tried to invalidate and belittle their experience. Instead of showing empathy, they came up with various conspiracy theories about how Turkish secularism would take a hit if those tortured by the Syrian regime could achieve some justice in Damascus.</p>
<p>This mindset expressed itself in various ways. Take the Orhan Pamuk affair. In 2012, a year into the civil war, the French daily <em>Libération</em> published a letter addressed to Assad and signed by various international writers including Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel Laureate in literature. They demanded Assad’s resignation, warning him that &#8220;other than resignation, there will be just one road that remains and that will be a death similar to what happened to Saddam or Gaddafi. Or life imprisonment in a cell at the Hague.&#8221;</p>
<p>This created a furore in Turkey. <em>SOL</em>, the publication of the Turkish Communist Party, depicted Pamuk wielding a shotgun on their front page. “You’re a fascist,” read the accompanying headline. Elsewhere, Ulusal Kanal, the television broadcaster of the Kemalist Patriotic Party, called the intellectuals&#8217; letter “an open threat” and described Pamuk as “an intellectual loser… After the Young Turk revolution, his new target is Syria.” According to Ulusal Kanal<strong>, </strong>Pamuk “had collaborated with the imperialists and remained under the wings of the US”.</p>
<p>Increasingly, the secular Turkish opposition to Erdoğan and his Islamist allies took the form of anti-immigration and anti-Syrian sentiment. A decade into the Civil War, Turkey was hosting 3.6 million Syrian refugees: the highest number in the world. And by 2021, anti-Syrian riots rocked Turkey, with activist groups torching Syrian houses and shops in Ankara. Then, this summer, more than 470 people were arrested for attacking shops and smashing cars in Kayseri. Ugly, racist questions became increasingly unmuted: who were those Syrians filling up our streets anyway? Weren’t they paid-up voters of the Islamist government? Weren’t they inflicting violence on Turkish women on the streets? Weren’t they the sole cause of Turkey’s recent demise?</p>
<p>And immigration played a decisive role in the general elections last year. Erdoğan seemed to be on his way out in 2023: his one-party regime had rattled millions with its ceaseless nepotism, while his unorthodox economic policies, including lowering interest rates as an antidote to inflation led the Turkish lira to a free fall. Turkey was ready to turn the page from his ilk.</p>
<p>But Erdoğan had an advantage. As an Islamist, he could claim that his loyalties were clear and accuse the opposition of flip-flopping when it came to issues like the Syrian refugees. He told his voters that while the secularists were promising to understand the pious now, it was nothing more than a calculated electioneering strategy. The Left’s hatred against immigrants was proof that they were no humanists, but opportunists. The opposition parties suffered from the same selfishness; the alternative to Islamist rule was no better, so people should elect the autocrat they already knew.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;As an Islamist, he could claim that his loyalties were clear and accuse the opposition of flip-flopping when it came to issues like the Syrian refugees.&#8221;</div>
<p>Although Turkey’s leading opposition party promised change, purporting to have become a democratic party and extending a hand to Turkish Kurds and Armenians, the Leftist CHP reverted to its ugly anti-immigrant rhetoric days before the second round. The party allied with far-Right firebrand Ümit Özdağ, and covered thousands of billboards with a pledge to deport “15 million immigrants”. Had they been elected to office, the Turkish Left would have forcefully sent back all immigrants from Turkey to Syria by May 2024.</p>
<p>Erdoğan wanted the best of both worlds: incorporating the rhetoric of “anti-imperialist” Third Worldism, demonising “foreign intervention” and “internal enemies” in the pay of foreign powers, while sustaining Turkey’s involvement in Syria and its support for Syrian dissidents. But the fall of Assad is not all good news for Turkey’s president. It removes a rhetorical device from his lexicon — no longer can he rule out domestic secular opponents by <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/facing-defeat-erdogan-personally-intervenes-against-opposition-candidate-istanbul" target="_blank" rel="noopener">comparing them</a> to Assad and his allies such as Egypt’s Sisi. And the Left can regain popularity without drawing from Erdoğan’s playbook. Take Istanbul’s Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. Having strayed from anti-immigrant rhetoric, İmamoğlu has shown how a social democrat politician doesn’t need far-Right ideas to retain popularity. He was reelected earlier this year, thwarting Erdoğan’s preferred candidate. He will likely run for president in 2028.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the meantime, it looks as if Turkey’s Syrian immigrants will return. Last week, BBC’s Turkish service reported how “almost all Syrians say their country is safe to return now” and how Turkey’s Syrians, “women, men, young and old, say in unison: ‘It’s now time for us to go back.’” Their departure will mean a culturally poorer and ethnically more homogenous Turkey.</p>
<p>Will the self-fashioned Turkish “communists” and Kemalists, whose hateful chatter about imperialist designs and regressive Arabs is now passé, feel ashamed about the fall of the Assad regime? Will they feel guilty about the bodies of dissidents (reportedly deported from European countries and Turkey) found at Sednaya Prison? More likely, they’ll pour their resentments on other targets: the heinous liberal intelligentsia or any other group they believe they can easily scapegoat without consequences.</p>
<p>And so whenever foreign journalists and scholar friends ask me how Erdoğan remains this popular in Turkey despite his autocratic rule and the accompanying financial meltdown, I remind them of what Turkey’s public perceives as his alternative. For so long, the tragic fate of Turkey’s secular resistance was to act heartless in the face of tragedy just beyond Turkey’s borders. From now on, if they want to convince people that they act ethically and not out of self-interest, they must do better.</p>
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					<title>How Syria will shape Europe&#8217;s future</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 14 Dec 2024 00:10:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:57:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolar world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=644027</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[We cannot afford another refugee wave]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>War is of its nature an uncertain business. Only in retrospect does Assad’s fall, so improbable last week, now look fated. It is ironic, given the opprobrium with which Arab normalisation with his regime was greeted by pro-rebel advocates, that that same normalisation may have helped spell his doom. Seeking to reintegrate himself into the Arab fold, Assad <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-hezbollah-iran-and-the-downfall-of-assad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">allowed relations to cool</a> with the Iran-centred Resistance Axis which had ensured his survival a decade ago. Yemen’s Houthis have accused Assad of clamping down on their activities in Syria to win Israeli and Gulf Arab favour; Iran now briefs that Assad was an ungrateful and undependable ally in their conflict with Israel; Hezbollah, smarting at Assad’s standoffish response to their recent setbacks, swiftly abandoned a last-minute attempt to preserve his rule.</p>
<p>For all that the Western advocates of the Resistance Axis worldview lament the downfall of their embattled hero, it was the decisions made by the Iranian and Hezbollah leadership to abandon him to his fate that made Assad’s fall so swift and relatively bloodless. Hamas has congratulated the victorious rebels; Hezbollah has expressed its support for Syria’s territorial integrity and political transition; with Russia apparently negotiating with HTS to preserve its coastal bases in Syria, and Iran and the new regime <a href="https://x.com/IranObserver0/status/1866537036733096106" target="_blank" rel="noopener">establishing diplomatic relations</a>, when Assad finally sank, the regional waters closed over him with barely a ripple.</p>
<p>Syria now pauses at a crossroads, where both hope for a better future, and scepticism that it will be achieved, are equally warranted. The essential problem of Syrian politics has always been <a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">how to manage the country’s religious and ethnic diversity</a>. The Baathist model, essentially an alliance of minorities and the Sunni elite against the Sunni Arab mass (and east of the Euphrates, of Sunni Arab tribes against the Kurds), in the end failed. Whether or not the new Syrian regime can succeed is an open question. Yet whatever happens now, it is up to Syrians to achieve. Rebel victory was won not by Western intervention but by the West essentially walking away from the Syria question at a loss. Advocates of the Syrian rebels, who spent a decade demanding Western military intervention to place a rebel government on the throne, now possess the end-state they have fought for for so long. Now it is their responsibility to ensure that the system they demanded is an improvement upon that which it replaced. The Assad government’s fall was not the result of the West’s actions, nor will the results be the West’s responsibility.</p>
<p>Indeed, it is for the better that Assad’s fall was not the product of Western bombs. This was a Syrian-led transition, helmed by a group Western powers spurn as terrorists, whose success depended as much upon the sudden decision by Assad’s own former loyalists that the regime was no longer worth fighting for as it did the rebels’ force of arms. Kleptocratic, unwilling to translate seeming victory into necessary political reform, deliver prosperity beyond the regime leadership to its core support base, or in the end ensure their security, the Assad regime simply shredded its own legitimacy. A state is like some local deity in this respect: once enough people cease to believe in it, it suddenly ceases to exist. There is a lesson for Western, particularly British, leaders here; HTS has spent years honing its legitimacy by observing the core competences in statecraft and effective governance — policing, transport, swift and responsive reaction to sudden crises.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It is for the better that Assad’s fall was not the product of Western bombs.&#8221;</div>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7efc20db-6da9-47d0-96e3-94b0f230134c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">extraordinary recent interviews</a> with HTS officials attempting to introduce their own stripped-down, digital governance to Syria’s bureaucratic state suggests that Jolani may be as much a 21st-century state-capacity autocrat like Bukele or the younger Gulf rulers than any narrow analogue in Islamic statecraft. Rather than a retreat to the Middle Ages, for good or ill the new Syrian state will be a 21st-century one, and not built on the old model of 20th-century regimes like its Baathist forebear.  Technocratic, results-driven governance is, by its nature, non-liberal, even if not necessarily illiberal: in the new Syria, we may indeed see glimpses of our own near future. But whether or not HTS can expand its effective governance in Idlib – the establishment of which, it should not be forgotten, involved <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/11/23/four-years-have-passed-since-activist-raed-al-fares-was-killed-as-the-party-responsible-for-his-and-hamoud-jneeds-assassination-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-must-be-held-accountable/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the eradication of some of the most prominent liberal revolutionary voices</a> – to the wider country remains to be proved. When Damascus fell, it was to the forces of the rebel Southern Operations Room, formerly Jordanian assets latterly (and we now see, ineffectively) “reconciled” to Assad’s rule by Russia. The repeated exhortations by HTS for armed rebels to leave the cities to allow security to be established by (its own) police forces highlight one potential tension: how far HTS can exert its authority over its own notional, and generally worse-disciplined allies.</p>
<p>It is one of the ironies of Syria’s rebellion, which does not map onto mainstream pro- or anti-rebel Western discourse, that Salafi jihadist groups such as HTS, through their greater discipline and adherence to stern moral codes, have generally been better at governance than the broadly secular rebel militias the West once backed to varying degrees. Indeed, the Islamic State’s original rise to power across Northern Syria came off the back of quashing predatory rebel militias to the acclaim of Syrian civilians — before then imposing its own brutal and apocalyptic vision of governance. Initial, cautious noises of optimism made on social media by some of the former regime’s most outspoken advocates have been dented in recent days by footage of atrocities carried out, seemingly, by members of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) rebel militias, some of which were once recipients of American military support. Retaliatory rebel excesses — or the sheer banditry for which the SNA is now renowned — will rapidly lose HTS its recent and hard-won domestic and international legitimacy unless Jolani can rein these groups in.</p>
<p>Yet this may not be possible. Whatever Turkey’s role in the HTS offensive, Erdoğan has used the sudden <em>fait accompli</em> in western Syria as the moment to achieve his longstanding aims in the country’s east, of eliminating the Kurdish-led but multiethnic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) statelet, the West’s chosen partner in the fight to destroy Islamic State. Backed by Turkish airstrikes, SNA militias have forced the AANES’s Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) troops from the city of Manbij, west of the river Euphrates. An apparent American diplomatic push to ensure AANES’s survival east of the river does not seem to be working, with Turkish ground and aerial bombardment of the celebrated border city of Kobani heightening fears of a wider invasion. While the AANES and SDF leadership have made clear their desire to incorporate their statelet in the new Syria, and have already begun pragmatic negotiations with HTS, Jolani may not be strong enough to rein in the SNA or confront its Turkish backer. Indeed, he may not want to: rather than fight the SDF himself, it may be easier for HTS to allow Turkey and the SNA to take the brunt of the fighting and international opprobrium, and reap the spoils at some later date.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-1787694781-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain has learned nothing from Palestine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like the opportunistic Israeli ground invasion of southern Syria, condemned by European states, the Turkish invasion of northern Syria shows two notional American client states pursuing their own expansionist foreign policy ends, while a directionless United States seems powerless to stop them. Condemning each other for identical actions, Turkey and Israel together threaten Syria’s largely peaceful transition, eroding the new state’s legitimacy while setting the stage for a resumption of major conflict, and in the case of Northeastern Syria, almost certainly provoking a new refugee crisis for Europe.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the pragmatic acceptance of Syria’s new order by regional and international powers like Russia and Iran shows what actual “multipolarity”, rather than the crude, reflexively anti-Western folk usage, could look like; the West is simply one actor among others hashing out mutually acceptable compromise deals. Yet the opportunistic aggression of both Israel and Turkey highlights that the most dangerous multipolar rivalry comes from within the American order itself. If America has any part to play in the new Syria — and the incoming Trump administration seems to disavow any future involvement in the country — it is simply to use whatever diplomatic leverage it still possesses to safeguard the country’s sovereignty from its own regional clients. Whether it is able to do so will determine the extent of America’s survival as a regional actor.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The most dangerous multipolar rivalry comes from within the American order itself.&#8221;</div>
<p>For us Europeans, with America fading from the picture, the stability of Syria and the wider Middle East is <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-fall-of-assad-europeans-have-an-opportunity-to-help-forge-a-new-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a core strategic interest.</a> Leaving the management of the Syrian conflict to America and regional rivals over the last decade destabilised European politics through the ensuing interlinked waves of mass migration and terrorism, the combined effects of which will ripple through our continent’s politics for decades to come. Europe cannot afford another Syrian refugee wave, and it is a central interest in preserving Europe’s stability that much of the previous wave must be undone, as humanely but swiftly as possible. Diplomatic engagement with HTS, indeed, sets a precedent for the same process with Afghanistan’s comparable Taliban government, for the same ends.</p>
<p>Beyond that, it is in Europe’s interests to help Syria recover from the effects of its lost decade, through lifting sanctions and supporting the country’s economic recovery. Removing terrorism designations from HTS, as the Labour government has suggested may soon follow, could well be a pragmatic step: ensuring that European volunteers from within the group’s ranks, and from within the ranks of allied, even more extreme jihadist groups do not return home is also pragmatic governance. If the overriding theme of Syria’s transition to rebel governance is one of pragmatic, multipolar bargaining for acceptable outcomes, then Europe must begin to think of itself as an independent actor, with its own interests to safeguard, rather than a charity on continental scale.</p>
<p>Rebel rule will mean a new Syria, one way or another. It must also mean a new European way of engaging with an unstable world.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">644027</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Out of the frying pan? Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
<div></div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 00:03:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 09:48:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damascus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=643177</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Turkey has always feared their revolution]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Syria’s two million Kurds have every reason to loathe Bashar al-Assad. His Baathist regime long repressed their identity, and there are many Kurdish activists among the countless people emerging, dazed and stumbling, from the dictatorship’s dungeons. But even as Kurds danced and toppled statues, the shadow of further violence cast a pall across the celebrations, especially now their bête noire Turkey is emerging as the dominant foreign power in a new Syria.</p>
<p>With Russian forces withdrawing in disarray, Washington wrong-footed, and Tehran neutered by Israel, Erdoğan appears the main winner from the extraordinary developments in Syria. Turkey’s own objectives in Syria are clear enough: liquidating the Kurdish presence on its border by establishing a 20-mile deep corridor of Turkish influence. In fact, it was reportedly Assad’s refusal to capitulate to this proposed violation of Syrian sovereignty which led Ankara to give an implicit green light to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s military operation. Aleppo, the first city to fall to HTS’s blitzkrieg advance, was a former jewel in the Ottoman Empire’s crown. After its capture, the Turkish flag flew from the Aleppo citadel once more.</p>
<p>Under Assad, the Kurds were written out of state politics — literally. Hundreds of thousands were denied Syrian identity papers, following a Sixties policy intended to “Arabise” the country’s north. In practice, that involved displacing the Kurds, described by an official as a “malignant tumour” in the body of the nation. Over more recent decades, Assad tolerated a militant Kurdish presence within Syria’s borders. The idea was to provoke nearby Turkey, a Nato member and key Western ally. Yet as the relationship between Damascus and Ankara warmed after the Cold War, that arrangement came to an end, and local Kurdish leaders were jailed or expelled. Many locals bear the scars of torture from those dark years, particularly after Assad’s security forces violently repressed a Kurdish uprising in 2005.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1076552636-scaled-e1679934999530.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Rojava a socialist utopia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The revolutionary Kurdish political movement has moved away from its Marxist-Leninist roots, instead advancing a unique model based on women’s autonomy, minority representation, and a nominally devolved system of municipal governance. That’s even as it retains a strict Leninist political culture, an ideological paradox which nonetheless allowed the Kurds to react swiftly following the 2011 outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Soon enough, they declared autonomy in Rojava, as Syrian Kurds refer to their homeland. During the brutal fight that followed, the Syrian Arab Republic spilled oceans of blood to keep Arab-majority cities in its grasp. That it quickly withdrew its forces from Kurdish areas, surrendering control to a ragtag militia, shows how little it cared about its nominally Kurdish citizens.</p>
<p>Beyond the Baath Party’s Arabist sentiments encouraging a dismissive view of Kurds, Assad likely felt able to ignore his country’s Kurds for other reasons. When compared with the Kurdish homelands in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, the arid badlands of Syrian Kurdistan were long dismissed as poor and undynamic. Yet the Kurds, bolstered by returning militants, battle-hardened during a dogged guerrilla war against Turkey, proved the only local force capable of defeating Islamic State. Along the way, they saved the Yazidis from genocide, and forged unexpected tactical partnerships with both Americans and local Arabs. As they drove Isis out of its former strongholds, including its erstwhile capital Raqqa, the Kurds helped forge a fragile multi-ethnic alliance alongside Arab Muslims, Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities. Known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), this alliance has since faced existential threats. That includes a deadly Islamic State insurgency; sporadic battles against Assad; and successive military occupations launched by Turkey — with Ankara bitterly opposed to the project in Kurdish-led autonomy on its southern border.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Kurds helped forge a fragile multi-ethnic alliance alongside Arab Muslims, Yazidis, Christians and other minorities.&#8221;</div>
<p>Throughout this fraught process, constructing a quasi-state while espousing a determinedly anti-statist ideology, the Kurdish movement demonstrated a protean diplomatic adaptability, finding various accommodations with Assad, Islamist and secular opposition forces, the US and Russia. With Russian and Iranian troops stationed in western Kurdish regions, and the US, UK and France to the east, the Syrian Kurds were able to exploit tensions between the two blocs, and make themselves indispensable to both. Kurdish forces even mediated when US and Russian patrols clashed while establishing their respective zones of influence in 2019-2020: a striking illustration of their ability to profit from the chaos of great-power conflict.</p>
<p>This pragmatic spirit enabled the Kurds not merely to seek reconciliation with Arab tribal federations, which had formerly thrown their weight behind Isis, but also maintain a tense if functional détente with Assad and his Russian backers. The Syrian army, for its part, was generally confined to small administrative centres and garrisons in Rojava’s cities. This tension was made tangible in the complex, interlocking geography of Qamishli, where the Assad regime controlled some streets and the Kurdish movement others. Anarchist international volunteers would regularly pass Syrian regime soldiers in the street, each studiously ignoring the other.</p>
<p>But with Assad ignominiously dispatched to Moscow, the calculus has changed. After helping the West defeat Isis, to the tune of 10,000 dead Kurdish fighters, Syrian Kurdish representatives want to pay a key part in rebuilding Syria. Their involvement in Syria’s government would benefit Western strategic interests, securing an anti-Iranian axis while creating a counterweight against Islamist rule.</p>
