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		<title>peace deal - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>peace deal - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Why I went to Moscow</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Peace deal</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Yanis Varoufakis]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/yanis.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A Russian National Guard serviceman stands guard on Red Square on April 1, 2026. (Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Yanis Varoufakis</strong> is an economist and former Greek Minister of Finance. He is the author of several best-selling books, most recently <em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783678148958000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1NxNKwGArRJCAgzL7ZSnY4">Raise Your Soul! A personal history of resistance</a>.</em></p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>yanisvaroufakis</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an economist and former Greek Minister of Finance. He is the author of several best-selling books, most recently <em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783678148958000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1NxNKwGArRJCAgzL7ZSnY4">Raise Your Soul! A personal history of resistance</a>.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 23:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 13:35:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1055411</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Russians are ready to compromise]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Since the invasion of Ukraine, Europe has had only two options regarding its stance toward Russia: forever war or offering Russia a sensible peace and security pact.</p>
<p>Europe’s leaders chose forever war. They labeled Vladimir Putin the new Hitler. Once they had done so, it was impossible to envision any agreement with him. Like Donald Trump, who had hoped that shock-and-awe over Tehran would trigger an internal coup or rebellion that might topple the Islamic Republic, European leaders placed their bets on the prospect that the combination of tough sanctions on Russia and arms for Ukraine would topple Putin. It didn’t.</p>
<p>Four years of sanctions and war have achieved the opposite result. They rebalanced Russia’s current account, energized factories that lay dormant since the end of the Soviet Union, transferred foreign-owned companies to Russian oligarchs and kept oligarchic profits within Russia. Thus, the sanctions combined with military Keynesianism to stabilize Putin’s reign. Meanwhile, despite its impressive resistance on the battlefields, Ukraine’s economy is being steadily weakened while Europe is trapped in a geostrategic conundrum of its own making and the new oil crisis engineered by Israel and the United States.</p>
<p>Lacking both a strategy for winning the war and an interest in suing for peace, European leaders have ended up struggling to find increasingly scarce means of prolonging the war a little more in the vain hope that some miracle may deliver them from their strategic void or that their tenure will have ended by the time their folly has been exposed for all to see. Meanwhile, the bodies pile up in Ukraine’s killing fields and Europe’s social economies are hemorrhaging.</p>
<p>With Europe’s strategic defeat a near certainty, there are only two ways it will play out. One is that President Trump puts on the table a take-it-or-leave-it peace plan that President Zelensky and the European Union must accept, or else the United States ceases to share intelligence and to sell weapons to the Europeans to pass on to Ukraine. Exhausted by their energy crisis, fiscally stressed, and unable even to maintain the current level of support to Ukraine, German, Italian and French politicians will acquiesce to Trump’s plan. A Europe that has left them high and dry will leave Ukrainians feeling abandoned, unsafe and disillusioned. The ignominy will be complete when Russian natural gas begins to flow again into Germany, Italy and the rest of the European Union through pipelines that are, now, partly US-owned, with Washington retaining a share of the proceeds, while the European Union foots Ukraine’s reconstruction costs in their entirety.</p>
<p>The other possibility, one that will obtain if Donald Trump remains distracted for the rest of his tenure by his Iran war folly, is even less appetizing. Russia’s juggernaut, boosted by the windfall from high oil and gas prices, ekes out the rest of the Donbas slowly, painfully, devouring lives with a ruthless, mechanical precision until, at a moment of his choosing, Vladimir Putin declares victory and announces a unilateral ceasefire. Then, any leverage the European Union might have had to shape a peace and security agenda for its neighborhood withers to nothing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-1231134359.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin can’t survive without war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What if Europe were to ditch forever war in favor of its second option, the path never taken? What if it were to offer Russia a sensible peace and security pact that extends beyond settling the Ukraine war? Just posing the question will, undoubtedly, trigger howls of betrayal, charges of appeasing the new Hitler, accusations of reciting Moscow’s speaking points. These are the natural responses of having made, initially, the forever war choice which, as already argued, leads to a bitter betrayal of Ukraine and a miserable outcome for Europe.</p>
