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		<title>American Empire - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>The world after Trump</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-world-after-trump/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Gray]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Trump’s rise was a by-product of the neo-liberal cult of globalisation.'  (Finn Gomez/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Gray</strong> is a political philosopher and author. His books include <i>The New Leviathans: Thoughts After Liberalism, Feline Philosophy: Cats and the Meaning of Life, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, Gray’s Anatomy: </i><em>Selected Writings</em>, and<i> Seven Types of Atheism.</i></p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a political philosopher and author. His books include <i>The New Leviathans: Thoughts After Liberalism, Feline Philosophy: Cats and the Meaning of Life, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, Gray’s Anatomy: </i><em>Selected Writings</em>, and<i> Seven Types of Atheism.</i>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:05:34 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:05:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hegemony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kleptocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1081354</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[He oversaw the end of the American age]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For future historians, Donald Trump’s awkward curtsey when greeting Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, when they arrived at the White House for tea in September of this year may serve as a turning point. In a genuflection not accorded to his allies, the President saluted the epoch he has brought into being. Impelled by a degenerate capitalism in which everything is for sale, and a singularly manipulable demagogue, America is aligning itself with the adversaries of what used to be called the Western world. As in the Yalta conference in February 1945, when a triumvirate of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union carved up Europe into spheres of influence, a new global order is taking shape. Unlike the Yalta settlement, which ended with the Soviet collapse, the international system projected by America, China and Russia today implies a precipitous retreat of Western power.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump’s presidency has now entered its most dangerous phase. With little left to lose after an earth-shaking midterm wipeout, he is released from political restraint. He has accepted the result with apparent grace, dismissing the fact that the elections were a referendum on his presidency with the assertion that he was not on the ballot — an amusing claim, since he spent the campaign saying the opposite. The mood in the party is somber. The Florida governor Ron de Santis, mooted as a presidential candidate, has described the results as “close to an extinction-level event for Republicans”. No doubt rightly, given its impact on prices at the pump, the vice-president JD Vance — also looking to his future — has averred “the reason we lost is the war”. They and many others are pointing the finger at Trump, but he may not care.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In control of the House and Senate, the triumphant Democrats can launch as many legal challenges as they like. They can block legislation, launch investigations into his crimes and impeach him, but he retains the presidential veto, and the supreme master of the attention economy will not be out of the limelight for long. An adventure in Cuba would be a welcome distraction, and he may yet trigger a greater cataclysm in the Gulf. Trump’s second administration is the experimental refutation of liberal legalism. Post-Trump America is not a constitutional republic but an illiberal democracy, the triumph of politics and executive power over law and procedure.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/john-gray-liberal-civilisation-is-finished/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/john-gray-liberal-civilisation-is-finished/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1229371664-e1696609480224.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/john-gray-liberal-civilisation-is-finished/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/john-gray-liberal-civilisation-is-finished/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>John Gray: liberal civilisation is finished</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/john-gray-liberal-civilisation-is-finished/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Gray</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Those who believe Trump shares a mindset with the world’s leading tyrants are mistaken. Neither the Russian nor the Chinese leader displays his all-consuming narcissism. Putin is an archetypal creature of the Soviet system</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">,</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> a cold-eyed killer schooled in the art of survival. Xi is a suspicious autocrat possessed by the insecurity of his position. Putin’s aggression combines self-preservation — his own survival inseparable from that of his regime — with a neo-tsarist vision of a mystical “Russian realm” targeted for destruction by the West. Xi’s “Chinese dream” is the project of making China into the global hegemon and an unapologetic affirmation of Chinese civilization.&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Embodying nothing except his own emptiness and venality, Trump is the ideal dupe for these flinty tyrants. Possibly he fears Putin as the possessor of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">kompromat </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">of some sort — there must be many possibilities — and he has certainly done business with the regime. But if Trump is behaving like a Russian asset, it is not because he was recruited as a Manchurian candidate in Moscow 40 years ago. Putin never expected Trump to become president (any more than Trump did himself) and seems to view him with bemused contempt. Trump sees the Russian dictator through the lens of his ideal self-image as strongman and admires him as a model of how to use state power to accumulate personal wealth.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Those who speak of the </span><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/02/putinization-america/681837/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Putinisation of America</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> can point to undeniable parallels. Putin is a master of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">vranyo</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, the Bolshevik practice of telling lies that both speaker and audience know perfectly well are falsehoods — as when he </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-idUSKBN0KU12Y20150121/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">denied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> that the “little green men” invading Crimea in 2014 were Russian troops. The goal</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">is not persuasion but domination: by imposing a narrative that is transparently false, the very idea of a domain of facts independent of power is undermined. With his incoherent boasting — claiming to have “</span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2025/06/irans-nuclear-facilities-have-been-obliterated-and-suggestions-otherwise-are-fake-news/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">completely and totally obliterated</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">” Iran’s nuclear capability, then justifying a resumption of the war to destroy it — Trump also asserts power over facts. The difference is that Putin knows he is lying, whereas in Trump’s moment-by-moment solipsism, truth has no meaning.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For his critics, Trump is the kingpin of a Putin-style kleptocracy. It is true that his second administration has seen the presidency monetized to an <a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/will-corruption-catch-up-with-the-trumps/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unprecedented degree</a>. Diplomacy has become a rent-seeking family business. Insider trading has been normalized. In August of this year, the Trump Media and Technology Group (TMTG) launched a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/bloomberg-two-trading-firms-agree-pay-trumps-truth-social-faster-access-2026-10-29/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">premier data feed</a> allowing Wall Street banks and high-frequency trading firms access to his market-moving Truth Social posts milliseconds before they become available to the public, with subscribers paying a hundred thousand dollars a month for the service. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">By the time they leave office, Trump, his family and acolytes will have amassed immense riches. Likewise, Putin’s extraction of capital from Russia’s economy has, </span><a href="https://fortune.com/2022/03/26/elon-musk-says-hes-probably-not-richest-man-in-the-world-putin-significantly-richer-than-me/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">by some estimates</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, made him richer than Elon Musk. Yet wealth and government interact differently in Putin’s Russia and Trump’s America. Under Trump, the US is ruled by a variant of capitalism in which the state is used as a means of corporate enrichment at the expense of America’s strategic interests. In Russia’s version of state capitalism, corporate influence is curbed when it threatens the state itself. The same is true in China.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">When Russia’s richest oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, became involved in opposition politics and negotiations to sell part of his oil company, Yukos, to American firms, he was arrested at gunpoint on his private jet, sentenced to 10 years in a Siberian penal colony and Yukos bankrupted. When the CEO of the Alibaba Group, Jack Ma, criticized China’s financial regulators, he was taken out of circulation and his business empire dismantled. In contrast, the Trump administration authorized the export of high-end computer chips of Jensen Huang’s Nvidia for export to China. During Xi’s visit to Washington, Trump bent the knee in more than one sense. He reportedly pitched the Chinese leader regarding purchases of American military technology, violating decades-long commitments to Taiwan and other allies. He prioritized corporate gain over national security and America’s standing in the world.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump’s “transactional” diplomacy consists of the exchange of American power for promises of private gain. The settlement of the Ukraine war being brokered by Trump’s special envoys, his son in law, Jared Kushner, and the real estate investor Steve Witfkoff, follows this playbook. A multibillion-dollar deal to acquire the international holdings of Lukoil, Russia’s largest remaining private oil company, has apparently been discussed, along with reopening the Nord Stream pipeline, blown up in September 2022. Elon Musk’s Space X — on Trump’s instructions, according to Musk — imposed speed limits on Starshield, which allowed Ukraine to intercept Russian drone and missile attacks. Sanctions have been paused, and Trump has called more than once for Zelensky’s removal. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Embodying nothing except his own emptiness and venality, Trump is the ideal dupe for these flinty tyrants.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump’s aim is full-scale economic détente with Russia, which he believes will realize large profits for him and his coterie. Very likely he and they will benefit, but there is something spectral about the fabulous wealth envisioned in these sordid machinations. Why should Putin respect the terms of any deal? The “energy ceasefire” Trump believed he had agreed with him was flouted within hours. Much of Trump’s chicanery is based on fantasies — the reverse of</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400"> realpolitik</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. If Ukraine is being sold out, it may be for next to nothing. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Lured by dreams of financial gain, Trump has torn up whatever remained of an American-led “rules-based” order. This is more than the much-discussed passing of a unipolar order. American power is imploding, with the post-Cold-War leviathan now a floundering, flailing behemoth. Rather than an “unreliable friend”, the US seems closer to the enemies of the countries that depended on it for their security. Yet there can be no assurance that America’s new strategic partners will keep their end of the deal. When they met in St Petersburg in October, Witkoff praised Putin as a “humanitarian” for releasing an American prisoner captured in eastern Ukraine in April 2022. Such a toadying eulogy may be understandable. For the US, Yalta 2.0 may yield little more than the prisoner’s release. The presumed exchange is that Russia ends its support for Iran while the US forces Ukraine to surrender; but America has no way of ensuring Russia’s compliance, let alone that of China or Iran.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Iran debacle itself began with a whim that set in motion a fateful escalation. The illusory prospect of another Venezuela-style coup, semi-magical in its flawless operational execution, was irresistible. What Trump described in March as “a little excursion” has been a forced march to strategic defeat. The result of decapitating the Iranian leadership has been to install a military dictatorship more repressive than the decaying theocracy it replaced. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has become a permanent threat to the Strait of Hormuz. The pre-war status quo, in which it was an open international waterway, is irrecoverable. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;American power is imploding, with the post-Cold-War leviathan now a floundering, flailing behemoth.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This was not unforeseen. Similar bombing campaigns have been war-gamed many times, with similar results. As Barbara Tuchman showed in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> (1984), history is not so much a catalog of error as a succession of follies whose consequences can be known in advance. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">However the war develops, America has forfeited its position in the Middle East. Over the past months, its bases in the Gulf and Iraq have been disabled and its armories depleted. Tens of billions of dollars have been expended using costly missiles against cheaper and more quickly replaceable drones. Iran’s partner in the “Axis of Resistance”, the Houthis have turned another vital waterway, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, into a high-risk corridor, while launching a deadly wave of strikes on Saudi airports and refineries.The Gulf monarchies are constructs of European colonialism propped up by American security guarantees that have proved effectively worthless. It cannot be long before regime change comes to the Kingdom, weakened by festering rivalries within the House of Saud since Mohammed bin Salman’s Ritz Carlton coup in November 2017. How could the debt-laden US withstand the collapse of the petrodollar, which channeled Saudi oil revenues into an AI-led stock market bubble already showing signs of bursting? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Another “short, intensive” bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear and energy facilities, which seemed to be prefigured in the “limited” American strikes on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz early this week, would only postpone a further American retreat. Trump’s curtailing aid to Israel has been seen as reducing the likelihood of a resumption of the war. But Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump may still think they can “finish the job”.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Iran’s economy is being slowly strangled by the American naval embargo that is blocking its seaborne oil exports. Yet the regime retains the capacity to devastate the Gulf’s energy production, causing acute shortages of diesel — the fuel on which the global economy runs — and irreplaceable agricultural chemicals. Undersea cables and data centers could also be attacked. The true Iranian nuclear option is disabling water and desalination plants. Weaponizing its geography, with its mountainous streams, inland rivers and lakes, Iran could wreak an enormous civilian catastrophe in the desert kingdoms of its Gulf enemies. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">At a global level, a species of total war is already underway. In the delirium of the Western mind, Gaza has been singled out as a unique catastrophe, but the reach of the battlefield into civilian life is practically universal. In Ukraine, Putin’s relentless bombardment destroys schools and scientific academies and cuts off electricity and water, aiming to render Kyiv uninhabitable and drive out millions of desperate refugees. Across Europe, Russia is orchestrating assassination, arson and cyber-strikes, together with drone strikes that could easily spiral into mass casualty events.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Baltic and Nordic states have fortified their defenses, but most European countries seem paralyzed. Poland — the most militarily prepared — is in the throes of constitutional crisis. Emmanuel Macron’s technocratic centrism has reached its endgame. Teetering on the edge of default, the Fifth Republic is rehearsing the upheaval that will come when Marine Le Pen enters the Élysée Palace — as must now be likely — and Jean-Luc Mélenchon mobilizes an insurrection against her. “Cost-of living” rioting and looting has spread to Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Germany, Switzerland and Albania, among other countries. It is hard to envision the French banlieues and AfD strongholds in former East Germany accepting the cost of deploying European troops indefinitely in Ukraine. Nor is it clear that Europe could afford to forgo the billions of euros’ worth of oil and gas it buys from Russia (which help Putin fund the war). A European solution is a mirage, and for all the heroic resourcefulness of its struggle, Ukraine cannot go it alone. Unless Zelensky’s supporters in Washington can somehow tie Trump’s hands, the logic of the situation is a brutal partition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In America, Trump’s rise was a by-product of the neo-liberal cult of globalization. It was not simply an increase in inequality that stoked “populist” revolt. Whole sections of society were denied any productive role. Capital was exported and manufacturing offshored, labor imported and communities abandoned. With their workless families, drug habits and short lives, the human detritus of American industry could be safely left to molder on their reservations. Yet post-industrial decline has now affected much of the middle class. Occupations and career structures have melted into air. Neoliberal economics was the enterprise of re-engineering capitalism without a bourgeoisie, and the hollowing out of middle-class life has continued under Trump’s corporate kleptocracy. There was bound to be a countermovement from the Left. New York mayor Zohran Mandami’s “democratic socialism” is not a movement of organized labor. Like Jeremy Corbyn’s and Zack Polanski’s movements, it is a bourgeois populism, varnishing the status anxieties of heavily-indebted graduates and downwardly-mobile professionals with high-rent progressive causes. Incubated in campus seminaries of anti-Western orthodoxy, Mamdani’s leftism is set to be a deciding force in Democratic politics. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A sea change is underway in the Republicans as well. As he limbers up for a presidential campaign in 2028, JD Vance is cultivating the same nativist constituency that is the audience of Tucker Carlson — aside from Trump, America’s most accomplished demagogue. A devil’s brew of anti-Semitism, historical revisionism and conspiracy theory is shaping up as the ruling ideology of the MAGA Right. As in Europe, the old center ground no longer exists. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/where-is-trumps-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/where-is-trumps-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-1229208702.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/where-is-trumps-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/where-is-trumps-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Where is Trump’s heir?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/where-is-trumps-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> B. Duncan Moench</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The midterm clean sweep was a repudiation of Trump more than an endorsement of the Democrats. The winners included Dr Abdul El-Sayed (Michigan, US Senate) and Dr Abdul Hamawy (New Jersey, US House), Egyptian-born Muslims closely aligned with the progressive wing of the Democrats who campaigned strongly against the war. Foreign policy positions that used to be bipartisan are being questioned and rejected in both parties. Europeans who are still invested in the notion that the Trump era is an unfortunate anomaly would be wise to think again. Nothing is further from reality than a reversion to Nikki Haley-style interventionism. It is not fantastical to see the US becoming the first advanced post-Western state and joining Russia in a China-led Eurasian bloc.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">That does not mean such a concert of powers would be stable. If a trilateral summit between Xi, Putin and Trump is held at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Shenzhen scheduled for later this month, their exchanges may well come to nothing. In some ways this looks less like February 1945 and more like the run-up to August 1914. Now as then, great powers are engaged in wars for control of natural resources against a background of tangled and shifting alliances. With multiple players and no one in charge, miscalculation by any of them could bring disaster on all.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Another future is possible, however. Rather than drifting towards another Great War, we may be entering an era of peace. A curious kind of peace, to be sure, accompanied by unending bloodshed. Proxy wars and urban terrorism will rage unabated. War and peace will, in effect, be one and the same. The West will cease to exist as a geopolitical or civilizational bloc. But joining forces with its adversaries will fuel another stock market boom, and what neo-Marxian theorists fondly call “late capitalism” will enjoy a new lease of life. Having used the neoliberal interlude to build a mercantilist juggernaut, China will re-establish globalization in a dirigiste form that entrenches its economic primacy, with Russia exploited as a vassal state. A certain equilibrium will prevail, underpinned by the shared interests of transnational ruling classes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Then again, none of this may come to pass. The future may not be advancing authoritarianism but accelerating disintegration. If Taiwan is not easily absorbed, Xi’s autocracy may be overthrown, and China could revert to disunity of a kind recurrent in its history. Putin might be toppled by war-weary oligarchs, only to be replaced by a more extreme anti-Western despot ruling a nuclear-armed Muscovy surrounded by breakaway fiefdoms. The United States may fragment, with enclaves of anarchic high-tech vitality booming alongside wastelands of poverty and desolation, presided over by an enfeebled federal government.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But of one thing we can be certain. Donald Trump has brought Western hegemony to a close. A world-historical figure as much as Napoleon or Mao, the founder of MAGA has ushered in a post-American age.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1081354</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How America went awry</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-america-went-awry/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-america-went-awry/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/image-23.jpg?w=626</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>America 250</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Samuel Moyn]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/blued-300x300-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Samuel Moyn</strong> is the Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and History at Yale University. His most recent book is <em>Liberalism against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times </em>(2023).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>samuelmoyn</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and History at Yale University. His most recent book is <em>Liberalism against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times </em>(2023).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 23:03:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 23:03:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America 250]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hannah Arendt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vietnam]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1065031</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Hannah Arendt was blind to the present]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/America-250.jpg" alt="America 250" /></p>
<p>Over recent years, few writers have been quoted as incessantly as Hannah Arendt. Or rather misquoted — for though Donald Trump’s first presidential win catapulted Arendt’s 1951 book on totalitarianism back into the bestseller list, her fans have largely <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ideas/philosophy/40685/you-have-misunderstood-the-relevance-of-hannah-arendt" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ideas/philosophy/40685/you-have-misunderstood-the-relevance-of-hannah-arendt&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1782570791390000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2g1-_myykT17pPSvuYKoAw">wallowed</a> in anachronism. Avoiding her most arresting insights, they have instead reimagined Arendt as a kind of Resistance liberal, offering warnings of what happens when “politics as usual” is shamefully disrupted.</p>
<p>“Once again,” wrote Anne Applebaum in her new introduction to the re-publication of <em>Origins of Totalitarianism</em> in 2024, “we are living in a world that Arendt would recognize.” Which makes Arendt’s own response to America’s 200th anniversary so useful now, as Trump’s cage-filled 250th celebrations reach their climax. For the truth is that the philosopher’s own example actually proves she was far more thoughtful about her present than her contemporary followers are of theirs — even if her own hunt for usable versions of American patriotism ended up fomenting its own mistakes.</p>
<p>The most critical Arendt ever got of the United States was in a public <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1975/06/26/home-to-roost-a-bicentennial-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1975/06/26/home-to-roost-a-bicentennial-address/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1782570791390000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2z3bi1yOagikDsBJ_kiVCW">lecture</a> in Boston, 50 years ago, to mark the 200th birthday of her adopted land the year before it was celebrated. It wasn’t, she reflected, an anniversary that inspired much confidence in the future. Nor was the problem one disastrous politician, even one as nefarious as Richard Nixon. It was, rather, where capitalism and empire were taking the country, as Arendt looked out at “an increasing disarray in the very foundations of our political life”.</p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, America had gone down to ignominious defeat. The attempt to prop up South Vietnam after the “peace” in 1973 had only led to more war, and the emergency airlift of anyone who could make it out from the roof of the United States embassy in 1975. (Arendt gave special attention to the now almost forgotten “Operation Babylift”, which spirited thousands of orphans out of Saigon before the city fell.)</p>
<p>At home, Nixon’s resignation in 1974 came with soul-searching about how executive mendacity and secrecy undermined trust in government. Indeed, the Pentagon Papers publication had revealed — Arendt suggested — that the agonizing loss in Vietnam wasn’t half as bad as the fact that it took so long for Americans to register the truth about the war, since modern “public relations”, and not just age-old concealment and lying, had obscured their failures.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/size-mattered-for-the-founding-fathers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/size-mattered-for-the-founding-fathers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-544285512.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/size-mattered-for-the-founding-fathers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/size-mattered-for-the-founding-fathers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Size mattered for the Founding Fathers</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/size-mattered-for-the-founding-fathers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Andrea Wulf</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Instead of celebrating anniversaries simplemindedly, Arendt concluded, it was time to confront how badly the American experiment had gone awry. The crimes, mistakes, and sins of the immediate past were like chickens coming home to roost, in the phrase made famous by Malcolm X and which Arendt chose as the title of her speech when it was published in the <em>New York Review of Books</em>.</p>
