<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	xmlns:unherd="https://www.unherd.com"
	>

	<channel>
		<title>reindustrialisation - UnHerd</title>
		<atom:link href="https://unherd.com/tag/reindustrialisation/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
		<link>https://unherd.com/tag/reindustrialisation/</link>
		<description>think again</description>
		<lastBuildDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 17:33:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
		<language>en-US</language>
		<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
		<sy:updateFrequency>12</sy:updateFrequency>
		<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5</generator>

 
<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">241381703</site>				<item>
					<title>Laborism isn’t working</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/labourism-isnt-working/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/labourism-isnt-working/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2224758598.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>The North</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Skelton]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Skelton.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Colliery banners are carried during the 139th Durham Miners' Gala on July 12 2025. (Ian Forsyth/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Skelton</strong> is author of <i>Little Platoons, </i>founded Renewal with the goal of broadening the appeal of the Tory Party and was Head of Research at Policy Exchange</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>djskelton</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is author of <i>Little Platoons, </i>founded Renewal with the goal of broadening the appeal of the Tory Party and was Head of Research at Policy Exchange]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 23:03:37 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 26 May 2026 23:03:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labourism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Wall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reformism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1061128</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The North needs more than nostalgia]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Two miners’ halls once dominated the politics of England’s coalfields. The first, Redhills in Durham, is one of the most beautiful buildings in a city blessed with many. Its domed roof and oak-paneled committee rooms are a monument to working-class pride and self-organization. The Miners’ Hall was once home to the Durham Miners Association and the so-called Pitmen’s Parliament. About 100 miles south, meanwhile, stands the Edwardian Miners&#8217; Hall in Barnsley. Later the headquarters of the National Union of Mineworkers, the Barnsley hall is stunning too, with its stonework, turrets and gables, all built by a movement that asserted its presence in stone.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Indeed, the grandeur of both buildings stands as a testament to the political weight these communities once carried — reaching the highest levels of national decision-making. As Herbert Morrison famously declared when rejecting the European Coal and Steel Community, “the Durham miners won&#8217;t wear it&#8221;.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Durham and Barnsley symbolize what the academic and parliamentarian David Marquand described as &#8220;labourism&#8221;, a class-based politics rooted in the institutions of the organized working class. It was a politics embedded in place, still visible in traditions like pit banners, or the Miners&#8217; Gala — or the 297 numbered seats of Redhills&#8217; debating chamber, each corresponding to a Durham colliery. All the while, labourism was focused on the material improvement of local communities: patriotic, often culturally conservative, and practical rather than abstract, so unlike the bourgeois socialism of the Webbs and others.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/can-burnham-banish-maggies-ghost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/can-burnham-banish-maggies-ghost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Untitled-design-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/can-burnham-banish-maggies-ghost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/can-burnham-banish-maggies-ghost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Burnham banish Maggie&#039;s ghost?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/can-burnham-banish-maggies-ghost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Labourism is now dead, and the Labour Party has lost its grip on its former industrial heartlands. In Barnsley this month, Labour were reduced from 48 seats to 11, while Reform rose from zero to 42 and took control of the council. This follows similar gains in Durham a year earlier, where Reform surged and Labour was reduced to only four seats. This same pattern is being repeated across the English coalfields, from Sunderland to Durham to Barnsley, and together is starting to look like a more durable realignment of working-class England. The push for Andy Burnham to succeed Keir Starmer is also symbolic of a romantic desire within Labour to revive labourism.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This is understandable. At its peak, after all, labourism was not merely a political identity but a complete social world. The pit or the steelworks provided the work, but the union, the cooperative and the chapel provided so much more. Miners&#8217; institutes housed libraries stocked with improving literature. Choral societies and cricket clubs gave leisure its shape. The workplace was not just where you earned your living — but the hub around which an entire network of community institutions revolved. To be working class in Durham or Barnsley was not simply an economic condition, but an identity, a set of loyalties. Together, it encompassed, in David Marquand&#8217;s memorable phrase, a civilization as much as a politics.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Labourism suffered a gradual decay, followed by a more sudden collapse. The decline of the industries on which it depended made that erosion almost inevitable. When the pits closed, the institutional network and the communal loyalties that had sustained labourism began to unravel with them. Without the workplace as its organizing core, the dense web of community life began to thin. The Labour Party remained, of course, but as a weakening electoral habit rather than an expression of a living culture.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The cultural transformation of the Labour Party accelerated this decline. As the Party became more closely associated with metropolitan, progressive values, it lost touch with its voters. Labour’s approach to immigration distanced it from supporters who saw it as undercutting working-class wages. Its emphasis on welfare created further distance from those who felt the system was being misused. Its approach to Net Zero compounded a deindustrialization that had already hollowed out these communities. The energy costs that accompanied the transition fell disproportionately on the kind of energy-intensive manufacturing that remained in these areas.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whereas labourism emerged from and represented the industrial working class, modern Labour does neither. Rather, Labour has come to resemble what Thomas Piketty describes as the “Brahmin Left”, a party of “high-status city dwellers”.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Whereas labourism emerged from and represented the industrial working class, modern Labour does neither.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">As memories of deindustrialization and the Miners’ Strike faded, meanwhile, the cultural ties between Labour and post-industrial towns weakened. Labourism became, at first, nostalgic and then moribund. Old tropes were repeated, but without the cultural rhythms that defined labourism at its peak. The Miners&#8217; Gala continued, but what had once been a living demonstration of collective identity has become, for many Labour activists, something closer to heritage tourism.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nor have these economic wounds truly been healed. I grew up in Consett, where the steelworks closed overnight in 1980, and what it left behind was still visible a generation later. Brexit crystallized the frustration of working-class voters, but the economic model that had failed these places remained intact, and the political class that had ignored them continued to do so.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Much of the Red Wall voted for Brexit in 2016, then Conservative in 2019 on the promise of Leveling Up. But the Tories proved too tied to economic orthodoxy, and too weakly embedded in their new constituencies to deliver it. Too many treated these places as a temporary electoral asset to be managed, rather than a new heartland to be rebuilt.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Meanwhile, net migration reached record levels, a fact that sat particularly badly in communities where the relationship between immigration and wages had long been a source of grievance. Studies by the Bank of England and the City of London Corporation confirmed what many in these communities felt directly: that mass immigration placed significant downward pressure on wages at the lower end of the labor market. The communities that felt that most acutely were precisely those that had already lost the most to deindustrialization.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The 2024 election appeared to mark a revival of the old alignment, with Labour recapturing much of its former industrial heartland. Yet as the local-election results so vividly showed, that realignment has proved hollow. All this provides an opportunity to fill the void left by the collapse of labourism: for a doctrine that is both distinctive and rooted in the communities it now represents.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Call it reformism. Labourism endured because it was embedded in the institutions and daily life of the communities it represented, and because it offered a coherent account of those communities&#8217; place in the national story. A modern equivalent would need to do the same, starting from the question of how to rebuild economic life in the towns and regions where it has drained away.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Just as Durham and Barnsley were once the emotional heartlands of labourism, giving the movement its identity, its imagery, its sense of moral purpose, these same towns could perform the same function for a new politics of place. But that cannot be conjured through rhetoric alone. Instead, it requires the patient rebuilding of local economies that generate rooted, dignified work, and the institutions that give people a genuine stake in the places where they live. The emotional heartland has to be built, not proclaimed.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In the first place, this is true aesthetically. The Miners&#8217; Halls of Durham and Barnsley were not merely functional buildings: but beautifully deliberate statements of permanence, soaring visions of dignity in stone. The labourist movement understood instinctively that elegant buildings generate civic pride, and that the quality of the built environment tells a community something about how much it is valued. Most of what has been built in these towns since says something very different. The default architecture of post-industrial regeneration — the retail parks, the bland civic centers — has compounded rather than reversed the demoralization of deindustrialization. A new politics of place would need to take beauty seriously, understanding that handsome architecture is not an aesthetic indulgence but an act of civic respect.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All this naturally requires thoroughgoing economic transformation. Without that, Reform risks becoming another chapter in the long quest of post-industrial England for a coherent political identity. In practice, that means seeing places like Durham and Barnsley as vigorous economies for the future of Britain. These would be places defined not by what they used to be, but what they do now.</p>
<p dir="ltr">At its core, then, reformism would need to shift the economic focus from redistribution to production. For much of the past generation, policy has been concerned with how to allocate the proceeds of growth rather than where that growth takes place, even as growth itself has weakened since the financial crisis. A durable alternative would emphasize reindustrialization and a stronger private sector in the parts of the country where both have declined. That means rebuilding productive capacity, supporting firms that sustain local employment, and encouraging risk-bearing capital to invest in the places it has historically avoided, rather than relying on centralized redistribution to fill the gap.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In practice, this is already visible in varying forms. In South Yorkshire, for instance, advanced manufacturing has grown out of surviving metalworking skills. In Sunderland, the Nissan plant has anchored a wider supply chain. In Preston, procurement and cooperative business have kept value circulating locally. And, further afield, in Germany’s Ruhr valley, a former industrial heartland has been reshaped through sustained investment in skills and infrastructure. These examples could provide the outline of a serious place-based economic doctrine, one that starts from the assets of particular towns rather than assuming national growth will eventually reach the places it has bypassed for generations.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-labour-restore-our-pride-in-place/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-labour-restore-our-pride-in-place/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-545624992.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-labour-restore-our-pride-in-place/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-labour-restore-our-pride-in-place/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Labour restore our pride in place?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-labour-restore-our-pride-in-place/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Littlefair</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The case for reindustrialization is reinforced by strategic necessity. The pandemic exposed what it means to hollow out a productive base, while the war in Ukraine underlined the risks of dependence on fragile supply chains. The need to increase defense spending offers one potential demand anchor for domestic manufacturing, though only if procurement is designed to build industrial capacity at home. Either way, rebuilding productive capacity is not just an economic argument for left-behind towns. It is a national security argument too.