<p>To envisage this second option, a European offer of a peace and security pact, there are three prerequisites. First, the abandonment of the delusion that the offered pact should contain nothing that Putin can present as a victory. All pacts, agreements, peace deals, etc., must offer each signatory things they can present as great gains to their own constituency. Is there something that Putin can present to the Russians as worthy of their sacrifices during this awful war which Europe, including Ukraine, can live with? I think so. How about that, in the same way the United States can say an emphatic “No!” to the right of Mexico to deploy Chinese weaponry in Tijuana, Russia also has the right to seek security by demanding, as it has done for three decades, that Nato stay out of Georgia and Ukraine? A provision in the proposed European Peace and Security Pact that recognizes this Russian concern is not just a particularly small price to pay but also one that Europe should desire, in view of the dangerous tensions that a face-off between Russian and Nato troops within a postwar Ukraine, or indeed in Georgia, would generate.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The best Keir Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” can deliver is a sad outfit facing the fate of UN peacekeepers in South Lebanon.&#8221;</div>
<p>The second prerequisite for a genuine peace and security pact is the rejection of the notion that it will have to involve an Anglo-European “coalition of the willing”; that is an army of British, German, French soldiers facing off their Russian counterparts along whatever line of control is agreed to. To insist on such an army is to state that Europe is not even attempting a genuine détente, assuming it to be impossible. The United States did exactly that on the Korean peninsula, leaving behind an ironclad, nuclear armed, huge army to police an impenetrable line of control. Europe cannot and should not want to do likewise in Ukraine. The best Keir Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” can deliver is a sad outfit facing the fate of UN peacekeepers in South Lebanon. It takes no more than a few moments of clarity to recognize that a functional peace and security pact must involve full de-militarization of the contested territory and its surrounding areas. In turn, this requires a spirit of détente based on the recognition that Europe must provide both sides, Ukraine and Russia, with security guarantees.</p>
<p>Finally, the third prerequisite is a readiness to be creative with issues of sovereignty and governance over disputed territories with a view to preventing the type of airtight partition left behind by the British Empire in India, Palestine, Cyprus, and Ireland, guaranteeing permanent conflict. Speaking of Ireland, the Good Friday agreement, a worthy effort to part ways both with the logic of strict partition and Westphalian sovereignty, is a splendid example of how the Donbas and other contested areas can be governed after the cessation of hostilities as part of a comprehensive peace and security pact.</p>
<p>Having stated the three prerequisites for a European pivot from forever war to offering Russia a peace and security pact, and before delving into what such a proposal might contain, the importance of rebuilding channels of communication with Russian society cannot be overestimated. The European Union’s policy of frowning upon, even sanctioning, anyone who dares maintain communication channels with Russian civil society is a form of self harm. This is why I accepted an invitation to address an investment conference in Moscow last week, one that involved no government representatives but did engage a large audience of financiers, technologists, students and journalists. If channels of communication are to be rebuilt, this is the type of audience that needs to get involved.</p>
<p>My visit to Moscow did not come out of the blue. In April 2022, two months after the war’s commencement, the movement that I helped co-found, DiEM25 (the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025), canvassed a <a href="https://diem25.org/diem25-has-plan-for-peace-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">five-point solution</a> which I subsequently <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-final-victory-for-ukraine-only-negotiated-peace-by-yanis-varoufakis-2022-05" target="_blank" rel="noopener">campaigned</a> for, leading to the <a href="https://progressive.international/wire/2022-05-13-corbyn-temelkuran-varoufakis-the-athens-declaration/en/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Athens Declaration</a> on behalf of the Progressive International which called for a solution to the Ukrainian tragedy within the broader framework of a new <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Non-Aligned Movement</a>. That was the background to my recent Moscow visit. Naturally, a Moscow visit by a former finance minister who failed spectacularly to alter Europe’s course a decade ago is not any kind of breakthrough, at least not in itself. However, what it can do is to demonstrate how Europeans can begin to mend fences with Russian civil society.</p>
<p>Turning to the actual proposal for a comprehensive European peace and security agenda, which I went to Moscow to canvas for, it consists of six parts.</p>
<p>First, Ukraine becomes in the 21st century what Austria used to be during the Cold War: a neutral but armed European country with its territorial integrity and political sovereignty jointly guaranteed by all European countries, plus Russia, under the auspices and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.</p>