<p>Arendt claimed that returning to their beginnings could inspire Americans in crisis to overcome their blunders in the mid-20th century. The deeper past of the American founding, she suggested, offered a chance of transcending them. Let us, she admonished, not “forget these years of aberration lest we become wholly unworthy of the glorious beginnings 200 years ago”. In this, she channeled the spirit of her earlier classic <em>On Revolution</em>, which had presented the American Founding as a modern reprise of austere Roman republicanism. She disdained what many people, then and now, take to the beating heart of the American project: whether law, liberalism, or rights. Rather, Arendt thought, America had once exemplified political action for the sake of collective freedom, a value she worried was dying in the modern world.</p>
<p>Amid the celebrants of her day, Arendt certainly refused to look away from the anxiety and depression that the following two centuries had produced. Yet she, too, was stumbling — not so much because of her misunderstandings of the 1770s, as because she confused the stakes of the Seventies. Five decades on from Arendt’s speech, America ended up in the age of Trump — as a direct consequence of the forces unleashed in her day. But she didn’t see them coming.</p>
<p>In her piece, for instance, Arendt mourned “the erosion of American power” following the Vietnam fiasco. But when she mounted the Boston lectern to celebrate the Founding, she didn’t imagine that the Democrats and Republicans alike would move to renew America’s global power over subsequent decades: including its military muscle. For the Democrats especially, the catastrophic defeat of peace candidate George McGovern in 1972 cast the die. From Mogadishu to Kabul, other failed wars, and countless casualties, invariably followed.</p>
<p>The militarism of an American hegemon rehabilitated in the 50 years since Vietnam, alongside the greater damage it wrought around the world, left too many disaffected voters, displeased by the ignominy of their country’s record. It also left an opening for Trump to run twice as a peace candidate — even if he finally and unceremoniously betrayed that promise. All this is a reminder that, as great a theorist of the imperial origins of totalitarianism as she was, Arendt never did glimpse the possibility that America itself had been, or could indeed become, an empire.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Arendt never did glimpse the possibility that America itself had been, or could indeed become, an empire.”</div>
<p>Arendt had other ideological blind spots too. Her political theory had always resonated with the ideal of participatory democracy in things like the Port Huron Statement, the 1962 manifesto propounded by student activists. Yet she always preferred to recognize the political action stemming from the deep past of the American Revolution, or Greece and Rome before it, and perhaps in some evanescent modern situations like the French resistance or the Hungarian uprising of 1956.</p>
<p>In her lecture, Arendt raised doubts about her American modernity and its consumerist economy, its mendacious ad-men and image-managers. They were, she said, exactly what made the American Founding indispensable, because it demonstrated public-mindedness beyond private gain or pleasure.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, though, Arendt’s failure to anticipate a renaissance for war was matched by a misrecognition of economic transformation. She did not anticipate that the economic instabilities of the Seventies were giving rise to the neoliberalism of the era since. She acknowledged the economic events<strong>,</strong> inflation most notably, that defined her decade when the 250th ceremonies were held across the country. Yet in her flawed belief that failed wars are fueled by inflation — a consequence, perhaps, of her German background — she missed the deeper geopolitical reasons for her age’s economic malaise. Both the first oil shock and Nixon’s decision to float the dollar transformed America’s long-term fortunes, even as the neoliberal response to Seventies-era inflation soon redefined the national economy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/liberalisms-sin-was-born-in-the-cold-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/liberalisms-sin-was-born-in-the-cold-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-113494976-1-e1693059367268.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/liberalisms-sin-was-born-in-the-cold-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/liberalisms-sin-was-born-in-the-cold-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Liberalism&#039;s sin was born in the Cold War</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/liberalisms-sin-was-born-in-the-cold-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Samuel Moyn</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Even more than the return of American militarism, meanwhile, the economic choices beginning in the Seventies produced the most damaging aspects of our own time. It was the American carnage of neoliberalism, after all, that permitted Trump to run against his own party and then the Democrats for betraying the people in the name of “elites”. (Never mind that practically Trump’s only legislative accomplishment is a gargantuan tax cut he gifted to the rich in his first term and renewed in his second.) Talk about chickens coming home to roost!</p>
<p>“We may very well stand at one of those decisive turning points of history which separate whole eras from each other,” Arendt wrote, in one striking moment of clarity. “The dividing lines between eras may be hardly visible when they are crossed; only after people have stumbled over them do the lines grow into walls which irretrievably shut up the past.” When she asserted that people can confusingly stumble into a future so starkly different from the past that it makes their own confusion unintelligible, she was right not least about herself.</p>
<p>Indeed, beyond prompting skepticism of the restoration of American “normalcy” that Resistance liberals today so confidently counsel, Arendt’s greatest value is less about the dangers of prophecy — even if it’s striking that she was hardly the Cassandra of her own age. Rather, she reminds us how easy it is to miss what’s happening under our noses, and pretending that our past, even when we celebrate it, is where the cure for the rot can be found.</p>
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					<title>War is being hypernormalized</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/war-is-being-hypernormalised/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/war-is-being-hypernormalised/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[B. Duncan Moench]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Blue-33.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Nearly everything about Trump is larger than life, beyond belief, and too much to bear.' (Roberto Schmidt/ Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>B. Duncan Moench</strong> is a writer and scholar of American political culture. He also writes the <a href="https://producerist.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Producerist</a> Substack. <span class="im"><br />
</span></p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DuncanMoench</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a writer and scholar of American political culture. He also writes the <a href="https://producerist.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Producerist</a> Substack. <span class="im">
</span>]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2026 00:15:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 28 Mar 2026 00:15:16 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Absurdism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Post-liberalism]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1054131</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America is resigned to conflict]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As terrible as Donald Trump’s war is, you wouldn’t know it from America. Outside the political obsessives on Twitter or BlueSky, people here simply aren’t preoccupied about the blackouts and bombings — certainly not compared to previous foreign adventures. Forget the Gulf War or even Vietnam. When George Bush launched his so-called “shock and awe” campaign against Iraq less than a quarter of a century ago, it was gripping, must-watch TV. That’s just not the case now, with many Americans seemingly more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2026/mar/19/abc-bachelorette-season-cancelled-taylor-frankie-paul">exercised</a> by <em>The Bachelorette</em>. Yet this passive, numbing acceptance of an illegal and dangerous foreign war is about more than the triumph of celebrity nonsense.</p>
<p>A week before the Iraq War began, in the middle of the night, I got on a filthy, retired Greyhound bus commandeered by unreformed communists. Together we went to an anti-war protest on the Washington Mall. Roughly 50,000 people showed up. In the days before smartphones, it was easy for mainstream media outlets to downplay resistance to the war, or indeed pretend it didn&#8217;t exist. Many supported the Iraq War, but just as many did not. Either way, back in those lost pre-smartphone days, the country argued, protested, debated heavily and often. Many politicians and journalists embarrassed themselves repeating Bush propaganda. For good and for ill, talk about the war was everywhere, and that’s just not the case now.</p>
<p>Now, though, American politics now operates in a post-kayfabe era. In the sweaty, steroid-filled world of professional wrestling, “kayfabe” refers to the meticulously maintained illusion that everything in the ring is real: the melodramatic rivalries, the improbable alliances, the blood feuds. Up until the late Nineties, wrestling promoters protected this illusion because they believed the entire spectacle would crumble if the audience understood that the whole thing was choreographed. But as the new millennium dawned, rising public cynicism meant wrestling bosses stopped trying to hide the truth: and instead asked the audience to just embrace the ludicrous nature of the spectacle.</p>
<p>Something similar has happened in American politics under Trump — yet unlike what liberal politicians and commentators seem to believe, the fall of American kayfabe was inevitable. Trump was merely the conduit for obscene forces already at work within American institutions. The Iraq War, in many ways, was the last great performance of American political kayfabe. For anyone paying attention, the pretexts for the war in Iraq were comical — but at least people were paying attention. More than that, the government still felt obligated to construct a coherent narrative for war, the media still treated political messaging as something that needed to be defended, and the public still believed that exposing lies might actually change policy. The performance had not yet collapsed; the audience was still expected to believe the show was real.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us">the post-liberal, post-kayfabe</a> era of American politics, not only is the public too preoccupied with the latest happenings in their social media algorithms, nearly everyone has given up on the idea that American politics is anything other than the theater of the absurd. No one embodies that oeuvre better than Donald Trump himself. From his Dadaesque speeches to his frat-boy mannerisms, nearly everything about Trump is larger than life, beyond belief, and too much to bear. The President is the very definition of &#8220;over the top&#8221; — the living, breathing singularity of absurdity. The gravity of Trump&#8217;s supreme ridiculousness pulls nearly everything and everyone into its orbit, then down into a dark psychic funnel of confusion where we must constantly ask ourselves, <em>&#8220;Wait, did he really say that?&#8221; &#8220;Is he doing what I think he&#8217;s doing?&#8221; &#8220;This man is our President — is it all a joke?&#8221;</em></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Nearly everyone has given up on the idea that American politics is anything other than the theater of the absurd.&#8221;</div>
<p>It’s tempting, of course, to compare all this with previous debacles. Wasn’t Dubya a joke too? Well, it’s true that the Iran War, Iraq, and even Vietnam feel similar in their dubious justifications and blood-stained pointlessness. Nonetheless, the trajectory of this latest war continues to evolve along its own absurd imperial logic. Unlike with Lyndon Johnson, after all, no longer does the American president seem to care if the public deeply opposes the war, nor even if the Wilsonian pretense of &#8220;making the world safe for democracy&#8221; is even halfway believable. Trump simply proceeds as if his own population’s reservations didn’t exist, unabashedly pursuing not national self-interest but something closer to an nth-generation copy of “national self-interest” distorted through a childhood game of telephone.</p>
<p>Don’t believe me? Just compare Condoleezza Rice’s justification of the Iraq War:</p>
<p><em>The Iraqis are building weapons of mass destruction, we don&#8217;t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud — pass it on.</em></p>
<p>To Trump’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/NYPost/videos/trump-warns-us-down-to-the-final-moments-to-block-iran-going-nuclear/992758452227253/">meanderings</a> on Iran:</p>
<p><em>We are in the “final moments” to prevent Iran from getting a nukes… Not good… Not good.</em></p>
<p>So while it’s tempting to laugh, everything about the Trump era has been characterized not by comedy, but what late-stage Soviet anthropologist Alex Yurchak called &#8220;hypernormalisation&#8221;, a concept made famous by Adam Curtis in his 2016 film of the same name. Little could have been more prescient than Curtis seizing on this idea right before Trump took office.</p>
<p>“Hypernormalisation” describes the idea that during the later stages of a dying empire, politics becomes defined by bureaucratic ritualism, ideological decay, and surreal, performative politics. All the elites inside the Soviet Union knew that the leadership was lying. Eventually, by the early to mid-Eighties, Soviet citizens did too. The fraud of the whole system was obvious and undeniable. But nearly everyone went along with the charade anyway, because there was simply nothing else to be done. My fellow Americans: we are <em>here</em>. We know the language is fake, the justifications are recycled, and the outcomes are predictable, yet the machinery continues anyway.</p>
<p>Who, besides the most MAGA diehards, believe that the war in Iran is <em>necessary</em>, much less worth its absurd economic consequences? Whether it&#8217;s the price of gas at the pump, the inflation of everyday goods, or the possibility of food shortages due to the absence of necessary fertilizers, all of these downstream effects of the war in Iran are likely to be more economically consequential than anything that ever occurred because of Vietnam or Iraq. Yet Americans still can barely look up from their hand-held gambling apps and TikTok feeds to muster concern. Even as its consequences become intimate, the war feels distant and immovable.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://maristpoll.marist.edu/polls/war-with-iran-march-2026/">majority of Americans</a> disapprove of the war in Iran. An <a href="https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/54343-donald-trump-is-losing-support-from-independents-over-iran-march-13-16-2026-economist-yougov-poll">even greater majority</a> want the war to end quickly. Only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/just-one-four-americans-support-us-strikes-iran-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2026-03-01/">25% approved</a> of the initial air strikes that launched the war in the first place. Practically speaking, no one other than true-believer followers of Trump and Netanyahu wants what&#8217;s currently happening. Unfortunately Trump&#8217;s constant breaking of every norm of political etiquette over the last decade has so turned up the dial that Americans — and everyone on Earth — have been lulled into accepting it as normal.</p>
<p>Certainly, we all seem completely uninterested in trying to mobilize any kind of serious opposition. In the early days of Trump&#8217;s ascendancy, the Democrats and their legions of legacy-media allies jumped the gun so many times trying to portray Trump as a &#8220;fascist&#8221; and a &#8220;threat to democracy&#8221; — long before anything substantial actually took place — that we&#8217;ve all become numb to the grotesquely out-of-control actions now actually happening inside Trump&#8217;s White House. On Monday, according to the <em>Financial Times</em>, over <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1171d623-3709-4f6e-8ded-a5df4ec57696?syn-25a6b1a6=1&amp;utm">$580 million in financial bets</a> were made on the oil futures just 15 minutes before the President’s announcement of supposedly “productive conversations” with Iran.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-107987662.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Trump killed liberalism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/how-trump-killed-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> B. Duncan Moench</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Whether it was someone in the Trump family or their friends or confidantes, <a href="https://www.comsuregroup.com/news/mystery-trader-nets-millions-on-ultra-timed-oil-bet-just-minutes-before-trump-s-iran-de-escalation-announcement/">whoever made</a> these futures trades likely made out with more than $1 billion in profit. All this insider-trading corruption surrounding the White House has followed a distinct pattern throughout Trump’s second administration, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/07/wager-platform-polymarket-will-not-pay-out-on-bets-on-us-invasion-of-venezuela">polymarket bets</a> made prior to the conflict in Venezuela. While nearly every American I know is financially struggling, our political insiders extract generational wealth by gambling on events they control from start to finish.</p>
<p>In “normal” times — when the country wasn’t at war, facing mass job losses, or runaway inflation — these corruption scandals, which are worse than anything that happened under Nixon, would dominate the discourse. But Democrats and their media allies conducted perhaps the greatest “Boy Who Cried Wolf” campaign in modern Western politics. Long before Trump took office, they declared him an existential threat in the most alarmist terms possible. After a while, everyone stopped listening, which only contributed to our current hypernormalisation. Everything is always the &#8220;end of democracy&#8221; — and so nothing ever is.</p>
<p>Six months ago, when Pete Hegseth pushed for the Department of Defense to change its name back to the Department of War, it seemed little more than a perverse stunt. But, in fact, it couldn’t fit better with our new post-liberal, post-kayfabe reality. Just seven months later, Trump and Hegseth launched the most aggressive and unpopular war in the nation&#8217;s history and yet few Americans believe there&#8217;s anything to be done about it. That&#8217;s hypernormalization working its magic. The spectacle becomes so overwhelming, so frenzied, so totalizing, that you stop seeing it as a performance and start forgetting there was ever anything else.</p>
<p>The dystopia of the Iran war, then, is not that it began on illegal grounds, or that the justification for it barely makes any sense, or even that most Americans oppose it. Its dystopia lies in that none of this seems to matter. The machinery of the American empire now runs independent of public opinion, political norms, or even coherent rhetoric. Maybe Trump will &#8220;TACO&#8221; and wrap up the conflict in the next few weeks. Or maybe, to cover up his failure to anticipate the difficulties of the war, Trump will be the first head of state to drop a nuclear weapon post-Nagasaki. Who knows.</p>
<p>In 21st-century America, our wars begin, they spur corporate profiteering, and then presidential cronies suck billions out of our economic system placing bets on events only they can accurately anticipate. Everyone knows all this is happening, but the response is not outrage or protest — it’s total resignation. This is what hypernormalization looks like in practice. A society that knows what is happening, knows it is absurd, knows it cannot last, and yet continues behaving as if everything is perfectly <em>normal</em>. But, hey, maybe there&#8217;s something good on Paramount plus. I hear they&#8217;re merging with HBO Max, that might be alright… or unimaginably terrible. Who knows.</p>
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					<title>Peter Mandelson&#039;s failed revolution</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/peter-mandelson-failed-revolution/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/peter-mandelson-failed-revolution/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-83098944.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The tragedy of modern Britain is that Mandelson and his clique succeeded.' (Credit: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 00:20:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 15 Feb 2026 10:07:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epstein]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Globalisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mandelson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Revolution]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1048605</guid>
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								<![CDATA[New Labour sold Britain to the highest bidder]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There is something of late-career Le Carré in Lord Mandelson’s latest fall from grace, beyond the fact that the villainous politician Aubrey Longrigg of <em><a href="https://johnlecarre.com/books/our-kind-of-traitor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Our Kind of Traitor</a></em>, friend of oligarchs and corruptor of the body politic, is a vicious pen-portrait of Mandelson himself. Longrigg, “the most two-faced, devious, backsliding, dishonest and well-connected” of politicians, was for Le Carré “an archetype; a classic symptom of the canker that was devouring not just the City, but our most precious institutions of government”. The younger Mandelson, at least in print, would have shared the elderly writer’s moralizing rage. “Not only does Parliament look corrupt, it appears weak and powerless,” the MP for Hartlepool advised in his well-received 1996 tract on the necessity for a New Labour government, <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blair-Revolution-Can-Labour-Deliver/dp/0571178189" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Blair Revolution</a></em>, as “the respect in which politicians are held has been… damaged by the widespread impression that ‘they’re only in it for themselves’”.</p>
<p>As the architect of New Labour’s campaigning focus on Tory sleaze, warned his readers: the British voter’s faith in politics is squandered “when those who are elected to serve the public interest see nothing wrong in helping themselves to their own share of the consequent commercial rewards in directorships and consultancies. The idea that there is nothing objectionable about a public figure pursuing a dubious private commercial interest as long as it is declared is one of the most corrupting principles in public life today. As far as the electorate is concerned, many think we have a government that consists of business back-scratchers and a Parliament made up of politicians on the make.”</p>
<p>That two years later Mandelson was forced to resign for an undeclared loan from a parliamentary colleague, whose entanglement with the late press baron Robert Maxwell’s estate it was Mandelson’s remit, as trade and industry minister, to investigate, is more than just a piquant historical irony. After all, to have been once forced from office for perceived corruption and undue coziness with the interests of the super-rich may just be bad luck. By the third instance, the blame surely falls to the employer: the character of the person involved is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/feb/09/mandelson-machiavellian-victim-spin-doctor" target="_blank" rel="noopener">all too well-known</a>, and the pattern long-entrenched. As <em>Le Monde</em>, freed from English niceties, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/02/11/epstein-affair-the-downfall-of-peter-mandelson-the-evil-genius-of-the-british-labour-party_6750378_4.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">characterizes</a> New Labour’s Third Man, he is “the evil genius of the British Labour Party”, a “tactician fascinated by fame and money” who “showed contempt for morality and common social rules.” The scorpion stings because that is its nature; the blinking protestations of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Scorpion_and_the_Frog" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the frog</a>, clinging to the wreckage of his premiership, that such an outcome could not be anticipated are too absurd to be entertained.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-02-at-17.48.43.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Jeffrey Epstein&#039;s corrupt overclass</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Instead, the greatest, most ironic contrast that strikes today’s reader is not that between the younger Mandelson’s reformist, moralizing tone and the well-established tenor of his political career, but rather the yawning gulf between his domestic reputation and the raw facts of wealth and power unveiled by the ongoing Epstein revelations. The notorious “Prince of Darkness”, the fearsome and powerful intriguer at the heart of British governance, stands revealed in his email correspondence as more <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Widmerpool#Origins,_appearance,_personality">Widmerpool</a> than Machiavelli. Westminster’s ruthless operator, the terror of lobby journalism, comes across as a needy, social climbing arriviste, a grasping provincial striver dazzled by the opulent consumption of his rich friends and desperate to grab a slice for himself. So desperate, indeed, that his mentor Epstein even once rebukes him for his constant demands for favors. His New Labour memoir, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/18/peter-mandelson-third-man-memoirs"><em>The Third Man</em></a>, sent to Epstein for writing advice, is, the two friends discuss, merely a CV for a role at Deutsche Bank. Epstein dangles other glittering prizes before his friend. Would Mandelson like to sell an Israeli oil field for Ehud Barak, Epstein enquires. Why not? Would Mandelson like to involve himself in post-Tahrir Square Egypt, Epstein wonders? Why not? The affairs of nations, once the engine of history, had at the End of History become mere business opportunities: it must have seemed, back in the 2000s, as if the party would never end.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It must have seemed, back in the 2000s, as if the party would never end.&#8221;</div>
<p>The glittering, amoral world of Epstein and his associates, of the Russian oligarchs and Arab potentates and financiers who flit across the correspondence, is simply the end product of the world of globalization, and of America’s unipolar imperial moment, without which the New Labour project is incomprehensible. When we read Epstein and Ehud Barak venomously gossiping over the extravagant income Tony Blair has amassed as the consigliere of Central Asian dictators, we are granted a glimpse of the true architecture of the world New Labour sold us as unstoppable progress. &#8220;We live in the new global economy, and that there is no alternative to that,&#8221; the Mandelson of 1996 advised his readers, and this is the result. Just like Blair, whose planned post-premiership career of resolving the Palestine conflict while accumulating wealth was rather more successful at the latter than the former, it was fortunate for him that this brave new world would transpire to be so personally rewarding. Epstein was nothing more or less than a vampiric aristocrat of American empire, extracting whatever he desired from its outer reaches. Mandelson his eager courtier, risen from that same empire’s provincial backwaters. How meager and parochial British politics must seem from this exalted vantage point: it must have been hard to remember that the needs and desires of British voters ever mattered at all.</p>
<p>The age when a former prime minister could retire to obscurity in a quiet cathedral close ended with New Labour. Today, their second acts revolve around the imperial center. As the German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck observes in <em><a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/204-how-will-capitalism-end?" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How Will Capitalism End?</a>,</em> corruption, broadly defined, is simply a symptom of financialized capitalism in a globalized world, and the decaying social fabric of its host countries the result of a world in which “the rich may rightly consider their fate and that of their families to have become independent from the fates of the societies from which they extract their wealth.” If British industry did not notably prosper from Mandelson’s time overseeing it, smoothing its wholesale transfer into the portfolios of the globalized oligarchy, so be it. If the MP for Hartlepool more rapidly and dramatically prospered from New Labour’s time in office than did the people of Hartlepool, that is the nature of things. For all that Mandelson can <a href="https://x.com/NicholasGuyatt/status/2018793200035799238?" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proclaim</a> that the business dealings with Epstein, for which the police are currently investigating him, were in &#8220;the national interest&#8221;, the governance of Britain does not figure in this worldview as anything other than a career first act, the highest offices of the British state merely a provincial dry run for advancement in the higher world, among the richer people, who actually matter. When even the former Prince Andrew inserts himself in Epstein’s court, seeking rest and relaxation from the onerous privileges of his sinecure, we see, if not the secret harmonies of the world, then its true architecture, beneath the Westminster state’s ornately crumbling facade.</p>
<p>As for the little people, the truculent and aggrieved British voters whose anger was to be assuaged by the scraps from the big table, redistributed as a consolation prize for the loss of their industries and the wholesale recomposition of their cozily insular society, if their time has not yet come, Mandelson’s third downfall is the harbinger of when it will. It is ironic to recall, now that the near-revolutionary tumult of British politics is waved away by the Government’s dwindling band of supporters as a false consciousness imparted by hostile Right-wing agitators, that the younger Mandelson once spun visions of Britain’s near future as dark as anything now found on Twitter.</p>
