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		<title>Regionalism - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Regionalism - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Devolution has failed Birmingham</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/08/devolution-has-failed-birmingham/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/08/devolution-has-failed-birmingham/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>The Midlands</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Dan Cave]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Birmingham's bin strike epitomises the Midlands' woes. Christopher Furlong/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dan Cave</strong> is a journalist and writer based in Birmingham. He usually writes about the West Midlands, city life, culture and the nature of modern work.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist and writer based in Birmingham. He usually writes about the West Midlands, city life, culture and the nature of modern work.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 17 Aug 2025 23:00:58 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 17 Aug 2025 23:00:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Birmingham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Devolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mayoralty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[midlands]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Treasury Brain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Regional mayors need real power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Labour has just </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/aug/13/labour-to-revive-northern-powerhouse-rail-project-trains" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">revived</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> Northern Powerhouse Rail, and it’s arguably all down to one man. A fierce advocate for the region’s transport network — he once described not extending HS2 to Manchester as a </span><span style="font-weight: 400">“monument to the British mentality”</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> — Andy Burnham is a walking, talking example of how much elected mayors can achieve: if they’re brave and charismatic enough to challenge the Whitehall consensus anyway. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Now compare Burnham to Richard Parker. Politicos are still unsure what even drove him from the spreadsheet anonymity of a career in accountancy to mayoralty of the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) a year ago. Certainly, Parker’s pitch for the job didn’t stray far from vague lines on family ties to the region — and being unable to stand by while the Midlands rotted. Boilerplate stuff, topped off with pledges written in a say-nothing Starmerese so diligent they may have come straight from the Labour leader’s playbook. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Parker’s lackluster style is even more striking given his peers. I don’t mean Burnham here, or indeed Sadiq Khan. Even in the West Midlands itself, there’s Parker’s predecessor Sir Andy Street, who elegantly dovetailed the region’s fortunes with his own personal brand. Mr Commonwealth Games. Mr HS2. Whatever you want to call him, Street </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">was </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">the Midlands for locals and outsiders alike. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Parker’s failure to follow suit is especially remarkable given there’s so much he could plausibly build a political personality around. In a largely deindustrialized region, housing inequality, transport woes, and low-paying jobs are all urgent problems to be solved. Then there’s the Birmingham bin strike. It may be the responsibility of the local council, but with 26,000 tons of stinking rubbish left uncollected, it’s hard not to see the dispute as the ultimate symbol of Midlands failure. Parker’s electoral victory at least paid lip service to these issues, promising to boost regional skills, explore high street rejuvenation and, given top billing, take buses back into public control. But the wide popularity of these ideas hasn’t protected him from criticism. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/bring-back-birminghams-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/bring-back-birminghams-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Screenshot-2024-11-12-at-11.04.16.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/bring-back-birminghams-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/bring-back-birminghams-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Bring back Birmingham&#039;s oligarchs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/bring-back-birminghams-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Dan Cave</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For one, bus franchising isn’t projected until 2027 at the earliest. A retiring figure, albeit one well-liked by colleagues, Parker doesn’t seem to lead much on policy, only getting excited about housing — a hangover, I’m told, from his exposure to the issue during his accounting years. He’s happy to outsource the blue-sky thinking the mayoral role is known for to less political policy leads. There’s a joke that if you want to know what Parker really thinks, you should ask Rachel Reeves, to whom he lent a holiday home and donated £12,000 in cash the year before he became mayor. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This closeness to the Treasury runs exactly contrary to the expanding mayoral model&#8217;s devolutionary principles. It also comes with risks, not least when the Westminster party’s poll numbers are in the basement. According to YouGov, after all, only 60% of Labour voters in 2024 plan to stay loyal next time. More than that, the latest polling has Reform UK on 30% nationwide, a far cry from the 5.8% the party won in last year’s West Midlands mayoral election. No less striking, May’s local elections saw Farage’s juggernaut pick up two mayoralties, with Labour pushed extremely hard by insurgent mayoral candidates in former Labour heartlands like North Tyneside. In such a landscape, it remains to be seen whether Parker can win in 2028; some insiders already whisper he may not stand at all.