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All this would also require a more demanding approach to the labor market, placing greater emphasis on domestic skills, training and productivity rather than imported lower-cost labor. Power would also need to shift away from the center, giving local economies greater control over skills, investment and planning. That points toward genuine experimentation with the conditions for growth in specific places, including the kind of lower tax, lower regulation zones that have driven renewal elsewhere. Poland rebuilt industrial employment through targeted economic zones, while South Korea anchored entire industrial ecosystems around specific sectors in specific places. The freedom for post-industrial towns to set their own conditions for growth, rather than waiting for solutions designed in Whitehall, may be the most radical and necessary element of a genuinely place-based economic doctrine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There is a deeper question lurking beneath all of this. Herbert Morrison’s anxiety about what the Durham miners might wear was not just a colorful anecdote. It reflected a real sense of power located outside London. Thriving post-industrial communities with strong local institutions and tight labor markets would not be passive recipients of central government policy. They would be politically potent in ways Westminster has not had to confront for decades.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The economic case for reindustrialization, then, is clear —  but whether the political class actually wants the world it would create is another question. Yet the communities of post-industrial England can’t wait for the political class to overcome its ambivalence. The need for a new doctrine of place, rooted in economic renewal and genuine civic power, is too urgent and too important to be left to those who may fear its consequences.</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2026/05/labourism-isnt-working/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1061128</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Is it too late to reindustrialize?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-it-too-late-to-reindustrialise/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-it-too-late-to-reindustrialise/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2242228718.jpg?w=530</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Sovereignty</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rian Chad Whitton]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Blue-26.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Steelworkers have become a rarity in the British economy. (Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rian Chad Whitton</strong> is an analyst at Bismarck Analysis. He specialises in automation, energy, and industrial policy. His personal writings can be found on his newsletter <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/">Doctor Syn</a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an analyst at Bismarck Analysis. He specialises in automation, energy, and industrial policy. His personal writings can be found on his newsletter <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/">Doctor Syn</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 23:02:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 06:59:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Steel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Growth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1055564</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Britain faces painful tradeoffs]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>At a sprawling Texan-owned oil refinery overlooking Milford Haven, an estuary town in Pembrokeshire, crude oil from America and Norway is distilled inside 200-foot steel towers. The oil is heated to 400℃. Hydrocarbons with low boiling points, like gasoline and kerosene, rise to the top of the column, while heavier chemicals like asphalt remain at the bottom. Out of the towers come the fuels that power cars, trucks, shipping, aircraft, and much of the chemical industry, not to mention almost all military vehicles. Britain was formerly home to over a dozen refineries. Yet the Milford Haven site is now one of just four refineries left in Britain, with two closing in 2025 alone, one in Scotland and another in Lincolnshire. Similar scars are borne by many towns and cities across the country. Just recently, we’ve lost production of salt in <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/why-ending-the-manufacture-of-a-humdrum-substance-would-be-final-nail-in-the-coffin-of-an-industry-that-was-once-britains-pride-13494625">Runcorn</a>, synthetic textiles in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp80l716yzyo">Brockworth</a>, steel in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0818y4jdlo">Rotherham</a>, bearings in <a href="https://www.nsk.com/company/news/2026/notice-regarding-proposed-withdrawal-of-production-en/">Newark-on-Trent</a> and ceramics in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/mar/31/denby-pottery-call-in-administrators">Denby</a>. British Steel in Scunthorpe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/mar/30/british-steel-on-track-to-be-fully-nationalised-within-weeks">limps on</a>, if only with government support.</p>
<p>It has been a steep decline. At the turn of the millennium, Britain possessed the fourth-largest industrial economy in the world. More than 800,000 people worked in foundational sectors: oil and gas extraction, refining, metals, chemicals, and inorganics. Contrary to popular belief, Britain’s energy-intensive production did not peak in the Seventies — but in 2002, supported by relatively cheap energy and booming global demand.</p>
<p>Then, between 2006 and 2008, Britain’s output and productivity began to fall. Globally, heavy industry shifted decisively toward China, hollowing out Western industrial employment. Britain, like its peers, lost jobs — but suffered more acutely. Heavy industry employment has halved from over 800,000 workers in the early 2000s to just over 400,000 today. Since 2008, Britain’s steel sector has nearly collapsed multiple times; the ammonia industry has died out; salt production has ended and aluminum production has rapidly declined. Production of cement and glass is down, while imports of the same materials are up. Those jobs were lost during a time of perceived economic and political stability, where countries would specialise and become ever more integrated. But due to tariffs, wars, pandemics and a general sense of insecurity, talk of reindustrialisation, once dismissed as pangs of nostalgia, is becoming de rigueur in Westminster. Robert Jenrick, who stands a good chance of being the next chancellor, has <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52820/robert-jenrick-reform-will-be-careful-with-your-money-speech-in-full">argued</a> for “creating the conditions for Britain to reindustrialise, restore our proud industrial heritage and create good jobs for British workers once again.”</p>
<p>For different parties, “reindustrialisation” means different things. Ed Miliband envisages a “green industrial revolution” where Britain’s reindustrialisation is directly tied to his ambitious carbon reduction targets. For Nigel Farage, the term means cutting red tape and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJpK3TdBI-g">reopening the mines</a>.</p>
<p>If reindustrialisation has cross-party appeal, it is because it intuitively makes sense that being able to manufacture complex equipment makes a nation stronger, more productive and more prosperous. This intuition has been tempered by economists who argue for economic specialisation and enjoying the reduced cost of goods by offshoring manufacturing to cheaper locations. But recent global events — Covid’s effect on supply chains; the Ukraine war’s effect on energy prices; the Iran war’s effect on shipping — have made this view increasingly hard to defend. Deindustrialised Britain grows its economy anaemically, if at all. The same is true of its productivity. As a result, the country’s hard power has rapidly diminished.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/gettyimages-2011425280-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why China will beat the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Hence the cheerleading for reindustrialisation. This high-spirited rhetoric rarely acknowledges tradeoffs, but it ought to. This is because deindustrialisation was a price willingly paid for cheaper consumer goods from imports, increased welfare spending, periodic tax cuts, and progress towards meeting Britain’s environmental and emissions targets — or, at least, those targets that pertained to onshore activity rather than activity handed off to the developing world. Reindustrialisation, then, might require some of those dividends to be relinquished. Partly for that reason, none of the cheerleaders have yet made firm commitments for how much of our economy should be manufacturing, or what level of growth they would aim for. Currently, the concept of “reindustrialisation” is comparable in rigour to “soft power” and “clean energy superpower”.</p>
<p>Granted, the country has industrialised before. But the Britain of Pitt and Lord Liverpool, with its high wages, captive markets and cheap energy, was primed for such a transformation. Modern Britain, with its expensive energy, low levels of investment, and asymmetric openness to foreign goods, is certainly not. Reversing decades of insufficient investment and making Britain a major manufacturing power is going to be a mammoth task.</p>
<p>Some argue that it is a task not worth pursuing. The staple criticism has come from free-marketers like Daniel Hannan, who argues there is “<a href="https://conservativehome.com/2025/04/23/daniel-hannan-the-conservative-case-for-globalisation-in-six-simple-points/">nothing special about manufacturing</a>”, and that globalisation is good for the consumer and the economy. Prior to becoming an MP, Labour thinktanker Torsten Bell <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/10/why-be-a-poor-version-of-germany-instead-of-doing-what-we-do-best">argued</a> that Britain should stay focused on being a world-leader in services. But the productivity statistics are on the side of the reindustrialists. Beyond the most rudimentary wood and textile craftsmanship, manufacturing is more productive per worker than average. Britain’s energy-intensive and resource-extractive industries employed 1% of the workforce, but accounted for nearly 3% of gross value added (GVA), an important metric of economic value. The average heavy industry employee contributes  77% more in GVA than the average worker.As for the <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7682/CBP-7682.pdf">advanced manufacturing</a> sector — defined in the Government’s 2025 industrial policy as chemicals, transport, aerospace, machinery, and electrical equipment — it accounts for just 2% of jobs (721,000) but 6% of GVA (£80 billion). For context, London’s creative sector, the most culturally prestigious sector in the country, encompassing computer programming, video game development, film and TV production, generates just <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossvalueaddedgva">£64 billion with 730,000 workers.</a></p>
<p>If we accept that some level of reindustrialisation is desirable for economic and extra-economic reasons, how do we achieve it? First, we must understand why British manufacturing is in the doldrums. For many, the blame lies with Thatcher’s reforms. For others, it is the mismanaged mergers of the Sixties and Seventies.</p>
<p>I would argue that the real evidence of industrial decline, the kind that is most relevant today, occurred much later. Britain’s industrial malaise is not simply the delayed aftermath of the Eighties, nor an inevitable by-product of a modern service economy. It stems from three big problems arising over the last 30 years: high energy prices, underinvestment in capital equipment, and the uneven nature of global trade, where some countries are far more open to imports than others.</p>
<p>While the Thatcherite consensus had allowed for industrial growth, it was growth that was incredibly uneven. Pharmaceuticals, automobiles and aerospace prospered, but increasingly under the ownership of foreign investors. Heavy industry, like chemicals, metals and the machining of components, was offshored as a result of generating lower marginal returns. This partial atrophication made manufacturing in general much more dependent on imports. It also made it harder to scale up new industries. As a result, there have been almost no new British industrial giants formed in the 21st century. Successful new corporations like Ineos and Astrazeneca were formed from the scraps of previous giants like Imperial Chemical Industries.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There have been almost no new British industrial giants formed in the 21st century&#8221;</div>
<p>The strength of the pound, and lenders&#8217; demands for ever-higher margins in shorter timeframes, certainly did not help. Studies <a href="https://hbr.org/2015/06/robots-seem-to-be-improving-productivity-not-costing-jobs?utm_source=chatgpt.com">have shown</a> that the UK during this period saw a uniquely significant contraction in jobs and a uniquely low investment in automation. We were coasting on the momentum of the 20th century.</p>
<p>That momentum is rapidly dissipating. Glass factories, refineries, and ethylene plants are closing. North Sea oil and gas production began declining in 2004, and the need for substantial investments in the electricity grid, which had been deferred for decades, drove up energy costs rapidly from 2005 onwards. These increases were compounded by the expansion of levies to support intermittent renewables.</p>
<p>Arguably as important as energy prices is the decline of the capital stock in manufacturing. This is a term that refers, essentially, to the total value of all the machinery, equipment and infrastructure accumulated to power Britain’s industrial base. The country is well below its peers in the purchase of industrial machinery. Some commentators have blamed the relative lack of industrial investment on the financial sector and private equity, both of which, it is argued, are overly focused on short-term returns. The decline of capital stock can also be seen as a supply-side problem: in other words, it is too hard to build and do business in Britain. For that reason, companies are unwilling to make large, capital-intensive bets on future manufacturing orders.</p>
<p>On that front — the supply side — policymakers could at least have worked toward making energy cheaper and capital expenditure more appealing. But a third great force has been hurting British manufacturing: the overcapacity of global manufacturing, exacerbated by uneven trade practices which benefit producers in some countries over others. Overall, global growth in manufacturing has slowed in the 21st century. But, some countries, most notably China but also Thailand, Vietnam and Taiwan, have, in mercantilist fashion, prioritised market share over profit margins. This has led to massive overcapacity, which has deflated global prices for consumers but also pushed out Western producers.</p>
<p>British firms have weathered this harsh environment stoically, increasing worker productivity and keeping overall value roughly stable in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. But the consequence of this efficiency has been a degradation of overall capacity and the ability to compete in new markets. Being a major manufacturer of electric vehicles is a non-sequitur: Britain has little capacity to refine the chemicals that make lithium-ion batteries. Given that our government has decided to ban petrol vehicles in the near future, this means we could conceivably lose most of our car industry within a decade.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/gettyimages-619875760-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Rolls-Royce is an engine of prosperity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aled Maclean-Jones</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>With other Western countries increasingly adopting a dirigiste stance toward protecting their own industries, British companies are being lured elsewhere. The German government, in a new spirit of fiscal profligacy, has actively courted major manufacturers, attempting to lure British Rolls-Royce with the implicit promise of subsidies. The company has urged the UK to subsidise its engine production, arguing it will otherwise be forced to move abroad.</p>