<p>Imagining the future world of 2005, in which the public had failed to vote a reforming Labour government into office, Mandelson in <em>The Blair Revolution</em> conjured dark prophecies of the forthcoming “millennium riots”, in which “the army had been brought in” and his fictional upwardly mobile family had witnessed “their neighbors running screaming along the road”, their Georgian townhouses set ablaze. As a result, “there had been a middle-class exodus from London to the Home Counties, into hastily built private estates with perimeter fences and private security.” In the real world of 1996, the “breakdown of society in Britain”, typified by “a crime wave [that] was dismissed as exaggerated tabloid scare-mongering”, derived from the simple fact that “the nation has been in relative decline for a century”, and was baldly “a declining, post-imperial, economically second-rank nation, which is also increasingly divided and unequal”.</p>
<p>In his introduction to <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blair-Revolution-Revisited-Peter-Mandelson/dp/1842750399" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the 2004 reissue</a> of <em>The Blair Revolution</em>, Mandelson lamented Britain’s “bleak ghettos depressing the spirits of all who live in them, dominated by the fear of crime and racial tension, too often becoming centers of danger and desperation”, language now anathema to his ideological heirs. The British public had begun to despise its political class, he warned: “New Labour&#8217;s task now is to ensure that public opinion does not slip back into this sullen mood — or, at least, not permanently — and that a deeper, lasting connection is made between government and governed.” Does Mandelson feel New Labour achieved this, we wonder? Does he believe his wavering place at globalization’s most-luxurious table is justified by the transformations his faction wrought? Mandelson termed his mission a &#8220;permanent revolution,” creating “a long-term transformation of Britain” in which New Labour’s ideology “embeds itself in the fabric and social architecture” so that “our changes can be entrenched”. Indeed, he notes, “We want to create institutions across British society that people can point to in twenty and thirty years’ time and recognize as distinctly New Labour landmarks.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1711917308.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Farage is a Burkean</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Indeed we can: New Labour’s monuments are all around us. The tragedy of modern Britain is that Mandelson and his clique <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f5ce448-e46a-48f9-91d5-e63d87e63a09" target="_blank" rel="noopener">succeeded</a>. The wreckage of our society is a testament to the success of their project, a series of time bombs buried within Britain’s social and economic architecture. The Britain of 1996, the dismal object of Mandelson’s declinist rhetoric, now looks like a vanished golden age: an even partial return to it is the highest aspiration of Right-wing populism. The current prime minister’s project of governing Britain as if it were still 1997, taking off where his ideological forebears were so rudely interrupted by the British voter, was doomed from the start, because Starmer is fated to rule the volatile and rebellious country that New Labour created. The least popular prime minister since polling began is now condemned to eke out his mandate without power, at the helm of a fractious and moribund party that despises him, lurching from crisis to crisis, until the electorate’s final sentence of execution rescues him from his purgatorial reign.</p>
<p>A badly run country has become an ungovernable one, ill at ease with itself and looking inward for enemies. Lord Mandelson’s one, unintentional gift to Britain is in hastening the collapse of the rotten and crumbling superstructure of the politics he helped construct. The reams of internal correspondence soon to be released will provide Reform, the de facto party of opposition, with ammunition in <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/">its mission to undo</a> the Blair Revolution Mandelson once flaunted. As the director of Labour Growth, Mark McVitie, <a href="https://futureoftheleft.substack.com/p/the-things-we-think-and-do-not-say" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rightly observes</a>, the scandal is “the latest and most grotesque signifier of a political culture that cannot carry on in its current form”, and “what is undoubtedly worth saving in the liberal democratic settlement will not be saved by the people who have presided over its decay”. But the domestic tragedy of British dysfunction is inseparable from the country’s willed transformation into the fawning servitor of a corrupt transnational order. That it takes an American scandal to demolish the Government’s last lingering traces of legitimacy, our peripheral backwater administration haunted by the nefarious pleasures of its metropole, is only fitting. In his career’s final act Mandelson has become, just as Le Carré perceived, the squalid archetype for the British state itself.</p>
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					<title>The virtue of America First</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-virtue-of-america-first/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-virtue-of-america-first/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend spotlight</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Arta Moeini]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/new-blue-300x300-1.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump has helped usher in a new multipolar age. Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Arta Moeini</strong> is the Director of Research at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and founding editor of <em>AGON</em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>artamoeini</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of Research at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and founding editor of <em>AGON</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 23:15:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 27 Sep 2025 23:03:20 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Sovereignty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Realism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1030201</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Sovereign realism is the future]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For more than 30 years, Washington pursued a strategy built on globalist illusions: that America could serve as the policeman of the world, that it could enlarge Nato endlessly, extend security guarantees without limit, and launch interventions to remake societies in its image. These projects — sold under the pretext of the “rules-based international order” — have drained their strength while hollowing out the republic.</p>
<p>Now, though, the unipolar moment that began in 1989 is over. Yet what we see today is not fragmentation or chaos — but a return to normalcy. The international system is reverting to its natural condition: a <a href="https://chasfreeman.net/surviving-the-world-order-to-come/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">post-hegemonic, multi-nodal</a>, and regionalized world where sovereign, civilizational powers coexist and balance one another within their historical spheres of interest. Elsewhere, I have <a href="https://carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/requiem-rules-based-order" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> this process the Great Transition, one which emphasizes the re-emergence of geopolitical plurality and cultural multiplicity after a brief, artificial experiment in universalism.</p>
<p>If there is any coherence to a Trump doctrine, it is in recognizing this reality. And in this context, the Pentagon’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/05/pentagon-national-defense-strategy-china-homeland-western-hemisphere-00546310" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new</a> “National Defense Strategy” (NDS) offers a much-welcome shift. Accepting the <a href="https://www.agonmag.com/p/the-resumption-of-history-and-the" target="_blank" rel="noopener">return</a> of history and geopolitics, the proposed draft affirms the need to adapt to the changing international environment. It prioritizes defending the homeland and the contested boundaries of “<a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/03/07/welcome-to-imperial-america/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">American Sphere</a>” from extra-regional interference — over the global military containment of China or Russia. Yet many in Washington, and even some Trump appointees, will abhor this shift.</p>
<p>From the moment he came down that golden escalator, Trump declared war on the foreign policy blob — the bipartisan consensus that treated America as a sucker, paying for others’ security, underwriting institutions that constrained us, and intervening in conflicts that made us less secure. Whatever one thinks of his style or execution, his insistence on “America First” was a necessary corrective, a reminder that the first duty of American statecraft is to its own people.</p>
<p>Still, these welcome bouts of realism are not only bound to be interrupted by the expected fervors of moralism and tired shibboleths about US global leadership, but also by a deeper, more entrenched force: globalism. This globalism is less about free trade or international cooperation and more reflects a broad cognitive bias. It is not a coherent ideology but an ideational reflex so deeply institutionalized that it pervades our foreign policy establishment, our universities, and even some among the MAGA counter-establishment. It is not a cabal to be purged but a mentality that saturates the very air of Washington.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2214731781.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump can forge a new Middle East</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Arta Moeini </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This mindset itself manifests in two forms. The first is the liberal universalism of the Clintons, Bushes, and Obamas, who sought to expand alliances, international institutions, human rights organizations, and liberal democracy: all at gunpoint and in pursuit of a cosmopolitan dream of global homogeneity. In the post-Trump era, however, its more enduring variant is the militarized globalism of figures like John Bolton. This latter group insists on permanent unipolarity and American unilateralism, achieved via the primacy of the US military.</p>
<p>The Boltonians — and their acolytes in Jerusalem — weaponize a cartoonish idea of “Western civilization” in a Manichaean struggle against a caricatured notion of global barbarism and international terrorism. The liberal internationalists Trump deposed championed the universalism of US values and yearned for the “<a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2022/06/27/woke-imperium-the-coming-confluence-between-social-justice-and-neoconservatism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">woke imperium</a>”; for the Boltonians and closeted Neocons who successfully infiltrated the MAGA-verse, the universalism of imperial force reigns supreme. Nevertheless, both groups are globalist, both are dogmatic defenders of US global hegemony, and both find common cause in mortgaging American sovereignty at the altar of ideology.</p>
<p>Consider Ukraine. Nato expansion — promoted as the defense of liberal order — has in fact destabilized Europe and entangled America in an attritional war with no clear endgame. By offering promises America was neither willing nor able to fulfill, Washington <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/how-western-elites-exploit-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">walked</a> Ukraine down a primrose path that left it devastated, Russia emboldened, and Europe vassalized. Instead of securing stability, then, Nato expansion has deepened insecurity and forced America into another open-ended commitment very far from its vital interests.</p>
<p>Or take the Middle East, where the Boltonians have hoisted their flag most strongly. Just weeks ago, the United States found itself dragged into the Twelve-Day War between Israel and Iran. Despite the IDF’s heavy bombardment of Iranian military targets and nuclear enrichment facilities, shadowed by America’s own strikes, the war <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/did-iran-win-the-12-day-war/?lang=us" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demonstrated</a> once again that force cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity, technological know-how, or its will to rebuild. Iran <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/trump-can-forge-a-new-middle-east/?lang=us" target="_blank" rel="noopener">emerged</a> bloodied but resilient, its nationalism hardened. Yet Washington reflexively positioned itself as a co-belligerent — risking escalation, draining munitions, and distracting from higher priorities.</p>
<p>Besides the fact that both Europe and the Middle East are peripheral to America’s main strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere, as noted in the NDS, perhaps the highest priority for the savvy American strategist is ensuring US competitiveness in the 21st century through a project of national renewal. To remain a great power, Washington must urgently upgrade its infrastructure and manufacturing capacity, while creating regionally integrated supply chains for essential items like semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and microchips.</p>
<p>Instead, by remaining enmeshed in endless conflicts abroad, America has accumulated $37.5 trillion in <a href="https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/#:~:text=$37.,Debt%20to%20the%20Penny%20dataset." target="_blank" rel="noopener">debt</a>, devastating communities and harming the middle class. For most Americans, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-strikes-yemen-oil-port-in-deadly-escalation-of-trumps-campaign-against-the-houthis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bombing</a> the Houthis — whom they have never even met in real life — to protect maritime trade to Europe could never justify the costs. Additionally, rampant US intervention has serious military consequences, compounding their societal and economic impacts. In June, over less than two weeks, the US spent billions to defend Israel, depleting its global stockpiles of advanced missile interceptors like THAAD, even as it <a href="https://san.com/cc/us-spent-billions-on-missiles-defending-israel-needs-more/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exposed</a> serious vulnerabilities in its munitions procurement and overall military readiness. All this, it goes without saying, makes America less secure.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;By remaining enmeshed in endless conflicts abroad, America has devastated communities and harmed the middle class&#8221;</div>
<p>In any case, these examples reveal the deeper truth. Universalism in all its forms — whether liberal or militarized — erodes sovereignty, global cultural pluralism, and the righteous spirit that undergirds anti-hegemonic movements like America First. It collapses the diversity of civilizations into a single template, one to be imposed by force and maintained by empire. It multiplies and extends permanent commitments that serve the imperium and its managerial class, along the way betraying the republic’s <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/03/11/george-washington-and-the-birth-of-american-realism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">founding</a> principles.</p>
<p>Even strands of neorealism, such as John Mearsheimer’s brand of offensive realism, fall prey to this globalist bias: by globalizing great-power competition and advocating for China’s military containment, they portray international relations as nothing more than a mechanistic, Hobbesian race for hegemony, everywhere and forever. But this, too, is not realism; it is rationalized universalism. And it has led Washington, like Athens in Thucydides’ history, towards imperial overstretch and decay.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-strategy-of-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-strategy-of-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2214859454.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-strategy-of-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-strategy-of-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s strategy of peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-strategy-of-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> George Beebe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ultimately, a state can be a conservative commonwealth serving its people, or an empire enriching its special interests, war oligarchs, and security-rentier class. But it cannot be both. Yet for decades, America, corrupted by its globalist reflex, has chosen empire. In fact, our “bipartisan” foreign policy consensus has corrupted and redefined the “national interest” itself, turning it into a justification for permanent war.</p>
<p>The danger today is that the globalist bias — be it liberal or realist, Neocon or Boltonian — will keep us chained to the illusions of unipolarity, luring us with enchanting calls to hegemony like the sirens of Greek mythology. Fixating our gaze on the 20th century, and the postwar status quo, they reduce the world to a zero-sum battlespace between perpetual black and white blocs — encouraging endless military intervention while resurrecting old dogmas to justify them. In short, the globalist cognitive bias prevents us from conceiving a cohesive grand strategy for the post-hegemonic era that has now arrived, keeping us vulnerable and hastening our decline.</p>
<p>What the country needs now, instead, is something I’d call sovereign realism: a radical foreign policy unburdened by ideology, freed from the conceits of universalism, and grounded in the conservation of American strength. That means privileging sovereignty over universalist crusades, regional balances of power over global policing, selective protection over blanket primacy, and renewal at home as the foundation of strength abroad. It means diplomacy without illusions: talking to adversaries and allies alike based on reciprocity and strategic empathy, not sanctimony or moralism.</p>
<p>Above all, it means adopting a new approach that shapes itself to the polycentric world at hand, rather than resisting it with futile bids for unipolarity. The Great Transition is not a threat to be conquered, then, but a reality to be navigated. For, in the end, the postwar “international community” was little more than a projection, international law a polite <a href="https://carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/gaza-war-twilight-international-moralism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fiction</a>, and globalization artificial and contrived. What lies ahead is not disorder but the world as it truly <em>is</em> — a <a href="https://www.agonmag.com/p/a-concert-of-powers-for-the-21st" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concert</a> of civilizational powers insisting, as America itself does, on their own sovereignty and resisting a managerial empire: whether run from Washington or Beijing.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1030201</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>America is lost without idealism</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/06/america-is-lost-without-idealism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/06/america-is-lost-without-idealism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2035834721.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Ideology</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Robert D. Kaplan]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['When the United States, led by Trump, stopped believing in Nato and the ideals that sustain it, the Western Alliance was undermined'. Photo: Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Robert D. Kaplan</strong> is the author of 24 books on military and foreign affairs. His book <em>China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival </em>will be published in November. He is a distinguished senior lecturer at the University of Texas at Austin.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of 24 books on military and foreign affairs. His book <em>China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival </em>will be published in November. He is a distinguished senior lecturer at the University of Texas at Austin.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2025 23:01:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 06 Jun 2025 18:24:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=682388</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Trump has undermined US power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The greatest empires have collective consciences. And, for this reason, they envision a universal world state based on their own ideals. Rome, Great Britain, and France, as cruel as they could be, stood for a higher form of civilization than was common at the time. Rome offered citizenship to worthy individuals far beyond the Italian peninsula. The British Empire constituted an early form of globalization and outlawed the slave trade. France offered a form of equality through acquisition of the French language. Then there were the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which offered relative political stability and protection for ethnic minorities in Central Europe and the Middle East, especially compared to the horrors of what was to follow. In other words, values and national myths can be essential to power. Great powers are usually on a mission of some sort.</p>
<p>The United States is no different. Ever since it became (in functional terms) an empire following the Second World War, it has had its own vision of a universal world state built on the ideals of liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism was not only for liberal Democrats, but for Republicans, too, even if they have since abjured the term. Both major parties believed in spreading democracy, or at least paid lip service to it, even if they differed when it came to the pace and methods. American diplomats often dealt with dictators not because they preferred to, but because they knew they had no choice. Of course, that universal world state of democracies was a distant and unrealistic goal: not an immediate objective. But it was, nevertheless, a goal. And that goal made all the difference to the way that America saw itself and the world saw America. The fact that the world was frequently disappointed with America was precisely because it expected better of it. For better and for worse, the American imperial experiment had values at its heart: whether it was “a city on a hill” that would mind its own business and yet shine as an example to other nations, or aggressively seek to implant democracy abroad.</p>
<p>This was true of even our most flawed post-Second World War presidents. Take Richard Nixon, whose opening to China was not a case of naked, cynical transactionalism. Far from it. Higher principles were involved. They were rooted in an essay Nixon published in <em>Foreign Affairs </em>in October 1967, “Asia After Vietnam”, in which the future president argued that global stability required inviting Communist China into the family of nations. In fact, there was relatively little transacted in Nixon’s historic February 1972 trip to China. Basically, both sides stuck to their principles while the Taiwan circle was virtually squared, with the United States essentially recognizing only one China, while Beijing’s rulers essentially accepted that they could not conquer Taiwan by force. The point of Nixon’s trip was less to negotiate than to make it clear to the world, through a series of ceremonial meetings, that the United States now had a civil relationship with Communist China and sought an understanding with it. This gave Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the leverage they needed to achieve détente with the Soviet Union and stabilize the Cold War.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The American imperial experiment had values at its heart, for better and for worse.&#8221;</div>
<p>Nixon’s ideals were masked behind a complicated and at times sordid reputation, which would be forever tarnished by Watergate. But America’s yearning for a more democratic world was more obvious in the Carter and Reagan administrations, where openly expressed ideals were a vital element of national power. Kissinger and President Gerald Ford negotiated the Helsinki Accords with the Soviets, which subsequently provided a vehicle for Jimmy Carter to hold the Eastern Bloc to account on human rights. Ronald Reagan’s stark rhetorical differentiation between the American and Soviet systems gave hope to tens of millions in Communist Eastern Europe, as I can attest from being a reporter there at the time.</p>
<p>American power mixed with idealism held fast, even when it least seemed to. In July 1989, a few weeks after the Tiananmen Square massacre, with the media and intellectual community outraged at China and demanding tough action, President George H. W. Bush sent his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, on a secret visit to Beijing to reassure Chinese officials that relations would not be broken. This laid the groundwork for stable relations as the Chinese regime proceeded to further liberalize the economy in the aftermath of Tiananmen, as well as sending more and more students to the West to be educated, creating untold prosperity for its people. It also helped stabilize the Asia-Pacific region. Bush’s action, though it seemed cynical, actually wasn’t. It was built on a realistic interpretation of American ideals.</p>
<p>The three Democratic presidents of the post-Cold War era — Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden — may have made mistakes in office, as all presidents do, but they were consistent in their support for democracy, human rights, and compassion for refugees. It infused their foreign policies, perhaps to a fault, as critics allege. But what stands out is the prominence given to the human rights, refugee, and international development bureaus in the State Department under their watch. Those bureaus were legacies of both the Cold War and its aftermath. They were legacies of the Cold War in the sense that such bureaus were meant to telegraph the humanitarian concerns that differentiated the ideals of the United States from those of the Soviet Union. They were legacies of the post-1991 age because of the way they addressed what came to be called global concerns: those beyond great power politics. Those bureaus may have lost their way to an extent since, and were certainly in need of reform and belt tightening. But their decimation by the Trump administration does violence not just to the tradition of Democratic presidents, but to Republican ones, too. Some of the greatest work done by those bureaus was under the Reagan presidency, as I <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/588768/the-good-american-by-robert-d-kaplan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">detailed</a> in my 2021 book.</p>
<p>Obviously, there was Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But all these wars were, in addition to much else, about idealism run amok. They began as quixotic struggles and ended up destroying presidencies. Poignantly, in painting portraits of military veterans, George W. Bush may have found a way to psychologically deal with the foreign policy disaster he unleashed. Though a requirement for American greatness, idealism can also be dangerous, since it can lead one into unnecessary fights.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/america-is-lost-without-the-centre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/america-is-lost-without-the-centre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2197819578-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/america-is-lost-without-the-centre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/america-is-lost-without-the-centre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America is lost without the centre</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/america-is-lost-without-the-centre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Robert D. Kaplan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That leads us to Donald Trump, who says his policy is to avoid leading the United States into more wars. That is an admirable goal. But shorn of any vision for a better world, it can be interpreted as mere weakness or isolationism. After all, the United States is not Sweden or Canada. It is a great power. And great powers project force in defense of principles. Those principles may involve cynicism and self-delusion, but the very fact of having to morally justify one’s actions can be disciplinary. Russia does not even bother to defend or justify its mass killing of civilians in Ukraine. In America’s case, a certain amount of idealism has led to great periodic miscalculations throughout the decades, in which presidential reputations have been held to account, but idealism remains the basis on which power is employed in the first place.</p>
<p>This is because without ideals or principles there is no trust, and therefore no reliable allies. What has held NATO together for three quarters of a century has been a large dose of idealism. When the United States, led by Trump, stopped believing in NATO and the ideals that sustain it, the Western Alliance was undermined.</p>
<p>In a claustrophobic world, where geography has been shrunk by technology, a weakened Western alliance in Europe will only make America’s Asian allies nervous. This is because in terms of geography, population, and economics, China is the natural organizing principle of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, situated on the other side of the globe, is present in the Asia-Pacific only because it wants to be. And it wants to be because of a vision of free societies — call it liberal internationalism, if you will — which works in tandem with economic and strategic interests, strengthening them rather than conflicting with them. It is all of a piece. Were America to remove values from its relationships with Japan, South Korea, and its other Pacific allies, it could force them to seek greater accommodation with China, their biggest trading partner. This is how transactionalism turns on itself. A nakedly transactional world is a world of no rules, and, therefore, no order.</p>