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It’s not just Reform that poses a threat to Parker either: his old rival Street retains plenty of popularity right across the Midlands. Many feel his 2024 loss was a repudiation of Tory rule rather than a personal slight, especially given Street himself is famous for his issues-first style. More than that, he lost to Parker by just 0.15% last year. Defeat, then, but one far less resounding than what his party suffered nationally. I know many across the Midlands, both to the Left and Right of Street, who admire his region-first approach. But as the former mayor is busy burnishing his centrist credentials — telling a recent </span><a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk-politics/2025/05/we-must-not-allow-people-to-fall-in-love-with-reform?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">interviewer</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> that he’ll fight for a “moderate, inclusive conservatism” — Reform’s rise could yet stymie the careers of Parker and Street both.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Reform’s rise could yet stymie the careers of Parker and Street both.&#8221;</div> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Quite aside from that looming light-blue wave, meanwhile, Street’s tenure was far from perfect. For one thing, HS2 was a nightmare. It’s too early to know if this latest iteration of the Northern Powerhouse could belatedly link London and Birmingham to Manchester, but Street himself certainly failed, and that was despite the help of Burnham further north. For its part, Street’s cross-city rail project was also hit by waves of delays. In contrast, and to give Parker his due, the current mayor has attached his name to a mega-bucks tram project which might finally give him a political identity worth the name. Linking up a proposed “Sports Quarter” in Birmingham with the airport and NEC events space is an unqualified good, especially when the network will travel through some of the city&#8217;s poorest areas.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But the region has been burnt by doomed development projects before. Forget HS2: though it rarely makes headlines south of Warwickshire, a long-in-the-offing gigafactory, meant to be built on the site of Coventry Airport, has faced epic struggles too. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For years, people across the Midlands were promised that the huge</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> battery-making facility, designed specifically to power electric vehicles,</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> would </span><span style="font-weight: 400">secure 6,000 jobs and </span><span style="font-weight: 400">£2.5 billion in investment. As far back as 2017, Street told the Conservative Party conference that the future growth of the West Midlands would emerge from its car-making past. “It’s a modern industrial strategy,” he said. You could almost see the gigafactory materialize as he spoke. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As it is, nothing much has happened, though those close to Street celebrate his ability to pull in private sector support for his embattled region. Perhaps — Street is certainly an enthusiastic booster for his patch — but apparent interest from Jaguar Land Rover and the Tata Group never went anywhere. Instead, a local manufacturer called Volklec, backed by funds from the Chinese battery sector, turned up instead. Yet even then, a £1 billion investment plan falls far short of Street’s grand words. All the while, the gigafactory itself is nowhere to be found, its promise of prosperity lost among the Warwickshire hedgerows. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In a sense, of course, these challenges aren’t the fault of Parker or Street. For if regional mayors occasionally show the strength of personality to make a difference, the fact is that they are never in complete control of their destinies. After all, even under boosted devolution deals, mayors rely on private partnership for success, a </span><span style="font-weight: 400">model that pits areas against each other. Tata, for instance, took investment that might have come to the West Midlands to Somerset instead. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A reliance on private cash also emphasizes risible public support. For the long-signaled gigafactory, the WMCA has only offered £23 million to the project. Whitehall might stump up another £65 million, but that’s not much either. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">“We hardly have the carrots to tempt investors with,” says one WMCA insider, a fair point when </span><span style="font-weight: 400">funding for projects comes from tightly controlled government pots. It’s impossible, here, not to mention the “Treasury Brain” adherence to environmental legislation and London-centric development logic — which together make it tough for post-industrial sites in the West Midlands and elsewhere to get off the ground. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In other words, then, for the mayoralties to really turbocharge their regions they first need to escape the clutches of Westminster. “Devolution is about driving economic growth, not societal or welfare change,” says Ben Brittain, a former advisor to Street. “You run the risk of low-energy over-promoted accountants or a chair of a council subcommittee as the region&#8217;s leader, which does a disservice to citizens of that region.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-black-sabbath-transcended-birmingham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-black-sabbath-transcended-birmingham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/sabbath.