<p>In practice, however, the situation seems grim: and Turkey is to blame. Up to 100,000 Kurds have already been displaced in the latest round of fighting. Yet that’s not the fault of HTS, whose campaign has been marked by relative restraint toward local minorities, but rather Ankara-backed militias taking advantage of the chaos to attack internally displaced Kurds and Yazidis. “The situation remains critical,” says Mohammed Sheikho, a local council leader who weathered attacks by Turkey’s jihadist proxies to lead thousands of people to safety in regions still under DAANES control. “Many thousands of [displaced people] remain outside. Houses are not to be found. We lack blankets, ways to keep warm, heaters, bread, food. Many other people were detained [by Turkish-backed forces], and their fate is unknown until now.”</p>
<p>Even worse, Turkish proxies, united under the banner of the Syrian National Army (SNA), are now staging a fresh assault on the DAANES heartland. To paraphrase Voltaire, these militias are neither Syrian, nor national, nor an army. Rather, they’re funded and armed by Turkey; dedicated to executing Turkish aims against the Kurds; and encompass a muddled collection of mostly jihadist militias, including some sanctioned by the US for war crimes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Turkish air power continues to pound the US’s Kurdish partners across the north-east. A Turkish drone strike has just killed 12 civilians, including six children, in the town of Ain Issa (despite Turkey’s posturing as a friend of the anti-Assad revolution, no drone strikes targeted Assad’s forces as they capitulated to HTS).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-595238680-2-e1705505455445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The betrayal of British Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The situation appears grave. Yet that same spirit of pragmatic cooperation, which has ultimately enabled the Kurdish movement to survive 13 years across one of the 21st century’s deadliest conflicts, could yet pave the way for an unexpected outcome. HTS and the DAANES are reportedly engaged in negotiations, with HTS so far seeming relatively restrained. But other forces are set to profit more directly from HTS’s rise to power. As Yusuf Can of the Wilson Center explains, though the DAANES could capitalise on their “relatively established” institutions, Turkey is “cautiously jubilant” at the prospect of using HTS to gain leverage with everyone from Trump to Iran.</p>
<p>What of the future? Will Turkey follow through on its threats of a cross-border operation to crush the Syrian Kurds for good? Or, given HTS’s unexpectedly conciliatory rhetoric towards minorities, perhaps there could be space for a multi-ethnic federation. If Turkey can, finally, be encouraged to end the communal bloodletting, a negotiated settlement encompassing all of Syria’s diverse populations could yet emerge. But despite these efforts, further bloodshed seems inevitable, with Donald Trump’s return to the White House unlikely to pour oil on troubled waters.</p>
<p>At the time of writing, Turkey’s proxy militias are advancing on Kobanî, the Syrian Kurdish city where the Kurds first turned the tide against Isis in 2014, launching their partnership with the US and UK. But 10 years on, with bands of Turkish-armed Islamists once again appearing over the horizon and swearing vengeance on the Kurds, their nominal Western allies are nowhere to be seen.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">643177</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>What next for Syria?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2188259877.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>revolution</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Syrians celebrate the flight of Assad. (Credit: Muhammad Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:05:32 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 13:12:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=642763</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[As the regime falls, the region is in flux]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It was the clock tower that settled it. The images of rebels driving around the central square of Homs, its famous clocktower visible, confirmed they had taken the city. This meant they could now sever Damascus from the coastal regions, cutting the Assad regime off from the remaining pockets of support it had outside the capital. It was over.</p>
<p>Right now, the rebels are at Umayyad Square in central Damascus; they have taken control of the State TV while explosions and gunfire can be heard in some neighbourhoods of the capital. These are likely to be bouts of sporadic fighting as pro-Assad militias try to make it to the coast or the Lebanese border.</p>
<p>Escape routes, though, are becoming hard to find. Damascus International Airport is closed, with all flights cancelled. The borders with Lebanon and Jordan are closed. The Syrian government has made no official statement yet, and the location of Assad and his family is unknown (though there are rumours that a plane he was fleeing in may have come down).</p>
<p>Syria is in chaos.</p>
<p>All eyes are now on Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay&#8217;at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group in Syria that leads the rebel forces. Formed in 2017 through the merger of several factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra — al-Qaeda&#8217;s former Syrian affiliate — HTS is a tricky proposition. It emerged from al-Qaeda but it also later fought them. Jolani is educated, sophisticated and politically astute.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187154696-e1733161682622.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Syria is back at war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>He has by all accounts been on a journey since he was dispatched from Iraq with bags of cash to bring jihad to Syria. He seems to recognise that international terror is a busted flush and that political pragmatism and moderation — or at least the avoidance of overt brutality — are the way forward. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/574cc17a-fa3a-411b-acb0-34fc032c7fe4?shareType=nongift" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Reports</a> indicate that when it comes to fusing religion with politics his belief is “the real world has to guide your Islam, that you cannot force your Islam on to the real world”. On parts of Arab social media, he has acquired the nickname “Jolani-Zelensky”.</p>
<p>HTS’s reputation has soared as it has advanced across Syria. Its soldiers would seem to be avoiding civilian casualties for now and are careful not to be seen as an occupying military power. Incredibly, there have — so far — been no reports of old scores being settled. Instead, there is footage of Assad troops surrendering and being set free to go home (the foot soldiers at least) and of peaceful transitions of power at airports, police stations and so on. As one Syria analyst said to me, “I’m surprised we haven’t seen more images of Assad soldiers being lined up and shot, gathered in squares for public executions, minority persecution, displacement and so on.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Let&#8217;s not forget that not so long ago HTS were selling foreigners to Islamic State to behead on YouTube.&#8221;</div>
<p>Unexpectedly, Jolani has been vocal about protecting minority rights. He has sought to portray a more moderate attitude in interviews and on the ground he has personally managed the surrender of Assad troops — offering pardons, and then handing over control of the areas to local councils and civil authorities.</p>
<p>Then there are the prisons. These are a shorthand for Assad’s barbarity. Social media is now drowning in videos of startled prisoners being released; of Syrians weeping with relief and joy to discover a relative imprisoned long ago is alive. It’s powerful messaging.</p>
<p>All of which is to say that if the military campaign is a success, the strategic communications have been a stroke of genius.</p>
<p>Not least because HTS remains problematic. Let&#8217;s not forget that not so long ago that its followers were selling foreigners to Islamic State to behead on YouTube. The US has designated the group a terrorist organisation and has a $10 million reward out for Jolani’s death or capture. If he intends to run for Syrian president — and there are a lot of Syrians who would love that right now — then the US bounty is a huge problem.</p>
<p>Assad had stamped on his people so hard for so long that what we are now seeing is the eruption of a sudden and colossal vacuum of power. For the moment, the only real contenders to fill it are Jolani and HTS. We must hope that Jolani’s conversion is indeed “Damascene”; the West simply cannot afford Syria&#8217;s implosion to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2176914586.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dangers of normalising Bashar al-Assad</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alessandra Bajec</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It would be salient, then, to remember the lessons of the fall of that other tyrant, Muammar Gaddafi. He was overthrown and everyone was euphoric. The problem was that booting him out had been the goal unifying all the armed factions — and without it, they turned on each other, with predictably disastrous consequences for Libya.</p>
<p>It didn&#8217;t help that the UN was too slow to put in place an effective political process. As a result, the government formed in Tripoli wasn’t inclusive, but made up of the Libyans who had been in exile and making friends in western capitals — just as the Iraqi businessman Ahmad Chalabi had conned so many people in Washington and London into believing that the Iraqis would welcome him as a returning leader. We never learn.</p>
<p>Ten years on, Libya is a mess. Tripoli is ruled by gangs and there has been zero development. Benghazi is run by a pro-Russian maniac. The country has become jihadi training camp and a launchpad for people smuggling to Europe.</p>
<p>Right now, the best-case scenario for Syria — and, most likely, regional security — is that Jolani is true to his word. What emerges is an inclusive political process to federalism, endorsed and supported by the international community, with funding for development and recovery. A transitional justice process is set up for perpetrators of war crimes, and there are no more Wild West jihadi training grounds fuelling untold terrorism and conflict the world over.</p>
<p>Regionally, the effects are huge. We don’t know what comes next, but it is extremely unlikely that a group that emerged from a Sunni Jihadists is going to have much time for Shia Iran and its militias. As it stands, Iran can kiss its land bridge to Hezbollah goodbye, severely weakening both parties, and strengthening Israel.</p>
<p>Jerusalem will have to watch what happens in the Golan Heights but as of now the events benefit Israel. One rebel even went on Israel&#8217;s Channel 11: “Dear neighbours from the State of Israel…” he <a href="https://x.com/dpatrikarakos/status/1865658530436469094" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>, “I’m speaking on my behalf and for all the free people of Syria. The next phase will be a phase of harmony and of peace with the State of Israel.&#8221; Whether that is true is debatable, but an extraordinary statement nonetheless.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2186488735.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hezbollah has weakened Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Another winner is Turkey, which has clearly been funding and training HTS. It may now move on with plans to further degrade the Kurdish PKK that runs part of Northeast Syria. At any rate, my friends in Kurdistan are nervous, and reaching out.</p>
<p>But Assad’s fall is bad news for Moscow. Syria is Putin’s southern flank, and it looks like he has lost it. Being unable to protect his client makes him look weak, and he may now also lose his naval facility at Tartus. Russian planes have been landing there all day — doubtless to extract their men.</p>
<p>Syria is once more in revolution, and the region is once more in flux. I think again of the Homs clock tower. On 18 April 2011, thousands gathered at its base for a peaceful protest. In the early hours of the following day, security forces dispersed the crowd with live ammunition, killing several of the protestors. The &#8220;Clock Tower Massacre” lives on for Syrians, who are now be hoping that some form of justice, and improvement in their lives, is coming. We must pray that these hopes are not in vain.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">642763</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The men paying to be taller</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/02/the-men-paying-to-be-taller/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/02/the-men-paying-to-be-taller/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-90851861.jpg?w=524</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Masculinity</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Sean T. Smith]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Blue-thumbnail-man-2.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[At 8'1", Sultan Kosen is the tallest man in the world (Dan Kitwood/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Sean T. Smith</strong> is a journalist and author.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>seansmithwrites</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist and author.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:00:09 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Masculinity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[none]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=491072</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Demand for limb-lengthening surgery is soaring]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When Ryan* arrived in Istanbul he was 5’7” — but when he returned to the UK he was 5’10”. By having his legs surgically broken and then extended at the glacial rate of 1mm per day, he had achieved his target height. Immobilised in an Istanbul hotel room, Ryan existed in a post-surgical limbo for three months to allow a fissure of new bone to form a bridge over the gradually growing gap. His stay was punctuated by regular physical therapy sessions with 20 fellow patients in one of the hotel’s co-opted conference rooms. “Some of them were screaming in agony,” he recalls.</p>
<p>Ryan acknowledges that his decision to pay £25,000<strong> </strong>for a surgery that was pioneered to help soldiers recover from battlefield injuries might seem irrational. Now in his late 20s, he worked extra shifts as a waiter and freelance writer to help finance the operation. “A normal person would think you were crazy,” he says. “But I was at breaking point. If you lived in my head for the last five years, you&#8217;d understand.”</p>
<p>Despite having an outwardly confident exterior, Ryan’s height-related insecurity began at around the age of 16 while he was still at college and started to notice that younger friends were outgrowing him. “I remember feeling significantly smaller than my classmates, as if I was underdeveloped. There was a sense that I didn’t matter as much as the others and that there was that something missing.”</p>
<p>Although he was never bullied, Ryan found the long-term cumulative effect of occasional height-related digs corrosive enough to lead from low self-esteem to anxiety and depression. “You realise that there’s something about you that&#8217;s outside the standard deviation of people that you&#8217;d meet — and then you realise you can&#8217;t do anything to fix it. It was definitely a contributing factor to a lot of the mental-health difficulties I had during my late teens and early 20s. It sort of consumes you.” Even close friends had little sense of the extent of his despair.</p>
<p>Ryan remembers reading that cosmetic limb-lengthening surgery had been pioneered in the United States. But at a prohibitive cost of around £125,000, it was too remote a prospect to ever entertain seriously. And then he became aware that, by outsourcing post-operative care and physical therapy to a non-clinical setting in hotels, providers in Turkey were offering several versions of the same procedure at more affordable rates.</p>
<p>At around £45,000, the most expensive package there replicates the higher-tech version of operation available in the States. By implanting an extendable nail in the bone cavity, and then using magnetic sensors to lengthen it by remote control, it does away with the need for a bulky metal external fixator while also speeding up recovery and reducing the likelihood of infection, nerve damage, blood clots or the possibility of the bones not properly fusing.</p>
<p>However, younger patients on more limited budgets like Ryan, tend to opt for the lower-tech Lengthening Over Nail (LON) method that costs between £25,000 and £33,000 Unfortunately, LON does requires require the bulky external fixator, which is wrapped around the leg externally and attached to the bone through the skin with pins, making scarring and infections more likely. What’s more, LON patients are required to lengthen their limbs themselves, by manually twisting a key in the metal fixator on four excruciating occasions throughout the day.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-male-baldness-industrial-complex/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-male-baldness-industrial-complex/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1407340830-e1706548613986.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-male-baldness-industrial-complex/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-male-baldness-industrial-complex/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The male baldness industrial complex</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-male-baldness-industrial-complex/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nicholas Harris</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By the time Ryan was ready to outline what the LON procedure would entail to his girlfriend, he had sunk further into his depression. Although she was initially horrified at the idea, she came around when she realised that the risks of doing nothing outweighed those from the surgery itself. Therapy had been repeatedly tried and had failed to remove Ryan’s crippling insecurity.</p>
<p>“She could see that I was at breaking point and that I’d already made my mind up, so she supported me throughout the process,” he says. After undergoing surgery 18 months ago, Ryan remained in hospital for five days on a cocktail of strong painkillers, morphine, antibiotics and blood thinners before being transferred to the hotel.</p>
<p>Today, Ryan claims he was one of the lucky ones because he always found the pain manageable; he remembers mind-numbing boredom being the biggest challenge. Robert, also from the UK, is there now and has not been so fortunate. When I spoke to him, he was halfway through the three-month lengthening process and still in very obvious discomfort. On the rare occasions that the pain subsides, Robert, an IT developer in his late 30s, can work remotely. “The pain is constantly there so I’m using painkillers. It stops you from doing anything like reading or watching films, but I sometimes manage to do some work on the laptop.”</p>
<p>Relentlessly, every six hours without fail, Robert turns the key in the external fixator that lengthens the legs by 0.25 mm. Invariably, the pain intensifies 10 minutes later as the muscles, and nerves stretch to accommodate the adjustment. ‘’It’s a serious procedure and being trapped in a hotel with such limited movement is obviously a very unusual situation.”</p>
<p>When I ask him why he’s putting himself through this, Robert cites a lack of confidence and a general sense of never quite being able to live life to the full. “Being taller has always been at the back of my mind — a sort of secret wish. You do feel as if you’ve missed out on certain things. And of course women desire taller men compared to themselves.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Women desire taller men compared to themselves.”</div>
<p>By the time he returns to the UK in around six weeks, Robert is hoping for 8cm of growth (from 167cm to 175cm). While he still needs a wheelchair to get around, by then he should be able to manage on crutches — although a full recovery will probably take nine months. He has no plans to broadcast where he’s been, but if close friends expressly ask him where he’s been or notice the change in his appearance, he plans to confide in them if they promise to be discreet.</p>
<p>Back in Istanbul, Makbulijana Haruni, the patient welfare coordinator at the Iwannabetaller clinic, remains inundated with dozens of enquiries about limb-lengthening each week. She explains that most requests are rooted in the desire to project more confidence, power and status at work. “We see a lot of businessmen who say I’m in a senior position and need to lead teams of people but with this height I’m not able to do this,” she says. People believe that if they are taller, they will be heard more or more likely to be considered for promotions because they’re taken more seriously.”</p>
<p>As a patient welfare coordinator, Haruni comes as part of the package. The clinic has the capacity to operate on 80 patients each year and Haruni works with her team to screen out patients with body dysmorphia — a serious mental-health condition where sufferers obsess over flaws in their appearance. She acknowledges that patients with body dysmorphia can be treated more effectively by therapy and antidepressants; surgery would be futile. Patients have to pass a pre-surgical psychological assessment to be eligible for the operation.</p>
<p>However, according to Haruni, not all of their competitors are quite so scrupulous. You only have to type limb-lengthening surgery into a search engine to see the proliferation of the procedure with clinics popping up in health tourist hotspots Mexico, India and even Iran. It’s an entirely unregulated global market where orthopaedic surgeons promise simple surgical solutions to complex problems with far too much gusto and entrepreneurial flair.</p>
<p>“Around the world, orthopaedic surgeons have clearly realised that they can make a lot of money in this way,” Haruni says, before adding that the hype is clearly fuelling unrealistic expectations. She increasingly has to reason with patients demanding growth of more than 6-8cm from the procedure, even though that escalates the risks of potentially life-changing complications.</p>
<p>But what is driving such international demand? When the American sociologist Saul Feldman popularised the term “heightism” in the Seventies, he identified an insidious unconscious bias that’s hiding in plain sight. “American society is a society with a heightism premise: to be tall is to be good and to be short is to be stigmatised,” he wrote. And to combat the last socially acceptable form of discrimination, he called for a “sociology of stature”. Over the past half century, researchers have been amassing an <a href="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/soc4.13178#soc413178-bib-0013" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imposing body of research</a>, with international studies showing that being tall correlates not just with enhanced educational outcomes, social mobility, romantic success, and acquisition of leadership positions, but a better quality of life in general.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-benign-bullshit-of-arnold-schwarzenegger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-benign-bullshit-of-arnold-schwarzenegger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-481406443-scaled-e1696520190432.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-benign-bullshit-of-arnold-schwarzenegger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-benign-bullshit-of-arnold-schwarzenegger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The benign bullshit of Arnold Schwarzenegger</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/the-benign-bullshit-of-arnold-schwarzenegger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Trachtenberg</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Elsewhere, anthropological studies across cultures consistently show that taller stature is linked to increased social status. Although the reason <em>why </em>is unclear, there is a lot of evidence to support the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1368430212437211" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interpersonal dominance theory</a> — that we’re more likely to defer to the judgement of taller people because they are more likely to win a physical confrontation. When, for instance, the journalist Malcolm Gladwell was researching how we unconsciously form erroneous first impressions for his book <em>Blink</em>, he found that 58% of the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies were above 6 feet even though only 14% of men in the general population were that tall.</p>
<p>Does this mean that heightism is hardwired into our consciousness as an insidious prejudice? Taken in the aggregate, the evidence for the existence of the so-called “height premium” is certainly compelling, to the extent that limb-lengthening surgery starts to seem like the extreme end of the cosmetic-procedure continuum: how different is it to transhumanist endeavours such anti-ageing biotech or biohacking?</p>