<p>Actually, none of this conflicts with realism. True realists, like Nixon, Kissinger, and the elder Bush, had a sense of history that provided them with a mature sense of the tragic. They knew that things could go horribly wrong if they were not extremely careful. In foreign affairs, they worshipped truth because the truth of a situation is often unpleasant. Trump is no realist because he has a disregard for the basic facts. He believes in nothing beyond a mechanical exercise in dealmaking. Whereas true realism is not merely a technique but something more, which is ultimately not in conflict with America’s idealistic mission.</p>
<p>Trump may succeed here and there, in making this deal with the Saudis or that deal with the Qataris. But because there is no higher purpose to anything he does, American power itself — a blend of material interests and moral values — is undermined. The presidencies from Franklin D. Roosevelt through Joe Biden, including both Democrat and Republican, with all of their mistakes and disappointments over 80 years, manifested the apex of American power because of the higher purpose they aspired to. That era is over and has been replaced by something consciously amoral and therefore decadent. This is what decline looks like.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">682388</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Bad news for America doomers</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/05/bad-news-for-america-doomers/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/05/bad-news-for-america-doomers/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Kotk.jpg?w=519</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Empire</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Joel Kotkin]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/slack-imgs.com_.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>International</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Reports of our demise have been greatly exaggerated. Credit: Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Joel Kotkin</strong> is a Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute, the University of Texas at Austin.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>joelkotkin</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute, the University of Texas at Austin.</p>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2025 23:00:37 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 01 May 2025 23:00:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geoeconomics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=674103</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Europeans wish-cast US decline]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It’s once more springtime for America doomers, those who believe the United States will soon lose its global top-dog status. Much of this is in reaction to the poorly considered ramblings of President Trump. <em><a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/04/10/the-thing-about-europe-its-the-actual-land-of-the-free-now">The Economist</a></em>, for example, suggests that “the actual land of the free” has moved from America to Europe, with the Continent epitomizing “moral norms” on the climate, free trade, and rule of law.</p>
<p>These prophecies — or dreams — of America’s downfall conflate the United States, a people and place, with the US government. The difference between the two things isn’t well understood, especially in Europe. Whoever controls the White House and Congress has an effect, to be sure, but the true power of America lies not with its elected leaders, but in the ambitions of its people, its remarkable physical endowment, and the constraints of its constitutional order (Trump is learning about that last — to his chagrin).</p>
<p>Great empires don’t fall easily. Often, they rebound from the worst setbacks. Rome suffered under the misrule of Caligula, Nero, and Commodus, but resurged under more enlightened leaders well until the fifth century AD. In the East, the Roman imperium lasted for almost a millennium longer than that. Britain, too, didn’t fade after losing American Revolutionary War; the country simply moved on, incorporating much of the world into its imperial system for the next 150 years.</p>
<p>Likewise, the United States emerged as the victor in the Cold War a couple of decades after <a href="https://www.rodmartin.org/p/fifty-years-after-saigon-remembering">the disaster of Vietnam</a>, the social upheavals of the Sixties, and mass deindustrialization.</p>
<p>Today, Europeans, having permanently lost their empires, may be tempted to console themselves with thoughts of inevitable American decline. Hence, the new talk about Europe being the best place for the “pursuit of happiness”. Yet in the real world, Europeans are far from happy. <a href="https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/46554/at-the-end-of-2022-some-happiness-only-prevails-in-private-life-not-in-public-sphere-anymore/">As Gallup International found in 2022</a>, the world’s top-five most pessimistic populations are all in Europe, including Italy and France; others like Britain are similarly distressed.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-sun-belt-will-save-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-sun-belt-will-save-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2162037164.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-sun-belt-will-save-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-sun-belt-will-save-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Sun Belt will save Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-sun-belt-will-save-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Joel Kotkin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This may reflect the fact that Europe has consistently lagged behind the United States in adjusting to changing economic trends. Over the past 15 years, the eurozone economy grew about 6%, measured in dollars, compared with 82% for the United States, according to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europeans-poorer-inflation-economy-255eb629?mod=hp_lead_pos8">International Monetary Fund data</a>.</p>
<p>To view this another way, consider that the most <a href="https://pittsburghquarterly.com/articles/europes-shrinking-relevance/">powerful economy on the Continent</a>, Germany, is barely bigger than that of my adopted home state, California. America’s industrial giants have faded, victims of their own incompetence and shortsightedness in Washington. But they were replaced in large part by aggressive new firms, something Europe hasn’t produced in a long time.</p>
<p>Two decades ago<u>,</u> one could legitimately see Europe as a determinative third force on the global stage. But this is no longer the case. The most obvious weakness is in technology: of <a href="https://companiesmarketcap.com/tech/largest-tech-companies-by-market-cap/">the top 50 tech firms</a>, only three are based on the Continent. The rest of the list is dominated largely by the United States, including in <a href="https://hotair.com/tree-hugging-sister/2025/04/29/40-years-ago-denmark-banned-nukes-theres-been-a-change-in-the-wind-n3802259">artificial intelligence</a>, with China coming in a firm and ascendant second. This gap may widen as massive new chip and computer plants open up in <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/new-samsung-semiconductor-plant-in-taylor-texas/">Texas</a> and <a href="https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/nvidia-manufacture-american-made-ai-supercomputers-us/">Arizona</a>, steps encouraged under both Joe Biden and Trump.</p>
<p>The overall entrepreneurial gap extends far deeper than tech. To wit, the United States within the last 50 years created “from scratch” companies with market caps over $10 billion at five times the rate of the European Union, according to MIT researcher <a href="https://open.substack.com/users/846976-andrew-mcafee?utm_source=mentions">Andrew McAfee</a>. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhettbuttle/2024/01/12/three-year-small-business-boom-is-unprecedented/">American entrepreneurs have flourished</a> in the past decade, and self-employment has grown, while in Europe entrepreneurship <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/2024/self-employment-eu-job-quality-and-developments-social-protection#:~:text=The%20proportion%20of%20self%2Demployed,from%2015.4%25%20to%2013.7%25">has declined</a>. Europe still possesses <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/content/008515-europe-second-best-deep-tech-and-willing-trade">great intellectual resources</a>, but the policies adopted by the Continent’s elites seem designed to guarantee further decline.</p>
<p>For one thing, the EU and Britain appear unwilling to curb millions of unvetted migrants, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/germany-immigration-struggles-election-8dfd4b65">mostly from developing countries</a>, many of whom find it difficult to integrate into European society. Some of these newcomers have undermined the safety and social cohesion of cities like <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/societe/un-site-de-l-universite-de-marseille-ferme-temporairement-a-cause-du-trafic-de-drogue-7491048">Marseilles</a>, Paris, London, Berlin, and <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/sweden-multi-cultural-dream-went-055041254.html">Malmo;</a> many are unlikely to contribute more in taxes than they draw in public benefits. Meanwhile, European governments remain <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en">wedded</a> to “net-zero” lunacy, burdening European firms and consumers with high prices, while robbing them of reliability, as demonstrated by the recent blackout in <a href="https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/blackout-risk-made-worse-net-201539284.html">Spain and Portugal</a>.</p>
<p>What about competition at the other end of the Pacific, from China?</p>
<p>Much digital ink has been spilled on how Trump’s offensive comments and hyper-nationalism play into the hands of Beijing. And to be sure, China (along with India) matters far more in world economics, politics, and military power than an increasingly debilitated Europe. But recent turbulence notwithstanding, the American imperium is more than up to the task of rivalry with the Middle Kingdom.</p>
<p>China is a dangerous but deeply troubled dragon, anxious not to occupy lands but to control them as vassals. Given the nature of the Beijing regime, it’s hard to get accurate information on the overall economy. Still, despite its impressive accomplishments, the country faces major challenges. These include a massive property crash, demographic decline, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60353916">growing disengagement</a>, particularly among the young, <a href="https://www.noemamag.com/chinas-last-generation/">from the Communist system</a>, much as occurred in the late stages of the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>After pushing for a “one-child” policy for decades, China has reversed course. But the Chinese people haven’t started <a href="https://time.com/6341316/china-baby-bust-demographics/">pumping out babies</a>. The country, which eschews <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/chinas-fear-and-loathing-of-the-japanese/">immigrants and foreigners</a>, is now faced with <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/china-working-ageing-population">looming demographic decline</a>. By 2050, notes demographer <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/content/003133-the-rise-post-familialism-humanitys-future">Wendell Cox</a>, China is expected to have 60 million fewer people under age 15, a loss approximately the size of Italy’s total population. The country also suffers <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economy-is-leaving-behind-its-educated-young-people-f742c23d">rising unemployment</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-brain-drain-threatens-its-future-dbe38096">outmigration</a> by its young, educated people.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The American imperium is more than up to the task of rivalry with the Middle Kingdom.”</div>
<p>Trump’s much-dissed tariff policy threatens a China that views exports as its savior. Even without Trumpian levies, the Communist Party’s assault on property rights and the rule of law drives foreign <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3045141/chinas-manufacturing-exodus-set-continue-2020-despite">companies</a> to reconsider their tech investments. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0575e216-8dae-4df6-bf50-312f78468e99?emailId=0a4e3522-902d-4b3a-bce9-c63d9267b584&amp;segmentId=13b7e341-ed02-2b53-e8c0-d9cb59be8b3b">Private-equity</a> barons are finding it difficult to get their funds out. Once-common projections that Chinese aggregate output could surpass America’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/01/new-chart-shows-china-gdp-could-overtake-us-sooner-as-covid-took-its-toll.html">as soon as 2028</a> are being readjusted to <a href="https://cebr.com/reports/we-forecast-that-china-will-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-for-only-21-years-before-the-us-overtakes-again-in-2057-and-by-2081-india-will-have-overtaken-the-us-how-does-this-affect-geopoliti/#:~:text=Cebr's%20last%20World%20Economic%20League,the%202028%20date%20previously%20forecast.">2036</a>; they may never come true.</p>
<p>Could Beijing tip the scales by allying itself with a Europe alienated by Trump? It’s possible, but it seems highly unlikely. After all, the Continent can offer little in terms of natural resources — China’s primary interest. As for intellectual property, Beijing has other, more underhanded means for getting at those, as American firms have learned over the past couple of decades. To be sure, Tuscany and Provence may lure tourists and second-home buyers from Shanghai. Great European universities will play along, too, as long as they get students paying a full ride.</p>
<p>But combining a declining Europe with Chinese power will not help mitigate the fundamental weaknesses of either party. A Europe that is fast sacrificing its industrial base on the green altar can’t supply a secondary manufacturing hub to the Chinese, who anyway prefer their own cheaper and more pliant workers. (However, China — the world’s surveillance super-state — <em>could</em> help European elites clamp down on dissent even more tightly than they have in recent years.)</p>
<p>Beholding these realities, many in the European media still view Trump as the primary threat to democracy. Like many Americans, I am disgusted by Trump’s lack of respect for constitutional niceties, much less his lack of personal decency. But his hardheadedness may be the only way to keep America and the West from collapse. Amid the challenge from China, a foreign policy based on “principles” would be subordinated to a stronger and less virtue-seeking will. Liberalism can only be preserved by an America that is less progressive Kumbaya, and more closely shaped by frank power politics.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-131440013.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Twilight of the American empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The better path, then, is a Europe that still looks to America, warts and all. Despite the protests (or wish-casting) of the European elites and academics, the United States continues to receive a remarkable, increasing surge in <a href="https://committeetounleashprosperity.com/hotlines/some-good-news-government-spending-fell-in-last-three-months/">new investment</a>. The United States, <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=60582#:~:text=LNG%20exports.,declining%20in%20May%20and%20June.">now the world’s biggest exporter</a> of liquid natural gas, could help solve Europe’s energy crisis, while reducing the trade imbalances that so enrage Trump.</p>
<p>Of course, some Europeans might prefer a courteous kowtow to the Russians or the mullahs to enriching brash Texans or pleasing the Donald. Yet the disdain of continental elites works against Europe’s long-term future. America’s vitality is clearly not spent. You won’t find it in DC, but in ethnic neighborhoods, like <a href="https://www.ocregister.com/2025/04/27/from-refugees-to-power-brokers-how-little-saigon-became-a-political-force/?utm_email=947AC49F84F5D40C547B04EF70&amp;active=yesD&amp;lctg=947AC49F84F5D40C547B04EF70">Little Saigon</a>, not far from my California home, where Vietnamese boat people have in five decades created <a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/after-saigon-fell-my-family-rose-50th-anniversary-vietnam-e40c8768">a prosperous community</a>. Or in the fast-growing New South. Or in the old fields of <a href="https://www.midlandtxedc.com/business-and-economy/our-economy/permian-basin-economic-indicators">the Permian Basin</a>, which by itself represents <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/03/05/permian-shale-boom-texas-devastating-opec/">the world’s fifth-largest producer of oil and gas</a>.</p>
<p>America’s system, with its checks and balances, may not be perfect, but it remains the only potential counterweight to China and her allied nest of authoritarian regimes. America’s continent-spanning empire is more than MAGA or its enemies in the liberal establishment. Its power derives from the American people’s energy, their entrepreneurship, and unwavering willingness to try something new.</p>
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					<title>Welcome back to 1945</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Donald Trump</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump is the antidote to all-consuming American global liberalism. Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 00:03:52 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 06:45:38 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American World Order]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[David Lammy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=636679</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The liberal world order was always a myth]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Were he magically granted the power of time travel, would it be a moral obligation for David Lammy to kill the baby Trump in his cradle? He did after all describe America’s President-elect as “a racist KKK and Nazi sympathiser” and “a wannabe despot”, “a neo-Nazi-sympathising sociopath” who “spits on the graves of men and women who died fighting fascism”. Similarly, a fortnight ago Kamala Harris labelled Trump a “fascist” who “would invoke Adolf Hitler, the man who is responsible for the deaths of six million Jews”, thereby invoking liberalism’s greatest political taboo in her failed attempt to win power.</p>
<p>These are serious questions: if his claims were true, then Lammy should shrink from his role as a quisling official in a major client state to a dangerous regime. Indeed, the only moral response would be a British withdrawal from Nato so immediate and dramatic as to make Jeremy Corbyn appear a collaborator in comparison. Harris, equally, should surely prepare her soul for political martyrdom, launch a military coup to save American democracy from its voters, or gather an armed band of partisans around her for a last desperate insurgency — <span style="font-weight: 400;">perhaps in the hilly California wine country she knows so well.</span> Yet apparently the answer to this thought exercise is <em>No</em>, as our hapless Foreign Secretary now brushes off these remarks as the youthful exuberance of a then-40-something politician. Harris, meanwhile, urged a peaceful transfer of power in a concession speech notable more for its ditzy wine-aunt motivational messaging than any allusion to being a participant in a dark and historic tragedy.</p>
<p>What can this all mean? Either Trump genuinely is a fascist or Nazi, and the self-proclaimed defenders of the liberal order have shirked their historic destiny — or the terms have become meaningless, and Trump is merely a politician like any other. We may assume, from the revealed actions of Trump’s critics, that the latter is the truth. Yet the inflated rhetoric, so easily cast aside, reveals something of great importance about the American empire, euphemised as the “liberal international order”, now, like its current overseer and contemporary Joe Biden, locked in a state of senility and decline. The “1945 order” so beloved of Washington’s caste of imperial officials and their propagandists — the “subintellectuals” <a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii149/articles/anton-jager-hyperpolitics-in-america">recently mocked by Anton Jäger</a> — is a highly mythicised construct of the post-Cold War world, created to justify America’s global military dominance and now cynically and vainly invoked, <em>reductio ad absurdum</em>, at the unipolar moment’s conclusion.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/labours-blueprint-for-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/labours-blueprint-for-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2181233010.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/labours-blueprint-for-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/labours-blueprint-for-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Labour&#039;s blueprint for decline</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/10/labours-blueprint-for-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As opposed to the actually existing one, the mythical “1945 order” began, we can say, at some point between 1989 and 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As John Mearsheimer <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal">correctly observes</a>, “&#8217;the Cold War order&#8217;, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a &#8216;liberal international order&#8217;, was neither liberal nor international&#8221;, instead being a bounded order, limited to Western Europe and North America, within a bipolar global system contested between the United States and the Soviet Union. From its inception, Nato had very little interest in the advancement of liberal democracy which has, from the Nineties onwards, become its ostensible purpose: Salazar’s Portugal, Greece’s junta and Turkey’s various military putschists were all valued members at one time or another. All of them were less democratic and more authoritarian than Trump. Peace in Europe — if not in Asia, which witnessed millions of deaths in the struggle between the two political poles for dominance — was not the natural product of a liberal democracy guarded by the great Western victor of the Second World War, but preserved simply by the nuclear standoff between the two rival empires.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;American liberalism searched the world for monsters to destroy and created them.&#8221;</div>
<p>Indeed, we can go further than Mearsheimer, deconstructing the Second World War myth so sacred to British institutional memory — no doubt because it recasts Britain’s subordination to the American Empire as an act of Christ-like sacrifice. In the vulgar version of the myth, the great contest was a struggle for liberal democracy, and indeed the Allied eventual victory was proof of its superiority over rival political systems — an otherwise perceptive British politician told me just this, with complete conviction, the other week. Yet Stalin’s Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the fighting, was hardly a benign liberal democracy, and Churchill was correct in viewing the alliance as one with the devil, borne of amoral necessity. Even the Poland Britain and France went to war to defend, in 1939, was not a liberal democracy but an authoritarian military regime, typical of the Central Europe of the time. Yet it was viewed as no less worthy of support for this. Yet by the standards of today, Poland’s Right-wing paternalist regime of 1939, happy to harass Jews and annex the territory of its weaker neighbours, would be the object of liberal enmity rather than support.</p>
<p>Today’s political taboos simply cannot be mapped onto the actually existing world which birthed them: following the fall of France, Britain’s only extant ally, for a time, was Greece’s military dictatorship; and following Greece’s liberation, Churchill made sure to oust the country’s effective Communist resistance and replace it with a Right-wing regime, which employed Nazi collaborators to hunt down the wartime resistance. Like many Western conservatives, <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/churchill-did-admire-mussolini/">Churchill had admired Italian fascism and Mussolini</a> — “one of the most wonderful men of our time” — and regarded Italy’s late alliance with Germany as a tragedy. Indeed, even the Britain and France of 1945, which together ruled vast swathes of what is today called the Global South through non-democratic and coercive means, would be far beyond the pale of 21st-century liberalism.</p>
<p>At its simplest, the Second World War was won by the combined industrial might of two great land empires, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose power was the result of the preceding two centuries of continental expansion, experienced as dispossession and genocide by the native inhabitants. It is perhaps natural that this simple truth is too much for liberals to bear as the foundation of their political system, and that a gentler and more noble myth was required to take its place. Yet the result is that the actual world constructed by the victorious Allies of 1945 — the world to which we have in many ways returned — is paradoxically an alien and hateful one to today’s shrill defenders of the post-Cold War “1945 order”. Trump’s mass deportation orders would be comprehensible to Eisenhower, the architect of both the D-Day victory and Operation Wetback; the attitude of today’s American liberals would not. It is hard to see how Musk is more objectionable a rocket scientist than Wernher von Braun, other than through liberal radicalisation in the intervening decades. It is the supposed destroyers of the 1945 order who instead retain its pragmatic values.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-art-of-trumps-israel-deal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-art-of-trumps-israel-deal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-686795950.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-art-of-trumps-israel-deal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-art-of-trumps-israel-deal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The art of Trump&#039;s Israel deal</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/the-art-of-trumps-israel-deal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Armin Rosen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Ukraine war, and the Gaza war, each in their own way define the terminal point of the post-Cold War 1945 myth. At the peak of Ukraine’s military successes, in 2022, it was commonplace to hear the claim that the war was a fight for liberal democracy against authoritarianism, which Ukraine’s fragile democracy was predestined to win due to the inherent superiority of its political system. Three years on, this argument is rarely heard, for obvious reasons. Indeed we can say Ukraine’s looming defeat is largely the product of liberal democracy. Within a domestic dynamic fuelled largely by the liberal conspiracy theories of the 2016 election, Putin served as a metaphorical final-boss Trump to be defeated. In response, the Trumposphere adopted an exaggerated antipathy for Ukraine, wearing the sympathy for Putin they were tarred with as a badge of honour. As a result of America’s divided democracy, the Ukraine war swiftly mutated from a bipartisan cause into another battleground of its own internal conflict. Putin’s calculations on Ukraine’s capacity for organised resistance may have been faulty, but his assessment of Western democracy has proved entirely correct.</p>
<p>In 2022, despite America’s own record of invading countries to overthrow their regimes, or annexing territory from hostile rivals to award it to pet clients, Washington’s criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine could reasonably expect a fair hearing. But in 2024, as the world observes America’s shrugged posture of helplessness at the slaughter in Gaza, the moral high-ground shimmers far beyond Washington’s reach. The original sin of the actually existing 1945 order was invading other countries, violating their borders in pursuit of a messianic political vision. But this taboo rapidly became obsolete once America claimed the same right for itself. Instead, after 1989, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h377.18?seq=4" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">as cultural historians have long noted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the Holocaust — only tangentially dealt with at Nuremberg — became </span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3211108"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“the supra-denominational passion story of late modernity”</span></a>. A<span style="font-weight: 400;">nd by </span><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273942889_Founding_Myths_in_Europe_and_the_Role_of_the_Holocaust"><span style="font-weight: 400;">explicitly tying the atrocity to contemporary conflicts in the former Yugoslavia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, “Never Again” suddenly became the moral basis for America’s new empire, justifying military interventionism as long as a humanitarian principle could be invoked. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Today’s political taboos simply cannot be mapped onto the actually existing world which birthed them.&#8221;</div>
<p>Yet the human rights NGOs who provided moral justification for America’s wars against its rivals find themselves ignored and helpless when it comes to Gaza: the revealed principle of America’s liberal order is not that never again can war be waged against civilians, but that only Israel may do so. As in other aspects of politics, Israel presents itself as a dark, perhaps unconscious satire of America: that the war in Gaza helped turn liberal American voters away from the global order which claims their name is only fitting. Perhaps, indeed, America’s global liberal order helped undermine its domestic one. If the first time round Trump was dealt with as an aberration against the natural order of things, now it is the Biden administration that shows itself the aberration — a brief and largely failed interlude in the new world that has dawned.</p>