<p>Whether the Government will give in to Rolls remains to be seen. No. 10 is already grappling with steel production, which has become the most visible industrial challenge. In 2024, Britain produced four million tonnes of steel, down 33% from 2023. This was less than Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, and Saudi Arabia — and only twice the output of Luxembourg. This might be seen as the fag-end of a long decline, but up until relatively recently, steel production was viable. It is worth noting that in Wales, which has been particularly hit in recent years, steel production peaked as late as 1997.</p>
<p>The Government’s recently published steel strategy will protect the industry through subsidies and tariffs. It sets a target to use domestic steel for 50% of consumption, up from 30% today. It also tightens the quota for excess imports and increases tariffs on those imports. Through the National Wealth Fund, the Government will provide £2.5 billion in funding to upgrade steel plants. The Government has also confirmed it will be a major buyer of steel for public procurement needs. This is a fairly meaty support package, and necessary to keep a steel industry here, but it leaves out the penalty of expensive energy. For as long as Britain’s industrial energy is among the most expensive in the world, the steel sector — which is highly energy-intensive — will suffer.</p>
<p>British industrial decline, then, is most visible in energy-intensive industry, but the decay is just as pronounced in the secondary stage of production: fabrication. Once manufacturing material has been produced in its primary form, it must be fabricated into products. This includes casting, forging and machining of components through the use of machine tools. Here, the importance of energy costs begins to give way to a lack of capital.</p>
<p>As an example of the fabrication stage, some components have to be forged using enormous hydraulic presses. A handful of facilities worldwide can produce 500-tonne steel ingots, required for nuclear reactor pressure vessels. Britain — through the Ministry of Defence’s ownership of Sheffield Forgemasters — remains one of only five such locations on Earth where such ingots can be forged.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1055574" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1055574" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1055574 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="777" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=300,228 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=768,583 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=267,203 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=253,192 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=250,190 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=660,501 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=480,364 480w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1055574" class="wp-caption-text">Prince Charles, as he was then, visits Sheffield Forgemasters in 2008. (Pool/Anwar Hussein Collection/WireImage)</figcaption></figure>
<p>While Forgemasters is a large operation, the majority of machining in Britain is done by thousands of small machine shops, which rely on repeat orders from longstanding clients. When Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) suffered a cyberattack, the existential threat was felt not only by JLR but also by suppliers such as Genex UK, which derives up to 70% of its business from JLR contracts.</p>
<p>This hidden economy is built around thousands of machine tools: a catch-all term for machines that cut and form components that are then assembled into products. Britain was once a major producer of such equipment. Today, most tools are imported from Germany, Japan, Korea, and increasingly, China. Despite having a similar industrial base, Britain consumes less than half as many machine tools as France.</p>
<p>The problem is stagnant demand and poor access to capital. Consolidation sounds appealing, but it is structurally complex. Most machine shops fabricate a low volume of highly variable components on thin margins. Yet their economic impact is disproportionate to their size. While a component may represent a tiny fraction of a nuclear plant’s cost, the ability to procure it quickly and locally could dramatically reduce project timelines and capital costs. There is <a href="https://www.nathanielbullard.com/presentations">circumstantial evidence</a> from Korea and China that nuclear plant costs dramatically fall in line with higher domestic content.</p>
<p>These machine shops are the ligaments of Britain’s industrial body: small, numerous, and under severe strain. Start-ups like Ealing-based Isembard, which franchises software across machine shops, offer a glimpse of renewal.</p>
<p>To what extent could that renewal be made national? There are no obvious examples of major countries that industrialised rapidly, deindustrialised and subsequently reindustrialised. Rather than envisioning a second British Empire, an incoming government could credibly commit to make manufacturing 10% of GVA by the end of its first term, and 12-14% thereafter. This would represent a 25-50% expansion from today’s 8% figure, restoring Britain to its early-2000s position — not some imagined golden age. This would mean a larger industrial base, higher productivity, and greater capacity to complete significant infrastructure projects and defence orders quickly.</p>
<p>The price of this improved capacity: more costs for consumers for intermediate and finished manufactured goods, since industry is currently costlier here than abroad. Additionally, Britain will shed some jobs in the “creative” and “business services”, as an increase in domestic production will increase demand for labour, even with automation. While painful and politically difficult, these developments will be manageable and even desirable. While some increased consumer prices will make us poorer in the short term, this would be meaningfully offset by higher productivity jobs, higher wages, more exports and greater R&amp;D spending.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2211058841.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Net Zero backlash</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rian Chad Whitton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>How can the Government get us there? Supply-side reform remains essential. Lower energy prices, reduced carbon levies, and R&amp;D tax credits can help, but would require the end of the Net Zero project as it is currently constituted. The <a href="http://t.co/slddFCfBGq">discretionary carbon taxes</a> that inflate the cost of gas, and therefore electricity, should be scaled back. Allowing for more exploration and drilling in the North Sea would have a limited impact on prices, but would improve our balance of trade and keep high-paying jobs in Scotland. More ambitious plans to frack in Northern England could have a much more significant impact on prices. In the short term, nuclear power development would be costly, but in the long term would provide firm power at acceptable prices.</p>
<p>But cheap energy alone is not sufficient. Despite lower electricity prices, France has only marginally outperformed Britain since 2008. The primary benefit will be that key heavy-industry sites will not require government bailouts. Nearly three times more R&amp;D tax relief is claimed by “office administrative and business support activities” than by machinery and equipment manufacturing. Much of this is thinly disguised tax arbitrage. Britain’s industrial R&amp;D intensity is about half the global average, while its financial sector is nineteen times more research-intensive than said average.</p>
<p>An eminently achievable policy would be to provide grants for industrial machinery. This should be a key focus: the country’s manufacturing sector has a lower capital stock of equipment now than in 1995. Rather than spend billions chasing speculative technologies or subsidy wars with the EU, US, and China, Britain would gain more by directly <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/p/the-british-machine-tools-gap">financing capital equipment</a> purchases — modernising workshops across the country. A £1 billion annual grant (under 2% of the £60 billion spent annually on industrial policy) for machine tools would double British purchasing capacity overnight. Those free-marketeers suspicious of a return to Sixties-style grants could be buttered up through cuts to energy levies, dubious R&amp;D tax credits, and unmeritorious university funding.</p>
<p>But even with a government committed to reindustrialisation, trade imbalances make the task uphill. The rise of Chinese industrial power, now accounting for more than 30% of global manufacturing value, has depressed production in the West. While <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/p/how-is-us-manufacturing-doing">Trump’s US</a> has been the most avowedly protectionist, the truth is <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/dont-swap-tariffs-minimum-prices-chinese-electric-vehicles">Europe</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-india-trade-deal-car-industry-goal/">India</a> have joined the East Asians in using tariffs and subsidies to hold on to industry.</p>
<p>As the most open, least competitive industrial base in the developed world, British producers are the least well-placed to thrive in an environment where trade is fractured yet globalised. There are no solutions; only trade-offs. In my view, plenty should be sacrificed to make industry competitive again. The current government has accepted protectionism for steel. Though far from ideal, it is the least worst decision and bides us time to make Britain more competitive through reduced energy costs.</p>
<p>While a manufacturing boom would not be a panacea to all Britain’s maladies, it would improve our ability to meet those challenges. It would mean greater prosperity outside of London, a wider tax base and greater security. With greater wealth in the regions, it could allow for the reduction of welfare spending. The establishment of large, modern British manufacturers would give the nation a chance to compete across high-value sectors like drones and rocketry. This, in turn, would allow us to field a stronger armed forces without periodically raising our defence spending.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that the credit for such dividends would be monopolised by one statesman or government. In fact, those determined to make reindustrialisation happen will face significant opposition. A strong industrial base is rarely attributed to a singular individual, but to general good governance.</p>
<p>Reindustrialisation is anything but an easy win. Yet if politicians and civil servants continue to act like there are no hard choices, expect the stagnation of the 21st century to turn into absolute decline.</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-it-too-late-to-reindustrialise/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1055564</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How Britain gets its future back</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-britain-gets-its-future-back/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-britain-gets-its-future-back/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2236150117.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jonny Ball]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Blue-34.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['In light of the recent outbursts from a mercurial White House, British bank bosses have begun to plan for an alternative to the US’s Visa and Mastercard systems'. (Leon Neal/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DespoticInroad</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 00:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 09:15:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Sovereignty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1049498</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Cheap energy is just the start]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>“It’s only when the tide goes out”, says the legendary investor Warren Buffet, “that you find out who was swimming naked”. Any second-rate trader can look like a financial whizzkid in a bull market — but when leaner times return we learn about everyone’s true mettle. The same applies to countries. The chatterati despair, grasping their thinning, graying heads of hair: where has the easy charm of elected politicians gone; why does nothing work; why are we consumed by permacrisis; why can’t we go<em> back to normal</em>? But the normalcy of which they speak, the end-of-history ascendency of liberal politics at home and global integration abroad, is gone and not returning. And without a post-Cold War peace dividend, the unipolar moment, Pax Americana, financialization, free-flowing North Sea energy, and ever-more transnational markets, Britain has been caught skinny-dipping.</p>
<p>We rely on the developmentalist economies of the Far East for our manufactured goods, on the Norwegians for our oil and gas-powered energy, on Europe for our food, Wall Street for our payments systems, Silicon Valley for our digital worlds, and on a diverse caste of cheap, subaltern labor to staff our care homes, serve us coffee, clean our offices, and deliver our meals. In light of the recent outbursts from a mercurial White House, British bank bosses have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/feb/16/uk-bank-bosses-plan-visa-mastercard-alternative" target="_blank" rel="noopener">begun to plan</a> for an alternative to the US’s Visa and Mastercard systems. And not a moment too soon: when the President threatened a Nato ally with annexation last month, all we could offer was bland platitudes, a humiliating prostration before hard power.</p>
<p>Even those few sectors in which we do excel — the consultancies, and the legal and financial services that we still export to the world — seem designed for a softer-edged era. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-36781883" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Like Tony Blair himself</a>, the “knowledge economy” was the future once, or so we were told. The real value was created through the immaterial labor practiced in the metropoles. Globalization was non-negotiable; “you might as well debate over whether autumn should follow summer”, in the words of its leading evangelist, and Britain would ride the wave, prospering at the cutting edge of international bullshit artistry. Once the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution has surrendered its economic autonomy to the whims of global finance capital, there’s nothing left to do but turn the art of corporate jargon and consultant-sophistry into its unique specialism — right before the glossy reports and PowerPoints are automated by AI.</p>
<p>But now the tide hasn’t so much gone out as receded past the horizon. Not only is automation coming for the white-collar service class, but the transatlantic alliance is more frayed than in its whole history. The “normal” of liberal-technocratic triumphalism looks like a one-time-only blip, a bubble punctured by the collapse of Lehman, its final illusions extinguished by Covid-19. A world of Great Power rivalry has returned — the Americans proving Lord Palmerston’s old <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00008130" target="_blank" rel="noopener">maxim</a> that there are “no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal interests”, and judging that it is not in Washington’s eternal interests to simultaneously confront the rising giant of Beijing while being locked into conflict with Russia on a declining continent that cannot defend its own peripheries.</p>