<p>Viewed in this way, Turkey’s nascent limb-lengthening industry feels like an unnerving glimpse into that biomedical brave new world where status itself is a marketable commodity. A tummy tuck or nose job might give you confidence and change the way you feel about yourself, but it can’t re-engineer the invisible power dynamics in every room that have been crafted by millions of years of evolution in the way a “height transplant” can.</p>
<p>Eighteen months on from his surgery, and three inches taller,<strong> </strong>Ryan has transitioned from just below average height to just above, and is perhaps uniquely placed to comment on these new power dynamics. “I just feel that I’m a default person now with my own attributes who can no longer be as easily dismissed,” he says. “It forces people to engage with me for who I really am.”</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">491072</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The betrayal of British Kurds</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-595238680-2-e1705505455445.jpg?w=707</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Justice for the Kurds. Dan Kitwood/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 00:00:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 09:30:45 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496601</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Slayers of Isis are being criminalised]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>This week, two activists are facing trial under the UK’s Terror Act for the “crime” of holding a flag at a demonstration. But this wasn’t a Palestinian flag, which former Home Secretary Suella Braverman has said could be a criminal offence. It was Kurdish.</p>
<p>Though troubling, this assault on free expression is far from an isolated incident. Over the past year, anti-terror police have arrested, charged and harassed a number of British volunteers who joined the Kurdish-led, UK-backed fight against Isis, along with their relatives. I have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/sep/20/british-journalist-held-by-police-at-luton-airport-for-five-hours-without-arrest" target="_blank" rel="noopener">detained and questioned</a> for hours by anti-terror police on the UK border due to my reporting on the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish community faces regular police harassment and home raids.</p>
<p>“It’s a freedom of expression issue,” <a href="https://medyanews.net/uk-targets-kurds-on-turkeys-behalf-says-journalist-facing-terror-charges/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">says Mark Campbell</a>, a photojournalist and one of the activists on trial for holding a flag associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a proscribed terrorist organisation in the UK, at a demonstration in London. “But it’s also a highly political issue — because that flag represents Kurdish peoples’ struggle for basic human and political rights in Turkey.”</p>
<p>Beritan, another Kurdish activist, will join Campbell in the dock. “Why should the British government be afraid of me, or of Kurds?” she asks. “Our flag is the symbol of a peaceful Kurdish nation, and a [political] programme of education, equality and democracy for all. Is this a danger to Britain?”</p>
<p>Given that the West relied on the armed Kurdish movement, spearheaded by the PKK, to lead the ground campaign against Isis, the Kurds might be forgiven for expecting a fair hearing. The British authorities had no complaints when more than 10,000 Kurdish fighters gave their lives to rid the world of the Isis caliphate. Or when, backed by US airstrikes, they saved the Yazidi minority from genocide. But Western policy-makers have short memories — and the Kurds have been all too often betrayed by their <a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/10/07/kurds-syria-turkey-trump-betrayal/#:~:text=The U.S. has now betrayed,naturally want their own state." target="_blank" rel="noopener">nominal Western allies</a>. Today, the UK Kurdish community remains criminalised and subjected to what its representatives describe as discriminatory, illiberal treatment in order to appease Turkey’s increasingly autocratic President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who views them as a political threat.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1090878854-scaled-e1648551227371.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdogan&#039;s Turkey won&#039;t save Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Will Campbell and Beritan be let off the hook? The UK’s Supreme Court has previously ruled against protestors who displayed a PKK flag, arguing that the infringement of the right to freedom of expression was outweighed by the need to deny the Kurdish movement “<a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2022/02/03/supreme-court-dismisses-protestors-appeal-over-pkk-flag-conviction/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a projected air of legitimacy</a>&#8220;. But a number of other high-profile anti-Kurdish trials have collapsed, including those targeting UK volunteers in the fight against Isis. In one case, UK police sentenced former soldier Dan Burke with terror offences for supporting the Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their fight. Both the father and 19-year-old brother of another volunteer, Dan Newey, were also charged with terror offences after the father sent Newey £150.</p>
<p>“The British state has repeatedly contradicted its own foreign policy,” Newey tells me. “While simultaneously funding, arming, training and working alongside the [Kurdish-led] Syrian Democratic Forces, the UK government charged internationalist volunteers [in the SDF] with ridiculous terror offences in order to appease Turkey.”</p>
<p>Burke spent 10 months on remand in jail without ever going to trial to clear his name. He suffered the humiliation of being labelled “Jihadi Dan” despite devoting his life to the struggle against radical Islam. Meanwhile, Newey&#8217;s family suffered <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53270896" target="_blank" rel="noopener">irrevocable harm</a>, losing work as a result of the police harassment. Burke would later be killed fighting in Ukraine, where he travelled in 2022 to join the struggle against Russia’s invasion. Yet even after his body was repatriated to the UK, his funeral was staked out by UK police. Prosecutors failed in both cases to present evidence against Burke or the Neweys, while other <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/10/28/josh-walker-anarchist-cookbook-terrorism-act-uk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">similar trials</a> have also collapsed.</p>
<p>These trials are part of a broader pattern of harassment and intimidation. Last month, the Kurdish community in London announced that it is bringing a lawsuit against the police over a violent, disproportionate raid on their community centre in Haringey. They also highlight how its representatives are regularly detained at the UK border under a controversial power: Schedule 7 of the Terror Act, one of the most invasive of its kind in Western Europe, which enables police to interrogate people without any right to silence, and to demand phone and laptop passwords. One Kurdish politician recently won a ruling suggesting the <a href="https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/high-court-imposes-protections-against-discriminatory-use-schedule-7-terrorism-act" target="_blank" rel="noopener">power</a> was being used in a discriminatory fashion against the Kurds, but Kurdish figures such as the former mayor of London’s Haringey borough, Ali Gul Ozbek, are still detained every time they fly.</p>
<p>Last September, I got a taste of this myself, when I was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/sep/20/british-journalist-held-by-police-at-luton-airport-for-five-hours-without-arrest" target="_blank" rel="noopener">detained under Schedule 7</a> for the second time and interrogated extensively on my work and reporting in and around Kurdistan, my views on the Turkish government, and British foreign policy in the Middle East. A middle-aged Welsh woman who held a poetry reading with Kurdish music and a member of a delegation observing the Turkish elections were among many others targeted by the same power last year.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1238766650-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Vladimir Putin weaponises refugees</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And yet, there seems to be little public interest in these costly and aggressive police assaults on Kurdish people who stand for self-determination, women’s rights and democracy — values shared by many Britons. Rather, incidents of repression tend to take place around the time of high-profile meetings between UK and Turkish officials. The community centre, for instance, was raided just days after Defence Minister Grant Shapps secured an arms deal with his Turkish counterpart, while Burke was arrested in the days after President Erdoğan visited London.</p>
<p>The extent of Turkish-UK security cooperation remains unclear. Yet these trials and arrests suggest significant Turkish influence over UK security and foreign policy. “As a Nato ally and a key trading partner, the Turkish state holds considerable sway in its relationship with the UK: the military and intelligence collaboration between the two states has a decades-long history,” says Iida Käyhkö, a security studies researcher at London’s Royal Holloway University, who focuses on the criminalisation of the Kurds.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in Europe, Turkey has been seeking extraordinary concessions in return for dropping its opposition to Sweden and Finland joining Nato. Erdoğan’s list of demands has included more raids on the Kurdish community, the removal of Kurdish flags, and the detention and deportation of scores of Kurdish exiles, including an <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/07/nato-turkey-sweden-finland-kurds-erdogan-repression" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iranian Kurdish member of Sweden’s Parliament</a> with no administrative or legal links to Turkey whatsoever. He also wants upgrades to its F-16 fighter jets and permission for a fresh ground assault against Kurdish-led regions in northern Syria. It appears he is willing to imperil Nato in pursuit of his anti-Kurdish agenda.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1826914452-1-e1704978468215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can stop the Houthis</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David H. Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>From Turkey’s perspective, the PKK and the UK’s Syrian Kurdish allies are one and the same: separatist terrorists. But while the PKK has long been included on UK and EU terror lists, no EU or international court has found that the PKK meets this definition. When a test case was brought in Belgium, the country’s highest court found that the Kurdish movement could not be considered a terrorist organisation, but instead a legitimate party to an ongoing civil conflict. “There is no doubt that PKK meets all the criteria that allow it to be considered as a political-military organisation, which carries out an armed struggle against Turkish security services, army and authorities, towards the realisation of the right to self-determination of the Kurdish people,” a lawyer involved in the case told me at the time.</p>
<p>Kurdish representatives argue that delisting the PKK from terror lists would enable both Turkey and the PKK to be held to higher legal standards — especially given that some of the crimes which Turkey imputed to the PKK in the Belgian case were <a href="https://medyanews.net/the-criminalisation-of-the-pkk-can-be-successfully-challenged-says-belgium-lawyer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">found </a>to have been committed by the Turkish forces themselves. Delisting would also pave the way toward re-opened peace negotiations and a diplomatic, negotiated settlement. Käyhkö argues: “The consistent pattern of repression targeted at Kurdish democratic political activity undermines not only the reputation of the British state, but broader prospects for peace, stability and democracy in the region.”</p>
<p>But as Campbell correctly observes: “The UK is politicising law in favour of one of the world’s worst rights abusers.” The Belgian government ignored its own court’s ruling so as to keep Turkey sweet. And the UK’s latest anti-Kurdish trial will probably demonstrate once again the way in which Erdoğan’s virulent anti-Kurdish agenda is allowed to undermine the best interests and judgement of Western states.</p>
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					<title>Despotism is a beast of capitalism</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/06/despotism-is-a-beast-of-capitalism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/06/despotism-is-a-beast-of-capitalism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Terry Eagleton]]>
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							<![CDATA[Absolute power is the brother of anarchy (Nathan Howard/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Terry Eagleton </strong>is a critic, literary theorist, and UnHerd columnist. He is the author of several books, including <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300293029/a-death-of-ones-own/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the forthcoming</a> <em>A Death of One&#8217;s Own: Reflections on Mortality</em>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[is a critic, literary theorist, and UnHerd columnist. He is the author of several books, including <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300293029/a-death-of-ones-own/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the forthcoming</a> <em>A Death of One's Own: Reflections on Mortality</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 23 Jun 2023 14:32:34 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Authoritarianism]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Authoritarians thrive off our nihilistic wasteland ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As history speeds ahead in the Age of AI, it is also being thrown abruptly into reverse. Authoritarian rule is our current Zeitgeist, spreading across the globe from El Salvador to Myanmar.</p>
<p>This isn’t, in fact, all that surprising. The more capitalism shatters traditional pieties, disregards frontiers and uproots whole communities, the more strident become the defenders of family, religion and fatherland. The more narratives of God, People and Nation are spurned as outdated, the more potently they return.</p>
<p>Those for whom identity is flexible confront those who know who they are only too well. For every Texan CEO knocking back free booze in the VIP lounges of airports, there’s a bearded patriarch with a rifle for whom the Other is to be found just over the river. There are some glamorous nightclubs in Istanbul, while around Mardin and Diyarbakir in the Kurdish south-east of Turkey people pray on the pavements and donkeys wander through filling stations.</p>
<p>Tradition and modernity are complicit as well as conflicting. A world of constant flux and restless innovation is in danger of eroding the values by which it legitimates itself. This wasn’t a problem for the Victorians, who despite the pace of social change and the clamour of the marketplace still clung to certain eternal verities. They were aware that you couldn’t legitimise what you did in purely secular, pragmatic terms, not least if it included herding people into slums and workhouses. Instead, there were certain foundational principles to which they could appeal, from the laws of God to the sanctity of the family and the supreme value of the individual.</p>
<p>Precepts like these were particularly important if you were trying to run an empire, a discreditable affair for which you need a whole raft of high-minded rationales. It’s true that there can be an embarrassing gap between your principles and your practice, as there is in today’s United States. Having spent the week bribing officials and shafting your competitors, you gather in church on Sunday morning to celebrate the metaphysical aspect of your existence. On the whole, however, the two sides of your life peacefully coexist, rather as Jacob Rees-Mogg is Victorian toff and modern entrepreneur in a single surreal person.</p>
<p>There are limits, however, to this coexistence. Sooner or later, the fluid, unstable, provisional nature of life in the shopping mall and marketplace is likely to infiltrate the moral sphere as well. It’s then that people begin to talk about postmodernism. Eternal verities drop away, and along with them the stout foundations on which you used to rely for defending your way of life. Talk of God, Progress and the Destiny of the Nation starts to sound hollow in the world of Tesco and Google. It served capitalism well in its earlier, more triumphalist phase, but it doesn’t ring true in the era of <em>Britain’s Got Talent</em>. Instead, moral values become relative and subjective: you may object to serial killing, but personally I find it a lot of fun. This kind of thing may be harmless among friends, but it’s no way to run a country. To do that, you need a firmer framework and a tighter consensus, not least at times of political or economic crisis. Yet what if you have just relativised all that out of existence? What if modern capitalism saws off the branch on which it is sitting?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/ireland-is-a-freudian-dream/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/ireland-is-a-freudian-dream/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-583262516-copy-scaled-e1680706987828.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/ireland-is-a-freudian-dream/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/ireland-is-a-freudian-dream/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ireland is a Freudian dream</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/ireland-is-a-freudian-dream/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Terry Eagleton </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s at this point that turning to nationalism, populism, religion and traditional ethics has its appeal, whether in Ankara or Washington. It’s particularly attractive if you are confronting an enemy such as Islamism, which has no trouble at all with moral absolutes and metaphysical foundations. You don’t want to be left ideologically disarmed in this struggle, even if you’ve done most of the disarming yourself. So large patches of the globe shift towards authoritarianism, which isn’t necessarily the same as coercion. In the recent Turkish elections, for instance, millions of people have just consented to be coerced, or at least consented to a political regime which works in large measure by authoritarian means.</p>
<p>Like any other form of government, such regimes will only survive in the long run if they can persuade enough citizens to identify with them. People must feel that their identity is at stake in supporting this power. They must find themselves reflected in the Leader, as a child may see itself in the fond look of its parents. Because power, law and the state are abstractions, it’s easier to get people to internalise them if they take on tangible form. In autocratic states, power is incarnate in a single figure; but this means that some of the people might identify not with power itself but with the individual who represents it. To avoid this happening, Nature in its infinite wisdom has made a lot of those individuals either faceless or repulsive. Erdoğan, who looks like a harassed, slightly down-at-heel schoolteacher on the point of retirement, is an example of the former. Adolf Hitler was an ill-favoured little runt, Stalin looked like a crafty walrus and Mao was in sore need of a spell in the gym.</p>
<p>Most of these men were dictators, not just authoritarians, and the power of a dictator is absolute. The word “absolute” means free or unrestricted, which includes being unrestricted by circumstances. To say that torturing a baby is absolutely wrong is to say that it’s wrong irrespective of any circumstances you might specify in order to justify it. Absolute power is power which is in principle unconstrained. It may rein itself in, or even show mercy and compassion, but it does these things only when it feels like it.</p>
<p>Nietzsche believed that the Superman should treat ordinary folk with kindness, but he saw this as an act of condescension, not as a moral obligation. It is a form of sovereignty which rests entirely on itself, and is therefore arbitrary. If it had to appeal to law or custom or tradition to validate itself, these things would take precedence over it and it would cease to be absolute. Besides, there are no laws for how the law is to be established in the first place, which means that law has a close affinity with lawlessness. Many political set-ups rely for their stability on people coming to forget the blood and tears in which they were born.</p>
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<p>Because absolute power is unrestrained, it can be hard to distinguish it from anarchy, even though it is often anarchy which it is out to suppress. The two are sides of the same coin. In Maurice Sendak’s children’s classic <em>Where The</em> <em>Wild Things Are</em>, the hero Max becomes king of the wild things, a phrase which contains a crucially ambiguous preposition <em>(of)</em>. Does it mean that Max is king <em>over</em> the wild things or the wildest thing of all? The answer, needless to say, is both.</p>
<p>The absolute and the anarchic are also related in another sense. Absolutists are people who fear that the only alternative to rigid laws and precise regulations is total chaos. Unless you have a rule forbidding players to pass the ball back to the goalkeeper, then — key phrase — <em>before you know where you are,</em> all the players will be passing back to the goalie all the time and the game will never get started. One might call this the essence of the authoritarian mind-set. Allow people their freedom and they will abuse it. The fact that they aren’t really people without it is overlooked. How could you possibly have pavements on which people can walk in opposite directions at the same time? Everyone would obstruct everyone else and nobody would ever get anywhere.</p>
<p>It is logical, then, that Shakespeare’s autocratic Lear is accompanied throughout most of the play by the anarchic Fool. There is more than one sense in which the two are terrible twins. For one thing, anyone who wants to be a king must be a fool, at least in Shakespeare’s day. This is one reason why Lear is mad. Monarchs attract envy and aggression, which is why tribal chiefs in pre-modern societies are sometimes ritually beaten during their coronations. This didn’t happen to King Charles, but he still managed to look like a helpless victim throughout the ceremony, as a group of men around his throne kept doing things to him and he just had to sit there and take it.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-doesnt-king-charles-like-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-doesnt-king-charles-like-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/charles-fixed.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-doesnt-king-charles-like-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-doesnt-king-charles-like-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why doesn&#039;t King Charles like me?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-doesnt-king-charles-like-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Terry Eagleton </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For another thing, the Fool’s debunkery strips the mask from his master’s authority, showing it to be just as arbitrary as his own antics. The problem with sovereignty is that, being perched on a height, it can’t see itself in the eyes of other people, and so can’t have its identity confirmed by them. This is why Lear begs for someone to tell him who he is. Without dialogue with others, selfhood simply implodes, which is another reason why Lear is mad. In one or two of his other plays, Shakespeare seeks to repair this situation by drawing on the legend of the ruler who moves incognito among the common people in order to learn about their daily lives. Today, minus the incognito, this is known as a walk-about.</p>
<p>Those who are driven mad by power in our own time aren’t so much kings or politicians as celebrities. Like Lear at the beginning of the play, they are told only what they want to hear, and thus see themselves mirrored everywhere they look. Only by encountering otherness can one know who one is, and thus retain a degree of sanity. Otherwise, like a certain famous <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/elton-johns-barmiest-demand-revealed-can-you-162940885.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">entertainer</a>, you will end up asking your assistants to stop the wind from blowing.</p>