<p>For as Mearsheimer notes, the American global liberal order, which claimed the mantle of the 1945 victory to justify its imperial dominance, was “bound to fail”. The hyperglobalisation of capital it undertook detached the working- and middle-classes of the Western world from an economic and political regime which impoverished them; the equivalent hyperglobalisation of human beings reignited the West’s dormant nationalism through creating a sense of demographic threat. The messianic mission to reshape the world in America’s image overstretched and weakened the empire, while consolidating an alliance of rival major powers which now outmatches it. As expansionist and revisionist as any of the great 20th-century totalitarianisms, American liberalism searched the world for monsters to destroy and created them, just as domestically it fears fascists under the bed — while it rapidly creates them too.</p>
<p>If Trump were a fascist, we should surely welcome his isolationism. Instead, for American liberal hawks, the proof of his fascism is his desire not to militarily intervene in far-off lands. In its dying days, the Harris campaign deployed voter-repelling neoconservatives-turned-Never Trumpers like Liz Cheney — the overlap between these two categories is more or less exact — and suffered for it. The age of the liberal imperialist is over. It is only natural for its remaining hawks to tremor at the age that has just begun, which they themselves midwifed. But in truth, American foreign policy is bound to continue much as before: America’s options are now constrained by its dwindling power, rather than ideology. A cold war, and perhaps a military confrontation with China is destined by geopolitical logic, rather than the personalities of the rival contenders for the imperial throne. A painful peace settlement for Ukraine was coming whoever won the American election, just as, for all Trump’s outreach to Arab-American voters, his policy on Israel will differ only by dispensing with the Biden Administration’s facade of helpless angst.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, we should not lament the collapse of the global order America built after 1989: indeed, liberals themselves should welcome it. Just as the bipolar order of the Cold War world, by restraining liberalism’s inherent tendencies to radicalisation and hubris, made the Western world safe for a tempered and moderate liberalism, so may the multipolar world we have entered save liberals from their own excesses. Beset by confident rivals abroad, and by the disenchantment of their own voters at home, liberals will once again have to learn restraint. The post-Cold War order ultimately proved disastrous for American liberalism: a return to the actually existing order of 1945 may prove more congenial. Lammy’s newfound equanimity at a Trump White House may yet prove uncharacteristically astute.</p>
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					<title>Hurricane Helene is America&#8217;s Chernobyl moment</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/10/hurricane-helene-is-americas-chernobyl-moment/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2173844169.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[This is worse than Hurricane Katrina. Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 03 Oct 2024 23:03:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 04 Oct 2024 05:02:50 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hurricane Helene]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[imperial decline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Natural disasters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Hurricane Katrina looms large in American cultural consciousness. As one of the defining events during George W. Bush’s second term as president, the scale of the devastation that struck Louisiana — combined with the inadequacy of the relief effort — earned notoriety even outside the United States. Almost 20 years after the levees broke, another storm has swept in an unprecedented catastrophe: the economic and human cost of Hurricane Helene might be even greater than that of Katrina. So why, then, are so few people acting like that is the case?</p>
<p>In Appalachia, one of the poorest regions in the country, the common belief is that the mountains protect the locals from storms. Unfortunately, this is true only up to a point: when a hurricane like Helene hits — bringing once-in-a-thousand-years levels of rainfall — the mountains become a curse rather than a blessing. Helene has brought the mountains down, triggering mudslides and rockfalls that have destroyed entire towns and obliterated almost every road in a vast radius.</p>
<p>When the lowlands flood, that is bad enough: in 2005, New Orleans stopped being a vibrant city and turned into one big, murky lake. But with storm surges and flooding, you can often navigate much of the disaster area by boat. Up in the mountains, it is the earth, not the water, that becomes your worst enemy. With the roads gone and bridges smashed, driving is impossible, travel by foot is next to impossible: isolated settlements can often only be reached via helicopter. Those I have spoken to in North Carolina describe a disaster of “biblical dimensions”. The only thing that comes close to it in recent history is the &#8220;Great Flood&#8221; of 1916 in North Carolina, but Helene has easily beaten the river gage measurements from back then.</p>
<p>The death toll of Helene is currently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1k70rnrp4xo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">inching closer to 200</a>, already making it the second-deadliest storm after Katrina. But this number will rise and then rise again in the coming days. In truth, with the reality of unnavigable mountain terrain, an obliterated road network, and massive power, cell phone and water failures, nobody knows how many are dead. Without sufficient rescue efforts, more Americans might end up succumbing to the lack of water in the wake of the flood. But despite all of this, and despite the fact that the clock is ticking for many Americans trapped without food, water, or means of communication, coverage of Helene has been strangely muted. This silence has, in turn, masked a far darker problem: the lack of resources and manpower going into the rescue effort.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-tyranny-of-columbine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-tyranny-of-columbine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-1224709007.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-tyranny-of-columbine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-tyranny-of-columbine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The tyranny of Columbine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-tyranny-of-columbine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Feeney</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Bush&#8217;s response to Katrina was criticised at the time for being lumberingly slow and ineffective. But the relief effort being mounted now is a pale shadow of what was done a mere 19 years ago, and that makes the silence around this disaster even more ominous.</p>
<p>In 2005, significant planning and resourcing was being carried out days before the storm even made landfall. Ten thousand members of the National Guard had gathered from several states to deal with the damage Katrina was about to cause. The final number who helped with the effort measured closer to 20,000. But those guardsmen did not stand alone: the US Army was preparing to assume overall command of the entire rescue effort through US Northern Command, where its battle staff coordinated response forces over various state lines. The regular Army helped too, including forces from the 82nd Airborne Division and the Army Corps of Engineers.</p>
<p>This time, things are very different. At the time of writing, fewer than 7,000 guardsmen are helping with Helene disaster relief, and there was no equivalent preparation before the storm actually hit. US Northern Command, which can only assume responsibility if it is asked to do so by other government authorities, is not coordinating the overall effort. During Katrina, more than 350 military helicopters were involved with the rescue efforts. This time, in a mountain disaster zone where many more helicopters are needed than in a coastal area, well below 100 helicopters have currently been committed.</p>
<p>The Katrina response had its fair share of problems. But the criticism it attracted had less to do with a lack of helicopters and more to do with the bureaucratic inertia that dogged the relief effort. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) proved to be slow, inflexible and often hostile to efforts to circumvent red tape or unrealistic rules in favour of things that were practical and simply worked. In one case, the supplier of bottled water that FEMA had on contract failed to turn up on time. Local rescue crews then went to pick up water from local Wal-Mart stores, which could track every litre of water entering and leaving its stores. The water was right there, sitting on the shelves; people needed immediate help, so why not distribute it now and have the government simply pay Wal-Mart for it later? Wal-Mart was more than happy to go along with this arrangement, but FEMA was horrified that someone had circumvented their own chosen contractor. Grudgingly, they accepted the deal already struck, but then acted forcefully to shut down future ideas of dangerous and unauthorised innovation.</p>
<p>So while it can be said that Bush’s administration fumbled parts of the Katrina relief efforts, they at least did so in the context of America as it existed back then. The planning wasn’t always good, but there was planning. The helicopters didn’t always go to the places they were most needed, but at least they were there in large enough numbers. This is worlds apart from the reality of America in 2024. Today, the institutions are weaker, the deficits are bigger, and the US empire itself — then at the height of unipolarity — is critically overstretched. There aren’t enough helicopters, nor enough troops. A decent portion of the Tennessee National Guard, rather than helping rescue Americans in their own home state, are currently deployed to bases in Kuwait. In 2024, the only way for the US military to source enough men for its various far-flung bases and military commitments is to lean heavily on the National Guard. The Guard is supposed to be the primary muscle when it comes to domestic disaster relief, but as the regular Army is falling apart, there simply aren’t enough resources available anywhere in the system anymore.</p>
<p>This means that even though the victims of hurricane Helene have found themselves stranded within a stone&#8217;s throw of some of the US military&#8217;s more significant military bases — Camp Lejeune and Fort Liberty are both located in North Carolina — very little help has been forthcoming. There remains a belief in the West that, despite various recent reversals and losses, the US military is a machine with near-godlike powers: if it really wanted to, it could fill the sky and blot out the sun with an uncountable number of helicopters and planes, whenever and wherever it wants.</p>
<p>Almost a week into the aftermath of Hurricane Helene, those endless helicopters have failed to appear. And as America readies to surge more troops to the Middle East to potentially fight Iran, it&#8217;s clear that they <em>can&#8217;t</em> appear, at least not without seriously breaking something somewhere else. Troops and aircraft busy in Tennessee or North Carolina can&#8217;t be deployed to Jordan, Iraq or Syria. In theory, the US military exists to protect the lives of Americans — that’s why it falls under the Department of <em>Defence</em>. In practice, Americans have largely been left to fend for themselves, 50 miles away from their own military bases, just in case those soldiers and helicopters are needed on the other side of the world.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Troops and aircraft busy in Tennessee or North Carolina can&#8217;t be deployed to Jordan, Iraq, or Syria.&#8221;</div>
<p>Trying to get a sense of the attitude in Washington, D.C. about the very worrying state of the Helene relief effort, I asked friends there to tell me what people were saying about it. Without exception, the response from everyone turned out to be the same: there <em>was</em> no talk. Helene wasn&#8217;t even on the radar; it was, after all, just a storm<em>.</em> Besides, hadn&#8217;t the situation already been handled? There were 6,000 guardsmen on the scene; that ought to be more than enough.</p>
<p>All of this is becoming eerily reminiscent of Chernobyl — and the accident that in many ways defined the last days of the Soviet Union. That too was just a minor accident that at first seemed like nothing more than a blip to the complacent authorities in Moscow. Only over time did people start to realise that this was truly serious. Chernobyl has since come to be seen as one of the proximate causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, though the reason why has often been misunderstood. Chernobyl wasn&#8217;t actually that lethal: approximately 30 people died as a direct result of the reactor explosion, with maybe 4,000 people dying years or decades later from illnesses related to radiation exposure. Hurricane Katrina, by contrast, led directly to 1,392 fatalities.</p>
<p>The real reason Chernobyl looms so large in stories about the last days of the Soviet Union was because of all the lying, the governmental incompetence, and the shared sense that the Soviet Union itself was a senile construct that no longer had any real point. A healthy society, one in which people still feel a sense of purpose and common belief, could have endured far worse disasters than Chernobyl. But by 1986, the Soviet Union was a place where neither the rulers nor the ruled believed the system still had a reason to exist. By the end, talk of socialism, Karl Marx and historical materialism seemed like nothing more than an absurd joke.</p>
<p>What happened to Russian Marxism, is now happening to American patriotism. Consider the lyrics to &#8220;Over There&#8221;, one of America&#8217;s more famous military-themed songs:</p>
<p><em>Over there, over there,</em><br />
<em>Send the word, send the word over there</em><br />
<em>That the Yanks are coming, the Yanks are coming,</em><br />
<em>The drums rum-tumming everywhere!</em><br />
<em>So prepare, say a prayer,</em><br />
<em>Send the word, send the word to beware! –</em><br />
<em>We&#8217;ll be over, we&#8217;re coming over,</em><br />
<em>And we won&#8217;t come back till it&#8217;s over, over there!</em></p>
<p>Twenty years ago, in the aftermath of 9/11, a song like this would have been the embodiment of American patriotism and martial pride. Then, the song had real meaning to it; people <em>felt</em> it. Don&#8217;t mess with our proud America, the song warned — if you do, we&#8217;ll come over and make you regret it.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/GettyImages-2044291975.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America will have to dodge the draft</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If you were to sing those words today to a mother stranded without water in North Carolina, or a Tennessee guardsman in Kuwait who still doesn’t know if his parents back home are even alive, the lyrics will appear like a particularly cruel joke. Indeed, that guardsman won&#8217;t come back to help Tennessee, not until &#8220;it&#8221; is over, over there in Kuwait. What that &#8220;it&#8221; is, nobody yet knows. The yanks are coming, the yanks are coming: they&#8217;re coming to bases in Iraq or Syria, they&#8217;re coming to Romania, to Bulgaria, to Poland, to Korea. They&#8217;re coming to endless gruelling deployments overseas that the US can&#8217;t afford, that talking heads in Washington insist are the most important thing in the world even as America slowly falls apart.</p>
<p>When Iraqi militias fired missiles that killed three servicemen stationed in Jordan, the reaction from most Americans was not patriotic fervour and hunger for revenge: it was <em>exhaustion</em>. Why are they even there? <em>Why can&#8217;t they just come home?</em></p>
<p>Contrary to popular belief, Hurricane Helene is not &#8220;just a storm&#8221;, in the same sense that Chernobyl was not &#8220;just an accident&#8221;. Beyond all the destroyed roads, the flooded towns, the ruined electrical networks and the stranded American families, Helene is also an indication that the US political system, followed by its military, is very close to the point of moral and physical exhaustion.</p>
<p>Appalachia has always been forgotten; the people there are used to being treated like dirt. Talking to locals whose families were still stuck in the disaster area, the common refrain was that the help wasn’t arriving because the elites simply hate the people now in need of help. Talking to people in D.C., however, quickly dispelled that notion. What is going on right now isn’t malice, it’s somehow even worse: it’s <em>senility</em>. People weren’t enjoying the suffering of fellow Americans; they were simply so oblivious and zoned out that they couldn’t even notice a problem.</p>
<p>Currently, a hurricane disaster that is significantly more challenging than Katrina is being serviced by something like a third of the resources that Louisiana called upon. And yet few people in Washington even think this is a problem. At the same time as Congress has borrowed another 10 or 20 billion dollars to hand over to Ukraine and Israel, presidential candidate Kamala Harris has announced that the victims of Helene will be able to apply for $750 in relief assistance to help them get back on their feet.</p>
<p>As Chernobyl was, Helene is now becoming: a point at which the sheer absurdity and uselessness of the machine becomes too obvious to ignore. Looking at the disaster unfolding in Appalachia, the winners of the Cold War are now starting to ask the same question that eventually brought down the Soviet Union: what the hell is even the point of all of this anymore?</p>
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					<title>China is winning the battle for the Red Sea</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/02/china-is-winning-the-battle-for-the-red-sea/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/02/china-is-winning-the-battle-for-the-red-sea/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>New world order</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Nathan Levine]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/blue-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Members of the Chinese Navy (VCG/VCG via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Nathan Levine</strong> is a Visiting Fellow in the B. Kenneth Simon Center at the Heritage Foundation and a non-resident Research Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is a Visiting Fellow in the B. Kenneth Simon Center at the Heritage Foundation and a non-resident Research Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 11 Feb 2024 00:02:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 12 Feb 2024 15:49:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[red sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=498315</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America has retired as world policeman]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Hardly for the first time, remote Arab tribesmen are reshaping the world. Piratical attacks on international shipping by Yemen-based Houthi rebels have created a significant security crisis in the Red Sea. The world’s largest shipping lines have been forced to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/02/maersk-red-sea-pause-shows-operation-prosperity-guardian-limits.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suspend</a> transit through the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal. And with nearly a third of global container traffic typically flowing through Suez, this has seriously disrupted world trade. Yet the most enduring impact of the crisis may be on the geopolitical balance between two great powers, each many thousands of kilometres away from the scorching sands of the Arabian Peninsula: China and the United States.</p>
<p>As the world’s largest trading nation, China has much at stake in the Red Sea. Europe is China’s top trade partner, and more than 60% of that trade by value <a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/01/21/containing-the-risk-cosco-red-sea-shipping-suez-canal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">usually</a> flows through the Suez Canal. With that route disrupted, cargo vessels are diverting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks in additional travel time and vastly increasing shipping costs. By 25 January, the average cost of shipping a 40-foot container from Shanghai to Genoa <a href="https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spiked</a> to $6,365, an increase of 464% from two months earlier. Insurance rates have also skyrocketed. What’s more, Chinese companies have in recent years poured billions of dollars’ worth of investment into assets in the region, such as the 20% stake in the East Port Said container terminal of the Suez Canal that is now <a href="https://doc.irasia.com/listco/hk/coscoship/annual/2022/ar2022.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">owned</a> by Chinese state shipping giant COSCO. At a time when China’s growth rate is already struggling, the crisis risks imposing a serious further drag on its economy.</p>
<p>Apparently perceiving this vulnerability, Washington has tried to use it as leverage to convince Beijing to help end the crisis. China is the top economic and geopolitical backer of Iran, which in turn backs the Houthis, using them as a proxy to needle Israel, the United States and its allies. Some officials in Washington are convinced that, if it really wanted to, Beijing could quickly pressure Tehran into ending the Houthi attacks. Biden administration officials have “repeatedly raised the matter with top Chinese officials in the past three months”, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bba68661-6c9b-41b5-ab74-d573b3a27c54" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according</a> to the <em>Financial Times</em>, and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently flew to Thailand to directly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f4fe30ce-3cbf-47f0-a1ad-7574b59f6f04" target="_blank" rel="noopener">plead</a> the administration’s case in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.</p>
<p>This diplomatic effort seems to have <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/27/sullivan-chinese-fm-meeting-fails-to-produce-breakthrough-on-red-sea-shipping-attacks-00138213" target="_blank" rel="noopener">failed</a>. Aside from a tepid public statement calling on “all relevant parties” to “ensure the safety of navigation in the Red Sea”, Beijing appears to have made no move whatsoever to remedy the situation. Instead, it called on Washington to “avoid adding fuel to the fire” in the Middle East. The attacks continue.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-862702934-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The paranoia behind China&#039;s spy war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Some in Washington are pouting. Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Massachusetts), for instance, slammed China in a Congressional <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3hvxUgYXoE&amp;ab_channel=T%26ICommitteeRepublicans" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hearing</a> in late January for being “not only missing in action as a purported upholder of international commerce and rules, but… in fact actively undermining the potential for a peaceful resolution to this issue”. This failure to intervene was just “another example of the malign and malicious attempts at global leadership from the Chinese Communist Party”.</p>
<p>But Auchincloss and others of like mind in Washington should perhaps be careful what they wish for. For decades — indeed, arguably for the better part of two centuries — it has been the United States that has served as the world’s “upholder of international commerce and rules”. In fact, it was a determination to protect the flow of maritime commerce from pirates that induced the young United States into its first foreign intervention, the Barbary Wars of 1801 and 1815, and permanently forged its identity as an international actor. If the nation were truly to become and remain a merchant republic that meant that it must, as then-President Thomas Jefferson <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0122" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a>, “superintend the safety of our commerce” through “the resources of our own strength and bravery in every sea”.</p>
<p>Two centuries later, the US Navy was still operating under the slogan of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiQODFm3IFg&amp;ab_channel=POWERAMERIKA" target="_blank" rel="noopener">A Global Force for Good</a>”. Which is to say that the whole image — and reality — of America as a superpower largely rests, like the British Empire before it, on its ability to secure global trade. If there is any remaining shred of the “Pax Americana” on which the whole recent era of globalisation was built, this is it.</p>
<p>It is in this context that Washington officials ought to consider what it would mean if Beijing were to listen to their pleas and actually take over America’s role as a security provider. If the nations of the world were to begin turning to China for “global leadership” rather than the United States whenever their merchant ships were in need of protection, it would decisively mark the transition from an American century to a Chinese one, much as Britain once yielded the seas to its former colony. Washington should count itself lucky that Beijing has so far declined to try out for the role.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1230428940-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is China about to turn on Russia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, America’s own effort to perform its old job of securing the sea lanes has proved little more than a fiasco. With the US Navy severely <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/06/28/navy-recruiting-increasing-work-week-to-six-days-to-combat-recruitment-shortages" target="_blank" rel="noopener">undermanned</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-maintenace-aircraft-carriers-russia-china-1846058" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overstretched</a> around the globe, it attempted to assemble “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a>”, a multinational coalition of forces under its command meant to patrol the Rea Sea. But this effort functionally collapsed almost immediately when France, Italy and Spain — all of whom Washington prematurely announced would be members — <a href="https://gcaptain.com/spain-italy-france-decline-us-command-of-red-sea-operation-prosperity-guardian/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declined</a> to participate, saying they wouldn’t accept US command. No Middle Eastern countries other than Bahrain signed up either. In a throwback to yesteryear, navies are instead each going solo and escorting the vessels sailing under their own flags and titles. What we are seeing, then, is a true breakdown in the “international order” — in the sense of there being any order — that was once imposed by American power. We are returning to an older, more typical world in which there is no world policeman, and everyone is obliged to protect their own national interests.</p>
<p>The Chinese are well prepared to capitalise on this situation. Although COSCO has for now also abandoned the Red Sea route, other smaller Chinese shippers have spotted commercial opportunity and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/41b3491c-d6b3-4da0-a272-239e51cfd7c6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">leapt</a> to fill the gap. China United Lines (CULines), for example, has rushed to start up a “Red Sea Express” service linking Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah to Chinese ports. They are able to do so because the Houthis seem to be under strict orders to try to avoid attacking China-linked vessels. Ships still running the straits into the Red Sea now regularly make sure to prominently display Chinese flags and use their satellite identification data to announce that they have Chinese owners, or even just Chinese crew members. The number of vessels transiting the area while preemptively broadcasting that they carry Chinese crew has <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2024/02/01/is-china-a-winner-from-the-red-sea-attacks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surged</a> from less than two per day to more than 30 in late January. Apparently this is the magic talisman to keep pirates at bay — though China’s navy has at least three warships in the area to escort its vessels, should it prove insufficient.</p>
<p>The reason Beijing seems so relaxed about the crisis is obvious: this is a situation in which China wins either way. Either the threat continues but shipping is safer for Chinese vessels than for others, in which case sailing under the protection of the red and gold flag may become a coveted competitive advantage, or Beijing finally tells Iran to knock it off, in which case China becomes the principal beneficiary of the security vacuum left by the United States. Both outcomes would be geopolitical coups. No wonder China is willing to accept a little short-term economic pain as the situation plays out.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the crisis also provides China with a real justification for continuing to rapidly build out a “blue water” navy able to project power far from its own shores. As it happens, this is the same justification traditionally been offered by the United States: that, in the absence of security and stability, it needs the ability to protect global sea lanes and the lives of its citizens abroad. The military base China built in Djibouti in 2016 to enable the deployment of its warships across the Indian Ocean and around the Horn of Africa now looks prudent.</p>