<p>Second, the signatories of this Peace and Security Agenda shall agree on the gradual elimination across Europe of certain categories of weapons (including nuclear, chemical, and AI-powered drones). Within this context of deescalation, Russian and Ukrainian troops shall withdraw fully 300 kilometers on either side of the agreed border or line of control.</p>
<p>Third, all war refugees will have the right to return to their pre-2014 homes, with all sides committing to aid their return in practice.</p>
<p>Fourth, the Donbas and other disputed territories that come under Russian control shall be demilitarized and governed in the same manner as Northern Ireland under the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/what-is-good-friday-agreement-b2317092.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Good Friday Agreement</a>. Just as London retained sovereignty on paper but, in practice, shares it with Dublin, while the two communities share power equally on every governing body (from local government to Stormont), the idea here is that sovereignty of the areas that Russia is granted will remain formally within Russia, but free movement within and outside these regions will be guaranteed, and each municipality as well as every Oblast will be governed on the basis of equal representation of Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers. Anyone who says that this is impossible must be reminded that, not long ago, it seemed similarly impossible to envision Sinn Féin and Ulster Unionists power-sharing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Untitled-design-3.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>On Iran and the Left</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Fifth, the European Union unfreezes Russia’s assets and removes all sanctions. Meanwhile Russian energy begins to flow again to Europe, with a portion of all proceeds dedicated to a Ukraine reconstruction fund.</p>
<p>Sixth, modeled on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established after the fall of apartheid to offer an opportunity to air grievances and to be heard by the opposite side, a similar council shall be convened by the UN, led by judges with experience in restorative justice from South Africa and other countries.</p>
<p>As wars and the fear of war expand their domain, an international push for peace is more pertinent than ever. An inability to imagine what a comprehensive European peace and security agenda would look like is perhaps the worst impediment to its emergence. The above six-point proposal is meant as an example of how to overcome this obstacle, outlining concrete steps Europe could take to break the deadlock and give itself a chance to become relevant again.</p>
<p>Many will ask: how would the Russian government, Vladimir Putin in particular, respond to such a proposal? While no one knows until it is on the table, my recent experience in Moscow tells me that Russian civil society is not only ready to welcome it enthusiastically but also to pressurize its government to take it seriously. Eager to reconnect with the West, but repulsed by the clear signs EU leaders want to see <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZrM0T05FUE" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia torn apart</a> by centrifugal forces, Russian public opinion is keen to enter into a fruitful dialog on the basis of such a plan — including opponents as well as supporters of Putin’s government.</p>
<p>Last but not least, many of the Russian technocrats, students and journalists I met in Moscow last Saturday told me there was a reason they were more amenable to this particular proposal for a European peace and security agenda: it was put to them by someone whose stance on the Ukraine war four years ago (“<a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2022/03/05/what-we-must-in-the-face-of-putins-criminal-invasion-of-ukraine-a-personal-view-plus-a-heartwarming-manifesto-by-russian-comrades/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Stand with Ukraine</a> but not with <a href="https://unherd.com/watch-listen/nato-expansion-was-never-about-security/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nato’s expansion</a>”) was attacked with equal venom by the Russian government’s supporters and Nato stalwarts. This may help explain the impromptu party atmosphere, following the proposal’s presentation, to which I <a href="https://x.com/BrianMcDonaldIE/status/2041210161105097169?s=20">surrendered</a> happily. Mending fences in the cause of peace takes a variety of small, human steps.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1055411</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Europe’s humiliation over Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2161516576-e1764526214252.jpg?w=551</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Peace deal</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['I find it personally painful to watch Kaja Kallas make a fool of herself with an often-uninformed war-mongering discourse that lacks any strategic content.' Kevin Dietsch via Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 01:29:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1039343</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Kaja Kallas is embarrassing to watch]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>We are on the eve of modern Europe’s most humiliating defeat. Donald Trump is pushing ahead with his peace plan for Ukraine, and there are no Europeans in the room. I am not surprised. The Europeans have no strategy of their own to end the war. All they want is to frustrate the peace process, for they have no agreed strategy to deal with post-war Ukraine.</p>