<p>And so, a political consensus is forming: we must reindustrialize. We must rebuild our national productive capacities. Without a solid manufacturing base, we are dangerously exposed in a hostile world of geopolitical contestation. In his first speech as the putative “shadow chancellor” this week, Robert Jenrick <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52820/robert-jenrick-reform-will-be-careful-with-your-money-speech-in-full" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told us</a> that Reform would “restore our proud industrial heritage and create good jobs for British workers once again”. “We do believe in industrial strategy”, he assured any listeners confused by his about-turn away from the party of the sovereign individual and free and open markets.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2239301599.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will we ever escape the ECHR?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In this, Jenrick is only echoing his leader Nigel Farage, a man who Maurice Glasman once described as “a saloon-bar Thatcherite”, but who has now taken to floating the idea of public ownership and equity stakes in British engineering firms, <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52601/nigel-farage-s-speech-at-the-birmingham-nec" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lamenting</a> the loss of “shipbuilding, cement making, chemicals, steel”. “It’s all gone off to India and China”, he says, articulating all the cultural-political sovereigntist themes of post-industrial Britain — lost identity, lost purpose, lost control. Yet all those on-the-ground resentments are ultimately the result of conscious macroeconomic decisions on the part of the monetarists: a strong sterling is a boon for the City but blows a hole in the UK’s balance of trade that can only be filled by constant rounds of inward foreign investment; the unedifying and unending ritual of flogging the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1ssGrq5S3w" target="_blank" rel="noopener">family silver</a>, until every old family firm and former national champion is in the portfolio of a Gulf state.</p>
<p>Gone are those days, Farage and Jenrick promise. Instead, Reform will pursue something called the “politics of national preference”, at least according to one of the party’s ideological gurus, James Orr, the national-conservative theologian and disciple of the patrician, communitarian Toryism of Roger Scruton.</p>
<p>And if all of this sounds familiar, that might be because it echoes the lines of our current party of government. Chancellor Rachel Reeves <a href="https://labourlist.org/2021/07/rachel-reeves-sets-out-labour-plan-to-make-sell-and-buy-more-in-britain/#:~:text=Rachel%20Reeves%20sets%20out%20Labour,the%20jobs%20of%20the%20future;" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> to “make, sell and buy more in Britain”. Her economic philosophy would be rooted in “<a href="https://labour.org.uk/updates/press-releases/rachel-reeves-securonomics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">securonomics</a>”: the doctrine of maximized efficiency would give way to the new watchword of resilience, and the local, national provenance of goods would be prioritized over their price. If Thatcher’s heirs have seen the writing on the wall, the second-generation of Blairism have too: a country that makes things, that has a trade surplus in goods, will fare better in an age of chaotic, global fragmentation.</p>
<p>Yet if we’re heavy on the diagnostics, we’re light on the prescription. Jenrick might position his vision as a “new political economy”, but nothing that’s so far been proposed will go any further towards “reindustrialization” than Reeves’ defunct “securonomics”. The latter was, more-or-less, dead on arrival, always to be sacrificed on the altar of the Labour leadership’s innate caution and overdue respect for established procedures. It is not in the nature of the apolitical, robotic meeting-chair-in-chief to challenge any of the orthodoxies repeated from the mouths of a recalcitrant, Treasury-brained senior civil servant, let alone the Confederation of British Industry.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If we’re heavy on the diagnostics, we’re light on the prescription&#8221;</div>
<p>To be fair, Jenrick’s “new political economy” differs from Labour’s take on industrial renaissance in one crucial respect. For Reform, the net-zero project is the primary blockage to the resuscitation of heavy manufacturing, particularly in high-carbon, energy-intensive sectors being crushed under the weight of subsidized renewables and grid costs. For Labour, the green transition is the exact opposite: the catalyst for the transformation of the British economy. In place of the dark Satanic mills of Victorian industry, and the monotowns of Fordist mass production, the new industrial revolution will restore England’s reputation as a green and pleasant land, a global leader in wind power with a sideline in batteries, solar cells and nuclear energy.</p>
<p>Both parties are peddling a fantasy. The seeds of deindustrialization were sown long before decarbonization became a uniparty dogma. The loss of much of Britain’s heavy industry took place even as we were net energy exporters. Besides, the Chinese economic miracle was built on more than cheap coal. The aggressive industrial policy contained in the Communist Party’s <em><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Made in China 2025</a> </em> has transformed the country from the world’s sweatshop into a high-tech center of advanced manufacturing, with massive, state-directed investment into highly competitive, strategic and innovative sectors, complementing a long-term policy of strict capital controls, high tariff walls, and a central bank that militantly supports investment-led growth. That’s reflected in Chinese exports: no more the crowded production lines of cliche, with the PRC instead becoming a global leader in high-tech sectors, robotics and AI.</p>
<p>In response, the US first <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/public%20and%20social%20sector/our%20insights/the%20inflation%20reduction%20act%20heres%20whats%20in%20it/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it_final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mobilized debt-financed subsidies</a> to “reshore” jobs to the American Rust Belt. “Bidenomics”, as it was called, attempted to lure back manufacturers in high-tech sectors by handing them taxpayer bungs. The results were mixed. Hundreds of billions were spent, but restive voters rewarded the Democrats by electing Donald Trump. The irony, of course, is that Trump has continued with the same “decoupling” strategy pursued by his predecessor, along the way hiding American industry behind a new and belligerent protectionism. That has now been hampered by the strength of the US constitution&#8217;s separation of powers, and a Supreme Court ruling that the President’s Liberation Day and subsequent tariffs are unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the idea that the UK, in this international context, could start a new industrial revolution simply by abandoning net zero targets is risible. Another latter-day Reformer Suella Bravermen <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/politics/suella-braverman-nigel-farage-socialist" target="_blank" rel="noopener">might want us to believe</a> she has undergone a Damascene conversion to Reform’s apparent “socialism” with a Faragist face, but Jenrick’s desire to <a href="https://x.com/realBenBloch/status/2024478285044789453" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demonstrate subservience</a> to the strictures of the OBR and its originator George Osborne precludes any radical rupture with decades of economic failure.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-2237851338.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain’s wage slaves are revolting</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, Labour’s positioning of net zero as a catalyst for industrial growth is equally a chimera — our expensive adoption of renewables is destroying the margins of what remains of heavy industry while propping up Scandinavian social democracy and Chinese developmentalism via the rapid import of Danish wind turbines and Chinese solar cells and electric vehicles. All of this while our reliance on Norwegian and US shale gas continues unabated. As with many of the thin promises of Starmerism, “securonomics” has never been translated from rhetoric to reality.</p>
<p>And so Britain remains buffeted by forces beyond its control, unwilling or unable to reassert itself. A genuine plan for national sovereignty would combine the dynamism of markets with the strategic direction that can only be provided by an agile, active state, one willing to do away with shibboleths that were built for a bygone world. In practice, yes, that means driving down energy costs as a matter of priority, but also supporting capital spending with unified fiscal and monetary policy. Primary budget surpluses would maintain market confidence while extra borrowing for long-term, pro-growth capital projects could be facilitated by a reformed Bank of England. The deep pools of capital in the nation’s pension pots could be re-domesticated and mobilized towards infrastructure and industrial investment.</p>
<p>This would be shadowed by other changes. For one thing, chancellors would set budgets that move us away from short-term cash transfers and, again, towards long-term investments. Welfare and pensions bills would be brought under control, moving from means-tested to contributory systems, while the tax revenue burden would shift away from work and patient, productive capital, and towards rent-seeking, unproductive assets, land, and real estate.</p>
<p>Core to this project would be an empowered executive, with a restoration of ministerial authority unencumbered by unaccountable bureaucracies, or an activist judiciary, and unafraid of disciplining and managing footloose capital to direct it towards strategic goals. The era of free movement of capital, labor, goods and services is giving way to one in which nations prosper with enforced capital controls, tariffs and an industrial policy that maintains a strictly <em>national economy</em>. Here, the success of the national payments system will be instructive. But resilience on other spheres should follow. The government last year intervened to rescue domestic steel-making capacity in Scunthorpe, and has since made noises about defense-industrial rejuvenation as a fulcrum for manufacturing revival. But signs that they can turn words and sentiment into concrete action are few; the future will belong to those states that act, that “just do things”, not those paralyzed by their own ideological quietism.</p>
<p>Nations, like Buffet’s investors, are truly tested when the tide goes out. It’s only now, in an age of tumult, that we discover that our embrace of hyper-globalization depended on geopolitical conditions that no longer exist. We bred over-dependency, and are now learning that true strategic autonomy is far harder to rebuild than it was to sell off to the highest bidder.</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-britain-gets-its-future-back/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1049498</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Trump’s factory revival is happening UK</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-factory-revival-is-happening/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-factory-revival-is-happening/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1135169078.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Industry</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Joel Kotkin]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/slack-imgs.com_.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>International</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The skilled workforce needs to catch up. Credit: Getty]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Joel Kotkin</strong> is a Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute, the University of Texas at Austin.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>joelkotkin</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute, the University of Texas at Austin.</p>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 23:17:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 04 Sep 2025 11:43:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized @us]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diverse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hard tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manufacturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=758862</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Tariffs are not enough]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Think what you will of President Trump’s </span><span style="font-weight: 400">chaotic-seeming </span><span style="font-weight: 400">tariff policies. The ostensible goal — the revitalization of US manufacturing — is of decisive importance for the success of the nation. Or put another way, America is unlikely to maintain global primacy with finance, services, and high-tech alone. All the capital, nice hotels, and mind-bending apps in the world can’t replace </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">factories</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. While tariffs may prove a good start toward this goal, they are hardly sufficient.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Tariffs are hardly a MAGA invention, of course. On the contrary, the United States has levied protective tariffs almost from its origins as a nation. Tariffs and import substitution formed one of the central pillars of Alexander Hamilton’s political economy. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Today, Europe screams about Trumpian tariffs, but the Continent has been reluctant to lower its own historically high protective barriers, most of them based on</span><a href="https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2025/07/23/restoring_americas_competitive_edge_1124374.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400">non-tariff regulatory policies</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. Canada, too, has been </span><a href="https://www.osler.com/en/insights/reports/2024-legal-outlook/the-burden-of-protectionism-outlook-for-canadian-trade/"><span style="font-weight: 400">very protectionist</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> and</span><a href="https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/history-canada-after-1867/protectionism"> <span style="font-weight: 400">for a long time</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. Now, after decades in which Washington put global integration over its own workers and industry, America is playing the same game. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The benefits of Trump’s tariffs will take time to become apparent. Already, they have spurred  companies like Eli Lilly to recommit to domestic production, forced Honda to scrap plans for shifting production of new models to Mexico in favor of Indiana, and prompted chipmaker</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">Taiwan Semiconductor and Samsung to build</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">new plants in Arizona and Texas, respectively.  Likewise, Nvidia, a company that long offshored its production to Taiwan, has committed to multibillion-dollar development projects. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Still, j</span><span style="font-weight: 400">ob recovery is gradual. US manufacturing revival has been a bipartisan goal, pursued in fits and starts, since the Great Recession. As the Reshoring Initiative</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> notes, the country has managed to claw back approximately 1.7 million jobs in an effort to bring manufacturing to or nearer the US homeland. This could just be the beginning. By some estimates, a</span><span style="font-weight: 400">s China rises up the value chain and production costs there increase, up to a third of all Chinese capacity will move away from the Middle Kingdom in the near future. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This shift gets an unintended boost from the </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/tech-companies-us-china-production-7e2b2b02"><span style="font-weight: 400">increasingly hostile atmosphere in China</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, which confronts even big, established firms like the appliance giant Whirlpool, General Electric,   Caterpillar, Goodyear, General Motors, and Polaris. Most recently, Chinese exports to America dropped to the lowest level since the pandemic, driving the trade deficit to $280 billion this year, down from $500 billion under President Joe Biden.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yet the road from here is by no means easy. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">One key concern is that firms will merely shift production from China to other third countries. This would be a plus in terms of weakening Beijing as a rival, but only domestic production in key industries can guarantee US economic preeminence and, with it, US geopolitical primacy.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-71152065.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why tech bros disdain humanity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Joel Kotkin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Like any trend that enriches some, reshoring faces strong opposition from those who benefit from the offshoring trend. You can start with the greens, whose anti-growth ideology and embrace of “net zero” are simply incompatible with industry-led economic growth. Their view boils down to letting the Chinese and their satraps do the dirty work, while America and the West purchase the products from the world’s No. 1 polluter. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Traditional liberals also find tariffs distasteful, as reflected in most of the business press: </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">The Wall Street Journal</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Financial Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">The Economist</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, and the like. Most of their </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/tariffs-mean-electoral-defeat-for-the-gop-american-history-republican-losses-ee637c44?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=ASWzDAjKGI8iUQQwyPq85-rEJecKxlMtkntUu09SxI3M1nDiinzPPJhyLna_nzR2MDU%3D&amp;gaa_ts=68a1fb02&amp;gaa_sig=WQxqYrFvrbKVRo_d7EhK3olfFPZ0wGG-bM5Sj0cVnNeRnLNAWPZxUhb3mSOS965N6T5kK3cQ0gtj1LDqEH-ASQ%3D%3D"><span style="font-weight: 400">favorite pundits</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> detest tariffs and focus on the ill effects on companies and consumers, while largely embracing the current trading regime, as long as financial markets thrive. </span><a href="https://mises.org/power-market/why-libertarians-loathe-tariffs"><span style="font-weight: 400">Libertarians</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, especially, rail against the very idea of having national policies to encourage manufacturers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Many mainstream Democrats naturally disdain industry, reflecting the prejudices of their party’s elite professional base. Factories, </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/factories-arent-the-future-manufacturing-jobs-protectionism-trade-9d573f8b"><span style="font-weight: 400">a Northwestern University economics professor claims</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, “aren’t the future,” and we can count on our service and tech economies to generate wealth. </span><a href="https://theweek.com/articles/478221/no-reason-favor-manufacturing"><span style="font-weight: 400">Christina Romer</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, who served as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Barack Obama, claimed concerns that building stuff was more important than getting haircuts reflected merely “sentiment and history,” not modern reality.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Then there’s the Democratic Party’s increasingly powerful socialist left — which along with many Silicon Valley oligarchs — prefer welfarism over growth and who have abandoned higher-wage jobs in energy, logistics, and manufacturing as a means to grow </span><span style="font-weight: 400">family incomes</span><span style="font-weight: 400">. Many embrace a  universal basic income as a means to palliate a populace made redundant by globalization — in effect, offering handouts, porn, and weed to the jobless children of a once-proud working class</span><span style="font-weight: 400">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Of course, China benefited the most from the status quo ante. Since its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2000, the People’s Republic has grown so much that it boasts as many factory exports as the United States, Japan, and Germany </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">combined</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In contrast, between 2004 and 2017, US reliance on Chinese inputs doubled, a barrage that, notes </span><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/growing-china-trade-deficits-costs-us-jobs/"><span style="font-weight: 400">an Economic Policy Institute study</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, cost as many </span><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/growing-china-trade-deficits-costs-us-jobs/"><span style="font-weight: 400">as 3.7 million jobs</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> since 2000. Europe’s industrial sector also declined, losing a million manufacturing jobs just between 2019 and 2023. Germany is projected to lose</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">as many 400,000 auto jobs by 2030 through competition with Chinese EVs. Britain, once the world’s industrial leader, has lost 200,000 manufacturing jobs since 2010 and is now only the world’s 12th largest manufacturing power.   </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Mass deindustrialization’s effects are not hard to see. Just travel to </span><a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/sociology/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2020.00054/full"><span style="font-weight: 400">northern England</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, the outer suburbs of </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/world/europe/france-olympics-paris-st-denis-poverty-immigrants.html#:~:text=The%20map%20locates%20Seine%2DSaint,off%20a%20debilitating%20downward%20spiral."><span style="font-weight: 400">Paris</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bearing-the-brunt-manufacturing-job-loss-in-the-great-lakes-region-1995-2005/"><span style="font-weight: 400">the American Midwest</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, or </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/rust-belt-on-the-rhine-the-deindustrialization-of-germany/"><span style="font-weight: 400">Germany</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">’s “Rust belt on the Rhine.” All these areas suffer reduced  economic mobility, high degrees of welfare dependence, and mass out-migration. For millions, the loss of such jobs has meant that, as </span><a href="https://news.mit.edu/2020/urban-job-escalator-stopped-0708"><span style="font-weight: 400">an MIT report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> put it, the traditional “job escalator” has shut down.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The digital revolution, and the creation of mega-companies in places like Silicon Valley has done little to make up the difference in terms of productivity or social mobility. Nor can services by themselves solve deep-seated social or trade woes. Overall US service exports, including those that go to tech firms, </span><a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions#:~:text=Services%20Exports&amp;text=U.S.%20exports%20of%20services%20account,overall%20U.S.%20exports%20in%202022."><span style="font-weight: 400">represents less than a third</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of the country’s overseas sales.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Needless to say, Chinese manufacturing supremacy under the former neoliberal regime also threatened to bring about Chinese defense and geopolitical supremacy. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But here, too, a reversal is underway, with new signs of life in the US defense industry. This comes not from the corporate dinosaurs, but a whole wave of new companies. “Innovation starts in the small shops,” notes the Dallas-based venture capitalist Bryan Chambers. Upstart “defense-tech” firms are feeding off a </span><a href="https://natsec100.org/"><span style="font-weight: 400">huge surge</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in investment, including the Army’s current $36 billion procurement overhaul.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left"> « All the capital, beautiful hotels, and mind-blowing apps in the world can&#8217;t replace factories. »</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Some of these companies, like Denver’s Palantir and Orange County-based Anduril have seized on a change in military affairs resulting from </span><a href="https://unherd-wpml-test.go-vip.net/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/"><span style="font-weight: 400">experiences with drone and missile attacks</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">Palestine, Yemen, Russia, and Ukraine. Equally important, we now see a shift among entrepreneurs toward </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/from-killer-drones-to-robotaxis-sci-fi-dreams-are-coming-to-life-ac30fe26?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=ASWzDAjiuyTRQh2_cZMJ7bX5bOcOWcivioN7FABo7UE_Tl-7RbXz_lzak0xTYlJBSGI%3D&amp;gaa_ts=68a1fe68&amp;gaa_sig=7nVuwdzJW0Uw6vTVJDiEH26UxiL3ML8LBV9_iU3r9UUjHPh_9JWZxZGxwrQRbd6A7mw0XwkzUac00McNlHnNbQ%3D%3D"><span style="font-weight: 400">“hard tech,”</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> essentially AI-assisted hardware, as the best bets for the future.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Likely, the bulk of America’s reindustrialization won’t take place in blue areas like California, due to their high taxes, prohibitive regulations, and high housing prices. </span><a href="https://www.nist.gov/blogs/manufacturing-innovation-blog/where-manufacturing-growing-and-where-it-not"><span style="font-weight: 400">The fastest industrial GDP growth</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> is taking place in Texas, Michigan, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arizona, Ohio, Minnesota, and North Dakota. These are also the states that, according to </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Supply Chain Digest, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">offer the best conditions for manufacturers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">If the industrial boom gains velocity, it could mark a massive reversal of fortune </span><span style="font-weight: 400">not only for the newly industrializing South, but </span><span style="font-weight: 400">especially for the Midwest,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">a region that, </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/bearing-the-brunt-manufacturing-job-loss-in-the-great-lakes-region-1995-2005/"><span style="font-weight: 400">between 2000 and 2005</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, accounted for nearly 40 percent of all US industrial job losses. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Contributing to the production comeback is the renaissance of the US fossil-fuel industry, now producing at </span><a href="https://committeetounleashprosperity.com/hotlines/america-producing-record-amounts-of-oil-and-gas/"><span style="font-weight: 400">a record level</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. The Permian Basin in west Texas, which by itself is the world’s fifth largest producer of oil, and new production sites in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania provide a critical raw material, cheap energy, for reindustrialization. For example, Shell in 2022 installed a $6 billion methane cracker in Monaca, Pa., to convert the region’s abundant natural gas into plastics.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Antoine </span><span style="font-weight: 400">van Agtmael and Fred Bakker, authors of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">The Smartest Places on Earth: Why Rustbelts are the Emerging Hotspots of Global Innovation, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">see the old industrial belt as the primary beneficiary of a growing interface between manufacturing and technology. Self-driving cars, wearable devices, smart grids, and smart farming </span><span style="font-weight: 400">all benefit from harvesting </span><span style="font-weight: 400">a legacy of industrial expertise. For example, Akron, Ohio, successfully reinvented itself from an auto and tire center to a hotbed for polymer research.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> Other parts of the heartland seem poised to do the same.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Tariffs alone will not bring industry back. After all, Europe and Canada have extensive tariff regimes but continue to lose industrial market share. A concerted drive to reshore requires basic preconditions: the use of new technologies and a better-trained workforce.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">New </span><span style="font-weight: 400">technology and the spread of affordable digital manufacturing tools like 3-D printers enable domestic firms to design, produce, and sell locally, reducing reliance </span><a href="https://fabfoundation.org/global-community/"><span style="font-weight: 400">on long supply chains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">.  </span><span style="font-weight: 400">These technologies allow American firms to produce </span><span style="font-weight: 400">better and often cheaper</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> products. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">In many of these dimensions, the United States is leading or regaining the edge.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-71152065.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why tech bros disdain humanity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-tech-bros-disdain-humanity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Finding competent workers will likely prove a more uphill battle. President Joe Biden talked about having factory workers and oil riggers “learn to code” but now artificial intelligence, backed by a </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/tech-ai-spending-company-valuations-7b92104b?