<p>This is how the “world order” has always been shaped and reshaped: by nations and empires acting abroad to protect their own interests — or progressively failing to do so while others move to fill the void. The crisis in the Red Sea is therefore both symbolically and practically meaningful. Unless the United States and its allies can get their act together, we may look back on this as a moment when a vast geopolitical shift was revealed for all to see. As for everyone else, it’s likely that the crisis will serve as a sign that the time to prepare for the harsh realities of a far more “multipolar”, less globalised world has by now well and truly arrived.</p>
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					<title>The world should fear 2024</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The last days of a hegemon? (Hamid Vakili/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=494951</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Escalation lurks on every battlefield]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When asked in 2020 to envisage the world after Covid, Michel Houellebecq proclaimed, accurately enough, that “it will be the same, just a bit worse”. It does not take a soothsayer to foresee that the same will hold true for this coming year. The year 2023 saw <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/world-war" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the greatest global resurgence of armed conflict since 1945</a>: 2024 will be worse. We are living, if not through a World War, then <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/11/conflicts-around-the-world-peak/676029/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a world at war</a>, the great post-globalisation jostling to divide up the spoils of what was once America’s unipolar imperium. This will be as epoch-defining a period as the late Forties were for Britain, or 1991 for Russia.</p>
<p>Unlike the two World Wars, the rival great powers are not challenging the superpower directly — at least, not yet. Instead, American hegemony is being challenged obliquely, as its rivals nibble at the edges of empire, targeting weaker client states in the confidence that the United States now possesses neither the logistical capacity nor the domestic political stability necessary to impose its order on the world. In the Nineties and 2000s, at the height of its unipolar moment, the United States made almost all the world its client state, writing cheques for their security it now struggles to cash: like bankruptcy, decline comes slowly at first, then all at once. The overriding theme of 2024 then, like 2023, will be that of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imperial overstretch</a> precipitating retreat from global dominance. From the Red Sea to the Donbas, the jungles of South America to the Far East, America’s security establishment finds itself struggling to contain local blazes that threaten to become a great conflagration.</p>
<p>Yet bad as things are, they could always be worse. We perhaps too easily forget that only six months ago, in the immediate wake of Prigozhin’s dramatic and unexpected rebellion, Russia’s security establishment was engaged in <a href="https://x.com/HannaNotte/status/1671421325930315776?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">vigorous and public discussion</a> over whether it was necessary to conduct a nuclear strike either in Ukraine, as a warning against the West, or against the West itself. So endemic has the sense of crisis, both globally and domestically, become that the most dangerous nuclear escalation since the Cold War went largely unremarked. We should be grateful that this moment passed, yet the fact it did pass is itself evidence of America’s weakening global position. The brief episode of nuclear anxiety came at a time when Putin’s Kremlin faced both an unprecedented internal threat and the risk of battlefield defeat, on the brink of Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer offensive. But the offensive, as we now know, faltered into a costly defeat for Ukraine, upturning the expected outcome of the war. For our now-lowered risk of nuclear war, Kyiv will pay a heavy price.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1485172147-1-scaled-e1701714807951.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Bidenism outlive Biden?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Gary Gerstle </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like an inscrutable game of chess, the battle lines in Ukraine have barely moved this year, but expectations for the war’s outcome have been totally reversed. This time a year ago, the consensus was that the invasion was already a strategic defeat for Putin: his armies had proved unexpectedly ineffective on the battlefield, and had crumbled before Ukraine’s rapid autumn 2022 northeastern counteroffensive. Rather than breaking apart through its internal divisions, the Nato alliance had found a new sense of purpose, consolidating itself against the Russian threat and devoting vast quantities of already-existing and soon-to-be-produced materiel towards military victory. That mood of triumphalism has already passed. The promised war-winning Western increase in munitions production simply has not materialised, while Russia’s transition to a war economy, and its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/73fa92eb-58bb-40ef-b2d6-e7571912990d?shareType=nongift" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seizing of Western companies</a> in response to a sanctions regime whose effects have proved the opposite to those intended, have granted Russia both renewed offensive potential and <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/12/10/vladimir-putin-is-running-russias-economy-dangerously-hot" target="_blank" rel="noopener">an economic boom</a> to pay for it. The West imposed on Russia a war stimulus it should have embraced itself. It did not, and as a result this winter is a bleak one for Ukraine; but the year to come looks to be far worse.</p>
<p>Through 2023, Kyiv and its Western backers gambled a successful conclusion to the war on a single armoured thrust in the country’s southeast, punching through Russia’s defensive lines and threatening its hold on the Crimea and Black Sea coast, forcing a humbled Putin into peace negotiations. That gamble failed, and there is now no viable path towards the expansive definition of victory adopted by Zelenskyy at a more buoyant phase of the war. Along the northern border and behind the current lines in the East, Ukrainian forces are <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-finally-moves-to-fortify-front-line-but-could-it-be-too-little-too-late/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hurriedly digging defensive lines</a>, hoping to blunt Russia’s resurgent offensive power in the same way Russia’s fortifications chewed up its own newly-formed and Nato-trained armoured brigades. The “mountain of steel” donated for the offensive by the West <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-ukraine-clash-over-counteroffensive-strategy-cb5e4324?reflink=share_mobilewebshare" target="_blank" rel="noopener">will not be repeated</a>; the wave of enthusiastic volunteers who initially manned the lines has been replaced by increasingly unwilling conscripts, with Kyiv planning a further mobilisation of half a million men just to hold the line.</p>
<p>When Zelenskyy’s over-optimistic prognoses of the war’s conclusion were punctured by his military chief General Valerii Zaluzhny characterising the current state of play as a “stalemate”, it revealed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/08/ukraine-zelensky-zaluzhny-russia-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">growing internal political strife</a> within the Kyiv leadership. But the hard reality is that now offensive momentum has passed to Russia, Ukraine forcing the war into a stalemate that will lead to peace negotiations looks as close to victory as will realistically be achieved. But as things stand, an <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-14/putin-vows-russian-victory-in-war-as-ukraine-s-allies-waver" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly confident Moscow</a> shows no inclination towards peace talks without Ukraine making territorial and political concessions indistinguishable from surrender. That Zelenskyy’s senior advisors are <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/when-how-will-ukraine-war-russia-end-2024-3bh9bvswr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">floating the possibility</a> of Putin’s sudden overthrow in Moscow as a possible path to victory shows the scale of the threat facing Kyiv. Short of a revolutionary deus ex machina in the Kremlin, the challenge for Ukraine in 2024 will be to hold its defensive lines, degrade Russia’s offensive power faster than its recruitment and industrial production can replace, and maintain the necessary political unity in Kyiv to steer the war towards the least painful conclusion possible. Of all these, perhaps the last will be the greatest challenge.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1718506746-scaled-e1702652972842.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The truth about the ethnic cleansing in Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But as Kyiv struggles, the hegemon is already losing interest in Ukraine, distracted again by its decades-long <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/05/12/us-military-readiness-degraded/?expand_article=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enfeebling entanglement</a> in the Middle East. Israel is both diplomatically and militarily dependent on the United States, but that relationship is not reflected in Netanyahu’s prosecution of his punitive war on Gaza. When US envoys beg Israel to scale down its war, Netanyahu immediately promises to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67819122" target="_blank" rel="noopener">intensify it.</a> Even as American planners fret over the erosion of their precious <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-stockpiles-nato-low-industry/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">munitions stockpiles</a> by the Ukraine war, Israel is burning through <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/19/us-israel-artillery-shells-ukraine-weapons-gaza" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US-donated supplies</a> at an alarming rate. Until the US can <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-push-to-restock-howitzer-shells-rockets-sent-to-ukraine-bogs-down-f604511a" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increase its munitions production</a> and replenish its arsenal, which may take years, every shell fired on Gaza or in eastern Ukraine weakens America’s deterrent power. The result will be the arms equivalent of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungry_gap" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“hungry gap”</a>, as its available military resources become <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/us-needs-more-munitions-deter-192031965.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly unequal</a> to its global commitments. This shortfall presents America’s rivals with a rare and unexpected window to challenge the superpower directly, in the knowledge that it will struggle to fight a high-intensity war of any great duration.</p>
<p>But if the logic of armaments production, as well as the diplomatic isolation and domestic outrage fuelled by the Gaza war, drives the United States to seek a swift resolution to the conflict, the logic of events leads towards escalation. The risk of the conflict widening to Lebanon has not abated — if anything, Israel appears to be straining at the leash to extend its full-scale war across<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/27/israeli-minister-gantz-says-situation-on-lebanon-border-demands-change?taid=658c9e781b6d7400019528ec&amp;utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&amp;utm_medium=trueAnthem&amp;utm_source=twitter" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> its northern frontier</a>, as thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes as a result of the tit-for-tat exchange of artillery fire with Hezbollah. Yet the blockade of Red Sea shipping by Yemen’s Houthi movement has shown that Western countries face direct costs for their increasingly qualified support of Israel, and that regional powers are increasingly confident in challenging the United States directly.</p>
<p>Having triumphantly survived a years-long war against Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/the-war-on-yemens-civilians/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">devastating to Yemen’s civilian population</a>, in which Saudi forces deployed US jets, bombs and intelligence support to little battlefield effect, the risk of a short-lived American punitive <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/23/us/politics/gaza-houthi-yemen.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bombing campaign</a> must seem a manageable one to the Houthis. Knowing that America has <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/16/us-strike-options-houthi-red-sea-00132160" target="_blank" rel="noopener">no appetite for a wider conflict</a> that will be seen both internationally and domestically as having been dragged into a war on Israel’s behalf, the Houthis now feel emboldened to attack US naval escorts directly. So politically toxic is Israel’s Gaza campaign that even America’s closest Nato allies <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/cracks-form-in-new-naval-coalition-drone-strikes-spread-to-indian-ocean">prefer to keep their distance</a> from American security efforts in the Red Sea, while as a result of <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/time-scrap-lcs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">poor procurement decisions</a>, the US Navy is struggling to marshal the resources necessary to keep trade routes open, the basic function of a global empire. Balking at fighting Hezbollah or the Houthis directly, the prospect of a US attack on Iran, deemed an over-ambitious goal even at the height of US power, is unlikely in the extreme, which in turn feeds Tehran’s appetite for risk. Overstretched, wearing down its ships through <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-sailors-are-cannibalizing-parts-to-keep-warships-operational-2023-2?r=US&amp;IR=T" target="_blank" rel="noopener">over-deployment,</a> and suddenly showing itself dependent on weaker, unenthused European allies to make up the numbers, in the Red Sea we are shown a glimpse of America’s naval performance in a future Pacific conflict: the results will be heartening to China.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2023-11-21-at-15.55.50.remini-enhanced-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ridley Scott: our Anglo-Saxon Maximus</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like an ailing mammoth, weakened by a succession of individual spear thrusts, the hegemon staggers bleeding across the global scene. Though stronger than any individual competitor, America is not capable of sustaining three simultaneous major conflicts against powerful regional rivals, without mobilising for a war effort unfeasible within its current political dynamics. At the height of its power, when America’s rivals were cowed and isolated, the United States assumed global security burdens that looked easily achievable at the time, while running down the industrial base necessary to sustain them. Bad choices were made, which are now difficult to undo. As a result, the United States has already shifted into a defensive mode, attempting to preserve its gains of better times against resurgent challengers, and delaying the grand-political reordering of global affairs for as long as possible. Yet unlike Russia, Iran or China, America’s democratic system incentivises short-term planning, and offers its leaders the escape route of shifting responsibility for failure to the next, rival administration. Heading towards what looks like an inevitable political defeat in 2024, the Biden administration is already drained of political authority, as tired and absent-minded as the gerontocrat at its helm.</p>
<p>In an earlier phase of America’s history, the looming handover of power would be expected to happen smoothly, and continuity achieved in maintaining the empire’s strategic goals. No such continuity can be expected in 2024. America’s previous two elections were marked by the most serious waves of civil disorder and political instability in decades as each party and their factions within the state bureaucracy contested each others’ legitimacy, each deploying excitable civilians radicalised by their respective court press as proxy weapons. Over the course of the coming year, America will likely be roiled by its internal political dysfunction in a way we have never yet seen, and the rest of the world will live in the shadow cast by the contested imperial throne.</p>
<p>Not just the fate of Ukraine but also of the Nato alliance will be determined by the battle for power in Washington. For Netanyahu, the incentive of America’s election year will be to drag the war out for another year, or widen it into a regional conflict, gambling Israel’s future security on the presumed greater indulgence of the incoming Republican administration. Similarly, for Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis, the waning days of a cautious Biden administration desirous to avoid a Middle Eastern conflagration presents the greatest opportunity for escalation. For China, waiting in the wings to deliver the final blow, the optimum time to act will be at the moment of Washington’s greatest distraction by internal disorder: perhaps this election season will present an opportunity too rare to pass up, accelerating the <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/06/23/milley-china-wants-capability-to-take-taiwan-by-2027-sees-no-near-term-intent-to-invade" target="_blank" rel="noopener">timetable to seize Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>The world is living through its most dangerous moment in many decades, and the logic of events, in every theatre, leads towards further escalation over the year to come. In 2024, America’s fraught domestic interregnum will create a feedback loop with the already bloody global interregnum for the spoils of its empire. <span style="font-weight: 400;">Last year was a hard year, drenched in blood and human misery through global conflict: but in retrospect, we may view it as the last golden summer of our world order, with the troubling storms still distant on the horizon. </span>The coming year will be a historic one: we are right to dread its approach.</p>
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					<title>The cursed outposts of America&#8217;s empire</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/08/a-feminist-outcast-on-the-edge-of-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/08/a-feminist-outcast-on-the-edge-of-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lily Lynch]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/150523.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Nicaraguan women soldiers in training (Bill Gentile/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Lily Lynch </strong>is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 23:01:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 15 Aug 2023 12:45:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cold War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Feminism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Literature]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nicaragua]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Summer reads 2023]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=481265</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Denis Johnson exposed the conceit of adventurism]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There is a distinct literary genre associated with imperial peripheries. In Britain, it is known as Greeneland, the world of Graham Greene — those dusty forgotten outposts where morality is suspended, the political illusions of the metropole are laid bare, and lost men are free to sin beyond judgement. It is a 20th-century genre, cognisant of evil and its consequences. Today, as our nightmares are once again filled with foreign wars, dubious <em>casus belli</em>, and mercenaries who operate beyond national flags, it is refreshing to return there, a place where cynicism breaks bread with truth.</p>
<p>Denis Johnson’s novel <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/87715/the-stars-at-noon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Stars at Noon </em></a>(1986) is the great American example of this form, a wet, hallucinatory junket through the jaws of hell that foreign interventions can become — in this case, 1984 Nicaragua, as CIA-backed Contras wage war on the Sandinista government. One of Johnson’s lesser-known works, the novel takes the form of an anti-travelogue narrated by an unnamed young American woman who will definitely not be documenting this unaesthetic excursion for Instagram.</p>
<p>The book begins with submachine guns in a grimy Managua McDonald’s, an American outpost patronised by horny officials and soldiers of the junta. It is here that we learn that our narrator may or may not be some kind of journalist, or at least aspires to be one, but for now is selling sex in an effort to acquire enough hard currency to purchase a flight out of Nicaragua.</p>
<p>This has led to her being sexually extorted by local officials, who are gratuitously taking advantage of her fallen position while promising to help. And she has fallen very far. Before this, we learn that she worked as a human rights observer with an organisation called Eyes for Peace. After bearing witness to the suffering of others, she quickly became disillusioned with this line of work — in her world, the word “humanitarian” has acquired a sinister meaning. Other exalted concepts — “justice”, “liberty”, “equality” — are equally scorned. “I’ll show you liberty and some of that other bullshit,” she tells one character.</p>
<p>We follow our young American to the bar at the InterContinental Hotel, where the assembled international press corps is drinking heavily and complaining about the lack of “bang bang”. It is better in Beirut, they all concur. But our narrator is similarly unimpressed with them: “As the cabdriver had understood they would be, several journalists were drinking here tonight, the usual bunch, every one the sort of person who really ought to be shot dead right away.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/in-defence-of-critical-theory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/in-defence-of-critical-theory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2GettyImages-939439412-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/in-defence-of-critical-theory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/in-defence-of-critical-theory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>In defence of critical theory</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/in-defence-of-critical-theory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Michael Greer </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is in this sad hotel bar, among these war tourists, that our narrator first meets her love interest. He is a bland British consultant (“pudding-like and ghostly”), who works for an oil company. “Consultant” is another opaque, sinister-sounding vocation in these parts, and she implores him “not to go into detail” about his dealings. “The Englishman”, as she calls him, is remarkable only for his total lack of remarkability (elsewhere, she notes that he reminds her of a cloud, with a vaporous, forgettable face and white skin). And this is a central point of the book: the title comes from a line from an W.S. Merwin poem, “what we are looking for / in each other / is each other / the stars at noon / while the light worships its blind god”. This is a love story rooted in narcissistic idealisation and self-delusion, with the libidinous political tumult and tropical locale lending the affair a frisson it would not otherwise have. Back in London or New York, we imagine, these two might never give each other a second look.</p>
<p>The political drama is as nebulous as “the Englishman” himself. We eventually learn that he has engaged in industrial espionage. His oil company, along with the Costa Ricans, knew of some possible oil deposits beneath Lake Nicaragua, and in the interest of “fairness” — and perhaps vague political sympathies with enemy states, though like the rest of him, these remain gestural — he passed them on to the Nicaraguans. But the Nicaraguans informed the Costa Ricans of this duplicity, and soon the lovers are pursued by the security services of several state agencies at once, <a href="https://time.com/3482909/this-is-the-real-story-behind-kill-the-messenger/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">including the omnipresent CIA</a>. Under increasingly unbearable surveillance, the pair make a long, dramatic dash for the border. It is significant that it is the Englishman’s ostensibly “humanitarian” act that triggers this panicked chase. In proxy wars, the road to hell is often paved with good intentions.</p>
<p>Read some 40 years after the counter-revolutionary war in Nicaragua, <em>The Stars at Noon</em> feels exhilarating, even liberatory. In more ways than one, Johnson’s novel is an escape, unencumbered by tedious contemporary puritanism. No one is mythologised in Johnson’s world, and we are invited to mock and revile both the dull revolutionaries and “the stupid CIA”.</p>
<p>This kind of cynicism in war is not new in literature, but it almost feels that way filtered through a female narrator. Johnson gives us a young woman in excruciating circumstances who is nonetheless not the traumatised female subject of so much millennial women’s writing, reflexively narrativising her experiences through the lens of victimisation. As <a href="https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/a-feminist-style" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Caitlín Doherty has written:</a> “MeToo’s impact is detectable not in any political transformation among the professional women who comprised its constituency, but rather in the desiccated dregs of a ‘feminist’ linguistic mode: a speaker who narrates in the first-person, invokes the literary and wants you to know of her pain.” Though our narrator is mistreated by men, she always has something that they don’t: the knowledge that these men, however powerful in the present circumstances, are pathetic, even pitiful.</p>
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<p>“Not that the pleasure and comfort of an incompetent small-time official in a floundering greasy banana regime surmounts my every concern, but all men tend to grow innocent, wouldn’t you agree, at the breast,” she muses during one unfortunate encounter. “You can’t help but feeling a little something, if only a small, sharp pity, as if you’d just stepped on a baby bird.”</p>
<p>Young women in the contemporary West have not lived under the top-down institutionalised patriarchy found elsewhere in the world, but this is precisely how women who do have to navigate it: by viewing powerful men not as totems of unearned privilege, but as pathetic prisoners of their own desire and therefore riddled with weaknesses to exploit. That Johnson was able to understand this as a man suggests that “lived experience” is not the only kind that illuminates: in this novel, he gives his female narrator a more powerful, eviscerating voice than most contemporary women would grant themselves. For that, he would undoubtedly be indicted by certain literary puritans today — for failing to make his female narrator sufficiently disempowered, or for writing in the voice of a woman at all.</p>
<p>Yet Johnson’s female narrator is also self-evidently him. <em>The Stars at Noon</em> was written after his own trip to Nicaragua, where he had hoped to produce an article on the revolution for a magazine. Instead, it was during this trip that he realised that he could never be a journalist. He reportedly flew home, fell into a depression and wrote this book. Certain details — the professional journalists in Managua restaurants observed with a mixture of envy and disgust — are clearly lifted from his own experience. At one point early on, Johnson’s narrator calls the editor of a magazine in the US with a desperate pitch; he laughs before hanging up on her. Among other things, this is a book about failure. And this, too, is refreshing in an era in which writers are more invested in constructing the identity of a writer on social media than they are in writing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-nato-seduced-the-european-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-nato-seduced-the-european-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-912598610-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-nato-seduced-the-european-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-nato-seduced-the-european-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Nato seduced the European Left</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-nato-seduced-the-european-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Last year, the French director Claire Denis released a <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10354106/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">film based on the book</a>. It is a fine enough adaptation, capturing something of the sensual yet sickly atmosphere of the novel, though Denis opted to lift the story from its original Cold War context and resituate it in present day, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the film, the run-down InterContinental Hotel has been partly transformed into a grimy Covid hospital, with a menacing biomedical security regimen and unsmiling guards carrying submachine guns. The story loses something essential set in the present, as the voluptuous and ideological <a href="https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/books/story/2022-10-14/claire-denis-explains-how-she-adapted-the-late-denis-johnsons-novel-stars-at-noon" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Cold War setting is swapped</a> for our vacuous, post-ideological Cold War 2.0, wherein dictatorship and democracy alike are drifting towards a tech-facilitated authoritarianism. If the movie feels less substantive than the book, then it’s partly because our times are hollower, too.</p>