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					<title>Can TV soaps get Erdoğan re-elected?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/05/can-tv-soaps-get-erdogan-re-elected/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Erdogan resembles a modern-day Sultan. The Last Emporer/IMBD]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 11 May 2023 23:02:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 11 May 2023 23:02:42 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkish election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TV]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=473154</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Turkey's incumbent needs a show of soft power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A well-turned-out man with a pointy beard stands in the centre of a luxurious living room, looking fierce. He waves away two flunkies — one of whom is a fat man with a large moustache, wearing a pristine white shirt, through which you can see his vest. “Baba…” says a young man to the fierce-looking man, who holds up his hand to indicate silence, before (confusingly) also shouting: “Baba!” The camera pans to an older man on a sofa, who slips on what seems to be a dressing gown as suspenseful music plays. The women look on nervously. Then everyone starts bellowing.</p>
<p>Watching at home, transfixed to the television is my stepmother. One of Greece’s leading lawyers, she is not a woman who has much free time, or who indulges in frivolities. She is captivated.</p>
<p>It’s a Turkish soap — a <em>dizi</em>. If there is one country that has little time for Turkey and its exports, it’s Greece. But these shows, for all their absurdity and melodrama — or perhaps <em>because </em>of it — are a big draw. And Greece is not alone.</p>
<p>From the Mediterranean to the eastern bloc to Central Asia, Turkish soap operas are huge. In a 2011 survey, 78% of respondents across the Arab world reported having watched one. I have lost count of the number of times I’ve turned on a hotel TV, anywhere in the world, only to be assaulted by a barrage of emoting Turks with big hair.</p>
<p><em>Dizis</em> (the Turkish hate calling them “soaps”) are unique: epic plotlines with seven minutes of adverts per 20 minutes of screentime, characterised by natural settings, a slow narrative pace, portentous music, and scripts dashed off week after week.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-1249861028-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Turkey is the year&#039;s most important election</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Chris Morris</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>They are also big business. Between 2020 and 2022, global demand grew by 44%. Loved across Central and Eastern Europe, including Serbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Poland and Hungary, they also have huge followings in Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Japan and Vietnam. Turkey is now the world&#8217;s second largest exporter of TV, after the United States, with more than 650 million viewers in more than 140 countries.</p>
<p>And if you want impact, how’s this: in 2008, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia issued a Fatwa against channels that broadcast <em>Noor</em>, a <em>dizi</em> that centres on the lives of a husband and wife seeking to “reconcile the conflicting pressures of traditional and modern worlds”. As part of a wider attack on &#8220;depraved&#8221; TV moguls, he declared, instructively, that these sorts of programmes were a “deliberate attempt to impose an imported culture on Arab societies”.</p>
<p>Here is where these soaps get (for me, at any rate) interesting. They aren’t <em>Citizen Kane</em>, but they might well be <em>Forrest Gump</em> — that sweet rendering of the American Dream — which is vastly preferable if you&#8217;re interested in promulgating an idealised idea of your own society.</p>
<p>We forget the degree to which the global view of the United States has been and remains filtered through Hollywood — especially for the billions around the world who consume its product but will never visit the place. America may underpin the Bretton Woods order that it founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, but in much of the global popular imagination, it exists only in its movies, which project US culture to all corners of the world.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1246887295-1-scaled-e1675879645176.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan survive Turkey&#039;s earthquake?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher de Bellaigue</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Turkey does not have the pull of the American hegemon so it must draw on other things. First is ethnicity. In central Asia, countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have large Turkic populations: “Turkey is looked at here like a big brother,” one local told me. Then there is history. “And don’t forget,” he continued, “it founded an empire. People are proud of that. In this region, there’s a lot of goodwill toward the Turks, who are seen as a people like us who did really well. Turkey maintains this influence through its soaps, many of which are based on historical themes.”</p>
<p>He’s not wrong. One of the country’s biggest exports is the <em>dizi Muhteşem Yüzyıl</em> (<em>Magnificent Century</em>), which focuses on the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent during the glory days of the Ottoman Empire. In 2012, Reuters reported that <em>Magnificent Century </em>was watched by 200 million people in 52 countries.</p>
<p>Then there is the question of the language. Across the former Soviet Union, where over the past century Russian became the lingua franca at the expense of the various indigenous languages, the various peoples there are fighting what might be described as a postcolonial linguistic fightback against Moscow’s cultural imperialism. The language wars are raging.</p>
<p>In Azerbaijan, for example, another former Soviet state, Turkish is now threatening Russian’s former dominance. “Azerbaijani is a Turkic language,” one TV exec explained to me, “and Azerbaijanis learn it through soap operas. Terrestrial TV is in Azerbaijani; satellite carries Russian and Turkish content, the latter of which is far more influential and popular because of its soaps.” The <em>dizi</em> has become, in many parts of the world, the vessel through which Turkish culture and language is transmitted to local populations. As a result, newborns across the Balkans are being named after the leading characters in <em>1001 Nights</em> — a <em>dizi</em> set in modern-day Istanbul.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1090878854-scaled-e1648551227371.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdogan&#039;s Turkey won&#039;t save Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Perhaps their popularity shouldn’t come as such a surprise. Like all soaps, they deal with universal social issues, such as love across class divides, children born out of marriage and gender inequality. But their strength for their vast Muslim audiences is that they remain avowedly Islamic, albeit in a very Turkish way.</p>
<p>Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan&#8217;s increasing Islamisation of society, Turkey remains pretty liberal compared to many other Arab and Middle Eastern countries. Storylines in Western shows often involve alcohol and sex, both of which are frowned upon in the Middle East. While Dizis tackle the subjects that everyone wants to watch — romantic relationships, jealousy, separations, betrayal and revenge — they do so without the sex, drugs and booze. Family-friendly viewing across the continents. Magic.</p>
<p>If the definition of soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce, and is about shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction, then the <em>dizi</em>s fit this model almost perfectly. As the American academic and diplomat Joseph Nye said about soft power: “The best propaganda is not propaganda.” He’s right. Who needs Goebbels when you’ve got <em>Aşk-ı Memnu</em> (<em>Forbidden Love</em>), a 79-part serial based on a classic romantic novel starring the immaculately coiffured heartthrob, Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ?</p>
<p>The Turks of course know this. Egemen Bağış, the former Minister of European Affairs, has declared that <em>dizis</em> are the “perfect tool for us to reflect Turkey’s image and Turkish lifestyle… Turkish series have become one of the most effective means of our soft power”. And it’s not just politicians who get it. İbrahim Şahin, Director General of Radio-Television of Turkey (TRT), articulated the central point: the model is not financial. “Maybe Turkey does not generate a high income from the series. But there is no price to transfer our culture and our social structures in the form of soft power abroad through the series.&#8221; Quite a statement from a media executive.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/fregeqg-1-e1682433729569.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Wagner Files</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s an understanding that goes all the way to the top. The importance of <em>dizis</em> is not lost on a politician as smart as Erdoğan, who is seeking re-election this weekend. Some commentators have even <a href="https://www.iglobenews.org/turkeys-new-soft-power-blockbuster-t-dramas/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a> that they are key to Erdoğan’s efforts to rally his supporters, a &#8220;soft-power tool to make his policies more desirable, instead of direct imposition and propaganda&#8221;.</p>
<p>This can, however, be a double-edged sword. In the run up to the elections, a scandal has arisen around the splendidly-named <em>dizi</em> “<em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCRfLDCtkSwmTdwHrbmC78Xg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Cranberry Sherbet</a></em>” in which the devout woman Nursema, after being married off to an abusive husband by her conservative family, got thrown out of a window by him after she resisted his attempts to rape her.</p>
<p>The storyline has highlighted the issue of domestic violence, which has become a contentious issue in Turkey; that it centres on the type of religious female who voted Erdoğan into power is problematic for the government so close to the elections.</p>
<p>Erdoğan, though, always tried to exploit the popularity of the <em>dizis</em> and in this sense, they articulate a final, perhaps counterintuitive truism about soft power: its effects are almost always more potent at home than abroad. Earlier this year, Erdoğan declared that much could be learnt from the historical drama <em>The Last Emperor</em>, set during the reign of the 34th Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamit. For a man who is increasingly resembling a modern-day Sultan, it might be useful to have an electorate that includes large swathes of voters hooked on tales of a glorious strongman from the past.</p>
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					<title>Turkey is the year&#8217;s most important election</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/05/is-this-2023s-most-important-election/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Chris Morris]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/blue-man.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[The end of Erdonomics? (Credit: Adem Altan/AFP/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Chris Morris </strong>is a writer and broadcaster and a former BBC Turkey Correspondent. He is the author of <a href="https://granta.com/products/the-new-turkey/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The New Turkey</em></a>, which charts Erdoğan’s rise to power.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>__ChrisMorris__</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a writer and broadcaster and a former BBC Turkey Correspondent. He is the author of <a href="https://granta.com/products/the-new-turkey/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The New Turkey</em></a>, which charts Erdoğan’s rise to power.

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										<pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2023 23:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 29 Jun 2023 16:28:04 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=472947</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A win for Erdoğan would have global consequences]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>This year hasn’t quite gone to plan for Turkey’s most powerful man. After two decades as Prime Minister and now President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could be about to lose his job. In a country of huge strategic and economic importance, he has presided over a gradual dismantling of democracy. The most important election in the world this year will decide whether the slide continues, or whether democracy in Turkey still stands strong.</p>
<p>The 100th anniversary of the founding of the modern Turkish republic this year was supposed to mark Erdoğan’s crowning moment: the point at which he hoped his muscular regional power would assert its place on the world stage. But his plans for a triumphant centenary re-election were dealt a severe blow as a devastating earthquake ripped through south-eastern Turkey in February, killing more than 50,000 people.</p>
<p>The last time a similarly destructive earthquake hit, it was 1999 and Erdoğan was fresh out of prison, convicted of inciting religious hatred and banned from public office. He was deeply distrusted by the secular elite running the country, but he took the lead in lambasting those in authority for their callousness and incompetence in response to the earthquake. Capturing the public mood, he led his Islamist party to national election victory three years later.</p>
<p>This time, though it was his own authority which was shaken by allegations of catastrophic corruption in construction projects built on the cheap in the earthquake zone, while state institutions which he has made less independent were criticised for failing to respond when thousands of buildings collapsed.</p>
<p>Any government would have struggled to cope with a disaster on the scale of February’s earthquake, but Erdoğan was already presiding over an economy suffering rampant inflation – an annual rate of 85% as recently as October and still above 50% in March – as well as a currency in freefall.</p>
<p>So, he’s under pressure. The Justice and Development Party which he created and leads with unquestioned authority had been an election-winning machine. But now, in the presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14 (with a likely presidential run-off on May 28) he is facing the prospect of his first ever defeat.</p>
<p>And the rest of the world is watching closely. Turkey’s strategic location has always made it important, but it now matters more than ever, with Erdoğan playing both sides during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: last year, Turkey brokered a deal allowing the export of Ukrainian grain, seen as vital for world food supplies; it is a member of Nato with a large standing army, but unlike its allies it maintains many economic ties with Russia.</p>
<p>Turkey is also an important power in the Middle East with a sphere of influence it polices across its volatile borders with Syria and northern Iraq; and its complex relationship with Europe, on issues ranging from migration to trade to its long-stalled EU membership application, is ever-changing and unpredictable.</p>
<p>All in all, this is an election of massive geopolitical significance. The result matters far beyond Turkey’s own borders. And if Erdoğan loses, a smooth transfer of power will be a real test.</p>
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<p>After two decades of unchallenged authority, he has become a controversial and divisive international figure, particularly in the West. But it’s easy to forget that this man now widely regarded — with good reason — as an illiberal autocrat, took office in 2003 promising democratic renewal. In his first two years as Prime Minister, he passed more democratic reforms than his predecessors had managed in two decades. He also made the country wealthier, taking control of the economy out of the hands of the armed forces and a small elite based in Istanbul. Across the country the economy grew quickly as obscure provincial cities, which voted for him in droves, developed into global centres of manufacturing. It was levelling up in action. It’s easy to understand his early appeal.</p>
<p>Abroad, too, his reputation grew. As an Islamist politician taking power after decades of secularist rule, he had an approach which many in the West initially welcomed: “Religion shouldn’t interfere with issues of government,” he told me at the time. “But government shouldn’t interfere with issues of religion either. That is the message we are trying to spread.”</p>
<p>With post-invasion chaos engulfing neighbouring Iraq in 2003, he offered an apparently compelling alternative. Tony Blair and other Western leaders saw him as welcome proof that liberal democracy and Islam could co-exist. In 2005, Turkey finally opened formal talks on membership of the European Union. But the West’s warm embrace grew cold — with Europe partly to blame.</p>
<p>Many of Erdoğan’s domestic critics had always been sceptical of his approach to religion, accusing him of having a far more hawkish Islamist agenda than he was given credit for, and of practising “<em>takkiye</em>” — the religiously sanctioned practice of concealing the truth in order to gain advantage for Islam. They watched nervously as restrictions on alcohol sales were imposed, an archaic ban on women wearing Islamic headscarves in public offices was lifted, and religion assumed a far more prominent role in public life.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1246887295-1-scaled-e1675879645176.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan survive Turkey&#039;s earthquake?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher de Bellaigue</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Erdoğan also began tapping into the nasty side of Turkish nationalism, once it emerged that Europe was not interested in putting his EU application on any kind of fast track. It quickly became clear, early on in the Erdogan era, that promises made by one generation of European politicians were being ignored by the next: Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel were far more sceptical about Turkey’s place in Europe. A divided Cyprus had also become part of the EU, and the Greek Cypriot government was determined to block Turkish membership at every turn, unless it regained control of the self-declared Turkish republic in the north of the island.</p>
<p>The net result was that Turkey’s membership bid had no chance of making any progress, and negotiations ground to a halt. Rejection in Europe angered Erdoğan and wounded his pride. His charm offensive came to an abrupt end. Instead, he adopted an us-against-the-world mentality, increasingly intolerant of any kind of opposition.</p>
<p>The big turning point in international attitudes came when a series of peaceful protests about the redevelopment of Gezi Park in Istanbul, which began 10 years ago this month, escalated into national anti-government demonstrations that were violently suppressed. Erdoğan responded by rallying his supporters and cracking down on his opponents. It soon became a matter of routine to imprison any critics, often on trumped-up charges. Increasing prosperity meant he continued to win elections, but the longer he stayed in power, the more confrontational he became.</p>
<p>The relationship with Europe deteriorated, becoming purely transactional, with the EU relying on Turkey to help stem the tide of tens of thousands of refugees and migrants arriving on European shores in 2015. And at the same time, Erdoğan abandoned his efforts to promote peace with the Kurdish rebel movement, the PKK, and launched a widespread military offensive in Kurdish areas. He said he was trying to suppress terrorism, but Kurdish political leaders were also treated as enemies of the state.</p>
<p>If he appeared increasingly paranoid, perhaps he had good reason to be. In 2016, Erdoğan narrowly survived a failed coup attempt led by a faction in the armed forces which claimed to be trying to protect democracy from his rule. Instead, it used air force jets to bomb parliament and sent tanks onto the streets of Istanbul. More than 250 people were killed.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s response was a widespread purge: more repression, tens of thousands of arrests and a further crackdown on human rights. He also pushed through a change in the constitution, creating an all-powerful executive Presidency which he won with relative ease as his supporters responded to his call to protect the country from its enemies.</p>
<p>And now he sits in his palace of a thousand rooms, surrounded by the paraphernalia of power and reminders of the Ottoman Sultans of old, the great survivor plotting his next move. But he might not have many moves left to make. In the past, where Erdoğan has been ruthless, the opposition has been toothless – weak and divided. This year, though, squabbling opposition leaders have set aside their disagreements, sometimes through gritted teeth, to form a six-party alliance led by the mild-mannered veteran, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu.</p>
<p>It includes liberals, nationalists and ultra-conservatives, while Turkey’s main pro-Kurdish party — which could win more than 10% of the parliamentary vote — has also urged its supporters to back Kılıçdaroğlu for President. It’s all part of a plan to replace one man rule with what his manifesto calls “a truly pluralistic democracy”, and the contrast with the bombastic Erdogan could not be more acute. One election advert saw Kılıçdaroğlu sitting in his humble kitchen fulminating about the price of onions.</p>
<p>Opinion polls generally show Kılıçdaroğlu slightly ahead of his rival, but the result will be close. The opposition has to ensure that it gets the vote out across the country, because the election itself – surprising as this may seem – should be relatively free. Ballot stuffing is not a Turkish tradition, and polling stations are closely monitored. Turnout is always impressively high. But while it may be free, it won’t be entirely fair. The President’s complete control of state institutions and his dominance of the media creates nothing close to a level playing field. And while his political base is smaller than it once was, it remains both substantial and incredibly loyal.</p>
<p>So, there is no question that Erdoğan could still win. His supporters are the millions of religious conservatives he has brought into the mainstream of Turkish life. They share his instincts, trust him to look after their interests, and revel in his bull-in-a-china-shop persona abroad. He also leans in to this strongman narrative. After two decades of political supremacy and mounting repression, he likes to play the tough guy and has the power to make things difficult. He has, for example, been holding up Swedish membership of Nato for months, angered by Sweden’s offer of sanctuary to Kurdish dissidents he describes as terrorists.</p>
<p>Equally, a recent video call with a friendly Vladimir Putin at the opening ceremony for a Russian-built nuclear power plant in southern Turkey, and an announcement that Turkish agents had killed the leader of Islamic State in northern Syria, were both designed to bolster Erdoğan’s image among voters at home.</p>
<p>But there is a real choice this time, and Kılıçdaroğlu has made it clear that he would do things differently. He says he wants to improve relations with the West, and restart negotiations on EU membership (although that could prove awkward in Brussels, where Ukraine’s application is top of the in-tray). More controversially, he wants to mend fences with Bashar Al-Assad in Syria as part of a plan to send millions of Syrian refugees back home.</p>
<p>If Kılıçdaroğlu wins, the world will watch to see what Erdoğan will do next. He has accumulated more power than any Turkish leader since the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and retiring gracefully has never been part of the plan.</p>
<p>That is another reason this election is so important. If a strongman can be beaten at the ballot box, it will send a powerful message that change is possible. Although some do fear a January 6 type protest from Erdoğan&#8217;s supporters if he should lose. Or a legal challenge if there&#8217;s a close result, in courts whose independence is already under scrutiny.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s interior minister has already spoken darkly about the election as a “political coup attempt backed by the West”. And the President will certainly try to do whatever it takes to win. His final campaign rallies have been littered with blunt patriotic warnings about enemies real and imagined, and belligerence has worked for him before.</p>
<p>But unusually, the election remains up for grabs. History in the making again, a hundred years on.</p>
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					<title>Will Erdoğan survive Turkey&#8217;s earthquake?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/02/will-erdogan-survive-turkeys-earthquake/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher de Bellaigue]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Blue-19-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Survivors asked: 'Where is the state?' (Turkish Presidency/ Handout/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Christopher de Bellaigue </strong>is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.