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=ASWzDAj69pYY1_wLYLL5GX8XKPn9UIki6_gwILPyl8M4ZzDjndkIWavyiE2qLU36VGw%3D&amp;gaa_ts=689f4aad&amp;gaa_sig=bbwN3zJiLw72pNfayPJeyf3KHo-kS7wOP8FiC255CTrmVejoK1Wg2T6TfceDPHuCtOagI07hkkYa-5vy1SlBfA%3D%3D"><span style="font-weight: 400">huge infusion of Wall Street cash</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, threatens to wipe out many software jobs. But there is a most pressing need for skilled, dependable workers such as drivers, machine-tool operators, and welders who can do basic industrial tasks. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">The American Welding Society estimates the shortage of skilled welders exceeds 400,000 nationwide.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Pushing all students into four-year programs is one source of the crisis. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">Schools made a terrible mistake by no longer offering shop classes. Few were encouraged to learn industrial arts. Now </span><span style="font-weight: 400">many of the most competent industrial workers are over age 45.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Fortunately, an incipient sea change is slowly lowering the age of skilled workers. Shop classes are making something of a comeback, and some states are investing more in skills education, something that engages less than </span><a href="https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2025/07/23/restoring_americas_competitive_edge_1124374.html"><span style="font-weight: 400">half as many US workers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than in Germany.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> Much of this is occurring in </span><a href="https://www.areadevelopment.com/Top-States-for-Doing-Business/Q3-2023/2023-top-states-workforce-development-programs.shtml"><span style="font-weight: 400">red states</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in the Midwest and South. One US senator, Tom Cotton of Arkansas, has even suggested taxing ultra-rich universities, once favored for their production of elite professionals, and using the proceeds to fund an expanded apprenticeship program.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Attitudes are changing. O</span><span style="font-weight: 400">ne </span><a href="https://press.thumbtack.com/announcements/new-report-from-thumbtack-examines-forces-behind-skilled-trade-labor-shortage-offering-optimistic-outlook-for-the-future/"><span style="font-weight: 400">recent survey</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> found that roughly </span><span style="font-weight: 400">83% of Gen Z feel that learning a skilled trade can be a better pathway to economic security than college. That includes 90% of those already holding college degrees. Indeed, as </span><span style="font-weight: 400">college enrollment dropped between 2020 and 2023, </span><a href="https://universitybusiness.com/trade-schools-are-in-a-growth-phase-can-it-last/#:~:text=Enrollment%20in%20trade%20schools%20has,to%202023%20grew%20by%2010.5%25"><span style="font-weight: 400">trade schools</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> grew by 10 percent.    </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">To a large extent, these shortages will likely be filled by working-class whites, but also increasingly immigrants and minorities. Today, barely 58% of all working-class Americans are non-Hispanic whites; according to a 2016 Economic Policy Institute study, people of color will constitute the majority of the working class by 2032.     </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Even in the rural Midwest, long plagued by shrinking workforces, refugees from places like Bhutan and East Africa have become a critical source of workers. In Fargo, ND, employers routinely call resettlement director </span><a href="https://www.inforum.com/business/a-dream-to-be-here-former-refugees-fill-gaps-for-fargo-employers-during-labor-shortage"><span style="font-weight: 400">Dan Hannaher</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> to inquire about new families moving to the region. Seventy percent of one local manufacturer’s staff is composed of first-or second-generation </span><span style="font-weight: 400">workers from immigrant families,</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> hailing from more than 30 countries.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">In Texas, according to a number of recent studies, as many as half of all manufacturing workers are foreign-born.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The challenge facing these companies will be to turn these newcomers, and the increasingly detached native-born working class, into effective workers, able to employ the new technologies. Today, the West needs these companies, and workers, to be well-compensated, restoring upward mobility as well as productive growth. These people will prove far more critical to the future of the West than social-media influencers or Wall Street wizards. In the 21st century, reindustrialization offers the best hope for economic renewal and revival of a real social democracy.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-factory-revival-is-happening/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">758862</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Tariffs will awaken the American Dream</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/04/tariffs-will-awaken-the-american-dream/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/04/tariffs-will-awaken-the-american-dream/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-1463832.jpg?w=537</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Reshoring</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Firing the imagination. David McNew/Getty Images.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2025 23:01:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 08 Apr 2025 08:43:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reshoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=668203</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Trump must ignore the lords of Martha's Vineyard]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>For decades, the United States provided an almost unlimited market for exporters. That allowed countries large and small to turn their populations from marginally productive farmers, struggling in overcrowded villages, towards low-tech industries making clothes, shoes and other consumer goods. At that stage, poor people worldwide became wealthier because the American market was wide open, with the American ruling elite of both parties uncritically devoted to free trade.</p>
<p>How did the US pay for that first wave of cheap low-tech imports? Partly with earnings from American agricultural exports, as well as some irresistible consumer products such as Coca Cola and cigarettes. Increasingly, though, America paid for its Adidas by selling Treasury bonds, eagerly bought by up exporters. That, in turn, drove up the dollar, and made foreign wares even more competitive.</p>
<p>But this model came with a downside. In the US, producers of low-tech and craft products started going out of business, even as the newly unemployed were encouraged to abandon hard industrial jobs for splendid new positions in the services sector. Go into foreign-exchange trading, they were told, whose winnings could earn you more money in a day than a lifetime spent turning out garden tools — which now anyway arrived more cheaply from overseas.</p>
<p>In speeches, articles and lectures, the country’s elite hailed the passing of our grim industrial economy, instead looking forward to a future where everyone could be a marketing consultant or a financial adviser.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1245740406.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How rearmament can make us rich</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was only small-minded people, fixated on the hourly-wage data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who noticed that industrial workers who made $30 an hour working on assembly lines did not in fact become foreign-exchange traders earning $3,000 an hour. When their competition-hit factories shut down, rather, they were much more likely to turn up as shopping mall security guards paid a pittance.</p>
<p>As far back as 1993, I myself published a book called <em>The Endangered American Dream</em>, in which I tested the claim that the replacement of the industrial economy by the service economy was a Good Thing. In the event, I found that it was only a Good Thing for South Korea, Taiwan, the lower end of the Japanese economy and the poorest European regions. All these places kept out foreign — including US — imports while exporting vigorously to the US. Stateside, where lower-tech industries were collapsing, the American heartland suffered too.</p>
<p>Fentanyl had yet to arrive. But in those towns, fathers could no longer provide a dignified life for their children, heading off with their lunchpails to work in the factory down the street. Instead, they counted themselves lucky if they could get a job at Walmart, at much lower pay, and selling cheaper imported versions of what they once made themselves.</p>
<p>My book included a warning that social breakdown would open the way for some form of product-improved fascism in the US. But reviewers failed to notice that, as they contemptuously slammed my protectionist idiocy, daring as I had to question the secular religion of the ruling elite: unlimited free trade that would make the whole world richer. That is true, but globalization also made American industrial workers poorer, certainly too poor to send their children to college, at a stroke destroying the American Dream that was.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Globalization made American industrial workers poorer, destroying the American Dream that was.&#8221;</div>
<p>Worse was to follow. Instead of prudent and limited protectionism — replacing industrial collapse across the US with a much slower transition, providing enough time to upskill at least the sons of industrial workers — Bill Clinton and the Davos free trade consensus opened the US to unlimited imports from North America. That was a great blessing for local industry, and the foreign companies from all over the world that started producing in Mexico, which then trucked their products across the Rio Grande without any limits.</p>
<p>Nobody in the US elite noticed that every other industrial country impeded US industrial imports, either via arbitrary regulatory hurdles or even outright conspiracy. Consider South Korea. The government finally removed its de facto prohibition of US car imports (rich Koreans loved utterly impractical Cadillacs), only to ensure that General Motors would not be able to rent a showroom anywhere in Seoul. Traitorous landlords tempted to offer their space were threatened with harsh retaliation: by the very same officials who had smilingly signed the auto free trade agreement with the US. South Korea, of course, is a country that enjoys the protection of US troops until today.</p>
<p>Then, China&#8217;s industrialization accelerated. That carried the country from Mao&#8217;s deep misery — which I experienced first-hand in 1976, when the whole of Beijing smelled like an open sewer — to great prosperity. Once again, this wealth was largely built on industrial and craft exports to the US, whose market was totally open to China, even as China&#8217;s market was largely closed to US exporters. Some of these barriers have since come down, but the process is not complete even now.</p>
<p>It was Chinese imports that finally drove most US factories out of business, taking much of our remaining industrial base with them. Increasing quality at a steady clip, while constantly expanding capacity, Chinese industrialists were also helped by continued purchases of US dollar bonds. Artificially pushing up the greenback, this again made Chinese imports even cheaper.</p>
<p>Why balk at China&#8217;s generosity in offering 97-piece toolsets that can be picked up for a few bucks at Walmart? No reason at all — if Americans are only viewed as consumers. But while the entire US elite celebrated free trade, an astonishing number of Americans lost the last of the good jobs that upheld families, towns and cities.</p>
<p>Trump&#8217;s tariff plan is simple: impede free trade so that surviving industrial and craft enterprises can survive, while other firms both old and new are re-launched with better technology, allowing them to become global exporters while still paying good wages. True, global wealth is favored by unlimited free trade. But, in the process, lower-income workers in developed countries are impoverished, even as higher income people everywhere get wealthier. While Clinton, the Bushes, and the lord of Martha’s Vineyard Obama supported free trade, as did the wealthy elite they hang out with, Trump is keen to reward his lower income supporters. Unsurprisingly, the <em>Wall Street Journal </em>and the <em>Financial Times </em>are outraged.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/trumps-epic-second-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/trumps-epic-second-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2182985530-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/trumps-epic-second-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/trumps-epic-second-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Trump learnt from his mistakes?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/trumps-epic-second-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And then there is another thing. It turns out that without a civilian shipbuilding industry, the US Navy can only make hugely expensive prototypes, not the 200 warships we need. The same is true of other sectors, including civilian aviation: Boeing is currently years late in delivering tankers to US and allied air forces (the Israelis must rely on 65-year-old converted airliners), and also terribly behind in fulfilling orders for commercial airlines around the world. Why? Because of the collapse of those machine shops, which trained skilled workers, and which ensured they could walk into any Boeing factory at a pinch.</p>
<p>As for the labor supply, cutting gigantic Federal gifts to rich universities — which turn out unlimited numbers of sociologists and sexologists, and who often end up working for the government in some capacity — will give us more workers, and perhaps some more plumbers too.</p>
<p>All of the above is more than enough to justify today’s temporary global turmoil, but there is one more consideration too. Unless the US industrial economy is vigorously rebuilt, the US armed forces will have to import their vehicles and weapons. From where? Likely China, so good luck with that.</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2025/04/tariffs-will-awaken-the-american-dream/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">668203</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>American industry must rise again</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/11/american-industry-must-rise-again/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/11/american-industry-must-rise-again/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2092452373.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Julius Krein]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The US needs an industrial policy. Jeff Swensen/Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Julius Krein is the editor of <em><a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/">American Affairs</a></em></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>JuliusKrein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Julius Krein is the editor of <em><a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/">American Affairs</a></em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 02 Nov 2024 00:10:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 04 Nov 2024 11:21:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Austerity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neoliberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=631099</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The US has squandered its Cold War victory ]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>Austerity is rarely popular during election season, and already this campaign has featured a variety of budget-straining proposals. Donald Trump has called for exempting tips from taxation, which Kamala Harris subsequently endorsed. J.D. Vance has suggested increasing the child tax credit to $5,000; Harris later upped her bid to $6,000. The current vice president has also proposed $25,000 in down payment assistance for first-time homebuyers, while Trump has promised to make Social Security benefits and overtime pay tax free. The list will probably continue to grow.</p>