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-black-sabbath-transcended-birmingham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-black-sabbath-transcended-birmingham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Black Sabbath transcended Birmingham</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-black-sabbath-transcended-birmingham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Daniel Kalder</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">At this point, it’s tempting to return to Parker. Even people less close to Street than Brittain miss his ambassadorial energy and soft skills: knowing when to bollock, reward, charm, or simply put in the hours to get things done. Of course, it would be unfair not to mention that every local and combined authority still battles austerity, which persists even under the Labour government in Westminster. “There must be a strong relationship between mayoral teams, No. 10 and No. 11, which can unblock a lot,” says Brittain. “But there is no formal structure for that.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Here, Parker might point to his relationship with Reeves as crucial to unlocking funds for his gleaming new tram project. But those same links, insiders worry, could be exactly what undercuts regional confidence and, potentially, renewal on the West Midlands’ own terms. Parker, after all, is Reeves’ man. And for a country like England, with its hyper-centralized political culture, it’s equally concerning that Labour may now plan to make its mayors more accountable to the party. What would this mean for Parker, who might need to take on Downing Street if his tramline goes the way of HS2? Then there’s the gigafactory which, as </span><span style="font-weight: 400">it stands, remains an underused airport. Hardly something to build a political brand around.</span></p>
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									<item>
					<title>Will small nationalisms remake Europe?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/will-small-nationalisms-remake-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/will-small-nationalisms-remake-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-1212879633.jpg?w=523</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Border Wars</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Andrea Valentino]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Blue-1000x1000-23.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[It's not impossible. Rafa Rivas/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Andrea Valentino </strong>is a commissioning editor at UnHerd.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a commissioning editor at UnHerd.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 23:02:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 10 Jul 2025 09:21:20 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nationalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Secessionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tyrol]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=690985</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The continent’s frontiers are never fixed]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>San Candido is Italy — if only someone would tell the locals. Even before you arrive, past needle peaks and pine trees, you’ll notice the road signs: “Innichen” defiantly above, “S. Candido” almost a nickname below. Once you reach the center, the houses are all Alpine shutters, and the villagers cry “<em>Grüss Gott</em>” (God bless) for hello. In the cafés, you can sip on schnapps, or gorge on strudels the size of your fist. Spend long enough here, where Italy nuzzles Austria, and even the cows seem to moo for <em>Mitteleuropa</em>.</p>
<p>Across the mountainous borderland of South Tyrol, their shepherds make similar sounds. In May, about 80 miles from Innichen, the town of Meran (Merano) decisively chose Katharina Johanna Zeller as its mayor. A member of the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), she has long fought for closer links to Vienna, even <a href="https://www.today.it/politica/neosindaca-zeller-rifiuta-fascia-tricolore-medaglione-tirolese-merano.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rejecting</a> the tricolor sash that accompanies her office. At the same time, the SVP is stalked by yet more radical forces: the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit (STF) backs the wholesale secession of South Tyrol from Italy, and longs to see the region reunited with Austria.</p>
<p>Soaring in the polls, the STF <a href="https://suedtiroler-freiheit.com/2025/05/13/70-gemeinderaete-sued-tiroler-freiheit-setzt-erfolgskurs-fort/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">picked up</a> 30 councillors in the recent vote. And as that word “reunited” implies, the party has history on its side. For centuries until 1918, South Tyrol was part of Austria, and if that explains the Teutonic mood in towns like Innichen, the STF is roused by more recent tensions too. From Mussolini and his thugs to postwar paramilitaries, this is a place where history blooms like edelweiss in spring. That could have profound consequences for Italy itself, yet what happens here is anything but parochial. Right across Europe, other “small nationalisms” are rising too, a phenomenon that could dovetail past and present to shred the continent’s established frontiers.</p>
<p>One tenth of Italy’s fighting men died in the First World War. But if their sacrifice helped secure what jingoistic statesmen called the country’s “unredeemed” lands — that still left the people who lived there. And here, South Tyrol posed problems that couldn’t be solved by treaty. From 1363, the region was under Habsburg protection; united with so-called North Tyrol, it was as Austrian as Innsbruck. The last prewar census made that clear: 89% of South Tyrolians spoke German at home. That made a clash with nationalist Italy inevitable, especially after Mussolini’s putsch in 1922.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/why-meloni-is-rewriting-italys-constitution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/why-meloni-is-rewriting-italys-constitution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2140106311-e1714488514919.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/why-meloni-is-rewriting-italys-constitution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/why-meloni-is-rewriting-italys-constitution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Meloni is rewriting Italy&#039;s constitution</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/why-meloni-is-rewriting-italys-constitution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Andrea Valentino</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Fascism soon stomped German from Tyrolean life. That began with the physical landscape, as street names were changed and public inscriptions tweaked to praise Italian luminaries like Dante and Verdi. In the regional center of Bozen (Bolzano), the Fascists built a vast marble “Victory Monument” to their conquests. Twenty meters high, this Roman pastiche cast Mussolini as Caesar with a paunch. If that wasn’t stark enough, there was also the arch’s Latin inscription. &#8220;Here at the border of the fatherland set down the banner,” it barked. “From this point on we educated the others with language, law and culture.” And so it proved: German was purged from courts and schools and newspapers, while Rome arranged mass migration from the south.</p>