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										<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2023 00:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Feb 2023 14:29:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Earthquake]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=460500</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The world’s most successful politician has never fought clean]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It took barely two days for Monday’s earthquake in Turkey and Syria to turn political. On Wednesday, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish president, warned of the danger of giving credence to “provocateurs”. He was referring to opposition figures who have criticised his slow reaction to the disaster and blamed the destruction of some 6,400 buildings in this notoriously earthquake-prone country on his government’s failure to enforce its own construction regulations. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party, accused Erdoğan of “primary responsibility” for these inadequacies, while on social media government and opposition figures batted back and forth footage of, on the one hand, ministers joining aid convoys to the affected region and, on the other, survivors standing in front of buildings that had collapsed onto their inhabitants, and pleading, “where is the state?”.</p>
<p>Turkey won praise for quickly assembling container cities to accommodate the Syrian refugees who streamed across the border in the early years of the civil war. And you can be sure that Erdoğan, a near-absolute ruler even before the state of emergency he proclaimed on Tuesday, will exert himself to get the homeless housed as soon as possible. Politically, the hazards lie in the past. Every collapsed building is a reminder of the corruption associated with a construction industry whose leading players are known more for their government connections than their adherence to safety norms. Alluding to hypothecated taxes that the government introduced after earlier earthquakes, and which are designed, among other things, to make buildings earthquake-resistant, Kılıçdaroğlu asked: “So where is that money? Gone! They fed it to the gangs!”</p>
<p>The tragedy will cast a long and bitter shadow over the presidential election that is due on May 14. For the government, disaster management is an election campaign by another name. And Erdoğan loves elections. Since 2002, he and his Justice and Development Party, or AKP, have won six Turkish general elections, one presidential election and three referendums. That he doesn’t fight clean or fair can make one forget that he’s probably the world’s most successful electoral politician, and certainly among the most instinctive, a populist who’s rarely happier than when whipping up a crowd of flag-waving supporters, ridiculing his opponents or addressing in terms of proprietorial familiarity those pious Turkish nationalists who make up the biggest section of the country’s electorate.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s worst shock at the polls came in 2019, when the AKP lost control of two key mayoralties: Istanbul, to a new star of the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and Ankara. Erdoğan responded to defeat in Istanbul, which he considers his fief, by insisting on a rerun, which İmamoğlu won by a bigger margin. But last December a pliant judge sentenced the mayor to two and a half years in prison for calling election officials “idiots”, and banned him from politics — thus blocking his path to a run against Erdoğan in May.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1090878854-scaled-e1648551227371.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdogan&#039;s Turkey won&#039;t save Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Opinion polls suggest that not only İmamoğlu, who remains in office pending appeal, but also other opposition politicians, could beat Erdoğan — which makes sense when you consider that inflation is at 64% and the economic miracle Turkey enjoyed until 2015 has given way to pain, much of it self-inflicted. (The reason why Turkish inflation is the second highest in the G20 is that Erdoğan has an ideological aversion to raising interest rates; his Central Bank — “his” being the operative word — has cut the benchmark rate by 10 percentage points since September 2021, just as other central banks raised theirs.) But when, shortly before the earthquake, I asked a politically astute Turkish friend — someone I have known since the late Nineties, when I was a resident reporter covering, among other things, the rise of a promising young Istanbul mayor called Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — whether the president really can be beaten, she replied with an unhesitating “no”.</p>
<p>After two decades in which he has survived coup attempts by secularists and rival Islamists and bombing campaigns by Islamic State and Kurdish militants, Erdoğan’s staying power can appear uncanny and preordained. Bekir Ağırdır, a columnist, <a href="https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/bekir-agirdir/toplumsal-uzlasmayi-hangi-secim-stratejisi-saglar,38371" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote recently</a> that news that the six opposition parties that have formed an alliance against the AKP are already “sharing out jobs and power” betrays a delusional complacency that only “strengthens the conviction that [the election] can’t be won”. Another commentator noted that the media in Russia, Turkey’s most important ally, is predicting a shoe-in for Putin’s chum across the water, “the indispensable Erdoğan”.</p>
<p>Since 2016, when Putin, in contrast with the West, backed Erdoğan unconditionally as he suppressed a coup attempt by rival Islamists, the Turkish president has met his Russian counterpart more than any other leader. Uneasy bedfellows the two countries may be, with interests that don’t always coincide in Syria, the Caucasus and, most recently, Ukraine, but the relationship isn’t really about Turkey and Russia; it’s about two strong men who share a desire to boss the neighbourhood but have sharper differences with the West than they do with each other.</p>
<p>One might marvel that even now, after Erdoğan has captured the judiciary, locked up tens of thousands of opponents, throttled the internet and herded the approved media into pens of abject obedience, all the while relieving his own party of anything resembling a mind of its own, Turkey has an opposition at all. But the country contains big minorities — Kurds, liberals and a heterodox sect called the Alevis — who hate his Sunni Turkish majoritarianism and that, in the Kurds’ case, have taken up arms against it. If these constituencies pull together, and there is sufficient attrition from the government side, an electoral shock may still be possible. In the three national elections and one referendum that have been staged in Turkey over the past six years, the number of votes received by the opposition has oscillated between 22.5 and 24 million, while Erdoğan and his allies have received between 24 and 27 million.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1246037456-scaled-e1675429844585.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The madness behind the battle for Bakhmut</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The opposition is disunited. Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party is a dogged but uninspiring Alevi. Its other main component is a Right-leaning party containing Turkish nationalists. But the Turkish nationalists refuse to admit the country’s main Kurdish party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party, regarding Kurdish nationalist politicians as the polite face of armed separatism. And yet Kurdish votes will be crucial if power is to change hands on 14 May. Four months shy of the election — and with the Peoples’ Democratic Party facing a possible ban for its links to Kurdish militants — it isn’t clear which candidate or candidates from the opposition alliance will stand and who might be acceptable to the Kurds.</p>
<p>Erdoğan devoted his first 10 years in power to trying to improve human rights, liberalise the economy and make peace with the Kurds, all under the approving eye of the US and the EU, with which Turkey opened accession talks in 2005. He also expelled Turkey’s meddlesome generals from politics and embarked on a creeping Islamisation of the state. He presented a smiling alternative to the authoritarian secular state when I met him, in his capacity as mayor of Istanbul, in the spring of 1997, offering me delicious early strawberries on the terrace of an Ottoman folly he had restored and assuring me of the purity of his democratic convictions. Six years later, after a spell in jail for quoting from a controversial poem, he came to power nationally with the support not only of a large chunk of the electorate but also of the West, which regarded Erdoğan’s brand of pious but apparently pluralistic conservatism, and the spectacle of a Muslim Nato member knocking on the door of the EU, as the world’s best chance of avoiding a clash of civilisations.</p>
<p>Then came the 2010s — the decade of the Syrian civil war, the collapse of the Kurdish peace process and rising tensions with the EU, which, it was now clear, had no intention of letting Turkey in — and his programme degenerated into an unstable collage of transactions, vendettas and exhibitions of military potency. Democracy and human rights were discarded even if Erdoğan still needs the shot in the arm of periodic elections, contests which, short of stuffing ballot boxes, he has used every means available to win. There is no longer anything in the way of overarching design save a mission to keep his job and resist the circling enemies that are determined to drag Turkey down from her rightful position of global influence.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/we-are-already-at-war-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/we-are-already-at-war-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1451205676-e1675788040204.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/we-are-already-at-war-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/we-are-already-at-war-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>We are already at war with Russia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/we-are-already-at-war-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Two decades of power does odd things. The same Erdoğan who once vowed to topple the “godless” Bashar al-Assad, and whose army occupies swathes of northern Syria, now wants normalisation with his southern neighbour. The philanthropist who let in 3.6 million Syrian refugees in the name of Islamic solidarity has done a volte face and vows to send them home. Erdoğan the doctrinaire Muslim welcomes millions of hard-drinking European tourists; the EU he takes such pleasure from deriding happens to be the country’s biggest trading partner and source of foreign investment. Putin’s pal also supplies drones to Zelensky. And every incoherence in policy is justified by invoking the goal of a strong, respected Turkey, capable of rebutting her many foes. You can be sure that, when the time comes to assess his government’s performance in dealing with the fall-out from the earthquake, Erdoğan won’t dwell on the Western countries that have rushed to Turkey’s aid.</p>
<p>Before the earthquake, in an address to the nation from his palace in Ankara, the President warned that the country’s enemies would never accept a Turkey “whose infrastructure is healthy, whose political will is its own, whose military and technological capabilities are rising”. Fortunately, he went on, “we have proved to the world in the struggle we have waged… that we can protect our independence and our future without regard to the impositions, desires and strictures of anyone else”. After a brisk overview of various recent ground-breakings, ribbon-cuttings and medal-pinnings he had attended, and not forgetting his latest chat with Mr Putin, he gave an enthusiastic account of the opening of a new high-speed metro line linking Istanbul and the airport, after which, pausing for effect, he said, “they don’t even have this in Paris”. This elicited dutiful titters among the cabinet ministers in the hall. Pressing home his advantage, the president concluded, “the Paris metro has a leaky roof”.</p>
<p>Having dealt with one European has-been, his tone hardened when he spoke of the public burning of a Quran by a well-known Islamophobe in Stockholm, on 21 January, as an “ugly act” which, since it took place outside the Turkish embassy and under the protection of the Swedish police, was “not only a religious issue, but also a national one”. Expanding his theme to include the current spat with Sweden and Finland over their accession to Nato, which he has promised to veto if they do not extradite scores of Kurdish “terrorists”, Erdoğan announced that “those who encourage or close their eyes” to the Quran’s desecration should “expect not the slightest indulgence from us on the subject of their application to join Nato… if you love the terrorists and Islamophobes so much (his voice rising to a familiar crescendo) why not entrust the security of your nation to them!” Calming down a bit, Erdogan went on to give details of his economic genius. The ministers crossed and uncrossed their legs. It wasn’t the performance of a man who expects to be moving out of his home, which cost $600 million, is four times the size of Buckingham Palace, and is alleged to have gold loo seats, later this summer.</p>
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					<title>Erdogan&#8217;s Turkey won&#8217;t save Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Let me tell you about my drones (ADEM ALTAN/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2022 23:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 16:17:52 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Istanbul]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelenskyy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The prospect of peace rests solely in Putin's hands]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Bayraktar Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) TB2 looks like the malformed<strong> </strong>lovechild of a small plane and a large, angry wasp. But if the armed drone looks weird, there’s nothing strange about its performance. Over the past few weeks, the Ukrainians have been using their fleet of just 12 to churn up Russian hardware. By all accounts — most of which are set to video and posted on social media — they’ve <a href="https://qz.com/2135820/the-cheap-tb2-drone-gives-ukraine-an-edge-against-russia/">taken out </a>a Russian command post, a bunch of military vehicles (including a tank); various types of truck; a load of surface-to-air missile systems and a couple of Russian fuel trains.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainians write <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/03/22/ukrainians-love-the-turkish-combat-drone-bayraktar-so-much-they-wrote-a-song-about-it/">songs</a> about their beloved Turkish drones. Ankara is feted in Kyiv. Now, not content with helping to kill Russians, Turkey’s President Recep Erdoğan is now trying to negotiate with them. Erdoğan spoke to Putin over the phone on Sunday <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/erdogan-discusses-russia-ukraine-talks-in-turkey-with-putin">and stressed</a> the palpable need for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds, saying Turkey was happy to help. He also — and this is important — made clear that Turkey will not jeopardise its relations with Russia or Ukraine. His ability to speak to both sides was, he said, an asset. They both agreed to hold more talks in Istanbul.</p>
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<p style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey has offered to mediate between the two sides ever since the Russian army<strong> </strong>barrelled into Ukraine, following Putin’s hour-long televised meeting in which it became quite clear he was in the grip of despotism’s true curse: an utter detachment from the reality that would, under normal circumstances, restrain him. Thousands have now died in a war that is now over a month old and that Putin told everyone would last three days. Then again, he also told everyone — including Ukraine&#8217;s Jewish President — that he was going to “denazify Ukraine”, which his troops chose to do last week by shooting up the Holocaust Memorial in Drobitsky Yar on the outskirts of Kharkiv.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">So Putin now finds himself in a tricky spot. His soldiers are getting shredded by Ukrainians buoyed by Western weaponry and the motivation that comes with defending their homeland . <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/">My concern</a> has always been that Moscow has never cared about the lives of its soldiers — it’s not like their families can complain or the government is accountable to its citizens. Besides, there are plenty more where they came from and, despite some reports, plenty more Russian hardware to wheel into play.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1238924342-scaled-e1647966212670.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia will never want peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">But for now, Russia flounders. There is much talk of “off-ramps”, a phrase used in geopolitical circles to mean giving someone a way out of a disastrous situation (usually of their own making). The problem is: how do you do it? Putin cannot talk to the United States or to Britain or even the EU — all of whom are doling out weapons and cash to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia — without looking pathetically weak.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Any Western state is a problem for him, which is a problem for us because we’re not going to trust China to do it. And no country in the non-Western world has the relationships or political clout to do it, apart from maybe India, which is more concerned with keeping things sweet with Moscow and is therefore clearly unacceptable to the Ukrainians. Such is the desperation for mediators that last month saw the yarmulke-wearing Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett jetting off to Moscow to try to make some progress (“see how Putin big-dicked him by making him fly on Shabbat,&#8221; observed an Israeli friend to me). It didn’t seem especially serious.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey, though, is different. “Turkey is kind of unique here,” Ziya Meral, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI tells me. “It borders Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea and has made sure to have good relations with both. It has consistently condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine — especially the seizure of Crimea. It is supplying the Ukrainians with drones. But at the same time it has strong relations with Russia, especially around energy, defence and tourism.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-76717125-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Chechnya&#039;s gamble in Ukraine backfire?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harold Chambers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">He continues: “For the Russians, there are obvious advantages. First of all, it allows them to sit down and say they are negotiating. They can claim they are trying to find a solution — but not with the West. That is vital to them: to show they are engaging for peace but on their own terms. They are not bowing to anyone.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It does seem the Kremlin is exploring this possible off-ramp seriously. The Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who is personally close to Putin, was on the ground in Turkey over the weekend, acting as an unofficial plenipotentiary for Moscow and will report back to his President personally. To be fair, he is by all accounts now living there anyway after being forced to scuttle out of both London and Israel. It’s not the type of forced exile that millions of Ukrainians are suffering right now, but it’s something.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">For Turkey, the war in Ukraine presents both danger and opportunity. Erdoğan wants his country to form part of an energy route across the European continent — something that has become much more likely following the EU energy sanctions on Russia, as well as the fact that no one now wants to rely on Moscow for gas anymore anyway. Erdoğan has also always insisted that Turkey is an important global player that needs to be involved in the world&#8217;s major events. And the one now playing out in Ukraine folds all his neuroses into it. For him, Turkey must never be too reliant on Russia and China but he is also perennially mistrustful of Nato. A middle course is the only way. Do this right and that might be possible.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1239366179-1-scaled-e1648054901722.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Zelenskyy got wrong about Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lahav Harkov</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">But as skilful a negotiator he may be and as open to resolution as Putin may be — and I have reservations over the veracity of both of those claims — there is a limit to what can be achieved. Putin is only talking so much because the Ukrainians fought so well. If they hadn’t, he wouldn’t be negotiating. He’d be gloating.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">And so it won’t be Turkey, or Erdoğan, that brings about peace in Ukraine. In the coming weeks, it might play a supporting role, but that’s it. As Meral concludes: “It’s not the men in suits but the ones on the battlefield that will ultimately decide what happens — as they always do.”</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">401552</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>How Vladimir Putin weaponises refugees</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1238766650-1.jpg?w=622</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ayaan Hirsi Ali]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AHA.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Mass immigration is now a military weapon (DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Ayaan Hirsi Ali</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist. She is also the Founder of the AHA Foundation, and host of <em>The Ayaan Hirsi Ali Podcast</em>. Her Substack is called <a href="https://www.restorationbulletin.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Restoration</em></a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Ayaan</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist. She is also the Founder of the AHA Foundation, and host of <em>The Ayaan Hirsi Ali Podcast</em>. Her Substack is called <a href="https://www.restorationbulletin.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Restoration</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2022 00:04:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 02 Mar 2022 11:38:19 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asylum seekers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Khalifa Hafar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Migrant crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Refugees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine at war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=371242</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Immigrants have become a tool of war]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For the last three decades, Europe’s leaders have pursued a noble strategy to prevent conflict using trade, aid and diplomacy. But their reliance on soft power has had an unintended consequence: it has left them divorced from reality.</p>
<p>Soft-power tools are honourable and often pragmatic methods of conflict prevention and, at times, resolution. Just look at America’s Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after the Second World War, or the foreign aid provided today by the wealthy West to smaller and poorer nations.</p>
<p>However, as we are now seeing, it is deluded to conclude that evil men can be stopped by soft power alone. In the days since Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Europeans have been reminded of the necessity of having a well-funded and well-trained military. It has also become clear that we need to abandon our irrational energy policy, which imagines meeting Europe’s energy needs exclusively from ‘renewable’ sources.</p>
<div class="ad-insert"></div>
<p>Nevertheless, a key battlefield in the conflict playing out in Ukraine continues to be overlooked — and that is immigration policy. This is, of course, nothing new: just as soft power has been divorced from hard power, so immigration policy has been divorced from national security, even though it has been a destabilising factor in Europe for at least a decade.</p>
<p>Both sides of the immigration equation — the push and pull factors — dramatically affect Europe’s national security. The unyielding flow of immigrants from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia remains a source of civil unease. Social cohesion and national identity have become incendiary issues in polling stations across Europe. Intolerance towards immigrants is high and extremist parties remain popular. At the same time, radical Islamist extremism and the constant threat of terrorism still linger.</p>
<p>Add to this the burden on local resources — on housing, healthcare, education and policing — and it’s hardly surprising that the status quo exacerbates resentment towards immigrants, while undermining trust in the political class. It is no accident that Putin and other adversaries have been using misinformation and disinformation to support anti-immigrant parties and other groups on the far-Right.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/our-rulers-are-a-bunch-of-weaklings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/our-rulers-are-a-bunch-of-weaklings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2GettyImages-1233483502-scaled-e1645526123340.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/our-rulers-are-a-bunch-of-weaklings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/our-rulers-are-a-bunch-of-weaklings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>We deserve better than these weaklings</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/our-rulers-are-a-bunch-of-weaklings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What is less well-known, however, is how immigrants have become a tool of war — one that is increasingly deployed by cruel, inhumane autocrats such as Putin.</p>
<p>Since the start of this conflict, at least half a million Ukrainians have crossed into neighbouring countries; according to the EU’s latest warnings, that figure could rise <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-invasion-of-ukraine-to-create-7m-refugees-eu-warns-9zkntd2zt" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to seven million</a>. To put that in perspective, when Russia <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2022/01/20/a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-could-flood-europe-with-millions-of-refugees/">invaded Ukraine in 2014</a>, roughly 1.5 million Ukrainians were displaced. But even then, there was no exodus to the EU; the refugees simply relocated to other regions within the country.</p>
<p>This time, however, it’s unclear if Putin will leave any Ukrainian territory for them to flee to. And make no mistake: this is all part his plan. Indeed, Putin has become the world’s leading advocate of hybrid warfare. In 2016, US General Philip Breedlove, Head of Nato forces in Europe, recognised this, warning that “Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponising migration from Syria”.</p>
<p>Yet in recent years, it’s been in Libya that Putin has pursued his most fierce — and secret — <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20161231_art007.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">weaponisation of migrants</a>. There, <a href="https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/weaponizing-human-migration/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia exploits</a> its increased presence by collaborating with militias to foster and facilitate crippling migrant flows into Europe. By deploying Russia’s ‘private’ military companies in the region, Putin all but controls the most significant routes for mass migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe — and therefore has the power to cripple economies and sow societal division.</p>
<p>Take Khalifa Hafar, the commander of the Libyan National Army — a nominal national force that is really an amalgamation of local militias. Hafar is currently trying to rebrand himself <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/libyan-warlord-khalifa-haftar-to-run-for-president">as Libya’s next President</a>, but in reality is nothing more than a <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/civil-war-libya-russian-goals-policy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russian-speaking</a> warlord who benefits from the support of at least 1,500 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/world/middleeast/russia-libya-mercenaries.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russian mercenaries</a> associated with the Wagner Group.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22GettyImages-1367558729-e1646072801269-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ukraine is winning the online war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What would drive Putin to dirty his hands in the chaotic, tribal world of North African politics? As Mark Grey, Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Army War College, has <a href="Adjunct%20Professor%20at%20the%20U.S.%20Army%20War%20College" target="_blank" rel="noopener">observed</a>: “Large tribes control vast territories in the region, operate beyond the control of nation states and ignore borders. Just as <a href="https://www.egyptindependent.com/backed-italy-libya-enlists-militias-stop-migrants/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Italy</a> pays militias to curtail migration from western Libya, Russia can pay tribes and militias to just as easily encourage and facilitate migration as control it.”</p>
<p>The impact this has on the West must not be ignored; and neither must the failure of our leaders to recognise it. Europe needs immigrants and immigrants need Europe. Years ago, as this mutual need became apparent, European leaders could have developed a rational system to manage the issue. Instead, they found themselves unable to escape an ideological impasse: one moment, they issued virtue-signalling declarations of solidarity and compassion for immigrants; the next, they made panic-stricken concessions to populist parties. How else should we characterise Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2015 wild reception of Syrian refugees, followed just a year later by her €6 billion EU deal with the President of Turkey after he threatened to open the floodgates?</p>