<p>But despite these promises, Americans are likely in for a period of consumer austerity no matter who wins the election. The only question is what form this austerity will take.</p>
<p>In somewhat simplified terms, the fundamental policy choice is between conventional or “neoliberal” austerity, progressive-environmental austerity, and what might be called “catch-up reindustrialisation” — a policy shift in favour of investment over consumption to rebuild the US industrial base and shore up America’s long-term security and economic prospects, particularly vis-à-vis China. In my view, the third option is both the necessary and most desirable choice, yet all three present their own difficulties and complications. The fact that all these choices involve some level of austerity doubtless contributes to the increasing bitterness of American politics.</p>
<p>Let’s start by considering neoliberal austerity. Conventional budgetary concerns have resurfaced with the inflation spikes of recent years and interest rates still near their highest levels since 2008. In the past, deficits significantly above 3% of GDP were only experienced during major economic downturns or in wartime. In 2023, however, the United States ran a roughly 6% deficit with a relatively low unemployment rate of around 4%. While paranoia about the US national debt has always proved baseless in the modern era, the limits of the present trajectory are becoming more visible, as interest payments take up greater and greater percentages of government spending.</p>
<p>The question for deficit hawks — today and in the past — is whether they are in fact primarily concerned with reducing the deficit. In America, this pose is often, if not typically, disingenuous — rhetorical cover for an ideological project of shrinking the state rather than responsibly balancing revenues with expenditures. Hence the most strident deficit hawks are almost invariably the most eager tax cutters. Or, perhaps more accurately, the most aggressive tax cutters often masquerade as deficit hawks but have little real interest in responsible fiscal policy.</p>
<p>Today, with federal tax rates at low levels, any serious deficit reduction programme would have to consider tax increases. The rates themselves may not even be the key issue: taxing corporate profits in the country where they are earned, or closing various personal loopholes, may have a greater impact at this point. But these items are largely excluded from the “deficit” agenda, especially among Republicans, who continue to indulge in fantasies that tax cuts will “pay for themselves”, despite the manifest failure of the Bush and Trump tax cuts to generate meaningful growth.</p>
<p>Instead, the conservative focus remains entirely on cutting spending. The problem here is that, within the realm of political plausibility, there is not all that much to cut. According to the most recent numbers from the Congressional Budget Office, “<a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59728" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mandatory spending</a>” (mostly Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) accounted for $3.8 trillion of the $6.1 trillion 2023 federal budget. Defence spending added another $800 billion, constituting almost half of “<a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59729" target="_blank" rel="noopener">discretionary spending</a>”. Interest costs were an additional $700 billion, contributing to a total deficit of $1.7 trillion. The bottom line is that, even if all $900 billion of non-defence discretionary spending were miraculously cut — zeroing out transportation, education, veterans’ benefits, the justice system, and scientific research — that would only reduce the deficit by about half. Significant deficit reduction must therefore involve cuts to the most politically sensitive areas: defence and entitlements.</p>
<p>Given China’s emergence as a <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2024/08/china-is-winning-now-what/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">peer competitor</a> — and one with a massive industrial-base advantage — cutting defence appears to be off the table. On the contrary, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, has <a href="https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2024/5/senator-wicker-unveils-major-defense-investment-plan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed</a> increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP, up from the current level of 3%. The reasons are clear: China <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noopener">built</a> 21 submarines last year, while the United States <a href="https://news.bgov.com/bloomberg-government-news/lagging-industry-base-crimps-congress-bid-for-more-attack-subs?utm_source=Daily%20on%20Defense%20%2806062024%29_06%2F06%2F2024&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=WEX_Daily%20on%20Defense&amp;rid=24899895&amp;env=ab58cea04a63d6bf88463dd72ccd81c76fc1bae71c677fe00b1a18dce25c6d63" target="_blank" rel="noopener">struggled</a> to build one; it will take up to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seven years</a> to replenish certain munitions stocks used in Ukraine, and analysts <a href="https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20results%20of,capacity%20for%20a%20major%20war." target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimate</a> that the United States would be out of some critical weapons within a week in any active conflict over Taiwan. One reason the US Navy has not been able to better protect Middle Eastern shipping lanes from recent Houthi attacks is a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-09-06/houthi-ship-attacks-america-is-losing-the-battle-of-the-red-sea?sref=cD53rqQH" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concern</a> that the increased use of certain munitions there would compromise readiness for other potential conflicts.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;China built 21 submarines last year, while the United States struggled to build one.&#8221;</div>
<p>Simply throwing more money at the Pentagon and incumbent defence contractors will not solve these problems: serious procurement reforms and broader industrial policy measures are necessary. And yet there is little doubt that America’s security situation is more perilous than it has been for generations. Legacy ideological commitments further complicate these issues. The most aggressive “deficit hawks” — such as Nikki Haley in the Republican Party or various centrist Democrats — also tend to be the most fervent supporters of interventions in Ukraine and elsewhere to uphold a “US-led liberal international order”. Although Haley and others typically prefer to imagine that foreign policy and economic policy are distinct domains, their interventionist commitments nevertheless preclude any significant cuts to defence spending.</p>
<p>That leaves Social Security and Medicare. Cutting Social Security is so politically toxic that Trump has completely distanced himself from the proposals of George W. Bush and Paul Ryan, once hallmarks of conservative economic policy. Republican congressional leadership also notably refused to endorse entitlement cuts in the last midterm elections. Even if Social Security cuts were politically viable, however, there has been little serious effort to think through the effects.</p>
<p>Significant cuts would mean workers would have to defer their own consumption, either to save more for their own retirement or to keep their elderly parents out of poverty, creating a drag on growth and complicating deficit reduction efforts. Although Social Security is structured as social insurance rather than welfare, the benefit formulas are somewhat redistributive, so major cuts would probably result in a further shift of wealth from lower-income people, with a high propensity to spend, to affluent savers, with a lower propensity to spend.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-university-monopoly-must-be-broken/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-university-monopoly-must-be-broken/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-1240711233-e1709909246183.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-university-monopoly-must-be-broken/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-university-monopoly-must-be-broken/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The university monopoly must be broken</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-university-monopoly-must-be-broken/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Julius Krein </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the past, advocates of “privatising” Social Security sometimes argued that allowing individuals to manage their own retirement savings would enable higher returns and boost growth. But the Social Security programme functions less as a professionally managed pool of capital, like the public pension funds common in many other countries or in US states, and more like debt-funded consumption stimulus. Eliminating Social Security, therefore, is not simply a matter of distributing a pool of assets to individual accounts. Furthermore, if the goal were simply to maximise returns, the Social Security “trust funds” could be authorised to make public and private investments beyond US Treasury securities. But the same small-government ideology that calls for cutting Social Security also resists giving the government the authority to make such investments, which could distort “market signals”. Devolving all responsibility to individuals, on the other hand, would magnify the impact of market volatility for each household and likely require further increasing savings. At the same time, the government would probably still be called upon to bail out retirees — whether they saved prudently or not — during major stock market crashes.</p>
<p>A more practical approach might aim to maximise the value derived from the existing programme rather than cutting it. Senator Vance was roundly criticised for saying that more should be done to enlist grandparents to assist with childcare. Yet there are a number of serious <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2023/11/the-iron-triangle-of-family-policy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposals</a> to use Social Security to incentivise childcare or otherwise better support the sharing of resources within extended families.</p>
<p>The other major area perpetually on the chopping block is health care. This would appear to be more fertile ground: the United States spends 17–18% of GDP on health care, by far the most in the world, to achieve overall public health outcomes that are decidedly mediocre. Spending on health care programmes composes about a quarter of the federal budget. Surely, the system could be more efficient?</p>
<p>The problem, once again, is that ideological motivations are at odds with practical solutions. Those most eager to cut health care spending tend to be those most committed to “market fundamentalist” ideology, who tend to ignore the possibility that increasing state intervention might be necessary to control costs. But marketisation, in practice, has generally failed to control costs and, in theory, there is little reason to expect that it should. As the economist Kenneth Arrow demonstrated back in 1963, normal market dynamics do not apply to critical aspects of health care. Ordinary competitive and pricing dynamics are often absent, and the sector is characterised by deep information asymmetries and network effects.</p>
<p>The irony is that even practical incremental steps to reduce health care costs, such as government negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies or hospital monopolies, or better regulating parasitic middlemen such as “pharmacy benefit managers” (PBMs), are generally resisted by the same people who claim to be most concerned about reining in spending. As a result, “marketisation” in the US context has simply meant a refusal to employ the state to control costs, contributing to a cycle of expanding subsidisation.</p>
<p>In sum, the concerns of deficit hawks are real enough when it comes to health care, Social Security and defence, but the politics around these concerns remain insincere and ineffective.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The concerns of deficit hawks are real enough, but the politics around these concerns remain insincere and ineffective.&#8221;</div>
<p>A similar pattern prevails in progressive environmentalism, another sphere in which legitimate concerns have been pressed into the service of a counterproductive politics. In the United States, unlike in Europe, true “de-growth” austerity has become so discredited that most politicians have run away from it, though the impulse still exists among many NGOs and activists. Yet even if American progressives, for the most part, are not looking to shut down modern agriculture, discourage having children, or revert to hand-washing their laundry to stop climate change, they are eager to restrict consumer choices and divert public resources to promote renewable energy and electric vehicles. The Inflation Reduction Act, which includes most of the climate-related subsidies passed during the Biden administration, is estimated to cost somewhere between $800 billion to $1.2 trillion over 10 years. The actual cost is unknown, because some of the IRA’s tax credits are uncapped and theoretically unlimited — but the “energy transition” is certainly expensive.</p>
<p>The necessity of such costly carbon reduction efforts is often presented as beyond ordinary politics — only pathologically greedy science-deniers would oppose taking action to avert a global climate emergency! Yet while environmental concerns are seemingly universal, the environmental movement remains deeply partisan. There is no getting around the fact that climate activists frequently demand sacrifices from ordinary people while ignoring the behaviours of ultra-wealthy donors and displaying clear sectoral biases. The farmer, the coal miner, the exurbanite, and so on are all called upon to make difficult adjustments to meet various arbitrary emissions targets. But the billionaires who shuttle between multiple estates on private jets are never expected to change their lifestyles to save the planet, except perhaps to donate to the climate NGO complex. Wind and solar fields are supposedly essential — but not within sight of Nantucket. Fossil fuel companies are demonised, but tech giants whose server farms consume more and more energy are largely exempt from such criticism, as long as they make the right noises on ESG. Likewise, the environmental movement has fought to impose more and more regulatory burdens on manufacturing and heavy industry, all while turning a blind eye toward pollution offshoring to China and elsewhere.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Climate activists frequently demand sacrifices from ordinary people while ignoring the behaviours of ultra-wealthy donors.&#8221;</div>