<p>Mussolini’s death freed South Tyrol from the worst Italian chauvinism. But just as the Victory Monument still squats near Bozen’s old town, unhappiness has lingered. When my family came, to hike and ski in the Sixties, some older folk were loath to answer questions in Italian. Younger activists were more direct. Beyond several failed attacks on the Victory Monument, in 1961 Tyrolean terrorists blew up electricity pylons near Bozen. And in 1967, on a lonely peak near Innichen, they killed a soldier and three military policemen.</p>
<p>The vast majority of South Tyrolians reject bloodshed. But as the popularity of the SVP and STF implies, the valleys still shimmer with discontent. To an extent, the secessionist impulse can be understood financially. South Tyrol is one of Italy’s richest regions, its GDP growth among the fastest in the country. Especially as the national economy stagnates, some here fear migrants from poorer regions. Yet it’s revealing that even this humdrum bickering is framed by looking backwards, with the STF <a href="https://suedtiroler-freiheit.com/2025/05/17/absenkung-der-ansaessigkeitsklausel-gefaehrdet-minderheitenschutz/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">complaining</a> that migrants know nothing of Tyrolean “history, language, or culture”. The party’s leader has spoken in related terms, <a href="https://www.tageszeitung.it/2018/11/11/nichts-mit-italien-zu-tun/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">describing</a> Italian annexation as a “mistake of history”.</p>
<p>Not that the STF are mere nostalgics. On the contrary, their policies are hard-nosed attempts to right the wrongs of the 20th century. That ultimately means secession, something informal polls suggest is backed by the majority of South Tyrolean Germans. For the moment, though, the party hopes to ban Italian from schools, reversing a trend that’s seen native German speakers fall to 58% of South Tyrol’s population. Hospitals are another target. One STF poster shows a pair of feet on a morgue slab, its caption warning that the “doctor didn’t know German”. This nastier tinge sometimes escapes the realm of propaganda. In January, at a student event in Brixen (Bressanone), an Italian teenager was badly beaten by a group shouting “<em>Dreckwalscher</em>” (“dirty Italian”).</p>
<p>But though Rome indulges South Tyrol, with 90% of its tax revenues staying local, outright secession is anathema. Italian politicians are doubly sensitive given how often their sovereignty has been challenged, whether by Sardinian terrorists or the Venetian separatists who invaded St Mark’s Square in a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venetian_Most_Serene_Government#/media/File:Tanko1.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">homespun</a> tank. Yet if that’s led Giorgia Meloni to warn that South Tyrol must work for Italians too, and emphasise that the region is <a href="https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/20165050/giorgia-meloni-austria-alto-adige-cittadinanza-secessione-seggi-svp-maria-elena-boschi-graziano-delrio.amp" target="_blank" rel="noopener">indisputably</a> Italian, what’s most striking is just how common these controversies are, and far beyond the Dolomites too.</p>
<p>According to one recent estimate, around 100 regionalist <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/think-without-borders-the-rise-of-separatism-in-europe-mick-ohare/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">movements</a> exist in Europe today. But even that doesn’t do justice to their bewildering range. There are gentle autonomists and hardline secessionists — and some, like the Polish Silesians, who wallow tipsily between the two. Some activists, notably Occitan speakers in southern France, put a premium on their distinct linguistic heritage. In Andalusia (Spain) and Masuria (Poland), campaigners care more about cultural solidarity; Belgium’s Walloons and Finland&#8217;s Sámi tend to straddle both. That’s before you recall the old ideological splits. There are Galician Marxists, and Cornish progressives, and pot-bellied Saxon monarchists. As in South Tyrol, meanwhile, movements face internal splits. The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) both defend ethnic Serbs in Bosnia. But if the SDS is increasingly pro-European, the SNSD’s leader sees Putin as a friend.</p>
<p>Combined with their varied tolerance for violence — there are plenty of Corsican nationalists, but only <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20231009-france-s-corsica-rocked-by-blasts-claimed-by-separatist-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a few</a> willing to bomb the second homes of French tourists — and Europe’s secessionists become a discordant political chorus, each howling in the hope that the public will listen. In many cases, of course, voters are more likely to reach for the mufflers. Though nationalists in Catalonia and Scotland still enjoy plenty of support, other causes are marginal at best. Who really imagines the Isle of Man will soon <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MecVanninOfficial/?locale=en_GB" target="_blank" rel="noopener">secure</a> its freedom? Who, perhaps even campaigners themselves, truly envisages autonomy for Frisia, or believes that Gozo can throw off the Maltese yoke?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Europe’s secessionists are a discordant political chorus&#8221;</div>