<p>How did Europe get in a position where it has no strategic choices left? It is quite a reversal. Machiavelli, an Italian, was one of the early architects of modern strategic thinking. Strategic diplomacy reached a peak with Metternich and Talleyrand, the foreign ministers of Austria and France: each played an instrumental role in the Congress of Vienna. This was the ultimate peace conference, one that provided Europe with stability and security for a century. After the Second World War, the diplomatic giants were mostly Americans such as George Marshall, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger.</p>
<p>Beside the chess-board type diplomatic strategist, there is another kind: the long-term strategic actor. The most successful modern example is China. China’s transformation began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, at which Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reforms. It took three or four decades until these reforms translated into geopolitical power. During the transformation, uninformed Western opinion held that China was becoming more Western. The genius of the Chinese project was that it led others to underestimate it.</p>
<p>Both types of strategy, chess-playing and long-term scheming, have their place. Modern Europe has neither. We Europeans used to be good at the long-term stuff, like the Chinese today. The early European Economic Community was an example of a focused strategy to defragment Europe’s splintering economies. The single European market in the Eighties and early Nineties was the most important of the EU’s grand strategic projects, but also its last. To devise the single market, around 200,000 experts gathered in 2,300 technical bodies. They spent half a billion to one billion hours on it. That’s strategy. The euro was more ambitious than the single market, but it was not strategic, because the EU never built upon it. The EU could have turned the euro into a challenger to the US dollar, but that would have required different economic policies, like the introduction of a European sovereign bond.</p>
<p>When strategy fades, action turns first into reaction, and eventually into delusion. The Europeans do not have the foggiest idea of how to help Ukraine defeat Putin on the battlefield, and yet they dream of dragging him in front of the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Their discourse is about the rule of law. They are prosecutor, jury and judge in their imagined trials. They think of themselves as on the right side of the virtue-signaling spectrum.</p>
<p>I find it personally painful to watch Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, make a fool of herself with variably informed war-mongering discourse that lacks any strategic content. But she is not the only one. I have yet to identify a single official in any national capitals, including London, who has a strategy to end the Ukraine war. There is no one who has done the math of the military capabilities Ukraine would need, on the logistics of how to produce or procure it. There is also no strategy whatsoever on how to finance it.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;I have yet to identify a single official in any national capitals, including London, who has a strategy to end the Ukraine war.&#8221;</div>
<p>Take the French contribution, or lack thereof. Emmanuel Macron is one of the loudest cheerleaders for Ukraine. And yet the French government is allocating a mere $120 million for Ukraine aid in its 2026 budget. Italy and Spain, another two large European countries, also spend little. The Germans and the UK are not in a position to bankroll this operation.</p>
<p>Do European leaders believe their meager contributions can deliver a Ukrainian victory? A dead giveaway is the overuse of the passive tense. They don’t say: &#8220;We will do whatever it takes to defeat Putin.&#8221; They do say: &#8220;Putin must be defeated&#8221;. In other words: We want Ukrainian soldiers to die and American taxpayers to pay. In a rare moment of candor, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, admitted only last week that the European taxpayer is not going to pay for it. Indeed.</p>
<p>When Trump came to power, he demanded that the Europeans increase their defense spending from just under 2% of GDP to 5%. The Europeans agreed immediately. And they are raising the money through debt.</p>
<p>Faced with Trump’ demands, a strategic approach on the part of the Europeans would have been to identify the precise shortcomings of the continent’s defense, like staffing, technology, and military procurement, and compare them to existing capabilities. The second step would have been to devise a strategy to acquire what is needed and start with the development of new technologies. Then you calculate what it costs under different scenarios and make the corresponding budget allocations. At this point we have to remember that ammunition made in Germany costs five times as much as what the Russian army pays for.</p>