<p>But how would the contemporary commentator, trained to reflexively pincer apart each piece of media for hidden loci of oppression, react to the novel it is based on? For one, it’s a story that “centres” the experiences of two white Westerners in Nicaragua. Further, our narrator is not interested in signalling awareness of her “positionality”, her “privilege” and her “Westernness”. But, at a time when the CIA would probably employ the language of decolonisation to justify arming the Contras, it is invigorating to read outsiders who are allowed to be simple outsiders. The narrator of <em>The Stars at Noon</em> belongs to the American pantheon of drifters, losers, outsiders, drunks and dreamers. These are not figures that “speak over” local voices, to use the bloodless academic-activist parlance, but from beneath them, as they come from below.</p>
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					<title>Will America share Rome&#8217;s fate?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/06/will-america-share-romes-fate/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/06/will-america-share-romes-fate/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Robert D. Kaplan]]>
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							<![CDATA["A great power cannot cut and run" (Brooks Kraft LLC/Corbis via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Robert D. Kaplan</strong> is the author of 24 books on military and foreign affairs. His book <em>China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival </em>will be published in November. He is a distinguished senior lecturer at the University of Texas at Austin.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is the author of 24 books on military and foreign affairs. His book <em>China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival </em>will be published in November. He is a distinguished senior lecturer at the University of Texas at Austin.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 05 Jun 2023 23:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 05 Jun 2023 23:02:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Roman Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=474220</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Our empire's over-extension could be its downfall ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The similar destinies of the United States and Rome can at times seem eerie. The three Punic Wars fought between the middle of the third century BC and the middle of the second century BC, constituted the great world wars of ancient Mediterranean civilisation, and ended with Rome’s complete destruction of Carthage. More recently, the two world wars of the 20th century ended with the complete destruction and defeat of Germany and Japan, and with the United States in a position of global dominance. In both conflicts, an empire’s supremacy reached its peak at the moment of victory.</p>
<p>Like the United States during the Second World War, Rome in the course of the Punic Wars became an empire. The First and Second Punic Wars saw Roman power established over Sicily, Sardinia and a good part of Spain — all former areas of Carthaginian influence. Rome also gradually extended its sway over greater Greece and Numidia, the latter coinciding with modern Algeria, to the west of Carthage on the North African coast.</p>
<p>Again, somewhat like the United States, imperialism helped lead to a dramatic increase in wealth in Rome itself, as a class of nouveau riche in the capital benefited from war booty, overseas trade, money lending and the like, according to the late British classicist S. A. Handford. Eventually, the Roman legions would evolve from a mass conscription military to a more professional, volunteer fighting force in order to regulate the vast territories under its influence as an imperial behemoth. The rough parallel with the development of the United States as a great power is hard to ignore, given how Washington itself has developed into a money-culture of well-heeled think tanks and flashy lobbyists, even as the mass conscription army that fought Second World War and Vietnam has morphed into a highly professional volunteer force of working-class youth, culturally divorced from the well-bred policy nomenklatura in the capital.</p>
<p>But the comparison becomes especially eerie when one considers that following the Punic Wars and Rome’s becoming an empire, it immersed itself in small wars against tribes and other chieftains that brought little glory and much political complications to Rome, and were a factor in its gradual decline. Of course, that is the common fate of empire, since to influence large and varied regions of the Earth naturally requires military as well as economic and political involvement. In the oft-quoted words of the mid-20th century American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“The same strength which has extended our power beyond a continent has also interwoven our destiny with the destiny of many peoples and brought us into a vast web of history in which other wills, running in oblique or contrasting directions to our own, inevitably hinder or contradict what we most fervently desire.”</p>
<p>The young Winston Churchill was reading into the worst nightmare of Niebuhr’s and America’s imperial future when, in 1897, he described Afghanistan in <em>The Story of the Malakand Field Force</em>: “a roadless, broken and underdeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerrilla tactics. The result… [is] that the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy….</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-2149949898.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The sorry decline of Central Park</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Freddie Sayers </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>“The impractical”, the young Churchill wisely continues, “may wonder why we, a people who fill some considerable place in the world, should mix in the petty intrigues of…border chieftains”. Some, whom Churchill calls “bad and nervous sailors”, would simply cut and run, even though that would be impossible under the circumstances, whereas others call for “full steam ahead”, that is, a dramatic increase in military resources until the frontier valleys “are as safe and civilized as Hyde Park”. But, as Churchill intimates, there are usually neither the troops nor the money nor the will to do any such thing. Therefore, “the inevitable alternative” is a system of “gradual advance, of political intrigue among the tribes, of subsidies and small expeditions”.</p>
<p>Subsidies and small expeditions? Now we are at a point of concision that defines the ancient Roman imperial past and the modern American one. Arguably the signature Roman imperial expedition, which vexed Rome and contributed to much political turmoil in the capital, was the so-called Jugurthine War, which lasted for seven years near the end of the second century BC. We owe our account of it to Sallust, who was born a few decades later in the first century BC, a time when this war fought by the Romans in Numidia against its king, Jugurtha, was still recent and presumably hotly debated. The geopolitics of the Jugurthine War were straightforward. Numidia, to the west of Carthage, had been an ally of Rome and their common hostility to Carthage had cemented their alliance. Yet, following Rome’s destruction of Carthage, Numidia suddenly no longer required Roman protection. That set the context for Numidia’s efforts at erasing Roman influence from its sprawling and difficult geography.</p>
<p>Jugurtha was a brilliant and devious king who fought against his adopted siblings over the spoils of Numidia, and bribed his way to victory time after time by his intrigues with Rome. He corrupted Rome and concomitantly gained power in Numidia. At first he was Rome’s ally. Then he became Rome’s enemy. By the time the Roman power structure realised he had to be destroyed it was too late to avoid a major war in a faraway territory. Sallust describes the war as “a hard-fought and bloody contest in which victories alternated with defeats”. The struggle, he goes on, “played havoc with all our institutions… For Jugurtha was so crafty, so well acquainted with the country, and so experienced in warfare, that one never knew what was the most deadly — his presence or his absence, his offers of peace or his threats of hostilities.”</p>
<p>There are shades of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in Jugurtha, in terms of the unconventional threat posed to Rome and the United States. In some cases the imperial power was ultimately victorious, as was Rome against Jugurtha; in some cases not. But the overall effect over time was to subtly and not so subtly weaken the empire.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-72544992-1-e1682001759519.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America&#039;s empire is bankrupt</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Michael Greer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>An analogue from British imperial history was in Waziristan of the Thirties and Forties, when British troops tried and failed to capture the Faqir of Ipi, a radical cleric who, because of his narrow tribal base, appealed to pan-Islamic ideals in the struggle against colonial occupiers. The Faqir, or holy man, whose real name was Mirza Ali Khan, hid out for years in the caves straddling the Afghanistan and Pakistan border, inspiring his troops with sermons on religious war. Despite British aerial bombardment, the Faqir died a natural death in 1960.</p>
<p>Churchill’s comments ring loudly here. A great power cannot often cut and run, nor can it achieve total victory in these small wars. Britain, whose days as a great empire are over, no longer faces this dilemma. But the United States surely does. America is not a country like Sweden or Belgium. It would be simple if it were. Instead, it is, to repeat, a great power. Despite Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States cannot merely withdraw from the developing world, whose very size, political and cultural variety, and general instability guarantees that Washington will regularly face wrenching choices about how to proceed.</p>
<p>The problem is compounded by the nature of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, often disparaged as the “Blob”, because it often thinks according to a single, well-rehearsed mindset. The Blob wants to do great things in this world, because its heroes — those it particularly wants to emulate — were “present at the creation”, as the saying goes. I refer to the American inventors of the post-war order: men such as George Kennan, John McCloy, Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson and so on. The alliance structure that these men built would eventually, over the course of the decades, win the Cold War. The Blob wants to do something similar: create a new and long-lasting American order.</p>
<p>The difficulty with this grand ambition is that the United States is not the country it was in the Fifties. During that period, America was the only major industrial power in the world whose infrastructure was not severely damaged by the Second World War. This gave the United States a comparative advantage that would last for decades. Back then, it completely dominated the world economy. Its robust middle class underwrote a great navy. It was a real nation-state with a military draft. This was long before the American middle class divided into an upper-middle global elite and a lower-middle trending toward poverty. Moreover, this middle class had just gone to war in Europe and the Pacific, and was consequently understanding of rebuilding Europe and Japan. And the foreign policy elite that guided America, the elite that was “present at the creation”, had themselves just gone through the Second World War, holding key positions. They had a comprehension of the world and the tragic choices involved that the American elite of today often lacks.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/fixed-pic.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Elbridge Colby: China is more dangerous than Russia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Freddie Sayers </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is a pattern in all of this: great power wars strengthen a nation and relatively smaller expeditionary wars dissipate it. In our age, a small war means a professional military in fierce combat and a nation at the shopping mall, oblivious to what is going on overseas. When the population at home cannot relate to the fighting overseas, it is probably best if possible not to do it.</p>
<p>The question becomes: can great power conflict over Ukraine and Taiwan rejuvenate America, as it did after 1945? In that way, America would avoid the fate of Rome. Possibly. Of course, there is no mass conscription military anymore and President Joe Biden — despite all the military aid he has been sending — has wisely not committed American troops to the defence of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the national interest in defending Ukraine and Taiwan is clearly much more obvious than toppling an Iraqi dictator or staying militarily engaged in Afghanistan for two decades.</p>
<p>And yet, the Biden Administration is going beyond merely defending Ukraine and Taiwan with arms shipments. It is actually demanding that all countries in the world become democracies, something that the great secretaries of state of the late-Cold War Era, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and James Baker III, never would have done. Those diplomats were more interested in reconciliations than with issuing ultimatums. Issuing ideological ultimatums is a sign of decadence, that befits a country that is splitting at the seams politically and with an out-of-control national debt.</p>
<p>The Jugurthine War helped presage the end of the Roman Republic. Will America recover from the stain of its Middle East adventures? It’s an open question. Yet, great power rivalry that will likely continue for years, by engaging the whole society and economy, may change America in unpredictable ways, possibly leading to more political and social cohesion. Meanwhile, possessing a memory of Rome and what it went through can only help.</p>
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					<title>The end of dollar supremacy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/05/the-end-of-dollar-supremacy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/05/the-end-of-dollar-supremacy/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
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							<![CDATA[A demonstration outside the former US embassy in Tehran (Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 23:02:34 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 28 May 2023 14:26:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dollar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=474592</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The West's imperial lifecycle is drawing to a close]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In January 1999, in a Washington of bustling bars and soaring stock markets, Bill Clinton rose to deliver his State of the Union address. America was so untroubled by threat or misfortune that it had spent the previous year debating the precise significance of <em>fellatio</em>. But Clinton, who had survived the scandal, exuded unshakeable personal and civilisational self-confidence. Declaring “a new dawn for America” and a future of “limitless possibility”, he called on Congress to decide how to spend all the record surpluses the government was soon going to enjoy. America’s only inconvenience, it seemed, was too much money. Today, as America struggles to support a crumbling dollar, marshal allies against Russia, ward off a rising China, it&#8217;s easy to forget that barely two decades ago it strode the planet like a colossus.</p>
<p>But pride before a fall has an ancient lineage, and only the arrogance of the historical present could treat American imperial decline as a novel phenomenon, let alone mere metaphor. Some 16 centuries before Clinton, in an uncannily similar setting of domes and colonnades, a Roman orator stood before the imperial Senate to deliver an equally triumphal speech. It was 1 January 399, inauguration day for the latest in a millennium-old line of consuls, the most prestigious Roman office. This year&#8217;s candidate was Flavius Mallius Theodorus. After rising to praise his audience — “here I see gathered all the brilliance of the world” — he went on to proclaim the dawn of a new Golden Age, celebrating the unparalleled prosperity of the Empire.</p>
<p>Rome’s rapid comeuppance is now a historical parable that America can learn from in real-time. Because the rhetoric of Clinton and his ancient predecessor was spoken from atop the crest of the same wave: an identical process of rise and decline which Peter Heather and I, in <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Why-Empires-Fall-America-Decline/dp/0241407494/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1NYHRI8RHQ7L1&amp;keywords=heather+rapley+why+empires+fall&amp;qid=1684855509&amp;sprefix=heather+rapley+why+empires+fall%2Caps%2C165&amp;sr=8-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">our new book</a>, call “the imperial lifecycle”. Empires grow rich and powerful and attain supremacy through the economic exploitation of their colonial periphery. But in the process, they inadvertently spur the economic development of that same periphery until it can roll back and ultimately displace its overlord.</p>
<p>America has never thought of itself as an empire, mainly because with the exception of the few islands in the Pacific and Caribbean, it has never accumulated a large network of overseas territories. But this modern European model, in which colonies were (and in a few cases, still are) administered by governors who answered directly to the imperial capital, was but one of many. The late Roman Empire, for instance, functioned as an “inside-out” empire — effectively run from the provinces, with Rome serving more as a spiritual than administrative capital. What held it all together was the shared culture of the provincial nobility that ran it, most of whom has provincial origins but had been socialised into what Peter Heather has called the imperial culture of “Latin, towns and togas”.</p>
<p>The American Empire — or more accurately the American-led Western empire — mirrors this confederal model, with an updated cultural-political glue that we might call “neoliberalism, Nato and denim”. Under this regime, the nation-state was primary, borders were inviolable, relatively open trade and capital movement prevailed, governing elites  were committed to liberal principles, and bureaucracy was based on increasingly standardised education systems (with economics training assuming an increasingly central role as the century progressed). But since its establishment in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, its fundamental economic model has been in the timeless imperial mould: exploitation of the periphery to the benefit of the imperial core.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-america-weaponised-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-america-weaponised-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-1245290696-1-e1684508980858.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-america-weaponised-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-america-weaponised-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How America weaponised the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-america-weaponised-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Arta Moeini </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The great wave of decolonisation that followed the war was meant to end that. But the Bretton Woods system, which created a trading regime that favoured industrial over primary producers and enshrined the dollar as the global reserve currency, ensured that the net flow of financial resources continued to move from developing countries to developed ones. Even when the economies of the newly-independent states grew, those of the G7 economies and their partners grew more. And while the treaty arrangements that cemented this system were periodically updated at international summits, even then the US and its main trading partners would typically draft a deal for sign-off by everyone else. As a result, the gap between rich and poor countries grew bigger than ever.</p>
<p>Clinton was speaking at the all-time peak of this American imperial order. Two years earlier, a financial crisis that had begun in Asia had ricocheted across the developing world. And when protesters filled streets and governments across the Global South collapsed, the rich in developing countries panicked and sent their money into the safe haven of US Treasury paper. That influx of cash sent the late Nineties US economy into overdrive, creating the abundance that Clinton took to be endless.</p>
<p>In fact, as he was speaking, the overall flow of global capital had already begun moving the other way. By this time, quietly but steadily, developing countries like China and India had shaken off the torpor of earlier decades and were starting to grow in leaps and bounds. The brief recessions induced in developing countries by the Asian Crisis and the consequent boom in the West obscured the fact that the really dynamic economies of the world were now in what was called the Third World. Once the protests died down and normal business resumed there, investors in the developing world — followed by fund-managers in Western countries — sent their money back to the growing economies of the global periphery.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-next-financial-crisis-will-get-ugly/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-next-financial-crisis-will-get-ugly/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-129214530-1-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-next-financial-crisis-will-get-ugly/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-next-financial-crisis-will-get-ugly/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next financial crisis will get ugly</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/the-next-financial-crisis-will-get-ugly/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the Roman Empire, peripheral states developed the political and military capacity to end Roman domination by force. In the modern case, the conflict was fought through diplomatic, economic and political channels. The year of Clinton’s panegyric now looks pivotal — not only for the changing capital winds, but because of what happened at that year&#8217;s World Trade Organization summit in Seattle. After decades in which they&#8217;d more or less signed off on done-and-dusted deals, delegations from some of the big developing countries got together, refused to go along and brought the negotiations to a halt. As their diplomatic and political capacity rose to match their economic heft, developing countries were now demanding, and getting, better deals.</p>
<p>The Third World was rising, and it quickly showed in the economic data. On the eve of the millennium, the cusp of its supremacy — a supremacy no other empire in history had come remotely close to matching — the West accounted for four-fifths of the global economy. Today, that’s down to three-fifths, and falling. The fastest-growing economies in the world are now all in the old periphery; the worst-performing economies are disproportionately in the West. These are the economic trends that have created our present landscape of superpower conflict — most saliently between America and China. A once-mighty empire is now challenged and feels embattled. Taken aback by the refusal of so many developing countries to join in isolating Russia, the West is now waking up to the reality of the emerging, polycentric and fluid global order.</p>
<p>These trends are only set to continue. But this is where America and Rome diverge. The Roman Empire existed at a time where there was one fixed factor of production: land. The economy was therefore necessarily steady-state and overwhelmingly agricultural. For the periphery to rise, the core had to fall, as the barbarian invaders seized physical Roman real estate. But in the modern world, where continued technological progress means economies can keep moving forward, if more slowly, decline may only need to be relative. The West can continue to grow, and to play a pre-eminent role in global governance.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-72544992-1-e1682001759519.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America&#039;s empire is bankrupt</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/04/americas-empire-is-bankrupt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Michael Greer </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But meek acceptance isn’t what builds empires in the first place. The danger is that, obsessed with past glories and tempted by a desire to turn back the clock, Western countries attempt to restore their greatness. Since its own imperial marginalisation, Britain has been possessed by a manic and counter-productive declinism, most recently responding to the 2008 crash with a programme of austerity that has sunk its economy into what may become a permanent decay. America’s interminable annual wranglings over debt ceilings could, if they continue, diminish the attractiveness of the dollar, at a time when developing countries are looking for alternatives.</p>
<p>The fate of the West hangs in the balance, and it must stop drawing the wrong lessons from Roman history, not the least of which is a stubborn refusal to accept a diminished role in its world. After all, the Roman Empire might have survived had it not weakened itself with wars of choice on its ascendant Persian rival. By finding a way to coexist peacefully with its own rival China, however uncomfortable that may be, the US could do itself and the world a favour.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">474592</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The myth of America&#8217;s imperial decline</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-myth-of-americas-imperial-decline/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-myth-of-americas-imperial-decline/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Doug Stokes]]>
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							<![CDATA[Standing up to the barbarians. (Drew Angerer/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Doug Stokes</strong> is the Director of the Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter and a fellow of the Council on GeoStrategy and the Legatum Institute. His new book, <em>Against Decolonisation: The Campus Culture Wars and the Decline of the West</em>, is due in September 2023.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>profdws</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is the Director of the Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter and a fellow of the Council on GeoStrategy and the Legatum Institute. His new book, <em>Against Decolonisation: The Campus Culture Wars and the Decline of the West</em>, is due in September 2023.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 30 Mar 2023 23:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 31 Mar 2023 08:39:24 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[grand strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=468754</guid>
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								<![CDATA[China and Russia have formed a barbarian alliance ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>With a New World Order lurking on the horizon, will America play nothing more than a supporting role? That is certainly the impression given by recent reports in the US and beyond. While the Ukraine crisis has helped to renew purpose among many nations in the West, the Global South, <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/united-west-divided-from-the-rest-global-public-opinion-one-year-into-russias-war-on-ukraine/#fragmentation-v-polarisation-what-will-define-the-next-world-order" target="_blank" rel="noopener">we’re told</a>, recognises that the post-Cold War era is finished. The international system is fragmenting into “<a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/united-west-divided-from-the-rest-global-public-opinion-one-year-into-russias-war-on-ukraine/#fragmentation-v-polarisation-what-will-define-the-next-world-order" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a multipolar world</a>”, and the age of US dominance “may be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/20/iraq-ukraine-us-global-supremacy-washington-power-china-global-south" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coming to an end</a>”.</p>
<p>Amplifying this view is the emergence of a renewed Sino-Russian axis, which, according to <a href="https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70743" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Vladimir Putin</a> himself, has “consistently worked to create an equitable, open and inclusive regional and global security system”. China’s CCP-controlled <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1257421.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Global Times</em></a> is equally optimistic, suggesting that the Russia-Ukraine conflict serves “as a catalyst for the burial of American hegemony”. A recent <a href="https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/a-world-divided/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">University of Cambridge study</a> seemed to confirm this: it found that, for the first time, developing countries are now more supportive of Russia and China than the US.</p>
