Labour and the Conservatives have always taken very different approaches to the business of changes of leadership. Tories care mainly about electability. Margaret Thatcher’s ideological legacy was adored by many Tories — and indeed still is. When they knifed her in 1990, her Cabinet were more concerned that the electorate had fallen out of love with her. Tellingly, John Major’s turn at the helm didn’t herald a decisive shift in ideology; he was simply a more acceptable face of Thatcherism for the Nineties.

When Labour looks for a new leader, though, it inevitably becomes an internal referendum on the political direction of the party. That helps explain the violent swing, say, from the Bennite Jeremy Corbyn to the centrist Keir Starmer that left the Labour faithful gasping for breath. But despite the bloodshed, modern political parties are not versions of Terry Pratchett’s Assassins’ Guild, where advancement comes through the elimination of rivals. Michael Heseltine’s proclamation that “he who wields the knife never wears the crown” has proven to be remarkably reliable. Either way, Starmer’s position is not new — but you don’t get the impression he’s relying much on the lessons of history.

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Starmer's weaponised incompetence

By Jonny Ball

Two years on from its famous landslide victory of 1945, Clement Attlee’s Labour government was already in bad shape. Chancellor Hugh Dalton was reportedly taking Benzedrine to keep going. Herbert Morrison, leader of the House of Commons, was recovering from a serious illness. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was drifting between office and hospital. Churchill had described Attlee as “a modest man with much to be modest about” — but he was clearly easy to underestimate. When Attlee’s internal enemies decided to oust him in 1947, their leader Stafford Cripps left his fateful meeting with the PM having accepted a new position as the Minister for Economic Affairs — a position created especially for him. In keeping his enemy close, Attlee took a somewhat different approach to Starmer, who first refused to meet with Wes Streeting, only to frostily dispatch him after 17 minutes of conversation the next day.

Hugh Gaitskell succeeded Attlee as Labour leader in 1955 but never became prime minister, dying suddenly in 1963. Harold Wilson took over and won the general election the following year, but before long the rumblings in his party about his leadership became too loud to ignore. By the late-Sixties, the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins seemed the most obvious choice to replace him.

Starmer claims his political hero is Wilson; Streeting has declared himself a Labour revisionist in the ideological mode of Jenkins and Anthony Crosland, who argued for reducing inequality, improving opportunities and dispensing with socialist dogma. Jenkins was admired by almost everyone who mattered in late-Sixties Britain, intelligent journalists, broadcasters, civil servants, captains of industry, and had a coterie of well-heeled and glamorous mistresses. He looked and sounded like the future. Wilson looked like the present, stretching out to infinity.

All Jenkins had to do was pick his moment — and the aftermath of the disastrous local elections of 1968 would have been ideal. He was egged on by his enthusiastic supporters, the Friends of Roy, whom Gerald Kaufman compared to a group of schoolchildren with a crush on the hockey mistress. But to his eternal regret, Jenkins failed to act. He later admitted that successful prime ministers generally possess “a seam of utter ruthlessness”, and wondered if perhaps he lacked it. Elsewhere, he observed that if you fired a shot at your enemy, you had better make sure they ended up dead. This is a conundrum that Streeting must have grappled with himself in recent days. As for Wilson, still the greatest Houdini figure in modern British politics, he governed on and off until 1976, by which time he had moved from a modernist belief in the “white heat of technology” to being more of a national headmaster figure, permanently disappointed with everyone.

Still, worse than failing to act is sending your foot-soldiers over the top and then failing to follow them yourself, creating only bitterness and resentment. A prime example was James Purnell resigning from the Cabinet to trigger a coup against Gordon Brown, only to find that his ally David Miliband had bottled it and failed to follow through with his own resignation. Purnell left British politics soon after: the Labour Party is not kind to failed assassins.