<p>Ultimately, defense spending is called spending for a reason. It is not investment. Trying to fund it through debt is self-defeating. Considering that we are talking about a defense strategy, this approach is monumentally stupid. A strategic thinker asks: What sacrifices do we make so we can match Russia’s military capability? A European military planner asks: how do much do we need to borrow to get ahead in the defense spending league tables? Defense spending targets are what you end up with when you have no strategy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2247393568.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump has called Europe&#039;s bluff</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>When people don’t have strategies, they often seek refuge in procedures — to a point where the procedures take on a life on their own. Since the war began, the EU has passed 18 packages of sanctions against Russia. The sanctions have been an abject failure, but Brussels refuses to acknowledge it. The officials did not think this through. They are shocked to see that China supported Russia, that sanctioned goods flow through Kazakhstan. Some EU countries still buy Russian oil and gas because they are dependent on it. Partly as a result, the Russian economy has massively outperformed that of Europe since the start of the war. Whereas Europeans are drowning in debt, Russia is an example of fiscal strength. Unwilling to make cuts to their bloated welfare spending, the Europeans have identified the frozen Russian assets as the only way to finance the war. Even with that money, they do not have a strategy to end the war, either through victory or peace. The simple goal is to keep the show on the road. That’s what non-strategic procedural thinking does to you.</p>
<p>It also makes you dependent. By outsourcing all strategic thinking, the Europeans have become dependent on the US for defense and trade. Now they get angry with Trump for excluding them from meetings.</p>
<p>Trump, like the Europeans, is not a strategic actor of the kind I describe, but this is for different reasons. Trump’s politics are transactional. He likes peace because war is bad for business. Trump could not care less about whether Putin broke international law. To the European diplomats who huddle in the antechambers of the peace process, Trump’s attitude is disturbing and alienating.</p>
<p>The Germans, with their special business relationships with Russia, used to be more like Trump. German politicians had their own private channels with Russian counterparts, just as Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy, does today. The Germans used to be the largest crowd in the St Petersburg International Economics Forum, Russia’s answer to Davos. Now I am hearing that the hotels in Moscow and St Petersburg are filled with Americans hoping to strike lucrative deals with Russia. It is an ironic twist of fate, for it was the US that tried to force Germany to abandon the Baltic Sea gas pipeline between Russia and Germany. Now there is talk of the Americans injecting themselves as the middleman to sell Russian gas to Germany. You could not make this up.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europes-century-of-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europes-century-of-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Trump-VS-Ursula.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europes-century-of-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europes-century-of-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe’s century of humiliation</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europes-century-of-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>I expect the Germans will eventually rejoin the Russia-is-open-for-business club. They are distrustful of the French in military affairs, and they don’t have any ambitions for the EU to develop into a global strategic actor. They may want to reconnect with the only vaguely successful independent economic partnership they had this century — with Russia.</p>
<p>There is a lot of literature on the subject of why nations rise and decline. My own favorite is Mancur Olson’s <em>The Rise and Decline of Nations</em>, published in 1982. It explains that Japan and Germany succeeded in the post-war period because the war destroyed political and elite systems. For Olson, decline is preceded by a slowdown in innovation, a focus on redistribution of wealth, and the power of special interest groups. His method perfectly describes not only the rise of Japan and Germany, but also both countries’ subsequent decline. The socio-political factors that Olson describes as the cause of national decline happen to be exactly the same as those that discourage strategic thought and action. Europeans think they can safeguard their welfare and their influence through regulation, procedure, the rule of law, and international institutions. The Europeans dream of a world in which no one acts strategically. This is also a world in which innovation is rare, a world without disruption and creativity.</p>
<p>Like no US president before him, Trump exposes Europe’s delusions, its lack of a strategic thinking and action. This is why the Europeans hate him so much. And to no avail. It promises to be another bad week for Kallas et al.</p>