<p>Considering, too, that Edinburgh and Barcelona both failed in their respective bids for freedom, it’s tempting to think that Europe’s political map will never be redrawn. That would be a mistake. As the STF so vividly shows, the past is like a teenage breakup: easy to resent, easier to exaggerate, and impossible to forget. The examples here are almost literally endless, as Scots conjure the Highland Clearances, and Bretons the depredations of Jacobinism. There are more positive examples too. Catalonia recalls its 13th-century law code; Flanders a 1302 victory against the French. The point here is that the historical tradition, the written word, really matters. Boasting a tradition of literacy stretching back generations — South Tyroleans still admire their medieval troubadours — even the most microscopic of European nationalisms can find something to cling to. In this, they differ from many other parts of the world, which through illiteracy or colonialism or conquest have far fewer sources to draw on.</p>
<p>Even so, it’d be wrong to suggest that Europe’s small nationalisms can be understood from the chronicles alone. In the decade since Alex Salmond’s doomed referendum, the continent has been transformed, battered by war, and pandemic, and the growing realization that welfarism is a transient gift. Then there’s immigration — 12 million new arrivals from in the five years to 2020 — with voters ever-more frantic for the numbers to fall. That offers regionalists space: not only can they rail against the creaking establishment, just like populists everywhere, their policies also come with the added pique of independence. As the STF <a href="https://suedtiroler-freiheit.com/ziele/zuwanderung/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">puts</a> it: “As long as Italy determines which and how many foreigners come to South Tyrol, we have no control.”</p>
<p>Others are even more explicit. As the leader of Vlaams Belang <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-break-up-flanders-wallonia-tom-van-grieken-vlaams-belang-far-right/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> in 2023, his Flemish separatist party exists because “Belgium is not working”. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), also <a href="https://english.n-va.be/frequently-asked-questions#ideology" target="_blank" rel="noopener">angling</a> for a free Flanders, has backed “the strictest migration policy yet” — among other things allowing the <a href="https://ecre.org/belgium-new-government-presents-strictest-migration-policy-ever-%E2%80%95-highest-number-of-asylum-applications-for-a-decade-%E2%80%95-reception-crisis-continues-amid-decrease-in-lo/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">authorities</a> to check the phones of asylum seekers. In February, the N-VA’s former leader became Belgium’s prime minister, the first Flemish nationalist to do so. Nor is any of this very surprising: many regionalist parties are past masters at evoking the spectre of cultural dilution, whether from far-off parliaments or foreign migrants.</p>
<p>There are broader trends here, too, with small nationalists helped by the supranational nature of the European Union. Though it allows member states to wield their authority against would-be secessionists — as Catalan leaders have <a href="http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56332270" target="_blank" rel="noopener">learnt</a> to their cost — the bloc is congenitally allergic to sovereign borders. And if that means warm support for minority languages, from Breton exchange schemes to Romani textbooks, the EU’s governance model also prompts secessionist dreams. If tiny Luxembourg can grab a seat at the table, why not Bavaria or the Basque Country? These forces doubtless explain the enduring popularity of EU flags at SNP rallies, with Brussels becoming a sort of proxy nationalism until genuine independence can finally arrive.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/donald-trump-the-last-american-don/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/donald-trump-the-last-american-don/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-170938320.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/donald-trump-the-last-american-don/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/donald-trump-the-last-american-don/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Mob went mainstream</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/donald-trump-the-last-american-don/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Andrea Valentino</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Equally important is how these small nationalisms interact with their neighbours. Much has been said about the rise of Europe’s populist Right. But these “large nationalist” movements can also encourage secessionist forces beyond their frontiers, especially if the latter long to be reunited with linguistic or ethnic kin. In 2018, Austria’s populist government <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45888287" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed</a> offering citizenship to native German speakers in South Tyrol, a sop to the STF and indeed Austrians themselves, given as many as nine-in-ten back reunification.</p>
<p>It’s a similar story elsewhere in the former Austria-Hungary, as Viktor Orbán spends millions on football teams and social clubs for ethnic Magyars in Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine. Given many of these people are actually Hungarian citizens — and the vast majority of the country’s diaspora vote for Orbán’s Fidesz Party — it’s a worthwhile investment. Not that the flames are fanned merely by secessionists and their backers. Though it was later shelved, Austria’s passport stunt inevitably enraged Italian nationalists like Meloni. Ready to mount the “barricades” for South Tyrol she may have been, but such facile grandstanding only gifts the STF more exposure.</p>