And there is another danger that Jenkins, who was at Bletchley Park during the war, would have appreciated more than most. This is the concept of political game theory — specifically, the tragedy of the first mover whose act will always benefit the second mover. The first mover bears all the costs while exposing themselves to a counter-strike, neatly explaining Heseltine’s famous quip, which he learned the hard way in his own doomed attempt to replace Magaret Thatcher. So while Jenkins could have mortally wounded Wilson with a challenge, in doing so, he may have allowed one of his rivals — whether Denis Healey, Jim Callaghan or Michael Foot — to take the prize and unite the party behind them. This was something the wily Wilson also knew, which was why he surrounded himself with a collection of powerful lieutenants, each the commandant of a different Labour faction. If one faction thought the other faction might triumph, that persuaded them to back the status quo instead. Another reason why David Miliband didn’t challenge Brown was because he thought the party might turn to Alan Johnson if Brown went, and not him.

A successful challenger must perform three functions at once. They must reassure markets and elites; they must excite activists and MPs; and they must appear plausible to ordinary voters. That combination is exceptionally rare. Tony Blair certainly managed it. Jenkins only managed two out of three (he was probably too patrician to appeal to regular voters, especially as the Sixties started swinging). And Streeting perhaps manages two or even three as well. He is one of the few figures in the current Cabinet whom Labour MPs can plausibly imagine facing Nigel Farage across a television studio without visibly shrinking. He is fluent, a self-declared revisionist, emotionally direct in the modern political style with a powerful backstory. But Labour history is not especially kind to obvious heirs, even when they look much more likely to be successful. The party distrusts naked ambition on almost theological grounds because surely true Left-wingers would want to put the common good first.

So, a politician seeking the leadership must appear ready without appearing too eager. The advice that Brown always tried to give himself was to do a good job, and not look like he was actively plotting against Blair, simply being available when a vacancy arose. A wise dictum — albeit one that fell apart as his desire to enter No. 10 rose to almost pathological levels. In 2006, his ally Tom Watson launched the so-called “curry house” plot against Blair. However, in what became a running joke in Westminster, the conspirators’ attempts to keep the meeting secret spectacularly failed after they signed the restaurant’s visitors’ book, which was then leaked to the BBC.

Brown finally inherited the premiership in June 2007, after years of subterranean warfare — though not before Labour briefly descended into the sort of factional farce that only Labour can produce. Michael Meacher and John McDonnell maneuvered against Brown simultaneously, prompting one weary figure to remark that “the left hand doesn’t know what the far-left hand is doing”. But even that was not as peculiar as Barry Gardiner flying home from Dubai to run for leader, only to throw in the towel upon landing.

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How to topple a Labour leader

By Richard Johnson

Coups fail when ministers hesitate, factions freelance, allies leak against one another, and everybody assumes someone else has counted the numbers properly. Most failed Labour coups begin in perfect agreement that the party leader is intolerable — only to end with catastrophic disagreement about who should replace him. Starmer’s saving grace is that those calling for his replacement have yet to choose their champion. In the coming days Angela Rayner, Ed Miliband and Andy Burnham might all join the contest — assuming Burnham can find a seat in time. If Starmer chooses to stay and fight, he may ultimately survive a bruising leadership challenge simply because his enemies can’t shape their forces into a single fatal implement.

As the clouds of dissatisfaction swirl about him, Starmer seemingly faces a choice. He could adopt a wait-and-see approach; or he could use Attlee’s method of coopting rivals into allies. Yet, instead, his experience as a former prosecutor seems to be governing his actions. He blocked Burnham from standing in Gorton and Denton (even turning up to vote against in person); suspended the whip from MPs who sided with the SNP over the two-child benefit cap; and insisted that Rayner resign over her tax problems. Now that those seem to be resolved in any case, wouldn’t it have been better to have kept her inside the tent? Lawyer first, politician second, this purge-and-eliminate approach looks more like something out of the Neil Kinnock playbook than anything else.