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					<title>What will the Gaza deal unleash?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/10/what-will-the-gaza-deal-unleash/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/10/what-will-the-gaza-deal-unleash/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/blued-1-300x300-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Will a better day dawn Jack Guez/AFP.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 23:03:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 11:00:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinians]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1032584</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Regional peace is a bad bet]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Amid the immediate joy of the hostage families, and the victorious crowing of the American President, Gaza’s peace plan may yet produce a long truce. Beyond the politicking of outsiders — Donald Trump’s quest for personal glory, Qatar’s desire to draw closer to the White House — fatigue among the combatants has brought an end to the fighting for now. And from a distance, certainly, neither Hamas nor the Palestinians envisioned the damage Jerusalem would unleash after militants slaughtered and kidnapped Israeli civilians two years ago.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Contrary to the way this agreement has been sold by the White House and Benjamin Netanyahu, then, it offers Hamas an opportunity to assess, while not being bombed, the ways and means for it to continue its rule over Gaza. Given the carnage, the Islamist outfit will likely remain on a tightrope, playing Palestinian hatred of Israel off against the desolation it has provoked. Islamic history offers a long record of martyrdom losing its appeal when the unrighteous prove stronger and more fierce than expected. Hamas is calculating that with both Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners safely exchanged, fear of a long-lasting insurgency will keep it in power. It’s a decent bet.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With any luck, the 250 Palestinians in jail for life, and who are now being released, might also reenergize the resistance. Hamas’ stubborn fearsomeness, fortified by all those tunnels, has certainly guaranteed that outsiders will approach Trump’s indispensable idea of an “international stabilization force” for post-war Gaza as a worthy recommendation best staffed by others. Are American, Emirati, Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, European, or, least likely of all, Palestinian Authority (PA), forces really going to patrol the Strip if Hamas fighters remain there to ambush them?</p>
<p dir="ltr">If Trump can finally get a stabilization force into the Strip — and that’s a big if — a slow but bloody harassment would likely be enough to keep the force’s effectiveness similar to that of a typical UN peacekeeping mission: basically useless. If Qatar calls off Al Jazeera, and the Saudis tell their myriad press outlets to limit Gazan reporting, Hamas may find it hard to show the world that other Arabs are thumping on Palestinians. But that potential advantage is nonetheless unlikely to convince them from jumping into the Gaza morass, especially when everyone from the Gulfies to Egypt held their distance from the Palestinian imbroglio.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/hamas-is-not-invincible/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/hamas-is-not-invincible/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-507783258-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/hamas-is-not-invincible/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/hamas-is-not-invincible/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is not invincible</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/12/hamas-is-not-invincible/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The biggest beneficiary of such a force, at least in the short term, would be the Israelis. The burden of policing Gaza would be lightened. Lots of Arabs now deal with the Jewish state, those within the Abraham Accords pretty publicly. The Gaza conflict may not have changed those exchanges much: given the private distaste that many Arab leaders have for Palestinians. The recent leaked Pentagon documents about regional cooperation against Iran and other threats since October 2023 surely reflect what’s been true since at least the First Iraq War in 1991, when many Palestinians sided with Saddam Hussein. But no Arab ruler has ever asked their soldiers to bleed for the Israelis — or the Palestinians. Across each of their four wars with Israel, Arab rulers definitely weren’t vying to create a Palestinian state. So unless the Gazans bring down Hamas from the inside, the group will likely rule the Strip’s rubble since no one else is going to volunteer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) obviously need a break from two years of constant combat. Even among the most hawkish of Israelis who believe the Palestinians — not just Hamas — share the guilt for what happened on October 7, war weariness is almost universal. In Gaza and on the West Bank, Israel hit the ceiling of how much manpower it can continuously deploy. It’s now crystal clear that most Israelis adamantly don’t want to reoccupy Gaza. Most Israelis would probably love to see an international stabilization force move in, even if such a deployment curtailed Israeli actions. Jerusalem obviously can’t trust Cairo to keep arms from crossing over the Egyptian-Gaza border. The Israelis might trust the Americans to stop arms from flowing through Hamas tunnels, but that would mean turning US troops, who would have to build a substantial security perimeter, into both an occupying force and a target for Hamas.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It’s now crystal clear that most Israelis adamantly don’t want to reoccupy Gaza.