<p>It’s easy to forget, though, that Europe’s frontiers are never really settled, even if their familiarity lulls politicians and publics into a kind of geopolitical coma. Who, in 1880, could have predicted the resurrection of Poland after a century of oppression, or that far-flung Austrian hamlets would now be ruled from Rome? Who, in 1980, could have foreseen the fall of Yugoslavia, or that the independent Baltics would soon join NATO? Serbs and Latvians, too, were once secessionists of a sort. And if the First World War and collapse of the Soviet Union offered ample opportunities for borders to shift, the signs are ominous today. Kosovo gained its independence as late as 2008, and you could argue that the Ukraine war was sparked by separatists in the Donbas.</p>
<p>It’s impossible, of course, to know exactly how our maps will move by 2080. But combined with a desperate, mutinous population, and a growing sense that Europe could yet stumble into turmoil, it would be foolish to bet against another upheaval.</p>
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					<title>Is Putin loosening his grip on Russia&#8217;s regions?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2020/07/is-putin-loosening-his-grip-on-russias-regions/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2020/07/is-putin-loosening-his-grip-on-russias-regions/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Mary Dejevsky]]>
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							<![CDATA[Can Putin hang on to the edges of his nation? Credit: Alexei DruzhininTASS via Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mary Dejevsky</strong> was Moscow correspondent for <em>The Times</em> between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>marydejevsky</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ was Moscow correspondent for <em>The Times</em> between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:00:52 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:00:52 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Khabarovsk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Separatism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sergei Furgal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Protests in Khabarovsk could herald big changes to the way the nation is run]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The city of Khabarovsk lies close to Russia’s Chinese border, more than 6,000km and seven time zones to the east of Moscow. So far is it from the Russian capital that, until recently, what happened in Khabarovsk could have been expected too stay in Khabarovsk, especially if it was embarrassing to the Kremlin. These days, though, Russians are able to follow something that increases resembles a regional revolt live-streamed on social media.</p>
<p>Street protests in the city have just entered their third week, with <a href="https://t.me/rpolitik/41" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">tens of thousands gathering on Saturday for a march</a> reported to be the biggest so far. Sparked by the removal of the regional governor, apparently on the Kremlin’s orders, the protests have grown into one of the most sustained regional challenges to the centre for many years. Placards and chants now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53441687" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">combine</a> support for the ousted governor, Sergei Furgal, with calls for Putin to resign: “Twenty years in power and we don’t trust you,” they say; “Russia without Putin”, “We are the power here!”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/the-liberals-are-falling-into-putins-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/the-liberals-are-falling-into-putins-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GettyImages-1083155436.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/the-liberals-are-falling-into-putins-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/the-liberals-are-falling-into-putins-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The liberals are falling into Putin&#039;s trap</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/the-liberals-are-falling-into-putins-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Small protests outside Moscow are not particularly unusual. What is unusual is that these have been so big and continued for so long. Still more unusual is that the local police have stood calmly by, doing nothing more disruptive than distributing anti-Covid masks and accepting the thanks of the marchers.</p>
<p>The demonstrations began on 11 July, two days after the governor’s arrest and summary transfer to a Moscow prison on charges of contract killings that date back more than 15 years. Initially, the protesters were simply demanding that he be freed or allowed to stand trial in Khabarovsk. Ten days later the protests gained new momentum, after Putin appointed a new interim governor, an MP from the Volga region, with no ties at all to the Far East.</p>
<figure id="attachment_42904" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-42904" style="width: 494px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class=" wp-image-42904" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GettyImages-1227772877-300x200.jpg" alt="" width="494" height="329" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-42904" class="wp-caption-text"><em>This weekend&#8217;s vast demonstration in Khabarovsk. Credit: Dmitry MorgulisTASS via Getty Images</em></figcaption></figure>
<p>Why Sergei Furgal was removed precisely when he was is not clear, but the political charge sheet against him <a href="https://www.stalkerzone.org/facts-of-the-furgal-case-that-are-inconvenient-for-msm-propagandists/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">could be long</a>, and he has enemies, local and national. Back in 2018, he had dared to stand for the governorship of the Khabarovsk region against the Kremlin-approved incumbent. Worse, he had won by a landslide. Worst of all, he had then become popular, introducing changes &#8211; including televised government meetings, hot meals for schoolchildren, and auctioning off the previous administration’s yacht. Governors seen as competent who become popular in their own right are quite a rarity, so he would have been noticed.</p>