Through the Eighties, Kinnock played an enormously important part in preparing Labour for a return to power. That meant he had to be ruthless in purging the hard-Left — as in his landmark 1985 conference speech, where he railed against the hard-Left militant faction in Liverpool. The rest of the party knew that the radicals were harming their electoral chances, and so were prepared to back Kinnock all the way.

Starmer has followed the Kinnock approach, albeit without the conditions to make it work. Notably, he lacks an external threat that the grassroots feel they need protecting from. The Conservatives have collapsed, and though the Greens and Reform are both a source of deep anxiety, they’ve yet to prove themselves as potent parliamentary forces. Besides, whoever ends up leading the party three months from now, the next election is still years away. The purge-and-eliminate strategy hardly seems wise in the circumstances. Maybe Heseltine’s dictum will need to be rewritten for Starmer. The leader who wields the knife loses the crown.

The polls tell the story. Prime Ministers with a disapproval rating of 70% rarely last long. Nobody defies gravity forever. Margaret Thatcher didn’t; nor did Tony Blair, despite winning three elections. Johnson has won only one. And the next test is not far away. On 5 May voters across the country will go to the polls in the local elections. A terrible set of results, and more letters of no-confidence will surely flood in. For Rishi Sunak, Liz Truss and their rivals, the prize must seem so tantalisingly close…

And yet, and yet. Political history is littered with examples of potential leaders who struck too soon or waited too long, future England captains whose moment never came. Nobody remembers the R. A. Butler governments of the late Fifties and early Sixties, because they never happened. A decade later, Roy Jenkins sharpened the knife, raised it high about his head and prepared to plunge it deep into Harold Wilson’s back… but the blow never fell. And a decade after that, everybody knew Tony Benn was going to become Labour leader one day — but he never did.

The list goes on. Willie Whitelaw delayed and delayed, loyal to the last to the beleaguered Ted Heath, and then found himself overtaken by, of all things, a woman. Michael Heseltine timed his deadly attack on Margaret Thatcher to perfection, only to discover that many of his fellow Conservative MPs would never forgive him for it.

Kenneth Clarke won three separate parliamentary ballots in three different Tory leadership contests, yet never wore the crown. David Davis arrived at the Conservative conference as a runaway favourite with two busty women in T-shirts reading “It’s DD for me”, only to find that the party faithful preferred a smooth-talking shepherd’s-hut enthusiast instead. Even Boris Johnson’s first leadership bid exploded on the launch pad, sabotaged by his chief engineer.

And then there’s the most disastrous campaign of all, the Labour moderates’ risible attempt to unseat Jeremy Corbyn in the summer of 2016. “Angela is a star in the Labour firmament. She will be at my right hand throughout this contest and if I am successful, Angela will be alongside me as my right-hand woman.” The words of the future Labour leader Owen Smith, talking about his erstwhile rival Angela Eagle. That was just five-and-a-half years ago. Dame Angela is still there somewhere, lurking unnoticed on the backbenches. But poor Smith isn’t even an MP.

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How to bring down a Prime Minister

By Dominic Sandbrook

It would be nice to claim there’s a clever formula for success, or to tease out some immutable “lessons from history”, but that would be disingenuous. There’s no formula. Indeed, the joy of political leadership campaigns is that nobody can quite predict the strange chemistry that makes a winner, the peculiar combination of luck and personality, the unforeseeable, unrepeatable point when man (or woman) meets moment.

Take Labour’s Roy Jenkins, the embodiment of metropolitan citizen-of-the-world liberalism, whose admirers often describe him as one of the best Prime Ministers Britain never had. In the spring of 1968, the only question was not if, but when. Following the humiliating devaluation of the pound a few months earlier, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, seemed crippled beyond recovery. The public had tired of his endless slipperiness, and as a smart and urbane crisis Chancellor — Rishi Sunak parallel alert! — Jenkins seemed the only plausible successor.