<p>For too long, Europe has maintained a contradictory stance towards mass migration from poor countries, lurching from compassionate rhetoric about asylum seekers to the development of an elaborate and ineffective system of migration management. But as the recent days — indeed, the recent years — have shown, with the advent of hybrid warfare and the abuse of migrant flows as a weapon to blackmail Europe, it is time not only to review minor features of the existing system but to overhaul the entire framework.</p>
<p>What needs to happen is not easy, but it is clear. Some of the measures we should take have dominated discussion for years, but are yet to garner widespread political support. For instance, for all the outcry they inspire in Western countries, border walls and fences do have their uses. When used appropriately, they not only deter crime syndicates and people traffickers, but also aggressive autocrats such as Putin. If EU countries had a functioning immigration system, the Kremlin’s use of hybrid warfare would be rendered ineffective.</p>
<p>More crucially, we need to simplify the international and European treaties that govern migration flows and those seeking asylum. And as the current crisis demonstrates, this requires the West to integrate immigration policy into the broader national security agenda. It should be an issue for the defence departments, rather than interior and justice civil servants. Whether we like it or not, mass immigration is now a military weapon. And it should be treated as such.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-2303990443.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why America can&#039;t keep China down</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-america-cant-keep-china-down/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lichfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Obviously, this won&#8217;t be remedied overnight. But Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has created a unique opportunity to question all the sacred cows of European policy. Four short months ago, it was unthinkable to have a serious conversation in Germany about the retention of nuclear energy. Now, faced with the stark reality that energy is inseparable from national security and the foolishness of having to depend on Putin, we are witnessing a welcome change in attitude.</p>
<p>The same must happen with immigration policy. Yes, there must always be a place for compassion — and it’s encouraging to see the EU and UK welcome Ukrainian refugees where they can. But if we really want to incapacitate Putin, that won’t be enough.</p>
<p>Immigration is now one of his most effective weapons. It may once have been unthinkable to overhaul international and European treaties to address this. But a new and harsh reality dictates otherwise.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">371242</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Europe can&#8217;t defend itself</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/11/europe-cant-defend-itself/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/11/europe-cant-defend-itself/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2GettyImages-1234773496.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Peter Franklin]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Peter-F.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The border between Poland and Belarus has become a battleground. Credit: WOJTEK RADWANSKI/AFP/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Peter Franklin</strong> is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>peterfranklin_</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 10 Nov 2021 00:02:06 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 10 Nov 2021 09:35:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belarus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Frontex]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=262362</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Current border crises highlight the weakness of the EU]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Europe is a continent, but also an ideal. The trouble is that the first Europe is too big for the second. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>When British Remainers claim to “believe in Europe” — most of them literally don’t know what they’re talking about. As one travels eastward from the pointy western end of the continent, Europe just keeps widening out. It contains entire nations and peoples that most of us haven’t even heard of. How about <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_in_Kalmykia">Kalmykia</a> — Europe’s only Buddhist state? Or the ginger-headed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29950844">Udmurts</a>? Or the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/58500f844.html">Alans</a> of South Ossetia?<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Faraway countries of which we know little? Evidently. But Europe beyond the borders of the EU is still out there — and it is currently reminding us of its existence. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Most urgently, there is the crisis on the border between Poland and Belarus. The Belarusian government has discovered that migration from the Middle East and elsewhere can be used as a weapon against the EU. Migrants are being flown to Belarus, bused to the Polish border and then <a href="https://twitter.com/tsihanouskaya/status/1457643398270263298?s=21" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pushed</a> across the frontier. The Polish authorities are pushing back, trapping thousands of people in the no-man’s-land between the two states. As temperatures drop, we’re coming closer to a full-blown humanitarian crisis — and perhaps to armed conflict. A regime capable of using people as weapons is also capable of giving weapons to people.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Meanwhile, a thousand kilometres to the south another crisis is brewing. The <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Agreement</a> that brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 is breaking down. This fragile state is divided into two main parts — Republika Srpska (predominantly populated by ethnic Serbs) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which ethnic Bosniaks and Croats are the biggest groups.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>It was never the most robust of arrangements, but now the Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is making <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/03/bosnia-serbia-russia-secession-milorad-dodik-eu-us-nato/">moves</a> towards independence for Republika Srpska. Most ominously, he wants to divvy up the Bosnian armed forces. What could possibly go wrong?</p>
<p>Unlike in the Nineties, this is happening right on the EU’s border. Bosnia is roughly triangular in shape and is surrounded on two of its three sides by Croatia, which is now an EU member. If the Bosnian state collapses, then that could bring the EU into conflict with Serbia and Russia — both of which support the Bosnian Serbs. And if that wasn’t enough, Turkey could be dragged in too — as the patron of the predominantly Muslim Bosniaks.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Turkey is itself a potential source of instability for Europe. President Erdogan has long been a thorn in the EU’s side, but at least he was willing to do a deal on curbing the flow of illegal migrants from the Middle East (in return for money). However, he’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/01/erdogan-sick-lead-turkey/">reported</a> to be in poor health — and his party’s grip on power is slipping. <a href="https://europeelects.eu/turkey/">Polls</a> show that the opposition is in with a chance of winning the next general election. Whether they’ll be allowed to win is anyone’s guess. But one way or another, disruption is coming — and that could mean an end to the immigration deal.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Could the European Union cope with multiple crises on its borders? No, because it just doesn’t have the capacity. You only have to look at Ursula von der Leyen’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5867">statement</a> on the Belarus border crisis. She condemns the actions of the Belarusian authorities — describing them as a “hybrid attack”; but she only offers unspecified “support” to the Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian governments. Significantly, there’s no mention of the only EU agency capable of acting in this matter — which is <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu">Frontex</a> — the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Even though Frontex is headquartered in Warsaw, the Polish government has declined the agency’s help. Clearly, the Poles have little confidence in the EU’s approach to border control.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, it’s the US keeping a lid on the situation. The EU has been of scant use — it couldn’t even stop the circulation of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/unofficial-eu-note-redrawing-balkan-borders-causes-angst-bosnia-2021-04-16/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">diplomatic note</a> that proposed a three-way partition of Bosnia (between Serbia, Croatia and a rump state for the Bosniaks). The Americans have <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/151572" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rejected</a> this dangerous idea, but what happens if they lose patience with policing Europe and tell the Europeans to sort themselves out?<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>As for Turkey, any agreement with the EU depends on the ongoing cooperation of the Turks — or, when that’s not enough, turning a blind-eye to the alleged strong-arm tactics of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/17/greece-violence-against-asylum-seekers-border#" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Greek</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/20/bulgaria-pushbacks-abuse-borders" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bulgarian</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> authorities.</span></p>
<p>What all of these crises reveal is the essential powerlessness of the European Union. We’ve been told <em>ad nauseam</em> that the EU is the producer of peace in Europe. The truth, however, is that the EU is the <em>product</em> of it.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>A political entity that lacks an army, a police force or the legitimacy conferred by national sovereignty, cannot survive without an international order created by others. If this order is compromised — even to a limited extent — then things start falling apart. Just look at the refugee crisis of 2014 and 2015, which contributed to Brexit, the election of a populist government in Italy and the tightening grip of the Hungarian leader, Viktor Orbán.</p>
<p>What would a deeper, longer crisis do to the EU? A number of possibilities present themselves, none of them good. The least worst option is that America, through NATO, rides to the rescue; in which case the western pecking order is settled for years to come. Alternatively, Brussels does a deal with Moscow — and essentially pays Danegeld to the Russians from hereon out.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Or maybe the EU could start manning-up — either by creating an actual European Army or expanding Frontex into a <em>de facto</em> military. However, that creates a problem of democratic accountability. Von der Leyen as Commander-in-Chief? I hardly think so. A more likely scenario is more of what we’re seeing already — which is the EU relying on its eastern member states to hold the line. That means allowing them (indeed, paying them) to do things their way — which won’t be pretty. As Aris Roussinos <a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/get-ready-for-fortress-europe/">argues</a>, expect to see more barbed wire, more walls, more tear gas and worse.</p>
<p>We should certainly expect Belarus — with Russia in the background — to keep up the pressure. If the line breaks, then illegal migrants will pour into Europe fuelling a renewed populist backlash. Don’t forget there’s a Presidential election in France next year and that candidates of the far Right are in second <em>and</em> third place.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Of course, the line may hold. But what would be the price of that? I’m reminded of the fate of the Roman Empire. Long before the western half of the empire fell and Rome was sacked, the institutions that had defined the state were reduced to hollow shells. That’s because all the real power had leaked away to the legions on the troubled frontier.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The decisions that actually mattered weren’t made in the Senate or anywhere else in Rome, but in the forts and watch towers along the Danube and the Rhine. In the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis_of_the_Third_Century">Crisis of the Third Century</a>, marked by multiple invasions and rebellions, the Roman establishment was usurped by a series of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barracks_emperor">barracks emperors</a>” — leaders of men who owed their position to soldiery not aristocracy.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Obviously, the EU is not the Roman Empire — but it is an empire of sorts. And like all empires it has to choose a frontier and defend it.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The stability of the EU currently depends on the sort of politician who can agree a budget proposal in a committee meeting or strike a backroom deal over dinner in a Brussels restaurant. It’s a dull, bureaucratic and sometimes corrupt culture of government. If, however, the EU comes to depend on the sort of person who can repel a column of cold and hungry migrants, then we’ll look back on the present era with fondness.</p>
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					<title>How France conquered Europe</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/10/how-france-conquered-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/10/how-france-conquered-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Looking hot. Photo by CLAUDE PARIS/POOL/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 05 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 05 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Greece]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Will Macron's alliance with Greece signal the end of Nato?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There are decades when nothing happens, and weeks when decades happen, as a quote dubiously attributed to Lenin states. Last week was one of those weeks. As it began, <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/aukus-is-a-risky-bet-on-american-hegemony/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">I argued</a> that the most significant short term effect of the Aukus agreement would not be in the distant Pacific, but rather here on our home continent, by rapidly accelerating Macron’s quest for European strategic autonomy from Nato structures under French patronage. The announcement in the following days of France’s <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/france-and-greece-take-first-step-for-eu/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">naval deal and defence pact</a> with Greece is a dramatic illustration of these processes at work in Europe’s rapidly shifting security environment.</p>
<p>After years of back and forth negotiations, the Greek Ministry of Defence finally settled on France over the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the United States as the provider of the Hellenic Navy’s new frigates. It&#8217;s a vital upgrade given the deterioration of both the Mediterranean’s security environment and of Greek naval capacity following more than a decade of austerity. <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/latest-details-on-the-deal-between-france-and-greece-for-3-fdi-frigates/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The FDI frigates chosen</a> pack a powerful punch, tilting the scales back in Greece’s favour in its increasingly heated contest of primacy in the Aegean with Erdogan’s Turkey.</p>
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<p>To accompany the new frigates, there is a strong likelihood of Greece also buying a number of Gowind-class corvettes from France as part of its rapid naval build-up. Coupled with Greece’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210912-france-confirms-deal-with-greece-for-six-more-rafale-fighter-jets" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent purchase of 24 Rafale fighter jets</a>, France has emerged as the country’s most significant supplier of arms, at a time when the likelihood of open conflict with Turkey is greater than it has been in decades.</p>
<p>Yet as with Aukus, the true significance of the deal lies less in the hardware purchased, than in the alliance-building underpinning it. The “Strategic Partnership for Cooperation in Defence and Security” agreement unveiled in Paris contains a mutual defence assistance clause in the event that either country is attacked anywhere on its territory, using “all the means at their disposal, including, if needed, armed violence,” to fend off the aggressor.</p>
<p>In doing so, <a href="https://uk.ambafrance.org/Franco-Greek-partnership-will-go-down-in-our-shared-history" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Macron stated</a>, “we commit ourselves to protect [Greece] in the event of intrusion, attack or aggression. This is my idea of friendship and of the European independence and European territorial unity that we value,” and thus a direct French promise to defend Greece from an attack by its purported Nato ally Turkey. When the two countries came to the brink of war last year, it was France, alone among all EU and Nato countries, that supported Greece, both diplomatically and through its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53767792" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deployment of French warships and fighter jets</a> to the eastern Mediterranean. Under Macron, France has become, simply, Greece’s strategic patron, an informal relationship the new agreement has now formalised.</p>
<p>As Macron stated at the signing ceremony, “Europeans must get over their naivety. When we’re under pressure from powers that are sometimes becoming harsher, to react and show that we too have the power and capacity to defend ourselves doesn’t mean giving in to escalation, it merely means ensuring we’re respected… we must, as Europeans, play our part in our own protection.”</p>
<p>For his part, Greece’s premier <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-28/greece-buys-warships-from-france-signs-major-defense-pact" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kyriakos Mitsotakis observed</a> that with this “very strong alliance, which essentially goes beyond each other’s obligations within the European Union and NATO”, France and Greece are “taking the first step towards a European strategic autonomy”. This is, in other words, the first tentative realisation of that bugbear of the perennially supine German security establishment, as well as of central and eastern European EU powers fearful of losing the American defence umbrella.</p>
<p>Yet significantly, Macron took great pains to change the frame of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-wants-strategic-autonomy-decide-what-means/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tiresome strategic autonomy debate</a>, emphasising that it is not a question of rejecting American military hegemony, but rather of responding to America’s strategic shift to the Pacific, which will mean a diminished involvement in European affairs. As he observed, “for just over 10 years now, the United States of America has been focusing a lot on itself and has strategic interests that are being redirected towards China and the Pacific”, and “it would also be naïve of us – or rather, we’d be making a terrible mistake – if we didn’t seek to learn lessons from it and act accordingly. And so it’s with the same pragmatism, the same clear-sightedness about our independence, that we must, as Europeans, play our part in our own protection.”</p>
<p>Instead of spurning the US defence umbrella, Macron stresses that strategic autonomy is not a replacement for Nato, but the enhancement of its European pole through self-sufficiency. By framing Europe’s strategic autonomy as a form of burden-sharing, allowing the United States to concentrate its attention and forces on the part of the world most important to its survival as global hegemon, Macron has, in effect, called Germany’s bluff. After all, the insistence with which Germany stresses the existential importance of the NATO alliance is matched only by its <a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/how-germany-is-jeopardising-the-eu/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">commitment to shirking</a> any serious attempt at fielding a militarily capable force of their own within it, a long-standing complaint of American administrations.</p>
<p>But the time for German free-riding has passed. With the Americans girding up for an air and naval contest in the Pacific, and their appetite for military interventions in the Islamic world blunted by two decades of failure, Macron has seized the chance for Europe to take the dominant role in providing the continent’s security against its troubled near abroad.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-liberals-made-the-british-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-liberals-made-the-british-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2gettyimages-463925341-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-liberals-made-the-british-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-liberals-made-the-british-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How liberals made the British Empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-liberals-made-the-british-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What is perhaps most noteworthy is that the agreement seems to have taken place with Biden’s blessing. While Northern European analysts tend not to bother themselves overmuch with tracking developments in Greece, it is significant that Mitsotakis had preceded the ceremony with <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/09/19/greece-a-strong-and-reliable-nato-ally-pm-mitsotakis-says/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a series of warm assurances</a> to the United States that the country remains a “strong and reliable ally” within the Nato framework, and that “since 1952, Nato has been at the heart of Greece’s security and defence architecture.”</p>
<p>At the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_186668.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Athens meeting</a> of Nato defence chiefs which immediately preceded the announcement, the Greek Chief of General Staff Konstantinos Floros <a href="https://www.viadiplomacy.gr/greece-a-strong-and-reliable-nato-ally-pm-mitsotakis-says/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pledged</a> that Greece will honour all its commitments and obligations, and remain “a pillar of stability in the eastern Mediterranean with respect for international law, good neighbourly relations and cooperation”.</p>
<p>The unspoken contrast is of course with <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nato’s problem child, Turkey</a>, a constant source of security crises and aggressive interventions across the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-28/u-s-senators-vow-sanctions-if-turkey-buys-new-russian-missiles" target="_blank" rel="noopener">already sanctioned</a> by the United States for its purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles. Trump’s warm personal relationship with Erdogan — the origins of which are a matter of speculation — has been replaced by an atmosphere of chilly froideur on the American side, with no realistic prospect of improvement.</p>
<p>Indeed, just as the French and Greeks were inking their agreement, Turkey’s erratic strongman Erdogan was meeting Putin in Sochi, suggesting that he would buy even more S-400s, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-mulling-further-defence-industry-steps-with-russia-ntv-2021-09-30/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pledging further defence cooperation</a> with Russia in space, and in the joint development of warships, jet engines and submarines.</p>
<p>As the US defence relationship with Turkey becomes ever more strained, Greece, supported by the strong efforts of the American ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt, has sought to supplant Turkey as <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1158156/in-turkey-s-eyes-us-getting-too-close-to-greece/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">America’s chosen partner in the region</a>. Starting with the joint air and naval base in <a href="https://www.thenationalherald.com/politics/arthro/us_navy_will_add_second_base_at_souda_bay_on_crete-3278774/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Crete’s Souda Bay</a> — a strategically important deepwater harbour Churchill wanted Britain to possess as an “amphibian citadel” in World War Two — Greece has <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1161613/us-greece-boost-military-cooperation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">given the US basing rights</a> across Thessaly in central Greece and usage of the port of Alexandroupoli in Thrace, an important logistics asset for any future operation in the Balkans — or indeed, <a href="https://www.yenisafak.com/en/columns/bulentorakoglu/why-is-the-us-amassing-tanks-in-greece-under-the-guise-of-war-games-is-turkey-the-target-3581143" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as Turkish analysts relentlessly sound the alarm</a>, in Turkey.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GettyImages-514140070-1024x681-3.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The walls are going up across Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While Erdogan’s national security advisor Mesut Hakkı Caşın is doing the rounds of Turkish cable news networks threatening to <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/09/24/provocative-turkish-analysts/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">invade Greece to throw the Americans out of Thrace</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/abdbozkurt/status/1442515577491398660?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attack American troops in Syria</a>, the Greeks are quietly soaking up American military largesse in the form of <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/354902/retired-kiowa-warrior-helicopters-join-partner-greek-fleet">helicopters</a>, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/09/03/these-acquisitions-and-upgrades-could-give-greeces-air-force-a-formidable-edge-over-turkey" target="_blank" rel="noopener">upgraded fighter jets</a>, joint training and equipment for <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/08/28/alexander-the-great-exercise/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Greek special forces</a> and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-army-greek-special-operators-helicopter-island-assault-exercise-2021-1?r=US&amp;IR=T" target="_blank" rel="noopener">airborne units</a>. Furthermore, the United States is offering strong background encouragement for Greece’s growing web of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-18/new-alliances-link-gulf-arab-states-to-the-eastern-mediterranean" target="_blank" rel="noopener">military and diplomatic alliances</a> with the Middle Eastern powers Egypt, the UAE, Israel and Saudi Arabia, all American partners, and all united by their shared antipathy to Erdogan.</p>
<p>Given the strategic centrality to Greece of its deepening defence relationship with the US, it is simply impossible to imagine that Mitsotakis did not ask and receive the Biden administration’s blessing for the pact with France, which indicates America’s newfound acceptance of a European drift towards strategic autonomy. Indeed, the State Department’s only comment on the pact to Greek media <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1168765/state-department-welcomes-greece-s-defense-upgrade/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was to note</a> that “the US and Greece enjoy a robust defense relationship rooted in our shared values”, and to stress that “we strongly support Greece’s role in creating stability in the region and look forward to continuing to work closely with Greece to advance our shared goals for peace and prosperity in the region including through our robust relationship with the Hellenic Navy”.</p>
<p>Over the course of a few days, then, European strategic autonomy under Macron’s leadership has gone from being a source of existential anguish and <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/03/germanys-transatlantic-ambiguities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">circular debate among German thinktankers</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/23b475f4-68eb-4f8e-9403-e7883deef510" target="_blank" rel="noopener">derision among British analysts</a>, to a matter of fact in the Eastern Mediterranean. By framing it as a means to strengthen Nato and to grant the United States cover to refocus itself on the Pacific, Macron has won Biden’s tacit blessing, outflanking his European critics.</p>
<p>Ahead of US Secretary of State Blinken’s trip to Paris this week, the State Department has already emphasised that it “will be looking at transatlantic security, and European security, and ways that we can support France’s efforts to strengthen European security and defense capacity,” as long as it is “in conformity with NATO,” stressing that “it is very much in our interest and Europe’s interest for those capacities to be strengthened. And having a more effective, capable European alliance is very much in our interest as well.”</p>
<p>The Biden administration has, therefore, essentially outsourced the role of containing Erdogan in the Eastern Mediterranean and generally upholding Europe’s security in the wider region to France. It is, from an American perspective, the European equivalent of AUKUS, and not its antithesis, formalising a small core of capable countries willing to uphold security in regions important to their strategic vision, and sidelining the rest.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/why-the-french-love-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/why-the-french-love-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2GettyImages-1077179678-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/why-the-french-love-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/why-the-french-love-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the French are revolting</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/why-the-french-love-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ed West</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Indeed, we can interpret the Franco-Greek pact as a form of sub-Nato alliance, just like the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/sweden-denmark-and-norway-sign-a-defence-cooperation-agreement/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new defence cooperation agreement</a> between Sweden, Denmark and Norway, which may become the model for the organisation’s near future. To reassure Poland and the Baltic states, no doubt in future a similar agreement will provide them with an equivalent alliance to lessen their fears of Russian encroachment. Indeed, this may become a useful future role for Britain, if and when the Army, weakened by <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/why-is-the-british-armys-equipment-procurement-so-shambolic/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">decades of underinvestment and mismanaged defence procurement</a>, is capable of fielding a significant armoured force again.</p>