<p>Yet while America&#8217;s unipolarity is undoubtedly fragile, we should be cautious about what this means — particularly when interpreting the motivations of states in the Global South, the symptoms of American decline, and the fragmentary potential of the new Sino-Russian relationship. Most obviously, states in the Global South are not some homogeneous non-Western “Other”, but a collection of different countries with competing interests. The historian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/war-in-ukraine-defining-new-world-order-says-thinktank" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Timothy Garton Ash</a> recently argued that the West urgently needs a “new narrative persuasive to countries like India”. This may seem like a harmless observation to make, but it confuses soft power&#8217;s capacity to woo a diverse range of self-interested nation states: what is persuasive to India isn’t necessarily persuasive to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Rather than acting as a unified bloc, it is far more likely that states will play sides off against each other, especially as the division between the West and a China-centred global economy <a href="https://reaction.life/will-coronavirus-split-the-world-into-two-regional-blocs-with-britain-as-a-province-of-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gathers pace</a>. Indeed, their capacity to withhold support is a rational strategy to enhance their bargaining power and to win concessions from the West. It is a form of enticement, not indictment. In India, for example, <a href="https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/indias-russian-oil-imports-surge-to-record-high-in-january/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">record imports of Russian oil</a> have boosted Narendra Modi’s position with key actors, such as the European Union, which has rapidly accelerated its free-trade negotiations with Delhi. This follows the rapid conclusion of a major semiconductor supply chain and innovation partnership with the US, which will be followed this summer with a visit by Modi, designed to shore up the two countries&#8217; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-17/white-house-to-host-india-s-modi-for-state-dinner-this-summer" target="_blank" rel="noopener">defence and economic links</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, those who posit the decline of America, and by extension the liberal world order, often get key metrics wrong. For instance, it has been argued that as the unipolar moment fades, so will the dollar’s international reserve currency status. Writing in <em>UnHerd</em>, <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?tl_inbound=1&amp;tl_groups%5b0%5d=18743&amp;tl_period_type=3&amp;mc_cid=b32e08abcc&amp;mc_eid=58f8c3464d" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Thomas Fazi</a> recently argued that Western sanctions on Russia have “enhanced the yuan’s reserve currency status”, while <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-02/will-russia-s-ruble-go-gold-backed-ukraine-war-to-impact-us-dollar-dominance#xj4y7vzkg?leadSource=uverify%20wall" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Bloomberg</em></a> reported that the dollar has reached a “critical inflection point”. Even the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3e0760d4-8127-41db-9546-e62b6f8f5773" target="_blank" rel="noopener">IMF has signalled alarm</a>.</p>
<p>However, the use of the dollar is based as much on geopolitics as it is on economics. Foreign investors will continue to use the currency not just because of its incredible liquidity as a store of value and medium of global exchange, but because of the US’s legal and governance infrastructure. It remains, after all, the currency of choice in foreign-exchange swap transactions, accounting for nearly half of the $6.6 trillion daily foreign-exchange turnover. Of allocated <a href="https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">foreign-exchange reserves</a> in late 2022, the dollar accounted for 60% of the world’s total. The Euro, by contrast, stood at 20%. The Chinese Renminbi? 3%.</p>
<p>The case for a renewed Sino-Russian axis is equally unfounded. Although Putin recently hosted his “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-welcome-xi-moscow-under-shadow-ukraine-war-2023-03-20/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dear friend</a>” Xi at the Kremlin, underlying this friendship is the stark reality of a deepening Russian vassalage to Xi’s China. A loss of Russian prestige and status in Ukraine, and by extension an American victory, would prove a mortal blow to Putin’s project of contesting the world order that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, represents a greater civilisational struggle. Given this existential framing, Putin has little choice but to deepen his reliance on China as a market for Russian commodities and supplies for his war machine (via useful proxies such as North Korea).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-america-can-win-the-chip-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-america-can-win-the-chip-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2GettyImages-1411483164-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-america-can-win-the-chip-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-america-can-win-the-chip-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How America can win the Chip Wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-america-can-win-the-chip-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Chris Miller </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Moreover, simmering tensions within the Sino-Russian axis already exist. The Siberian Pacific seaboard, which includes regions such as the Russian Far East and the Amur river basin, is rich in natural resources, such as timber, minerals and fisheries. China’s infrastructure and development projects in the region, including through its Belt and Road Initiative, have been primarily economic. As Moscow’s dependency grows, China may seek to salami-slice Russian interests, including the eventual <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2023/03/18/putins-choice-vassal-xis-china/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reabsorption of the Pacific Seaboard</a>. And this could lead to a weakening of the Federation as a whole, as well as its disintegration in the long term. None of the Central Asian states have supported the invasion of Ukraine, and are increasingly distancing themselves from Putin’s integration projects. As such, despite proclamations of brotherly love, the chaotic Sino-Russian axis remains unlikely to become a “soft power” pole around which much of the Global South will seek to organise.</p>
<p>The US, meanwhile, retains an incredible capacity to leverage its military power into structuring the international preferences of politically equal but security subordinate states. The threat posed by the emergent Sino-Russian axis increases its capacity to corral powers as diverse as Sweden, Finland, Taiwan and Japan under its strategic superintendence, all of whom look to the US for protection. Underlined by its newly energised Aukus deal, and growing role within Nato, America’s status in major centres of world power remains as strong as it did in the early post-Cold War period.</p>
<p>Zbigniew Brzezinski’s <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Grand_Chessboard/ealVDgAAQBAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">masterful dissection of world politics,</a> <em>The Grand Chessboard</em> (1997), recognised that Eurasia has long been the centre of world power. As a consequence, he identified that “the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among [Eurasian] vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together”. The “most dangerous scenario”, Brzezinski argued, “would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an ‘antihegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances”.</p>
<p>How can a US-led West keep the “barbarians” from coming together? By 1943, the US State Department had recognised that Nazi Germany could not win the global struggle for mastery, so it planned the kind of world order it wanted, which included incorporating a defeated Germany within a new, American-led global order. As the Ukraine crisis rumbles on, the West’s programme is clear, with the nascent expansion of Nato along Russia’s borders and the likely emergence of Ukraine as a fearsome buffer state. Under this strategy, in 10 years, Poland will become the preeminent land power in Europe.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-492383529-1-e1679081068457-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia and China overtook the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What “carrots” can it leverage? While history never repeats itself, it often rhymes. As in 1943, it is clear that Putin cannot win the Ukraine war. With this in mind, it is not inconceivable that a post-Putin European security order could seek to re-incorporate Russia into a new security and economy architecture. This new “grand bargain” would seek to settle the intersection of historical grievances and fears over status and security. Through institutional reform and transformation, it would attempt to entice a post-Putin Russia into its orbit. Doing so would settle many grand strategic dilemmas driving post-Cold War Nato expansion and Russian hostility. This new post-Putin security order would be right on Beijing’s doorstep, across the 2,615 miles between China and Russia.</p>
<p>In a tripolar world, with America, Russia and China operating as individual actors, any alliance between two great powers inevitably spells doom for the third. And by wedging apart the developing Sino-Russian coalition, America would also be free to “buck-pass” its superintendence to regional European powers, allowing it to finally move more decisively in its long desired “strategic pivot” to East Asia. The popular narrative of America’s secular decline therefore seems overblown. The US enjoys the Pacific and Atlantic moats, and regional hegemony in the Americas. China and Russia, on the other hand, live in a much rougher neighbourhood, and there&#8217;s no reason to think their axis could not be wedged apart. Whether that takes a year or a decade, it seems more likely that America will still be front and centre, playing its role as a global protagonist.</p>
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					<title>How bin Laden won</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-bin-ladens-prophesies-came-true/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-bin-ladens-prophesies-came-true/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[“The struggle is both financial and physical” (Universal History Archive/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 13 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 02 Aug 2022 10:50:48 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The American empire is finally crumbling]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">keynote speech</a> following the bloody debacle at Kabul airport, the American president presented a sober vision of the country’s new foreign policy realities that both liberals and conservatives seem loath to accept: that the age of remoulding the world in America’s image is over; that bloody and failing land wars in the depths of Asia were a luxury America could no longer afford; and that all along, the creeping, ever-expanding and ever-costlier mission had been a gigantic trap.</p>
<p>As Biden observed, entirely correctly, “there’s nothing China or Russia would rather have, would want more in this competition than the United States to be bogged down another decade in Afghanistan”. Instead, he asserted, “this decision about Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan. It’s about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries.” Whatever the howls of outrage from America’s prestige opinion pages, the age of liberal imperialism is over: the time of nakedly realist great power competition has begun.</p>
<p>Yet Biden’s worldview, so outrageous for an American commentariat as recklessly jingoistic as <em>John Bull</em> magazine in its Edwardian prime, is supported by analysis from an unexpected quarter: that of the architect himself of both America’s War on Terror, and of the great slaughter in New York that precipitated it, Osama bin Laden.</p>
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<p>Piecing together the themes of bin Laden’s <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/32-messages-to-the-world" target="_blank" rel="noopener">various statements to the outside world</a> in the years immediately before and after 9/11, a specific, concrete plan emerges, by which the “slave of God” — as the billionaire son of a Yemen-born construction magnate styled himself — would accelerate the collapse of the American empire through embroiling it in long, unwinnable and expensive ground wars in the Islamic world. This plan, bin Laden claimed, had formulated itself through his experience of the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, whose ignominious withdrawal from the country had shortly preceded their imperial collapse, events in which he himself had played a relatively undistinguished part.</p>
<p>In an interview conducted a month and a half after 9/11, bin Laden observed that:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>“the Soviet Empire has become — with God&#8217;s grace — a figment of the imagination. Today, there is no more Soviet Empire; it split into smaller states and only Russia is left… So we believe that the defeat of America is something achievable — with the permission of God — and it is easier for us — with the permission of God — than the defeat of the Soviet Empire previously.”</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Why would it be easier, asked the journalist, <em>al Jazeera</em>’s then-star reporter Taysir Alluni incredulously? Because, bin Laden replied, “we have already fought them — like our brothers who have engaged in battle with the Americans, as in Somalia. We have not yet found a significant force of note. There is a great aura about America, which it uses to scare people before it engages in battle.”</p>
<p>But, he claimed, the brief and inglorious American episode in Somalia showed that American power could not stretch to imposing order on insurgent forces far from home: “America left, dragging behind it tails of humiliation, defeat, and loss, without looking back; it retreated unexpectedly, and it forgot all that great media enthusiasm about the New World Order, and how it was the master of that order, and could do whatever it pleased.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/we-need-to-talk-about-9-11/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/we-need-to-talk-about-9-11/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2GettyImages-524835574-1-scaled-e1630666044956.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/we-need-to-talk-about-9-11/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/we-need-to-talk-about-9-11/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>We need to talk about 9/11</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/we-need-to-talk-about-9-11/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lionel Shriver</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This was not the first time bin Laden had used the example of Somalia to persuade sceptics of the logic underlying his plan. In his first interview with <em>al-Jazeera</em> three years earlier, after al-Qaeda’s twin bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which had killed more than 200 people, bin Laden noted that:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>“We believe that America is much weaker than Russia, and we have learned from our brothers who fought in the jihad in Somalia of the incredible weakness and cowardice of the American soldier. Not even eighty of them had been killed and they fled in total darkness in the middle of the night, unable to see a thing.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Even before then, in a 1997 interview with <em>CNN</em> journalist Peter Arnett, bin Laden noted that in Somalia, “after a little resistance, the American troops left after achieving nothing. They left after claiming that they were the largest power on earth. They left after some resistance from powerless, poor, unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in God Almighty, and who do not fear the fabricated American media lies.”</p>
<p>Indeed, he added, claiming dubiously that veterans of the Afghan jihad had fought against the Americans in Somalia, “We learned from those who fought there, that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters who fought and killed them, while the latter stayed.”</p>
<p>In choosing Afghanistan as the location for the war with the United States which would, he believed, bring about its decline, bin Laden embroiled the Afghan people in a conflict not of their choosing, doubling the length of their civil war by another twenty years and inflating its butchers’ bill by 46,000 civilian deaths alone. And yet, with the easy confidence of a billionaire, he told Afghans in a video message that their sacrifice was worth it — and that “whoever doubts this should learn from the Russians how the blessed <em>jihad </em>destroyed their myth.” Because, bin Laden claimed, “the struggle is both financial and physical” so that even as the Taliban reeled under American bombing, “it is possible to strike the economic base that is the foundation of the military base, so when their economy is depleted they will be too busy with each other to be able to enslave poor peoples.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/the-theatre-of-terror/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/the-theatre-of-terror/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2GettyImages-1161510-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/the-theatre-of-terror/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/the-theatre-of-terror/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The theatre of terror</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/the-theatre-of-terror/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Simon Cottee</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This emphasis on the War on Terror as a giant, entrapping money pit for the American empire runs throughout bin Laden’s messages. In his 2002 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Letter to the American People</em></a>, bin Laden taunted the inhabitants of “the worst civilisation witnessed by the history of mankind” that “it was easy for us to provoke this administration and lure it into perdition. All we had to do was send two <em>mujahidin </em>to the Far East to raise up a rag on which &#8220;al-Qaeda&#8221; was written, and the generals came running. This inflicted human, financial, and political losses on America without them even achieving anything worth mentioning, apart from providing business for their private corporations.”</p>
<p>Indeed, in his critique of America’s conversion of the War on Terror into a vast and lucrative wealth-creation scheme for the military-industrial complex, bin Laden either echoes or prefigures the identical critiques of American anti-interventionists of both Left and Right, from <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-24/ending-americas-endless-war" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bernie Sanders</a> to Trump’s <a href="https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/407398-trump-slams-bush-for-worst-single-mistake-in-us-history" target="_blank" rel="noopener">previous, anti-interventionist incarnation</a>.</p>
<p>As bin Laden boasted, the massive borrowing needed to finance the wars “truly shows that al-Qaeda has made gains, but on the other hand it also shows that the Bush administration has likewise profited. Anyone seeing the enormity of the contracts won by dubious large corporations, like Halliburton and others connected to Bush and his administration, can be certain of that. But the reality is that it is you, the American people and your economy, who are losing.” For “we are continuing to make America bleed to the point of bankruptcy, by God&#8217;s will,” he asserted.</p>
<p>Yet it was only the presence of America’s then-Republican government, surely a gift from God, which enabled this situation: “the White House leadership, which is so keen to open up war fronts for its various corporations, whether in the field of arms, oil, or construction, has also contributed to these remarkable results for al-Qaeda.” Indeed, he mocked, “to some analysts and diplomats, it seems as if we and the White House are on the same team shooting at the United States&#8217;s own goal, despite our different intentions.”</p>
<p>No wonder, then, that Biden has similarly invoked the vast cost of the wars — two trillion dollars in his estimate — in bringing about their end. But even this colossal sum may be an understatement. <a href="https://fortune.com/2021/09/01/cost-of-war-in-afghanistan-iraq-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">As <em>Fortune</em> noted recently</a>, this figure does not include the interest payments on the loans taken out to prosecute the war, nor the benefits paid to the survivors of the more than 7,000 American dead. Nor does it include perhaps the greatest single expense: the medical bills for the war’s more than 50,000 wounded veterans, which may alone total $2.3 trillion by 2050.</p>
<p>All told, claims <em>Fortune</em>, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">citing Brown University’s <em>Costs of War</em> project</a>, the real bill of the War on Terror, including the lesser engagements in Yemen and Syria, may end up closer to eight trillion dollars, the effect of which American taxpayers have not yet faced, as “almost the entire cost of the Afghan and Iraq wars has come from borrowed money, much of which has yet to be repaid”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/a-french-lesson-for-blair-and-bush/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/a-french-lesson-for-blair-and-bush/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-1860899.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/a-french-lesson-for-blair-and-bush/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/a-french-lesson-for-blair-and-bush/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>A French lesson for Blair and Bush</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/a-french-lesson-for-blair-and-bush/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Anne-Elisabeth Moutet</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Among America’s creditors is, of course, China, which made use of the West’s overriding distraction with winning over mountain village chieftains in the wilds of Afghanistan, with trying and failing to install a functioning liberal democracy in Iraq and then with destroying the Islamic State caliphate the invasion spawned to accelerate its rise to global industrial dominance. It is surely no accident that only now that the War on Terror is winding down, competition with China has finally intruded into the American foreign policy consciousness, despite being mocked as eccentric or even racist when expressed by then-presidential candidate Trump as the empire’s overriding challenge.</p>
<p>Even in the new Cold War over infrastructure and state capacity, perhaps the battleground on which wavering nations will be competed for, the money wasted on the failed wars in Asia could, as the <a href="https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:49984634-aee9-40f2-8dc9-1f49ac31c393" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Institute of Policy Studies thinktank observes</a>, “have solved multiple problems in the U.S., like<a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLOAS" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> erasing all student debt for $1.7 trillion</a> [or] decarbonizing the entire electricity grid<a href="https://www.woodmac.com/news/feature/deep-decarbonisation-the-multi-trillion-dollar-question/"> for $4.5 trillion</a><u>.”</u></p>
<p>But we are where we are. The twenty failed years of war, debt and distraction may not yet have led to America’s collapse in the manner bin Laden eagerly anticipated, but it certainly set the then-sole superpower at a disadvantage in preparing for the coming competition over its right to global hegemony. As Biden noted <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in his speech announcing the withdrawal</a>, abandoning the Afghan adventure was necessary because “we need to focus on shoring up America’s core strengths to meet the strategic competition with China and other nations that is really going to determine our future.” Returning to this theme in his speech justifying the chaotic scenes in Kabul, he reiterated that “the world is changing. We’re engaged in a serious competition with China… We have to shore up America’s competitiveness to meet these new challenges in the competition for the 21st century,” and “as we turn the page on the foreign policy that has guided our nation the last two decades, we’ve got to learn from our mistakes.”</p>
<p>But can America do so? Their foreign policy establishment certainly seems averse to learning any lessons from two decades of failure, even if ordinary voters overwhelmingly support Biden’s diminution of America’s historical mission. It is not obvious that a GOP establishment responsible for the manifold strategic disasters of the twenty-year war can legitimately criticise Biden’s decision to end it, especially not when its last president rode to power partly on the same platform.</p>
<p>Yet even <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_J._O%27Neill" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bin Laden’s purported killer</a>, a SEAL operative-turned conservative talkshow celebrity and anti-masking activist, maintains his brand by asserting that “It baffles me right now that we’re even considering negotiating with the Taliban … Why don’t we just go kill them?” — to the applause of American conservatives who applauded Trump’s anti-interventionism just as passionately when the random spinning wheel of America’s culture war was calibrated to reward different incentives.</p>
<p>For al-Qaeda itself, America’s endless internal political conflict, its deepest malaise, is nothing but a cause for crowing celebration. <a href="https://lucaswebber.substack.com/p/al-qaeda-urges-attacks-against-the" target="_blank" rel="noopener">In a recent propaganda video</a>, <em>America Burns</em>, an adaptation of a previous magazine article, al-Qaeda surveyed the American political scene, crowing at the internal divisions of a “decaying polity” on the “verge of collapse”. In al-Qaeda’s framing, America is teetering on the edge of civil war. Its vast security apparatus has increasingly been directed onto American voters themselves as the combination of crude populism and the reactive collusion between the security state and “the liberal press that controls the American media industry” raised the country’s tensions to boiling point. As a consequence, America’s “usury-based economy” is merely “an inflated balloon ready to implode”, serving only “the corporate robber barons” and “Communist China.” Indeed, they boast, “It was Allah’s wisdom that the fourth plane whose downing was ordered by Dick Cheney on the 11th of September did not reach its target, and Americans were left to destroy the edifice of their democracy with their own hands.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-the-neocons-got-away-with-it/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-the-neocons-got-away-with-it/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-77451116-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-the-neocons-got-away-with-it/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-the-neocons-got-away-with-it/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the neocons got away with it</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/09/how-the-neocons-got-away-with-it/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Razib Khan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So what can be said of America’s standing twenty years after 9/11? Strategically, the hegemon appears a strange oxymoron, a global military empire which cannot win wars. It <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/09/01/war-on-terror-deaths-cost/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">can kill hundreds of thousands of people</a> and cause untold destruction — generally with the very best and noblest of intentions — but is seemingly unable to deploy the overwhelming military force on which its global position depends in a way that advances its interests. Given its military caste was unable even to manage a bloodless withdrawal from an airfield it controlled under a timetable it itself set, who can bet confidently that they would emerge the victor from a struggle against a competent and prepared near-peer adversary like China?</p>
<p>Only a reckless gambler, or the British government, would be happy with such a high-stakes throw of the dice. Politically, America’s divisions are a cautionary tale rather than an example to the world it still claims to lead; if the US still retains its status as the global standard-bearer for liberal democracy, then liberal democracy is not as enticing a prospect as it once appeared.</p>
<p>Yet America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, like the withdrawal from Iraq — which, after a decent interval to avoid the appearance of being pushed out by the Iranian-backed militias the war empowered, seems certain to follow — does not herald the end of American power. It was the wars themselves that were the trap, as bin Laden made clear time and time again, and their ending is a necessary moment of rebalancing to focus on the far greater challenge ahead. In this, we can say Biden was the president the American empire needed, even if his supporters didn’t realise that was what they were getting: a cautious realist brought to power by a liberal-imperialist establishment, and a broadly competent manager of retrenchment, and objective decline.</p>
<p>It is therefore wrong to claim — <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2021/08/14/if-kabul-falls-it-will-be-americas-suez-moment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as Tom Tugendhat and others have</a> — that the withdrawal from Afghanistan is America’s Suez moment, not least because Suez was a military victory for Britain. It would be more apt to view it as America’s Singapore, <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-fall-of-singapore-an-avoidable-catastrophe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a failure of planning and overconfidence</a> which heralded the collapse of imperial power in vast swathes of Asia, yet a moral and psychological defeat more than a terminal strategic one. The Suez moment, if it comes, still lies over the horizon.</p>
<p>The lustre of the American empire has been tarnished, but the core underlying structure may hold good for decades yet; if America has lost its claims to global leadership, it has also lost its desire to press them. In abandoning America’s failing wars to <a href="https://smartasset.com/financial-advisor/biden-infrastructure-plan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">focus on its decaying infrastructure</a> and the great power competition that will now define its future, Biden has, perhaps, twenty years after the carnage of 9/11, finally exorcised bin Laden’s ghost.</p>
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