On the Labour benches Jenkins commanded what he called “a dedicated group of commandos, waiting as it were with their faces blackened for the opportunity to launch a Dieppe raid against the forces of opportunism”. Their leaders reported that they had assembled an elaborate system of ‘dissident cells’ comprising more than a hundred supporters, as well as an ‘inner group’ who would co-ordinate the revolt. At a secret meeting on 17 June the chief plotters even produced a definitive list of some 120 potential rebels. All they needed was the signal to strike.

It never came. A couple of weeks later, Jenkins told them to hold off for the time being. The premiership was so close — but he “did not want to be implicated in actually launching an action”. A convicted assassin, he believed, would never wear the crown: “I will never be caught with a dagger in my hand unless it is already smoking with my enemy’s blood”.

So Jenkins waited, and waited… and the moment passed. Wilson stayed on at Number 10 and Labour lost the next election. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, Jenkins lost his sheen. He went from tomorrow’s man to yesterday’s, without ever having been today’s. By the time Wilson retired in the spring of 1976, Jenkins’s chance had vanished. He had fallen out with the party’s Left wing over Europe, but there was a palpable sense, too, that he lacked the killer instinct.

Later, in his memoirs, Jenkins fell back on the excuse that he had never been ambitious enough, a clever way of complimenting himself for his own failure. But some of his supporters told a different story. “Roy was too ambitious, not insufficiently ambitious,” wrote his friend David Marquand. “He never thought it was the right moment; he always thought it was too risky”. The stakes were too high; he was paralysed by the fear of missing out. I wonder if, one day, Sunak’s friends will tell a similar story?

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Nothing can save the BBC

By Dominic Sandbrook

What of Jenkins’s insistence that the assassin never wins the ultimate prize? Well, there’s always the lesson of Heseltine in 1990. But such a flamboyant showman would have been deeply distrusted by many Tory MPs even if he’d never lifted a finger against Margaret Thatcher. And there are plenty of telling examples of political hitmen who made it all the way. Stanley Baldwin, instrumental in terminating Austen Chamberlain’s leadership in 1922, became Tory leader himself two years later. And Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden in 1957 precisely because many Tory MPs thought that by knifing Eden in the back, he had showed the cold, single-minded ruthlessness that Rab Butler lacked.

Then there’s the best-known political assassin of all, an object lesson in pitiless opportunism. Margaret Thatcher had spent the first four years of the Seventies nodding and smiling at Ted Heath’s policy U-turns. Not once had she whispered a word of dissent. And when, after the second general election of 1974, she announced that she was challenging him for the leadership, nobody seriously thought she would win.

The story goes that when, as a courtesy, Thatcher visited Heath to warn him of her intentions, he said coldly: “You’ll lose.” The Conservative parliamentary party, agreed his old rival Enoch Powell, “wouldn’t put up with those hats and that accent”. Even Mrs Thatcher’s family thought she was wasting her time. “You must be out of your mind,” remarked her husband Denis, not entirely supportively. “You haven’t got a hope.”

Yet as it turned out, Thatcher beat Heath by 130 votes to 119. (“A black day,” declared another of his old rivals, Reginald Maudling.) And now the strange magic of leadership contests took effect. With Heath gone, four new contenders, notably his lieutenant Willie Whitelaw, threw their hats into the ring. But it was too late; all the momentum lay with Thatcher. As the Telegraph remarked, it looked as if “a whole herd of fainthearts left it to a courageous and able woman to topple a formidable leader” and then “ganged up to deny her her just reward”. When the second ballot was held a week later, she stormed to victory. “My God!” exclaimed one Tory vice-chairman when the news came through. “The bitch has won!”

The other great canard about leadership elections is that you should keep an eye on the dark horse, with John Major’s victory in 1990 as Exhibit A. But was Major such a dark horse? He was, after all, Chancellor of the Exchequer, having just served a short stint as Foreign Secretary. It’s true that if the leadership election had been held a year or two earlier, he wouldn’t have stood a chance. But Major had timed his run to perfection, his victory a perfect example of how, in politics, you make your own luck. It would have been easy for him to waver in 1990: to bide his time and sit this one out. But he calculated, quite rightly, that he would never have a better chance. With cool, understated efficiency, he took it.