<p>The fact is, as the French analyst Benjamin Haddad <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6f2a36ad-aa1d-4aa0-af29-ec3b338739d5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted recently</a>, “the quicker we acknowledge something structural is changing in transatlantic relations, the better we can transform them in a way that serves the interests and security of both sides”. Europe isn’t pushing the Americans out; instead the Americans are disengaging of their own volition, keenly aware, as Haddad notes with an eye on Germany, that “pro-American sentiment can also conveniently be used to avoid increasing defence spending”.</p>
<p>The current Nato framework hobbles Europe’s military capacity rather than advancing it, and Haddad is correct in claiming that “European autonomy is not competing with the alliance”, but instead “could save the transatlantic relationship.” For now, both Macron and Biden win from the new arrangement; the formal assertions of continued fealty to Washington remain true, even as they set the scene for Nato’s obsolescence. Only the coming decades will tell whether or not history will assess the pact, as Macron claims, as “a contribution to Europe’s independence, to the strengthening of Europe’s sovereignty” in what is already becoming a post-Nato world.</p>
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					<title>The walls are going up across Europe</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-walls-are-going-up-across-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[A child on the Greek-Macedonian border (DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The EU is preparing for a militarised war on immigration]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There is an irony to be discerned in the European Union’s adoption of a series of </span><a href="https://www.boredpanda.com/euro-notes-real-bridges-comparison-robin-stam/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">fantasy bridges</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as a unifying symbol on its Euro banknotes: in reality, </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/13/a-bloody-method-of-control-the-struggle-to-take-down-europes-razor-wire-walls" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">it is walls that are going up</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> across the continent’s eastern approaches, as European politicians </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">brace themselves for the flow of refugees</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> about </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">to make the trek from Afghanistan</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. After 20 failed years of war, the American pullout from Afghanistan will probably see the Taliban controlling more of the country than it did on 9/11, including the former anti-Taliban heartlands of the Northern Alliance. With a median age of 18.4 — </span><a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/afghanistan-population/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">more than 40% of the country’s 30 million population </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">is less than 14 years old</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — most Afghans have lived their entire lives underneath Washington’s imperial umbrella. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The country’s Westernised </span><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/24/afghans-flee-taliban-united-states-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">middle classes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, centred on Kabul, and ethnic and religious minorities </span><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-29/young-hazara-refugees-make-dangerous-journey-to-europe/7206420" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">like the Shia Hazara</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, who played a central role in the 2015 migrant crisis, are unlikely to try their chances under Taliban rule, as long as the door to Europe remains open. Already, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Afghans make up</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> 42% of the refugees </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">and migrants living in squalid conditions on Greece’s eastern island camps</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, perhaps an even larger proportion than they did in 2015 when </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">the large presence of Afghan Hazaras</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was </span><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/18/europes-refugee-crisis-isnt-only-about-syria" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">dramatically underreported in the West</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, distracted by the Syria crisis, despite Afghans constituting a major portion of the migratory flow, including 2/3rds of Sweden’s 2015 arrivals.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But in any case, the Europe of 2021 is not the Europe of 2015, and Europe’s leaders have no appetite for a return of the political turmoil that followed </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-defends-open-border-migration-refugee-policy-germany/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Merkel’s experiment</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with open borders</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Distracted by Brexit and imported American culture wars, Britain’s remaining pro-EU contingent have neglected to follow the developing consensus on the continent, where the hard line on migration for which Viktor Orbán was </span><a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/9/18/9349081/syrian-refugees-hungary-viktor-orban" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">lambasted by liberal commentators back in 2015</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has now entered the political mainstream. </span></p>
<div class="ad-insert"></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When asked whether Germany had a duty to open the country’s doors to Afghan migration, even </span><a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/33829/merkel-pledges-more-help-for-afghans-who-supported-nato-troops" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Merkel herself recently responded</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that &#8220;we cannot solve all of these problems by taking everyone in”. Instead she encouraged, rather unrealistically, a dialogue with the Taliban so “that people can live as peacefully as possible in the country&#8221;. In neighbouring Austria, Chancellor Kurz’s centre-right/Green coalition has responded to the surge in arrivals on its eastern borders with </span><a href="https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/austria-to-deploy-more-soldiers-to-eastern-border-to-halt-migration-flux-3577111" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the deployment of the army</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and angry protests that European migration policy has “failed”, with the country’s </span><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/austria-says-it-will-not-solve-europes-afghanistan-problem/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Interior Minister Karl Nehammer complaining</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that “we have one of the biggest Afghan communities in the whole of Europe,” and that “it cannot be the case that Austria and Germany are solving the Afghanistan problem for the EU.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Austrian government has </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">decisively swung towards the Central European approach</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of hardened borders and expedited returns to countries of origin, with Kurz stressing that </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">he would not halt deportations to Afghanistan</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, as Sweden and Finland already have, a reflection of a public mood darkened by recent </span><a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2021-07-01/austria-rape-killing-teen-girl-three-afghans-held-2021021.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">high-profile crimes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> carried out by Afghan asylum seekers</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Like centre-left Denmark, which is accelerating both its </span><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-57156835"><span style="font-weight: 400;">return of refugees to Syria</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the search, apparently along with the UK, of </span><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/denmarks-immigrants-forced-out-government-policies" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">third-party countries in Africa </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">willing to host refugees and migrants on its behalf</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the new mood in Austria is not the result of the populist Right coming to power, but instead of </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">centrist parties adopting solutions</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that were in 2015 considered the sole preserve of the radical Right.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/europes-guilty-conscience/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/europes-guilty-conscience/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-525626684-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/europes-guilty-conscience/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/europes-guilty-conscience/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe&#039;s guilty conscience</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/europes-guilty-conscience/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As in Spain, where the next government is likely to be </span><a href="https://www.thecaravelgu.com/blog/2021/5/6/spains-far-right-vox-eyes-potential-coalition-with-leading-popular-party" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a coalition </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">between the centre-right PP and the radical right Vox</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, in Italy a coalition government between the centre-Right and the far-Right looms in the wings. Indeed, Salvini’s Lega is now so outflanked on its Right by the rising power of Georgia Meloni’s post-fascist Brothers of Italy party, </span><a href="https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1419657945504272386?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the most popular political party in the country</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, that it can be considered centre-Right itself, so far has the country’s Overton Window shifted. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">In France</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, where Macron has angrily rejected an imported American racial culture war in favour of the country’s homegrown culture war over Islam and </span><a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2021/07/france-s-silent-majority-how-political-class-was-left-behind" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the possibility of civil war</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">soi-disant</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> liberal saviour from the perceived populist menace has </span><a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/right-turn-ahead-macron-woos-nationalist-voters-to-safeguard-his-future-7vxn5ppqv"><span style="font-weight: 400;">moved so far to the Right</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the roughly even chances of a Le Pen victory in the forthcoming presidential election seem almost irrelevant in defining the country’s political trajectory. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perhaps it is Greece that highlights best not just the shifting mood in Europe’s external border states, but the shifting mood in Brussels itself. When Erdogan opened Turkey’s land borders with Greece in spring last year, </span><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/get-ready-for-fortress-europe/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">bussing migrants to the border fences</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in a confrontation that came uncomfortably close to war</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Greece’s militarised response unexpectedly won applause rather than censure from the EU hierarchy, as well as the swift dispatch of both Frontex border guards and funds to </span><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210610-in-migration-lull-greece-bolsters-border-arsenal"><span style="font-weight: 400;">build an impassable border wall,</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> now being beefed up with </span><a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/07/18/two-blimps-to-monitor-border/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU surveillance zeppelins</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and drones. Rather than a rerun of the 2015 migrant crisis, when Europe functioned as a ready source of monetary tribute to an embattled Erdogan, last year’s Evros crisis functioned as a dry run for the coming Afghan wave.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After all, when Belarus’s autocrat </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Lukashenko began funnelling </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">migrants to the Lithuanian border a few weeks ago</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Frontex immediately responded with the deployment of border guards, and support for Lithuania’s </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">planned new 550-km border wall</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — with Estonia even </span><a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1456206/lithuania-runs-out-of-materials-to-build-barbed-wire-fence-on-belarus-border" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">donating 100km of barbed wire</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to its struggling ally. Once again, the exact same fortification project </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/migrants-hungary-border-fence-wall-serbia" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Orbán was condemned for in 2015</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was hurriedly paid for by the EU in 2020, and presented as </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-condemns-belarus-pressuring-lithuania-with-migrants-michel-2021-07-05/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a heartening symbol </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">of EU solidarity by 2021</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. From the Baltic to the Aegean, walls are going up across the eastern marches of the European continent, which will soon define the bloc against the huddling masses straining to get in. </span><a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/afghan-refugee-influx-stokes-tensions-turkey"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even in Turkey</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, where the secular opposition CHP party has accelerated its demands to </span><a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kilicdaroglu-vows-to-normalize-ties-with-syria-if-chp-takes-power-165791" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">return the country’s </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">three million Syrian refugees</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> within two years and </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">made alarmed noises</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> about the increasing flow of Afghan migrants across the Iranian border, </span><a href="https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-building-enormous-wall-on-iranian-border-to-fend-off-illegal-migrants/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the ruling AKP party</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is constructing concrete border walls</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to stem the flow from Afghanistan, just as it has constructed a concrete wall all along its borders with Syria, </span><a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/213431/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_4b02c43041e2041dc86053afdeb9f4d7cec37783-1627381170-0-gqNtZGzNAeKjcnBszQk6"><span style="font-weight: 400;">and deploys lethal force </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">against Syrians trying to sneak through</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-fate-of-the-anywhere-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-fate-of-the-anywhere-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/EU.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-fate-of-the-anywhere-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-fate-of-the-anywhere-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fate of the &#039;Anywhere&#039; people</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-fate-of-the-anywhere-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Robert Tombs</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey has become, indeed, the archetype of Europe’s new border guard states, the model for what will no doubt become a ring of authoritarian states bordering the continent’s southern and eastern fringes, whose rulers will be lavishly bribed to keep migrants and refugees from landing on European shores, a relationship somewhere between clients and blackmailers. Like Erdogan, who quickly learned to deploy migrants as a weapon against Europe whenever he was under pressure, Lukashenko has learned the value of Europe’s desire to keep migrants away while not actively being seen to dirty its own hands with the rough business of border management. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Moroccan government was equally quick to learn this lesson, </span><a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/32291/ceuta-record-number-of-migrants-reach-spanish-enclave" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recently waving </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">through thousands of migrants</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to Spain’s North African foothold of Ceuta after the Spanish government granted asylum to a Western Saharan leader, and receiving a handsome bribe to take them back again. Meanwhile, Europe’s only interest in Libya is which faction can most effectively police migrants, just as its only interest in Tunisia’s ongoing coup will be the maintenance of </span><a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/28/tunisia-cracks-down-on-migrants-after-deal-with-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">this summer’s border policing deal</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Despite the difficulties raised by American financial sanctions, the EU even appears to be </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-rages-eu-weighs-more-funds-limit-afghans-fleeing-bloc-2021-07-22/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">eyeing up Iran </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">as one of the potential host nations for the coming Afghan exodus</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a dynamic which, if it takes effect, will surely dramatically affect all other aspects of its difficult diplomatic dance with the country. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So while handing responsibility for keeping migrants out of Europe to regional states may be domestically easier for EU leaders, particularly those from Northwestern and Nordic countries with Green-tinged parties ideologically committed to pro-migration policies, it also offers neighbouring nations handy weapons to deploy against the bloc </span><a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/this-time-is-different-spain-morocco-and-weaponised-migration/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">for their own geopolitical purposes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The great difficulty for European politics is how to balance these opposing tendencies: it is difficult to think, given the steady rightward drift of European politics, that an Open Borders attitude will win out against the simpler solution of a hands-on European effort to prevent migrants entering the EU. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The expansion of the </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/32d464ad-1efb-4b6b-ad43-427d05e01852" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU’s Frontex border agency</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> into a 10,000 strong armed rapid deployment force indicates the direction of travel. Indeed, we are already seeing early manifestations of this approach, both in </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-migration-frontex-pushbacks-illegal-parliament-report/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the pushbacks of migrants </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">in the Aegean by the Greek coastguard with Frontex support</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and in the </span><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/22/greek-authorities-target-ngos-reporting-abuses-against-migrants" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">growing legal restrictions</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the activity of </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Western European NGO boats</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> blamed for accelerating the migrant flow. Both were placed with the quiet acquiescence of Brussels, despite the protests of Northern European Green parties.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GettyImages-862043086.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why do dictators rise and fall?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All this is, of course, a dry run for </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">the almost certainly</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">militarised and exclusionary border policing efforts</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that will grapple with the vast population movements from Africa and South Asia that will attend </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/climate-migration.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the coming decades of climate change</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Already, </span><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/italy/unhcr-italy-weekly-snapshot-11-jul-18-jul-2021" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Bangladeshis </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">are the largest single national group making the dangerous crossing from North Africa</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and it is not difficult to see a desertifying Sahel or collapsing Lebanon adding new sudden crises for European leaders torn between their desire to maintain allegiance to postwar liberal ideals on asylum and </span><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/02/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the increasing desire o</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">f their voting publics to reject them</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The avowedly open, cosmopolitan Europe of the 1990s and 2000s is already dead, and even the lame duck Merkel and </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">her ailing CDU party</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">have abandoned the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Wir schaffen das </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">attitude of 2015</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the face of the coming wave. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The British debate over </span><a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/07/nationality-and" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Nationality and Borders Bill</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, insular and self-regarding as all British political debate somehow manages to be, therefore ignores this rapidly shifting European context. In some ways, this must be a relief to a Conservative government that has shown itself incapable of satisfying its core voter base’s demands to stem the flow of irregular migration across the Channel: without any action by the UK itself, the EU will find itself drawn towards a Fortress Europe approach that will, eventually, choke the flow arriving on Kent’s shingle beaches. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just as France’s Interior Minister </span><a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/33849/france-asks-frontex-to-secure-northern-border-amid-peak-in-channel-crossings" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Gerald Darmanin demands a Frontex deployment</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with aerial surveillance assets along the Channel coast, Priti Patel’s border woes will be solved by European leaders without meaningful British input other than </span><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210721-uk-to-pay-french-border-police-%E2%82%AC62-7-million-in-migrant-clampdown" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">funding</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">analogous to the tribute the EU hands in desperation to Erdogan</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The walls are going up across Europe: we will not see them coming down again in our lifetimes.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">177744</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>France&#8217;s mega-mosque problem</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/06/frances-mega-mosque-problem/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/06/frances-mega-mosque-problem/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GettyImages-657281188-scaled.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Lichfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/John.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[There aren't enough mosques for France's Muslims. Photo credit should read BERTRAND GUAY/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Lichfield</strong> was Paris correspondent of <em>The Independent</em> for 20 years. Half-English and half-Belgian, he was born in Stoke-on-Trent and lives in Normandy.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>john_lichfield</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ was Paris correspondent of <em>The Independent</em> for 20 years. Half-English and half-Belgian, he was born in Stoke-on-Trent and lives in Normandy.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jun 2021 23:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 10 Jun 2021 23:03:43 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mosque]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strasbourg Grand Mosque]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=145749</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Funding from abroad is dividing the country]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>France has a serious mosque problem. There are not enough of them to go around.</p>
<p>Some of the country’s 6,000,000 Muslims worship in informal prayer rooms which occasionally become breeding grounds for radical, anti-western Islamist teaching. Financing new mosques is difficult in a secular country where public subsidies for religion are banned.</p>
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<p>In any case, planning permission is systematically opposed by a range of Right-wing politicians, who also complain when Muslim prayers spill over into the street.</p>
<p>So a decision in 2013 to build Europe’s biggest mosque in Strasbourg — with the blessing of national and local politicians — seemed at the time to be an important breakthrough. Work began four years ago in an unlovely industrial estate on the southern fringes of the Alsatian capital; the Turkish Prime Minister was present, as were French national and local officials.</p>
<p>Construction of the Very Big Mosque — described ambitiously by its promoters as a rival to the magnificent 12<sup>th</sup> century red-stone Strasbourg Cathedral — was haphazard. Eight of the 30 domes were completed. The bases of two minarets appeared.</p>
<p>Building halted in 2020 and resumed this year – but stopped again last month in the midst of a<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/03/23/polemique-autour-du-financement-public-d-une-mosquee-a-strasbourg_6074215_3224.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> many-sided political row stretching from Alsace to Paris to Ankara. </a>Everyone involved now accuses everyone else of acting in bad faith; everyone seems to be partially right and partially wrong.</p>
<p>In the background — not very far in the background — is President Emmanuel Macron’s campaign to curb the spread of extremist Islamic ideology in France. Further in the background (again, not much further) are the presidential elections next April and May in which the far-Right leader Marine Le Pen hopes to exploit fear of radical Islam — and Islamophobia more generally — to reach the Elysée Palace.</p>
<p>The row over the Grande Mosquée de Strasbourg is, however, confusing and elusive. Macron’s interior minister <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20210324-row-over-plans-for-mosque-backed-by-controversial-turkish-muslim-group-islamist-religion-strasbourg-gerald-darmanin" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Gérald Darmanin said last month</a> that the mosque was “part of a project to impose political Islam” in France.</p>
