As America looks poised to intervene in the spiralling Israel-Iran conflict, one power which has been largely absent from discussions is China. Despite expressing some support for Tehran and condemning Israel, Beijing has, for the most part, been a bystander. During communications with Oman this week, it expressed a desire to take part in broader regional peace talks. Today, meanwhile, China even published a four-point peace proposal following a call between Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, this was dressed up in the same vague diplomatic niceties that Beijing uses for any international crisis — including Ukraine — without extending into practical action.

China’s centrality in global supply chains, combined with international discontent around Donald Trump’s tariffs, has furthered the idea among Left-wing Third-Worldists that Beijing can spearhead the global charge against American “imperialism”. Iran would seem a natural ally for this goal, yet the view of China as an anti-imperialist champion usually says more about the dreams of international admirers than it does about the country itself. Really, Beijing’s foreign policy tends to prioritise interests over alliances. It is pragmatic, transactional, and ultimately self-advancing, rather than standing up for a larger coalition of the Global South.

The case of Syria could help to predict how China might play its cards in Iran. During the civil war which began in 2011, Beijing offered diplomatic and rhetorical support to then-President Bashar al-Assad, and was supposed to play a role in the reconstruction of Syria. Even during the last days of Assad’s rule, China expressed its willingness to support the government — but in the end took no action. With Assad overthrown, Beijing is quietly adjusting to a new reality. In February, CCP officials met with representatives of the interim Syrian government to explore normalisation of relations.

If the current Iranian regime collapses, China will do what it has done in Syria and work with whoever comes next. A post-Islamic Republic government, no matter how pro-Western it might be, will still sell oil. And Beijing will be there to buy it.

There is, of course, a material reality behind China’s sceptical position on Iran. Beijing purchases oil from Tehran, but it is only its seventh largest provider; Iran also plays a secondary role in the Belt and Road Initiative, with China diversifying its infrastructure routes to bypass the Shia regime.

Key here are Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz: because the US is broadly independent when it comes to energy, any serious disruption to oil shipping routes will hurt China far more than America. Beijing’s real oil and gas supply lifeline runs through the Sunni Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These nations distrust American interventionism yet maintain friendly relations with Washington, and so are less likely to be the target of foreign-sponsored regime-change operations. Because they hold business in higher regard than ideology, they are valuable partners for the Chinese.

In the event of open warfare with America, China might prefer Iran’s current regime by its side rather than the mere business partnerships offered by the Gulf monarchies. However, the costs of getting involved in the Middle East quagmire outweigh any hypothetical marginal benefit. Meanwhile, if Trump decides to directly involve America in the conflict, it may even help Beijing. Such a move would fragment the domestic MAGA base, thus putting the US President in a weaker position when it comes to trade negotiations.

With US resources and attention diverted away from the Indo-Pacific front, China would have the time and space to consolidate regional power and deepen its technological base. Then, as international eyes are trained on the Middle East, it would be well-placed to execute what has long been Xi’s plan: a takeover of Taiwan.

---

Miquel Vila is a political consultant specialising in international affairs. He is also the executive director of the Catalonia Global Institute.

miquelvilam

---