In reality, most dark horses never come remotely close to winning, and many soon relapse into utter obscurity. Who now recalls Peter Lilley’s leadership pitch in 1997? How many people look back on Michael Ancram as the great lost leader of 2001? Is there, perhaps, some parallel world in which Stephen Crabb faced Liam Fox in the final round of the Tory contest in 2016? Can there really be a universe where Mark Harper battled Esther McVey for the crown three years later?

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Putin has history on his side

By Dominic Sandbrook

Yet all of these people, presumably, must have imagined the pieces slotting into place: their colleagues marvelling at their unexpected talents, the other contenders falling away, the momentum sweeping them towards that historic audience at Buckingham Palace. Alas, it almost never works out that way. If you enter the contest as an outsider, you’re probably doomed before you start, because most MPs like backing winners.

A good example is one of the most colourful dark horses in modern political history, the hard-drinking, grammar-school-smiting Labour intellectual Tony Crosland. When Wilson resigned in 1976, Crosland fancied his chances. He looked at his rivals. Jim Callaghan, the favourite: too old. Michael Foot: too Left-wing. Roy Jenkins: too Right-wing. Denis Healey: too arrogant. Tony Benn: too mad. And it all seemed so straightforward. One by one the others would blow up, and Crosland would come through the middle.

So the future Prime Minister summoned his protégé, Roy Hattersley, who would surely play a key role in the victorious campaign. They got straight down to business. The most important thing, Crosland said, was to get a “decent vote” in the first ballot, and build strength from there. “I take it you’ll vote for me.”

Silence. Then, at last, Hattersley confessed. He didn’t want to waste his vote, and had already promised to back Callaghan. Crosland couldn’t believe his ears. It was all falling apart, and the campaign had barely started. “You’ll not vote for me?” he said. “Then fuck off.”

Crosland finished dead last in the 1976 leadership election, with just 19 votes. And the winner? Callaghan, just as everybody had predicted. Dark horses aren’t dark horses by accident. Favourites are favourites for a reason.

So are there no lessons at all for Rishi Sunak and Liz Truss — or for Jeremy Hunt, Penny Mordaunt, Tom Tugendhat and the host of other putative dark horses? Well, here are a few thoughts. Most politicians only get one chance. Miss your moment, and it never comes again. Courage is usually more admirable — and more effective — than caution. If you do stand, don’t say anything stupid. Ideally, don’t say anything at all.

None of this is very helpful, I know — not least because there are so many obvious exceptions. So to finish, here’s one ironclad rule of leadership contests, which may not be what the current hopefuls want to hear.

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By Aris Roussinos

Really, honestly, it would be better to lose. Losers always have more fun. Just ask yourself: would Roy Jenkins have been able to enjoy quite so many agreeable three-course dinners if he’d been Prime Minister? Or would he rather have been defending the Government’s policy on salmonella? Would Denis Healey have been free to appear on TV with Roger Moore and Dame Edna Everage? Or would he rather have been at a meeting in Frankfurt with Helmut Kohl? Would Ken Clarke have been happier organising a junior ministerial appointment for John Bercow, or smoking his fifth cigar of the night in some West End jazz club?

For this is the great unspoken truth about leadership contests: it’s a competition to see who’s going to be the most despised person in the country in a couple of years’ time. Yes, you get to have your picture on the Downing Street stairs, just along from Gordon Brown and Theresa May. But as they would surely tell you, being Prime Minister is awful. Everything goes wrong, and everybody hates you. So instead of agonising about when to declare and what to say, just don’t do it. You’ll have a much happier life if you stay out, and the country will thank you for it.

Here endeth the lesson. Liz, Rishi: don’t say I didn’t warn you.