<p>It is possible that the Kremlin wanted to fire a warning shot across the bows of others hoping to emulate Khaborovsk’s brand of autonomy ahead of regional elections across Russia this autumn. The pro-Putin United Russia party fears that it could lose badly to the right-wing populist party — misleadingly called the Liberal Democrat Party. And, as it happens, this is the party that Furgal belongs to.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/what-brexiteers-share-with-russians/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/what-brexiteers-share-with-russians/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GettyImages-1096461872.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/what-brexiteers-share-with-russians/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/what-brexiteers-share-with-russians/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Brexiteers share with Russians</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/what-brexiteers-share-with-russians/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Dejevsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A more immediate reason could have been the relative lack of enthusiasm shown by Khabarovsk voters at the recent, 1 July, constitutional referendum. The referendum was held to approve amendments, including one that would, in theory, allow Putin another two presidential terms, but both the turn-out and the Yes vote in Khabarovsk were among the lowest in the land. The Governor had clearly fallen down on the job — hence, perhaps, <a href="https://www.ridl.io/en/the-tragedy-of-politics-as-normal-the-meaning-of-the-protests-in-khabarovsk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the revival of old criminal charges against him</a>.</p>
<p>The use of criminal allegations for a political purpose is, of course, a standard part of the Kremlin playbook — as it was in Soviet times. The Kremlin’s response to the unrest in Khabarovsk, however, has not entirely followed the script. So far, at least, it has resisted dispatching its own “heavies” to make up for the lack of local police action. And while the replacement governor — 39 year-old Mikhail Degtyaryov — is not a local, he belongs to the same populist party as the ousted governor, which was a concession reportedly made by Putin against his chief political aide’s advice, in the hope of drawing the sting of the protests.</p>
<p>There are other indications that the Kremlin may be trying a more calculated, psychological, approach than its usual swift resort to head-bashing. Attempts to dissuade protesters have included warnings of a local upsurge in Covid infections and of a pending terrorist attack (neither of which, it appeared, had any foundation or any effect). The Russian government then announced a new subsidy for the region, to coincide with the new appointee’s arrival (which did not stop him being booed).</p>
<p>Moscow also accepted, uncharacteristically, that the protests were home-grown. Asked whether there was orchestration from abroad or associates of the ousted governor, the official Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “No, we are not talking about that.” He went on to say that the priority was for the local authorities to ensure the smooth running of services and <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1182015" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">insisted that Putin had no plans to visit</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/how-90s-russia-prepared-me-for-coronageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/how-90s-russia-prepared-me-for-coronageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GettyImages-113418597.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/how-90s-russia-prepared-me-for-coronageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/how-90s-russia-prepared-me-for-coronageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nineties Russia prepared me for coronageddon</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/how-90s-russia-prepared-me-for-coronageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Daniel Kalder</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In all, this looks like a distinctly more hands-off approach to protests in the regions than Moscow has generally shown before. And this could make sense,  because while the Khabarovsk protests are unusual, they are also part of an emerging pattern. In recent years, some of the most effective — and perhaps threatening — opposition to Vladimir Putin has taken place not at national level, but over corruption and environmental issues that are essentially local.</p>
<p>Take some of the protests that have made a national mark in recent years. In 2010, there was huge and at times violent opposition to government plans to route the new Moscow-St Petersburg highway through the Khimki forest outside Moscow. The then President, Dmitry Medvedev, eventually halted construction and the road was diverted away from the forest. There were also protests in the Far East over tariffs on imported second-hand Japanese cars.</p>
<p>In 2017, there were protests in more than 30 regions against the illegal dumping of waste. Opposition flared up again last year over plans for a vast new waste processing plant in pristine peatland three hours’ drive to the east of Moscow. The protests were routinely broken up by riot police, but this  particular project was eventually abandoned, although other such facilities have gone ahead.</p>
<p>In spring last year the city of Yekaterinburg in the Urals was the scene of huge protests against plans by the Orthodox Church to build a cathedral on a city park. So fierce were the confrontations that Putin eventually took it upon himself to mediate and instructed the city to take a poll of local opinion. The result went decisively against the church hierarchy, which agreed to find another site.</p>