<p>In fact, the history of the American environmental movement and its political alliances is rather sordid. In its earliest days, environmentalism was associated with population control and even <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2020/07/22/liberal-progressive-racist-sierra-club-faces-its-white-supremacist-history/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">eugenics</a>. After rebranding as an emissions control movement in the second half of the 20th century, environmental groups first teamed up with <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2022/05/who-killed-nuclear-energy-and-how-to-revive-it/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coal</a> and utility deregulators against nuclear power. Then they took money from natural gas and <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2023/02/enron-after-all-a-history-of-our-broken-energy-paradigm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Enron</a> for campaigns against coal. Recent years have seen a turn against all fossil fuels, though nuclear has once again been grudgingly readmitted to the decarbonisation push. Ironically, the most significant opponents to new renewable energy construction are often legacy environmental groups, who helped construct a legal regime in which it is relatively easy for third parties to challenge any new energy installations on environmental grounds. This is one reason why far more solar fields have been built in red states like Texas compared to ultra-progressive states like California.</p>
<p>Beneath all the moral preening, then, the green movement is fundamentally just another interest group pursuing a relatively narrow, partisan agenda. It is, and always has been, primarily composed of affluent and professional-class individuals in “asset-light” corporate sectors, as well as opportunistic energy players. In many ways, it is the ultimate neoliberal coalition: a global, post-political orientation, overseen by technocrats operating through nondemocratic transnational organisations and financial markets.</p>
<p>To be sure, the fact that the environmental movement is a self-interested lobby does not necessarily mean that its core claims are false, even if some activists have engaged in alarmism and exaggeration in the past. Indeed, the absence of effective environmental policy is already imposing its own form of austerity, as seen in rising home insurance prices across the United States, to which climate change is almost certainly a contributor. Yet being right about some things does not make the environmental movement any less of a lobby.</p>
<p>Oddly, the green movement would probably have more success in the United States if it simply accepted its corporate-lobby character. Certainly, a movement that focused less on moral preening and NGO fundraising probably would not have made the mistake of trying to pursue decarbonisation while demonising nuclear energy for decades. It also might be more practical about encouraging the transition to clean energy and electric vehicles.</p>
<p>The current push into EVs, based on a combination of tax subsidies and state-level mandates, is already sputtering. Sales growth has slowed dramatically, and auto companies have shelved plans for new models. A more serious approach would recognise that the United States — unlike, say, Norway — is a large country with a weak rail network; people regularly drive long distances; and combustion vehicles’ rapid refuelling remains a significant advantage. At the same time, the United States — unlike, say, China — has little capacity to enforce top-down changes in consumer preferences and infrastructure construction. Two years after Congress appropriated billions for charging stations, not a single one has been <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/05/congress-ev-chargers-billions-00129996" target="_blank" rel="noopener">built</a>. A more practical agenda would have emphasised vehicles such as plug-in hybrids, which could have a major impact on emissions and would create incentives for the private sector to add more charging stations, while also appealing to consumers who desire flexibility. Such thinking, however, would require the green movement to abandon the pretence of moral purity and accept the compromises and coalitional balancing of any industry lobby.</p>
<p>The more likely outcome is the continuation of the status quo, in which lavishly funded NGOs persist in their attempts to push badly designed policy on a reluctant populace. Whereas neoliberal austerity is essentially an ideological movement trying to appropriate the rhetoric of economic interest, progressive environmentalism is a class- and sector-based lobby seeking to brand itself as a moral-ideological cause. Both will remain ineffective as long as they continue to labour under these self-delusions.</p>
<p>The third option is, for lack of a better name, catch-up reindustrialisation. As with environmental “austerity”, this does not involve conventional budgetary austerity — it may in fact require more public spending — but it does entail a shift away from maximising consumption and towards increasing investment in productive capacity. Trade measures such as tariffs intentionally raise prices, at least in the immediate term, while funding for industrial policies may come at the expense of other budget priorities.</p>
<p>The need for a serious industrial policy programme has become more pressing for various reasons. The first is national security. As discussed above, America’s defence industrial base has eroded considerably. By contrast, China’s manufacturing advantage is overwhelming, which has created supply-chain dependencies in a number of critical commercial areas as well. Surrendering sectors to foreign competitors often entails losing more than “commodity manufacturing”; it also means losing technological prowess and workforce skills. The United States need not look to dominate every manufacturing sector, but it will be impossible to fix the defence industrial base without improving the broader industrial base.</p>
<p>In addition, it is slowly dawning on American politicians that it is impossible to avoid having an industrial policy; the only question is whether to pursue one’s own, or to accept the imposition of someone else’s. China, in particular, by massively subsidising capital investment and export industries, has disadvantaged and discouraged investment in manufacturing and capital-intensive sectors in the United States. And by refusing to intervene, the United States has simply allowed Beijing to pick winners and losers.</p>
<p>Moreover, the fact is that, even without a self-conscious industrial policy, the US government has had to subsidise fallen national champions such as Boeing in recent decades. What has been missing is a serious plan to maximise the effectiveness of these investments, in large part because the post–Cold War neoliberal consensus precluded any open consideration of industrial policy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-hollywood-liberals-who-rule-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-hollywood-liberals-who-rule-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2167066330-e1724341237608.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-hollywood-liberals-who-rule-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-hollywood-liberals-who-rule-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Hollywood liberals who rule America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-hollywood-liberals-who-rule-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Frederick Kaufman</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>According to this conventional economic theory, industrial policy will always be inefficient, value-destructive, and a drag on growth because it interferes with market-driven capital allocation. If private-sector actors require government support or prodding to make an investment, the theory goes, then it must be a poor investment, even if necessary for non-economic reasons such as defence. These models assume, however, a form of economic rationality in which firms operate to maximise profits. In reality, firms operate to maximise shareholder value. The two may occasionally overlap, but they are <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2024/02/how-economic-theory-went-wrong/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not the same</a>. As a result, firms often maintain hurdle rates well in <a href="https://www.rubio.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/_cache/files/9f25139a-6039-465a-9cf1-feb5567aebb7/4526E9620A9A7DB74267ABEA5881022F.5.15.2019.-final-project-report-american-investment.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">excess</a> of their cost of capital, and pursue financial engineering strategies instead of investment. This behaviour may be irrational in the sense of forgoing profits, but it is often eminently rational in the sense of maximising equity valuation. The net result, from a national perspective, is chronic underinvestment, particularly in capital-intensive sectors where foreign industrial policies drive down returns. This is one reason why the relationship between financial returns and productivity breakthroughs has always been more tenuous than standard models would predict, and why industrial policy can spur economic development by dislodging financial rentierism.</p>
<p>Government investment promotion, therefore, is not necessarily value-destructive. It may in fact enable investments whose returns, while below private sector hurdle rates, are still positive. These investments, in turn, can form the basis of new companies, technologies, and industries, as the many historical examples of successful industrial policies attest, from Korean autos to Taiwanese semiconductors to early Silicon Valley.</p>
<p>From this perspective, successful industrial policy is perhaps best thought of not simply as consumer austerity but rather as “deferred gratification”, or investment in the future. Notably, the Chinese government has actively suppressed domestic consumption in favour of industrial investment throughout the last several decades, and yet, contra Western economic orthodoxy, has presided over a miraculous rise in living standards, in addition to its growing geo-economic power.</p>
<p>That is not to say, however, that the path forward for the United States will be easy. On the contrary, American industrial policy faces a number of obstacles and complications. First, US government agencies have relatively little expertise in designing and executing industrial strategy, certainly when compared to their Asian counterparts. The US government itself is poorly <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/its-economic-strategy-stupid/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">structured</a> for this end, with limited institutional capacity to integrate foreign policy and economic policy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/why-kamalas-glock-is-a-powerful-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/why-kamalas-glock-is-a-powerful-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2170787168.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/why-kamalas-glock-is-a-powerful-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/why-kamalas-glock-is-a-powerful-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Kamala&#039;s gun is a powerful weapon</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/why-kamalas-glock-is-a-powerful-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lee Siegel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Second, advocates of US industrial policy often have diverging goals in mind. Some focus on the defence industrial base, others on the “energy transition”, others on “creating jobs”. In a Venn diagram, these circles would intersect, but they are not identical. Such diffuse ambitions may impede both the passage and implementation of successful industrial strategy, as previous criticisms of “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/opinion/democrats-liberalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">everything bagel</a>” industrial policy have shown.</p>
<p>Third, the largest corporate and financial actors in the US are at best ambivalent about industrial strategy. They are deeply dependent on China, and are also prime beneficiaries of the “<a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/08/corporate-profit-strategies-and-u-s-economic-stagnation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fissured economy</a>” model in which intellectual property rents are separated from capital investment and labour. Furthermore, policies like the Chips Act passed in large part due to the support of incumbent industry lobbies, though policy design <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2022/08/where-the-chips-fell/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suffered</a> in various ways as a result. It remains to be seen whether the United States can pursue industrial policy in critical areas that, unlike semiconductors, do not have powerful incumbent lobbies.</p>
<p>Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a critical ingredient present in the canonical East Asian industrial policy success stories is absent in the United States. Namely, the “Asian Tigers” each used global export markets, particularly the US market, as a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Asia-Works-Joe-Studwell/dp/0802121322" target="_blank" rel="noopener">competition check</a>: companies that increased export share received more industrial policy support; those that did not were cut off. Without the export-market check, there is an increased temptation to subsidise “zombies”, rather than orient industrial policy investments toward improving productivity and competitiveness. US industrial strategy, therefore, may need to place greater emphasis on stimulating domestic competition. Another option involves using government procurement and investment to create milestone-based contests. In <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/05/inside-operation-warp-speed-a-new-model-for-industrial-policy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Operation Warp Speed</a>, for example, the government offered contracts only to vaccine developers who met certain thresholds, such as Moderna and Pfizer. Unfortunately, such contracting models remain more the exception than the rule in US policy.</p>
<p>Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, it is clear that the United States squandered its unipolar moment, not only via quixotic foreign policy interventions but also through imprudent economic policy. Deluded by abstract and idealistic theories, American leaders offshored the country’s industrial base to what is now its greatest rival, in order to support debt-funded consumption and financial asset bubbles. The result is a new era of great power competition, massive public and private debt loads, and an economy dominated by software monopolies that have done little to improve productivity. In the next few decades, America will have to commit more resources to addressing these problems. If it fails to do so, an even more drastic austerity will eventually be imposed upon it, as an already strained empire collapses completely.</p>
]]>
							</content:encoded>
																											<wfw:commentRss>https://unherd.com/2024/11/american-industry-must-rise-again/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">631099</post-id>				</item>
						</channel>
</rss>