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Limited Israeli occupation therefore still seems inevitable. Walling off the Palestinians in Gaza didn’t work brilliantly before. Rebuilding the Strip will offer ample opportunity to Hamas, or indeed other militants, to divert materials for underground bunkers. Unless the Israelis can check everything that comes into the Strip, Hamas or others could also begin to reconstitute crude but deadly missiles and mortars. The opportunities here for corruption and anti-Israeli sympathies, especially if Arab forces given policing duties, would surely be more than Israel could bear. Jerusalem might accept Americans, maybe Europeans, to verify Palestinian behavior. But if Hamas regains freedom of movement throughout all of Gaza — if Israel doesn’t have internal checkpoints from which to launch rapid operations — the IDF could once again find itself committing much larger forces later: with all the death and destruction that’ll inevitably entail. Without a Western-led stabilization force, willing to commit to years in Gaza, the Israelis will somehow need to fill the void.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All the while, Israelis hope the cessation of hostilities will make their country less of a pariah. They have traditionally had a close relationship with Europe, and would eagerly welcome less hostility. Images of Gaza in rubble likely won’t animate as much anger as those of active urban warfare. All Israelis would like to see the erosion of American support stopped; Netanyahu has no interest in bushwhacking the President’s peace-making. Trump’s current Gaza plans, as vague as they are, seem to be less delusional than his first-draft, “Las-Vegas-by-the-Sea” dreamscape. The harsh realities of postwar Gaza will tax Trump’s attention span, however, especially once it becomes obvious the stabilization force has zero chance of working without US troops entering harm’s way. Nor will a ceasefire resuscitate the lost affection on the American Left for Israel, especially worrying when their critiques increasingly cut to the very heart of the Zionist project. Pro-Israeli sympathies on the American Right may be somewhat safer — unless Trump actually sends US troops off on yet another Middle Eastern adventure.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For the moment, then, all Trump has actually achieved so far is the hostage-prisoner exchange. Netanyahu has agreed to the release of several stone-cold killers, though drew a red line at Marwan Barghouti, a significant player in the Second Intifada whom an Israeli court found guilty of the murder of five Israelis. Politically talented even behind bars, and fluent in Hebrew, Barghouti is undeniably charismatic. Since he’s been in jail for 23 years, he&#8217;s also untouched by the rampant malversation that defines the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas, Yasser Arafat’s successor.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/gaza-is-the-endpoint-of-liberal-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/gaza-is-the-endpoint-of-liberal-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2226742318.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/gaza-is-the-endpoint-of-liberal-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/gaza-is-the-endpoint-of-liberal-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Gaza is the endpoint of liberal democracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/gaza-is-the-endpoint-of-liberal-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Were Barghouti freed, he might try to force new presidential and legislative elections. Palestinian democracy died in 2006, when Fatah, the most powerful member of the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization, refused to recognize Hamas’s victory in legislative elections: something Fatah achieved with the approval of both Israel and the United States. Today, though, Barghouti might well triumph in a similar vote.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With more access to the press, Barghouti could make a lot of noise in favor of a two-state solution; unlike a growing number of Palestinians, and just about all Israelis, he still seems to like the idea. Israelis surely fear his disruptive potential: even without an election victory, Barghouti might be able to engineer a third intifada on the West Bank, especially when violence by Jewish settlers only ever seems to worsen. The IDF and the internal security service, Shin Bet, have deployed a lot of manpower to the far side of the Jordan to ensure that another insurrection doesn’t happen.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Most Israelis and Palestinians, let alone all those in the West who’ve watched the Gaza war with horror, will surely cheer if the bloodletting truly ceases. It’s likely, however, that what’s left of the Hamas leadership and Netanyahu, the IDF, and Shin Bet are all looking down the road, trying to figure out how “peace” might reward the enemy. In his peacenik aspirations, President Trump appears well-intentioned. But good intentions really don’t matter, least of all in the Holy Land. Money doesn’t actually matter that much either, once the fighting actually starts. If it did, the Sunni Arab Gulf states would be powerhouses, easily a match for Iran and capable of suppressing Yemen’s ragtag Houthis.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As for Gaza and the West Bank, the preeminent question today is whether the Palestinians’ physical and emotional exhaustion leads them to recalculate the costs of their beliefs and actions. They have by far lost the most since October 7, 2023. If they have changed, and that finally depletes Hamas’s reserves of manpower, then Trump’s diplomacy might actually be the start of something positive, far-Right Israeli intransigence notwithstanding. Then again, optimism is usually a very bad bet in the Middle East.</p>
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