<p>In some ways, the anti-corruption campaigner, Aleksei Navalnyy, stole a march on the Kremlin more than a decade ago by anticipating the trend for local activism. Not only was he a pioneer of political mobilisation via the internet and social media, but he eschewed the capital to establish a network of local offices in friendlier places — including the old Siberian university city of Tomsk. These became hubs for collecting information on local complaints of corruption, which then fed into his national campaign. Over the years, the Kremlin has clipped Navalny’s wings, but the methods he adopted have influenced the conduct of Russian politics, and maybe that influence is now reaching the very top.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/07/dark-genius-behind-destructive-creed-putinism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/07/dark-genius-behind-destructive-creed-putinism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GettyImages-463919708.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/07/dark-genius-behind-destructive-creed-putinism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/07/dark-genius-behind-destructive-creed-putinism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dark genius behind the destructive creed of Putinism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/07/dark-genius-behind-destructive-creed-putinism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In his first two terms as President, 2000 to 2008, Putin had two priorities. One was to bring order to the financial chaos he had inherited from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Salaries and pensions were not being paid; and inflation had devoured the earnings of professionals. The other was to keep the Russian Federation together. Scarred by memories of the Soviet collapse, there were widespread fears that Russia would be next. Preventing the break-up of Russia involved concessions to the largely Muslim republic of Tatarstan and is also what the two Chechen wars (1994-6 and 1999-2003) were all about.</p>
<p>Once Chechnya had been mercilessly bombed into semi-submission, Putin had to find a way of governing Russia’s vast expanse without the single-party structures of the Soviet era. His answer was to try to build what he called a “vertikal”, or pyramid, of power that would streamline administration nationally and develop levers that really worked.</p>
<p>Many commentators saw Putin’s “vertikal” as evidence of his autocratic, even dictatorial, ambitions. How effective it ever became, however, is questionable. After his four years as prime minister (2008 &#8211; 2012) and extensive travel around the regions, Putin lamented how difficult it still was to get the levers of power to work. In practice, many regions were often a law unto themselves. As the Russian proverb has it, “God is high above and the Tsar is far away”. With their chants of “We are the power here”, the Khabarovsk protesters clearly share some of that mentality.</p>
<p>More recently, however, and especially since his re-election in 2018, talk of Putin’s “vertikal of power” has been far less in evidence. Nor is it just in relation to the Khabarovsk protests that the Kremlin seems so far to be taking, or trying to take, a more cautious approach. From the start, Putin’s response to the Coronavirus pandemic has had much more in common with the approaches of more federally organised countries than is usual for Russia. Authority for deciding such matters as quarantine and lockdowns has been assigned to regional governors and city mayors, as has the building of “instant” hospitals.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/05/the-dangerous-influence-of-expats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/05/the-dangerous-influence-of-expats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GettyImages-1144186476.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/05/the-dangerous-influence-of-expats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/05/the-dangerous-influence-of-expats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dangerous influence of expats</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/05/the-dangerous-influence-of-expats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Dejevsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Cynics might argue that Putin was deliberately taking a back seat, to avoid the blame if catastrophe ensued. In fact, though — while the figures can be contested — Russia has not done so badly by international comparisons. Its death rate per million of the population stands at 89, which is well down the global table — <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1104709/coronavirus-deaths-worldwide-per-million-inhabitants/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">far below the UK (685), much of western Europe and the United States</a>. There is another possible straw in the wind, too. While the headline from Russia’s constitutional referendum was about Putin being able to extend his presidency, other changes include greater authority for parliament, the Duma, vis a vis the executive, which could be interpreted as part of a wider move to devolve some power from the Kremlin.</p>
<p>The potential for much greater decentralisation is there. Russia has 85 regions headed by governors or an equivalent and the extent of their authority does not depend only on the Kremlin, it also depends on the state of the local economy, how dependent it is on largesse from the centre and on how much authority the governor can exert in relation to other powerful local interests. Observation and anecdote suggest that Russia’s second and third tier cities have become more prosperous in recent years, with families moving from Moscow to enjoy a better quality of life elsewhere. Greater regional confidence may be one factor underlying the defiance towards Moscow being shown in Khabarovsk. Others have suggested it is proximity to China and disappointment with the relatively slow pace of development on Russia’s side of the border.</p>
<p>It is quite possible that, if the Khabarovsk protests continue, the Kremlin will revert to its old ways. But if what is happening is the start of some re-thinking in Moscow about decentralisation, then these could be interesting times. Change direction too quickly, and there could be a real risk of dislocation, such as resulted from the destructive regionalism and protectionism that accompanied the Soviet Union’s collapse. On the other hand, if Putin were to give up on the “vertikal of power&#8221; and accept more give and take with the regions, that could just be the key to making Russia governable as a modern state — not just for what remains of Putin&#8217;s presidency, but beyond.</p>
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