<p>Is he right? Not really. The mosque’s Franco-Turkish promoters, although ultra-conservative, have nothing to do with the anti-western, jihadist ideology which has generated more than 30 terrorist attacks in France in the last six years. Almost all were committed by radicalised French or foreign-born Muslims linked to France’s 5,000,000 or so people of North African or Arab descent.</p>
<p>The Strasbourg mega-mosque is the project of the 700,000-strong French community of Turkish origin, which is heavily concentrated in Alsace. No Franco-Turk has been involved in any of the jihadist attacks in France, although some have been accused of acts of intra-Turkish or anti-Kurdish terrorism on French soil.</p>
<p>The big row over the big mosque is part of a separate, but interwoven, confrontation between France and Turkey and in particular between President Macron and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The two men have frequently wrangled and exchanged insults in the last two years over their two countries&#8217; involvement in the Libyan conflict or illegal Turkish exploration for gas deposits in Greek territorial waters.</p>
<p>Turkey experts say that Erdoğan does have a political project in Europe, but it is about national influence and his own hold on power in Ankara, not the advance of Islam. His aim is to impose his own conservative nationalist interpretation of the Islamic faith on the large Turkish diaspora in Germany, France and other countries.</p>
<p>“The Turkish Government wanted to use this mosque as a kind of soft power,” said Erkan Toguslu, an expert on Turkish affairs at Leuven university in Belgium. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/strasbourg-mosque-lightning-rod-broader-french-turkish-tensions" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Erdoğan’s aim is not so much religious as nationalist.”</a></p>
<p>President Erdogan and the Turkish Government are, however, no longer directly involved in the Strasbourg Mosque. The ultra-conservative Turkish movement behind the project, Milli Görüs, has been close to Erdogan at various periods in the past, but Ankara cut off funding for the Grande Mosquée after falling out with Milli Görüs in Turkey last year.</p>
<p>So a bizarre situation has arisen. Successive French governments and local administrations gave their enthusiastic blessing to the Big Mosque when it was linked to Erdogan; after Erdogan ended his involvement it became, according to interior minister Darmanin, a Turkish Trojan Horse — an example of “foreign meddling on our soil”.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-145851" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/building-300x200.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="200" /></p>
<p>When they lost access to funds from Ankara, the mosque’s promoters asked for money from a newly-elected Green and Socialist administration at Strasbourg town hall. Previous local administrations of Right and Left had offered money for the mosque but were turned down. The new Green mayor, Jeanne Barseghian, agreed in principal to make a € 3mcontribution – almost 10% of the total cost.</p>
<p>Although public funding of religious projects is illegal under France’s 1905 “secularity” law, Alsace was not part of France at the time, having been annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.</p>
<p>When Alsace returned to France in 1919, it preserved some of its own laws and characteristics, and to this days Alsatian trains run on the right-hand track, as they do in Germany, not on the left as they do in most of France. The German-speaking province also retains a Napoleonic-era right to public funding of religious projects.</p>
<p>There was therefore nothing illegal in the decision earlier this year of the Green mayor of Strasbourg to promise the funds – yet all hell let loose all the same.</p>
<p>Darmanin and other members of the government accused Ms Barseghian of being politically naïve. The far-Right accused her of surrendering to so-called <em>islamogauchisme </em><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/macron-stuck-between-left-and-right-on-islamism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">(an alleged unholy alliance between radical Islam and the Left).</a></p>
<p>She received death threats from the ultra-Right, and was also bitterly criticised by French-Armenians — of which is she one — for helping an association which refuses to recognise the post-1915 genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/05/macrons-cunning-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/05/macrons-cunning-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/GettyImages-669932952.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/05/macrons-cunning-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/05/macrons-cunning-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Macron, the failed Machiavelli</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/05/macrons-cunning-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lichfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The man who leads the organisation which is building the mosque says that Mayor Barseghian has been the victim of shameless political hypocrisy. “Almost every other local political party has offered to helps us in the past,” said Eyüp Sahin, head of the Milli Görüs federation in the eastern region of France. “She never promised anything beforehand. Now they are attacking her.”</p>
<p>Milli Görüs has now withdrawn its request for money from the Strasbourg city authorities and, as a result, Mr Sahin says that completion of the giant mosque will be delayed until 2024 or 2025.</p>
<p>“It has become impossible to deal with French politics and politicians,” he said. “If we seek to raise money abroad, we are attacked. When we seek local money, the sky falls in.</p>
<p><strong>“</strong>When it suits them, we are French; when it doesn’t suit them, we are Turks. They demand integration. Well, we are integrated. My accent may not be French but it’s not Turkish either. It’s Alsatian.”</p>
<p>Mr Sahin protests a little too much, however. His organisation, Milli Görüs, is a powerful German-based movement which promotes a very conservative interpretation of Islam and seeks to preserve the Turkishness of the diaspora in Europe into the second, third and fourth generations.</p>
<p>Milli Görüs itself means “national dream”, and the nation that the title refers to is neither France nor Germany.</p>
<p>As part of President Macron’s drive to curb the growing extreme Islamist influence in France, more than a dozen Muslim organisations were asked to sign a charter earlier this year – the Charter for the Principles of French Islam —<strong> </strong>which rejects foreign influence and recognises the primacy of democracy and secular laws over sharia law.<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/04/06/culte-musulman-la-federation-milli-gorus-denonce-une-ingerence-de-l-etat_6075763_3224.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Only three refused,</a> including Milli Görüs and another Turkish organisation even more closely associated with the Turkish state.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-narcissistic-fall-of-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-narcissistic-fall-of-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GettyImages-1067267886-scaled-e1623087505346-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-narcissistic-fall-of-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-narcissistic-fall-of-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The narcissistic fall of France</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/06/the-narcissistic-fall-of-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michel Houellebecq</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The balkanisation of France’s Muslim community into organisations linked directly or partly to countries of origin was once encouraged by French governments. It is now recognised as part of the problem. There already is, for instance, a big mosque in Strasbourg which is also called confusingly “La Grande Mosquée”, and which attracts worshippers from the local Maghrebin (North African) communities but not Franco-Turks.</p>
<p>Interior minister Mr Darmanin is threatening to dissolve Milli Görüs, as an organisation which refuses the supremacy of French law and is “tied to a foreign power”. Samim Akgönül, head of Turkish studies as Strasbourg university, says that Darmanin is missing the point and missing a trick.</p>
<p>Since Milli Görüs seems to have parted ways with Erdogan the French government should be finding ways, he says, to draw them into French life, not push them away.</p>
<p>“By refusing to consider these populations as part of French society, we are giving them up to Turkey. But in truth they are Strasbourgers,”<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/05/14/a-strasbourg-la-polemique-sur-la-construction-d-une-mosquee-perdure_6080149_3224.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Mr Akgönül said.</a></p>
<p>Another academic who knows Turkey well, but who asked not to be named, said that the Strasbourg Mosque row, far from curbing Erdogan’s power, was playing into his hands. “Erdogan uses France in the same way that the Johnson government does in Britain,” he said. “For both of them, stirring up anti-French feeling is a useful way of stirring up national feeling.”</p>
<p>President Macron’s drive to restrain extremist Islamist ideology in France was necessary<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/what-macron-forgot-about-islamist-separatism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> and well-intentioned.</a></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/10/why-is-the-anglo-media-portaying-france-as-the-villain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/10/why-is-the-anglo-media-portaying-france-as-the-villain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GettyImages-1229322308.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/10/why-is-the-anglo-media-portaying-france-as-the-villain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/10/why-is-the-anglo-media-portaying-france-as-the-villain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why is the Anglo media portraying France as the villain?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/10/why-is-the-anglo-media-portaying-france-as-the-villain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Liam Duffy</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was grotesquely misrepresented in some parts of the Muslim world – and by liberal media in the United States. Unfortunately, however, Macron has allowed his ambitious interior minister to muddle the issue with tough-man posturing – on the Strasbourg Mosque and other issues.</p>
<p>The big, and often misleading, row over the big mosque is part of a wider and dangerous polarisation of attitudes to Islam in France. The far-Right and even part of the traditional Right exploit Islamist excesses and exaggerate Islamist influence to disguise and promote more generalised Islamophobia. Meanwhile, part of the Left refuses to admit that violent, Islamist ideology is advancing — or even that it exists.</p>
<p>The Strasbourg row is confusing — far more than it needed to be — but that’s not surprising. As the 2022 elections approach, it has become increasingly impossible to speak rationally about Islam in France.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">145749</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The autocrats of the world are uniting</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2020/10/how-autocrats-of-the-world-unite/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2020/10/how-autocrats-of-the-world-unite/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Rhodes]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/christopher.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are ringleaders of the new Dictators' Club. Credit: Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Dr Christopher Rhodes</strong> is a Lecturer at Boston University&#8217;s College of General Studies.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>PReligions</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Lecturer at Boston University's College of General Studies.</div>]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2020 23:02:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 05 Oct 2020 11:19:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autocrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Concert of Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dictators]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French Revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=47405</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Like the old Concert of Europe, the new Dictators' Club has set aside differences to focus on naked power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>If Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is so determined to <a href="https://atalayar.com/en/content/islamic-reconquest-erdogan" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">gild his nation’s Islamic credentials,</a> why has he been cooperating with Beijing to extradite Uighur Muslim refugees? Why hasn’t he protested against Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">mass detention and reeducation camps</a>?</p>
<p>When not currying favor with Xi, Erdoğan has also been busy consulting with Vladimir Putin — despite the fact that their two nations backed different sides in the Syrian Civil War. After a face-to-face meeting with Putin in March just before the global shutdown, the Turkish and Russian presidents were coordinating policy on everything from Syria to Libya to a new <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-armenia-azerbaijan/russias-putin-turkeys-erdogan-discuss-conflict-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-idUSKCN24S2FG" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">border war</a> between two of their shared neighbours.</p>
<p>Welcome to the Dictators&#8217; Club. Erdoğan’s antics are just a few indicators of a growing network of personal connections and cooperation between the world’s most notorious autocrats. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are clearly the ring leaders: the two have built a high-profile relationship, having met <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/730200317/as-relations-with-u-s-sour-xi-describes-putin-as-best-friend-at-moscow-meeting" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">several times a year</a> since the Chinese President took power. Xi refers to the Russian leader as his &#8220;<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48537663">best friend</a>&#8220;; Putin has marked Xi&#8217;s birthday by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/17/world/xi-russian-ice-cream-putin-birthday-intl/index.html">buying him ice cream</a>. Each was <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2137905/why-vladimir-putin-and-xi-jinpings-mutual-admiration">among the first to congratulate </a>the other for their respective “re-elections” in 2018, and they have publicly supported each other’s altering of their constitutions to extend their power for years to come.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GettyImages-1152470025-e1596707607662.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The irresistible rise of the civilisation-state</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And together they have their hearts set on expanding the club. Xi has had multiple summits with Kim Jong Un, continuing China’s support for the North Korean dictator’s family; Putin met Kim for the first time last year, <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2020/04/one-year-on-what-impact-did-the-kim-putin-summit-really-have/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">strengthening</a> what had been a tangential relationship between Russia and its most secretive neighbour. Not to be outdone, Saudi Arabia’s <em>de facto</em> leader Mohammed bin Salman has been <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/22/china-sees-potential-in-saudi-economy-as-crown-prince-mbs-visits.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">shaking hands with Xi</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/30/opinions/the-astounding-putin-mbs-high-five-zelizer/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">high-fiving Putin</a>. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro and Syria’s Bashir al-Assad have each grown publicly closer to the Chinese and Russian Presidents — and have established a relationship with one another as well. Both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china/irans-leader-says-never-trusted-the-west-seeks-closer-ties-with-china-idUSKCN0V109V" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Xi</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia-velayati/top-aide-to-irans-khamenei-says-putin-meeting-very-constructive-tv-idUSKBN1K21CY" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Putin</a> have even met directly with the reclusive Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<p>The Dictators&#8217; Club is more than just high fives and ice creams: it’s a source of significant material support as well. The <em>Wall Street Journal </em>warns of a “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-china-russia-iran-arms-alliance-11593212344" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">China-Russia-Iran arms alliance</a>” as China and Russia oppose extending US-backed arms sanctions against the Islamic Republic; Iran will likely make arms deals with both nations if the sanctions are lifted. Similarly, both China and Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-deals-specialreport/special-report-how-china-got-shipments-of-venezuelan-oil-despite-u-s-sanctions-idUSKBN23J1N1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">have emerged</a> as conduits through which Venezuela has been evading US oil sanctions, and Xi and Putin have both made oil deals with MBS. Individually and jointly through the UN Security Council, the ringleaders have been working to prop up beleaguered dictators, gaining customers for Russian weapons and partners for China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative in return.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-82077247.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can India keep China at bay?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tim Marshall</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Dictators&#8217; Club is alarming, but not unprecedented. On the contrary, the current moment in international relations is reminiscent of the century that followed the defeat of Napoleon, when the hereditary monarchs and nobility of Europe fought to suppress a wave of nationalism, republicanism and liberalism fanning out from France.</p>
<p>When the French Revolution beheaded King Louis XVI, France’s neighbours responded by launching war against the country. The monarchs of Europe wanted not only to strike their rival while it was internally divided, but also to contain the revolutionary ideology. To the surprise of Europe, France won these wars, and then went on the offensive under Napoleon’s leadership. It wasn’t just Mr. Bonaparte’s tactical brilliance that had given France an edge. The French armies, mobilised by a new spirit of nationalism, proved to be more motivated and effective than the forces of other European powers fighting at the command of distant monarchs. Liberty, equality and fraternity were inspiring forces — and dangerous to the status quo.</p>
<p>And so the monarchs of Europe dedicated themselves to cooperating in suppression of these forces. The resultant international order, the Concert of Europe, brought together Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox autocrats; united Germans and Slavs; and superseded national rivalries in the name of propping up the existing political order.</p>
<p>Likewise, the members of the current Dictators&#8217; Club have largely put aside religion, culture and ideology in lieu of naked power — hence why Erdoğan, MBS and Khamenei (all self-proclaimed defenders of Islam) have been silent or supportive of China’s oppression of its Muslim Uighurs. As the club expands, it has courted dictators from across the political spectrum, ranging from socialist Maduro to Right-wing dictators-in-the-making like Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/chinas-modern-genocide/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/chinas-modern-genocide/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GettyImages-606025304-e1593775864728.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/chinas-modern-genocide/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/chinas-modern-genocide/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s modern genocide</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/07/chinas-modern-genocide/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sarah Ditum</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It wasn’t supposed to be this way. After the end of the Cold War, a number of scholars made bold predictions of what the new international order would look like, but none of them quite match what we see today. Francis Fukuyama boldly proclaimed that we’d reached the “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man/NdFpQwKfX2IC?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=francis+fukuyama&amp;printsec=frontcover" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">end of history</a>”: the moment when liberal democracy had triumphed over all its alternatives — from monarchy to fascism to communism — as the only legitimate form of government. Even dictators, he claimed, would pretend to be democracies and attempt to legitimise their rule, and in the long run, real elections and respect for human and civil rights would proliferate.</p>
<p>In contrast, Fukuyama’s former teacher, famed political scientist Samuel Huntington, predicted that the world would again divide into opposing camps, not based on nationality or economic systems but along more fundamental lines of religion, culture and worldview.  The resultant “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Clash_of_Civilizations_and_the_Remak/1CM3GUNLzOAC?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=samuel+huntington&amp;printsec=frontcover" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">clash of civilizations</a>” would carve up the world into a handful of mutually antagonist blocs — Western, Islamic, Confucian, Latin American and so on — with a high degree of tension and war between the civilizations to be expected.</p>
<p>Still others, such as John Mearsheimer, assumed a return to “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Tragedy_of_Great_Power_Politics_Upda/lDzCD_C_ipoC?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=mearsheimer&amp;printsec=frontcover" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">great power politics</a>” — the international system that characterised Europe for centuries before the Concert, and during the early twentieth century. In the two World Wars, for instance, multiple powerful countries competed for power and position — fighting wars, making and breaking alliances, racing each other for colonial possessions, and so on.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/02/how-kenya-became-a-tyranny-of-the-minority/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/02/how-kenya-became-a-tyranny-of-the-minority/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/104755632_f2483b79-cab4-4d13-9bb7-3bdccbf29442.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/02/how-kenya-became-a-tyranny-of-the-minority/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/02/how-kenya-became-a-tyranny-of-the-minority/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Kenya became a tyranny of the minority</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/02/how-kenya-became-a-tyranny-of-the-minority/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Rhodes</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By 2020, however, all these predictions seem faulty. Political liberty has entered a period of decline: the number of democracies in the world <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/issues/democracies-decline" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">has dropped</a>, and the remaining democracies are becoming less democratic. Meanwhile, after a period in which terrorism and religious fundamentalism appeared to back up the idea of incompatible civilisations, authoritarian-led countries are making alliances that cut across worldview. Just as Muslim autocrats are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/08/muslim-leaders-are-betraying-the-uighurs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">supporting</a> Xi’s repression of Islam, Putin — who has taken a page from past Russian czars by presenting himself as a defender of Orthodox Christianity — <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/why-did-moscow-call-ankaras-hagia-sophia-decision-turkeys-internal-affair" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">has brushed aside Russian Christian’s outrage</a> over Erdoğan’s decision to turn the disputed cathedral-turned-mosque-turned-museum that is the Hagia Sophia back to a mosque.</p>
<p>And even though states like China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been interfering with their neighbours, annexing territory and generally expanding their regional or world influence, there have not emerged the sort of great power conflicts that some have been worried would return. Today, these various expansionary and interventionist states have largely been content to stay out of one another’s way — allowing each to develop its own sphere of influence (the mutually hostile Iran and Saudi Arabia being the notable exception). Even before Covid-19, neither the predictions based on democracy nor culture nor political realism seemed to match the present reality.</p>
<p>The modern Dictators&#8217; Club, much like the old Concert of Europe, is laser-focused on suppressing democracy and liberty. After Napoleon’s defeat, the European powers managed to last a whole century with few major wars between them, in which time they largely suppressed liberal revolutions within their territories and abroad. The monarchs intervened, for instance, to squash revolutions in Italy and Spain during the 1820s. Today, Russia and China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/opinion/russia-hacking.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">are selling</a> spying technology and techniques to authoritarians around the world. Yet the Concert of Europe broke down — temporarily, as nationalist and liberal revolts swept across Europe in 1848, and then permanently, as simmering tensions between the major powers boiled over into the First World War, a conflict that swept aside the last conservative monarchs of Europe.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-end-of-secularism-is-nigh/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-end-of-secularism-is-nigh/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GettyImages-1227960924.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-end-of-secularism-is-nigh/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-end-of-secularism-is-nigh/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The end of secularism is nigh</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-end-of-secularism-is-nigh/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom Holland</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Today’s Dictators&#8217; Club is similarly powerful but fragile. Its strength is in many ways an effect of the unique foreign policy of Donald Trump — a confusing and incoherent mix of tough talk, admiration for autocrats, and most important, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump%E2%80%99s-real-gift-putin-and-russia-isnt-collusion-121246" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">indifference to much of the world</a>. Should Trump lose in November — or be convinced to take a different approach to the world in a second term — it might not be hard to widen the pre-existing cracks that exist between the world’s dictatorial regimes.</p>
<p>Significant, sometimes violent, tensions exist between Xi and Putin’s allies. Take the Middle Eastern triumvirate of MBS, Khamenei and Erdoğan: Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a Cold War; Iran and Turkey have have supported opposing sides in Syria; and Erdoğan has personally embarrassed MBS over the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.</p>
<p>Friendship with Xi and Putin also comes with costs that their autocratic buddies may not always be willing to pay. Duterte and Xi have still not come to terms over their <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/china-refuses-to-quit-on-the-philippines.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">disputed claims</a> in the South China Sea; Russia and Saudi Arabia are fierce rivals in the international oil market and engaged in <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/08/russia-saudi-roller-coaster-from-high-five-to-price-war-pub-81896" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a brief price war</a> just a few months ago. And some dictators, like Kim Jong Un, simply remain wild cards, who won’t be tamed. The friendship between the two ringleaders themselves may not be sustainable: the Brookings Institute recently issued <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-limits-of-authoritarian-compatibility-xis-china-and-putins-russia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a report</a> concluding that strategic, economic and cultural differences between Russia and China will likely outweigh Xi and Putin’s personal relationship in the long run.</p>
<p>But even if these mutually supportive dictators are willing to ignore one another’s offences, the public may not be so forgiving. There has been outrage among Saudis and Iranians over the plight of the Uighurs; the Russian Orthodox church has condemned Erdoğan’s reverting the Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Sometimes even dictators have to listen to their citizens, when they shout loud enough. Neither Xi nor Putin is invincible: both are currently facing significant public protests, in Hong Kong and eastern Russia respectively. And China and Russia (not to mention Iran) have been among the countries hardest hit by Covid-19 (of course, so too have the US and UK), which has had destabilising effects in both countries.</p>
<p>Two hundred years ago, the choice by the kings, emperors, and tsars of Europe to cooperate came from a place of weakness, not of strength. Napoleon’s victories and the growing sentiments of liberalism and nationalism had exposed the fragility of monarchy. And yet the Concert system lasted, partly because liberal states like the UK supported them for the sake of stability, while the US focused on its own hemisphere. Now, as long as the democratic powers remain divided, indifferent and ambivalent towards democracy (at home and abroad) the Dictators&#8217; Club can continue to thrive — to the detriment of Hong Kongers, Uighurs, opposition leaders and others looking for liberty and freedom around the world.</p>
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